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Abstract
Ignited by the secession of Biafra from Nigeria on May 30, 1967, the Nigeria-Biafra War (19671970) with an estimated death toll of 3 million was followed by decades of silence and a ban of
history education. However, the advent of democracy in 1999 catalyzed the return of repressed
memories to public consciousness accompanied by renewed agitation for the secession of Biafra
from Nigeria. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether a transformative learning of
the Nigeria-Biafra War history will have a significant effect on conflict management styles of
Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin regarding ongoing agitation for secession. Drawing on
theories of knowledge, memory, forgetting, history, and transformative learning, and employing
ex post facto research design, 320 participants were randomly selected from the Igbo ethnic
group in the southeastern states of Nigeria to participate in transformative learning activities that
focused on the Nigeria-Biafra War as well as complete both the Transformative Learning Survey
(TLS) and Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI). Data collected were analyzed
using descriptive analysis and inferential statistical tests. The results indicated that as
transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history increased, collaboration also increased,
while aggression decreased. From these findings, two effects emerged: transformative learning
acted as a booster of collaboration and a reducer of aggression. This new understanding of
transformative learning could help in conceptualizing a theory of transformative history
education within the broader field of conflict resolution. The study therefore recommends that
transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history should be implemented in Nigerian
schools.

xi
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Background of the Study
Ignited by the secession of Biafra from Nigeria on May 30, 1967, the Nigeria-Biafra War
which started on July 6, 1967 and ended on January 15, 1970 with an estimated death toll of
between one million and three million people (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Njoku, 2013) was
followed by decades of silence, repression, and amnesia (Heerten & Moses, 2014). Scholars
attribute the repressed memory of the Nigeria-Biafra War to many factors, including the post-war
military interventions and policies, fear of revenge, as well as internalized and transgenerational
trauma (Maiangwa, 2016; Ejiogu, 2013; Korieh, 2012; Oloyede, 2009).
To deal with the painful history associated with this war, a Human Rights Violations
Investigation Commission (HRVIC) known as Oputa Panel was created on June 14, 1999
(Oputa, 2002). However, the Commission’s report was not released to the public and its
recommendations were not implemented. By failing to implement the Commission’s
recommendations, and by deciding not to officially release the report to the public, the Nigerian
government attempted to continue its politics of oblivion. Members of the Human Rights
Violations Investigation Commission stressed that “we must be prepared to confront this history,
if we are to forge ahead. We need to understand it, even if it means asking unpleasant questions
and offering blunt answers” (Oputa, 2002, p. 3).
With the advent of democracy and freedom of speech in 1999, new forms of activism and
currents of agitation inspired by past injustices and war injuries emerged in Nigeria. These
militant activists brought back the fundamental, old and uncomfortable questions about the
foundation on which the Nigerian federation was built, dating back to the amalgamation of the
northern and southern regions in 1914 by the British colonial government (Crowther, 1968).
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Prominent among these activists is the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign
State of Biafra (MASSOB). By proclaiming itself a nonviolent movement in the spirit of
Mahatma Gandhi, MASSOB, as its name suggests, has been passionately engaged in revitalizing
the old agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra. The activities of MASSOB
have gained national attention and often led to a confrontation with the law enforcement, leading
to the arrests and deaths of some of its members. However, the challenges and limitations of
MASSOB in leading the way for the realization of the Biafran independence have given birth to
new pro-Biafra independence activists with unyielding position, radical and innovative
strategies, most of whom were born during and after the Nigeria-Biafra War and have never
experienced or witnessed war. The most famous among the pro-Biafra independence activist
groups of our time is the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).
IPOB believes that “it is impossible to achieve independence without war and violence”
(Government of IPOB, 2014, p. 15) on the grounds that relying on the Nigerian judicial system
and process to decide the self-determination and independence of Biafra is only a myth that will
never be realized. Comprised of mostly educated and non-educated post-war generation with a
mastery of the 21st century technologies, sophisticated in their commitment to reveal the hidden
and painful historical events in Nigeria by telling and discussing the untold stories about the past,
and savvy in their use of social media, online radio and television, IPOB with its Radio Biafra
group has succeeded in zooming the light and redirecting the attention of millions of people to
the untold stories about the Nigeria-Biafra War and its devastating impact on the Biafran people
and their descendants. They have also leveraged on the strong sentiments and sympathy their
stories have generated to mobilize millions of Biafran sympathizers both in Nigeria and abroad
to join their fight for self-determination and independence, while appealing especially to the
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young people who are seeing for the first time the revealed images, videos and audios of the
Nigeria-Biafra War on the internet. Unfortunately, some of these postwar Biafra independence
activists were killed while others were seriously injured during months of protest and
confrontation with the law enforcement which erupted after the arrest of their leader, Nnamdi
Kanu, on October 14, 2015.
In sharp contrast with the ideology and methodology of IPOB with its Radio Biafra
group, but united in the same goal of achieving self-determination for Biafra, the elders in
Biafraland who witnessed, participated in, or were direct victims of, the Nigeria-Biafra War
strongly advocate for a peaceful process of achieving self-determination and independence
through nonviolence and based on the rule of law. Prominent among these Biafran elders are the
Ohaneze Ndi Igbo, the Igbo Leaders of Thought, and the Supreme Council of Elders of
Indigenous People of Biafra (SCE). The elders in Biafraland have categorically taken an anti-war
and anti-violence position on the issues of self-determination and independence of Biafra.
According to them, “both Nigeria as a whole and the remnants of Biafra who were not consumed
in this war are still suffering from the effects of the war. Having experienced, and fought during,
the war, the Supreme Council of Elders of Indigenous People of Biafra does not accept the
ideology and methodology of war and violence in the Biafran struggle for independence”
(Government of IPOB, 2014, p. 15).
The incompatible positions taken by the Supreme Council of Elders and IPOB with its
Radio Biafra group on the issue of self-determination and independence of Biafra on the one
hand, and the observed contradictory conflict resolution styles (Kilmann & Thomas, 1977) with
which these two groups try to achieve their mutual goal of self-determination and independence
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on the other hand, highlight the importance and role of history and memory in conflict and
conflict resolution.
Based on their direct (immediate) experience of the Nigeria-Biafra War, and influenced
by both the traumatic memory of what happened to them during the war and the lessons learned,
the elders in Biafraland, exemplified by the Supreme Council of Elders, categorically and
strongly oppose actions and behaviors that will result in another violence and war as a means to
achieving self-determination and independence. But they openly welcome opportunities for
negotiation, mediation, dialogue, and the legal process. However, since IPOB and its members
are mostly young people born during and after the Nigeria-Biafra War, they do not have direct
(immediate) experience of the Nigeria-Biafra War, and probably have never experienced war in
other countries.
As many philosophers within the field of epistemology - a branch of philosophy that
explores and investigates theories of knowledge - have argued, knowledge of something could be
acquired through different ways, including perception, introspection, memory, reason, and
testimony (Steup & Neta, 2020). On the one hand, the Biafran elders’ knowledge of the NigeriaBiafra War does not only depend on the disposition or state of mind (introspection) or the
narratives or stories developed and told by others (testimonies) or the a priori definition of war
as a fatal incident (reason). Most importantly, the elders’ knowledge of the Nigeria-Biafra War is
primarily drawn from what they directly perceived before and during the war with their five
senses of sight, touch, hearing, smelling, and tasting (perception), as well as the memories of the
war they retained and now remember (memory). On the other hand, the descendants of Biafra
who were born during or after the end of the Nigeria-Biafra War in 1970, as exemplified by the
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leader of IPOB, rely only on reason, testimonies, and introspection as the main sources of their
knowledge of the Nigeria-Biafra War.
Therefore, it is imperative to examine how the previously silenced, but now revealed
narratives or stories (testimonies) about the Nigeria-Biafra War, coupled with the a priori
definition of war as a fatal incident (reason), have affected the disposition or state of mind
(introspection) of the descendants of Biafra born during or after the Nigeria-Biafra War, and how
this state of mind has shaped their conflict resolution styles with respect to the ongoing agitation
for self-determination and independence of Biafra. Similarly, and for a comparative analysis of
this study, it is absolutely necessary to understand how the Biafran elders’ direct (immediate)
experience of the Nigeria-Biafra War (perception), the memories of the war they retained and
now remember (memory), the available narratives about the war (testimonies), and the a priori
definition of war as a fatal incident (reason) have all affected their disposition or state of mind
(introspection), and how this state of mind has shaped the elders’ conflict resolution styles with
respect to the ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra.
Statement of the Problem
The three major problems this research addresses are heralded by the preceding
discussion on the background of the study. The first problem is that the Nigerian government’s
delay or refusal to officially and publicly recognize, acknowledge and validate the hurts and
trauma inflicted on millions of Biafrans before and during the Nigeria-Biafra War could be
interpreted as a systematic and intentional denial of what happened. Sending the truth about what
happened before and during the Nigeria-Biafra War into eternal oblivion without an official
acknowledgement, public apology, and reparations has devastating consequences:
1. It leaves unhealed and ever fresh the traumatic memories and painful experiences of
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the past on the minds of the elders in Biafraland who witnessed, participated in, or
were direct victims of, the Nigeria-Biafra War. These unhealed traumatic memories
could have a significant impact on the conflict styles of the Biafran elders with
respect to the ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra.
2. It intensifies the negative effects of transgenerational trauma as these traumatic
memories will be passed on to future generations who, on discovering the magnitude
and extent of what happened to their parents and grandparents, may be predisposed to
seek justice through revenge.
The second problem is that the removal of history education from the school curricula in
Nigeria, and by implication, the ban on the teaching and learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War,
created a regrettable vacuum for the emergence of competing and opinionated narratives
(testimonies) about the Nigeria-Biafra War, and these narratives are based on mutual hatred,
suspicion, fear, and arrogance. The removal of history from the school curricula in Nigeria could
be interpreted as a political will to perpetuate silence and to continue the policy of oblivion
regarding the Nigeria-Biafra War.
Nigerian citizens born during and after the Nigeria-Biafra War grew up without basic and
formal introduction and understanding of the true nature of the war, its causes, extent,
consequences, and lessons learned. However, due to the rapid advancement in communication
technology, and given that more people are beginning to have access to information through
social media and other emerging forms of communication, there is currently high influx and
circulation of horrifying images, videos, audios, and texts about the Nigeria-Biafra War on social
media and other websites. Relying only on these alternative sources of information to acquire
knowledge of what happened during the Nigeria-Biafra War has serious implications:
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1. A sudden and unprepared discovery of these shocking, embedded and evolving truth
(testimonies) about what happened during the Nigeria-Biafra War through other
channels, for example, through social media, archives or museums in foreign
countries, and university research databases outside Nigeria, other than through
unbiased, transformative learning (Mezirow, 1991), will have a devastating impact on
the Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin born during and after the Nigeria-Biafra War.
2. A sudden discovery of these horrifying images, videos, audios, and texts about the
deaths and sufferings of millions of Biafrans during the Nigeria-Biafra War will have
a negative impact on the disposition or state of mind (introspection) of the Nigerian
citizens of Biafran origin born during and after the war. These could generate strong
sentiments for revenge.
3. These revealed and discovered testimonies will affect the conflict styles of the
Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin born during and after the war.
The third problem is that fifty years after the end of the Nigeria-Biafra War, eighteen
years after the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC)’s recommendation
that civic education should be reintroduced into the school curricula (HRVIC Report, 2002), and
six years after the unanimous recommendation of the National Dialogue convened in 2014 by the
former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, that “the teaching of History should be made
mandatory in Secondary Schools to sustain our historical heritage” (Final Draft of Nigeria
National Conference Report, 2014, pp. 399-401), history as a standalone subject is just being
reintroduced into the senior secondary education curricula. History as a subject has not yet been
included in the basic education curricula, including the junior secondary school classes.
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Although a decision to bring back history education in Nigerian classrooms was
announced by the Nigerian Minister of Education, Adamu Adamu (Obi, 2016), there is still a
debate over which narratives about the Nigeria-Biafra War will be taught in Nigerian classrooms.
The lack of consensus on which narratives about the war should be included in the school
curricula is an indication that the fundamental question of why the Nigeria-Biafra War history
should be taught in Nigerian classrooms has not yet been answered. If we know why we should
teach the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War in schools, we will definitely know what to teach
(content), how to teach it (method), how change in interethnic relationships will occur during and
after this history education (process), and the expected effects of this history education on the
students and the Nigerian society (outcome). These problems could be summarized as follows:
1. Not knowing why the Nigeria-Biafra War history should be taught in Nigerian
classrooms will lead to the inclusion of biased narratives about the Nigeria-Biafra
War in the school curricula.
2. The inclusion of biased narratives about the Nigeria-Biafra War in the school
curricula will lead to the use of wrong methods of teaching the Nigeria-Biafra War
history in Nigerian classrooms.
3. The use of wrong methods of teaching the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War will
create the conditions for the emergence of wrong processes of learning, which in turn
will affect the students’ ability to understand, retain, and apply the knowledge and
lessons drawn from this history education to solve problems in the society.
4. The absence of appropriate processes of learning the Nigeria-Biafra War history will
have a negative effect on the students’ conflict styles and on interethnic relationship
in Nigeria.
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Therefore, examining the types of effect a transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history will have on the Nigerian citizens’ conflict styles is absolutely necessary for
determining why this history should be taught in Nigerian classrooms, how it should be taught,
and which narratives should be included in the school curricula. A careful examination of this
kind will help in determining whether teaching controversial narratives and issues about the
Nigeria-Biafra War in school history classes through the transformative learning approach would
have the potential to create the conditions for national reconciliation, tolerance, and peace. This
research therefore seeks to understand the relationship between transformative learning of the
Nigeria-Biafra War history and the conflict styles of the prewar and postwar generations of
Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to explore ways in which transformative learning
of the Nigeria-Biafra War history compares with the conflict styles utilized by the prewar and
postwar generations of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin to resolve the ongoing agitation for
self-determination and independence of Biafra. To be more specific, this study focuses on three
main objectives:
1. To determine the relationship between transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history and the conflict styles utilized by the prewar and postwar generations of
Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin to resolve the ongoing agitation for selfdetermination and independence of Biafra.
2. To determine the extent to which transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history combine with these variables: age, gender, education level, and occupation of
the selected population predicts the conflict styles utilized by the prewar and postwar
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generations of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin to resolve the ongoing agitation for
self-determination and independence of Biafra.
3. To determine the difference in the levels of transformative learning and use of
conflict styles between the prewar generation and postwar generation.
The realization of these three objectives will help in providing answers to the question of
why the Nigeria-Biafra War history should be taught in Nigerian classrooms, how it should be
taught, and what kind of historical narratives would have the potential to create the conditions for
national reconciliation, tolerance, and peace.
Research Question and Hypotheses
Research Question
This research is guided by one fundamental question:
Is there a relationship between transformative history education, particularly transformative
learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history, and the conflict styles utilized by the prewar and
postwar generations of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin to resolve the ongoing agitation for
self-determination and independence of Biafra?
To explore various answers to this question, two main hypotheses are stated to guide the
data collection and analysis.
Null Hypothesis
Transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history is not related to the conflict
styles utilized by the prewar and postwar generations of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin to
resolve the ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra.
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Alternative Hypotheses
1. It is hypothesized that transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history is
related to the conflict styles utilized by the prewar and postwar generations of
Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin to resolve the ongoing agitation for selfdetermination and independence of Biafra.
The predicted relationship between transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history
and conflict styles in this context could be explained in two ways:
A. Participants who score high in transformative learning will most likely score high in
the collaborative style of conflict resolution and low in the aggressive (or competing)
style of conflict resolution.
B. Participants who score low in transformative learning will most likely score low in
the collaborative style of conflict resolution, but they are most likely to score high in
the aggressive (or competing) style of conflict resolution.
2. It is possible to predict the conflict styles utilized by the prewar and postwar
generations to resolve the Biafran secession conflict by knowing their overall level
(or score) of transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history, while
controlling for the effect of age, gender, education, and occupation.
3. It is also hypothesized that the prewar generation will tend to demonstrate a higher
level of transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and the use of the
collaborative style of conflict resolution in their efforts to resolve the ongoing
agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra than the postwar
generation.
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Significance of the Study
This research is significant in many ways. It is anticipated that the outcome(s) or findings
of the research will help clarify why the Nigeria-Biafra War history should be taught in Nigerian
classrooms, how it should be taught, and what kind of historical narratives would have the
potential to create the conditions for national reconciliation, unity in diversity, tolerance and
peace. Understanding the relationship between a transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history and the conflict styles of Biafrans with respect to the issue of Biafran secession will
help education policy makers and educators develop the type of history curricula and teaching
methods suitable for educating engaged and tolerant citizens.
It is also hoped that the research will provide us with first-hand understanding of the
effects of the revelation of this painful history on the conflict styles of both the prewar and
postwar Biafrans. Knowledge of this nature is important if researchers, policy makers and
practitioners want to know the role of historical memory in conflict escalation or conflict
resolution. In addition, the findings of this research are expected to bring new insights into, and
enrich, the body of literature on the Nigeria-Biafra War, teaching controversial issues and
transformative learning, as well as the role of history and memory in conflict and conflict
resolution.
The research is anticipated to be the first study to shed light on the relationship between
transformative learning and conflict styles, while providing the human and social sciences as
well as policy makers with an original understanding of the role of transformative history
education in achieving national reconciliation, unity in diversity, tolerance and peace in post-war
countries. Designed to provide classroom educators and pre-service teacher educators with
transformative learning tools with which to teach the Nigeria-Biafra War history and other
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controversial issues, it is expected that the research findings will support existing explanations
that traumatic historical memories of war such as the Nigeria-Biafra War when taught in school
classrooms following appropriate teaching methods have the potential to further deepen if not
complete national reconciliation and peacebuilding projects in post-war, transitional countries
(Cole, 2007).
Definitions of Key Terms
Nigeria-Biafra War
The Nigeria-Biafra War also known as the Nigerian Civil War occurred from July 6,
1967 to January 15, 1970. This 30-month bloody war was caused by a series of violent traumatic
events beginning from the Nigerian post-independence military coup and counter coup of 1966,
passing through the massacres of Nigerian civilians of eastern descent, especially the Igbos, in
northern and western Nigeria, culminating in the secession of Biafra from Nigeria through the
declaration of Biafran independence on May 30, 1967. With an estimated death toll of about
three million people (Njoku, 2013), the Nigeria-Biafra War was followed by a ban on history
education in schools by the federal military government of Nigeria. This ban led to the removal
of history from the school curricula, resulting in decades of silence, repression, and amnesia
(Heerten & Moses, 2014).
Self-Determination
This study adopts the principles of the right of self-determination enshrined in the United
Nations Charter and clearly articulated in two international law instruments: International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1966) and
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations General
Assembly, 1966). Article 1 of both instruments state:
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1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely

determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and

resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for

the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the
realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations makes it clear that the United Nations’ relation
with member states is “based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples…” (no. 2).
In addition to these international instruments, the right of self-determination is clearly
included in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981). In article 20, it states:
1. All peoples shall have right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and

inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political
status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy
they have freely chosen.
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds

of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community.
(nos. 1-2)
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Independence
As used in this study, the agitation for the independence of Biafra refers to the freedom to
separate from Nigeria based on the principles of self-determination. This means to be able to
politically organize and create an independent sovereign state of Biafra with a recognized
territory, government, constitution and sovereignty.
Biafra
Biafra is the name of the entire territory formally known as the Bight of Biafra before the
British colonization in Africa. In the context of this research, however, Biafra refers to the
former secessionist, independent and short-lived state known as the Federal Republic of Biafra
which declared its independence on May 30, 1967 and was dissolved on January 15, 1970 when
its leaders surrendered to the Federal Republic of Nigeria after a 30-month bloody war.
Igbo
In the context of this study, Igbo refers to the Igbo ethnic group in the southeastern part
of Nigeria who are separated across five states. These states are Abia, Imo, Anambra, Enugu, and
Ebonyi. The estimated total population of the Igbos in Nigeria is about 32 million (Nigeria Fact
Sheet, n.d.). The Igbos identify themselves as Biafrans. The agitation for self-determination and
independence of Biafra is led by the Igbos.
Prewar Generation
The prewar generation refers to Igbo indigenes born before the start of the Nigeria-Biafra
War, that is, those born before July 6, 1967.
Postwar Generation
The postwar generation refers to Igbo descendants born during and after the end of the
Nigeria-Biafra War, that is, those born during the war and after January 15, 1970.
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Memory
Memory in this study is understood in two interconnected ways: 1) as intention (la
mémoire); and 2) as the things intended (les souvenirs). According to Ricoeur’s (2004) typology
of memory, memory as intention highlights a capacity, habit or knowing-how which is
spontaneously evoked and its evocation results in self-awareness without any explicit form of
recognition of the absent past. On the other side, memory as the things intended or as
recollection is acquired by searching for the absent past through a process of remembering
connected to the situation and place in the world in which one remembers. Recollection in this
sense becomes successful when the past thing or event that is being remembered is recognized.
By recognizing the things intended through remembering, memory is said to be “a struggle
against forgetting” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 413).
Forgetting
In the context of this study, forgetting is conceived and defined as both the effacement or
erasing of traces and survival or persistence of traces not yet remembered. Forgetting is a
persistence of traces in the sense that the existence of the thing(s) that has/have been remains
unconscious to the mind. This means that traces that persist are removed from “the vigilance of
consciousness” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 441). Until the human mind becomes conscious of their
existence and remembers them as they are, they will continue to elude our minds and remain
forgotten.
History
This study understands history from the interconnectedness among three
historiographical operations. The first is documentary which provides a proof of what happened
in the past through the testimonies of eyewitnesses and all the archival materials. The second is
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the process of explanation and understanding which focuses on the meaning of testimonies and
archival materials. The third is the process of representation accomplished by coherently and
faithfully connecting archived proofs to what actually happened through history writing and
other literary works. In these three historiographical operations, the ultimate intention of the
historian is to engage in “a true reconstruction of the past” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 137).
History Education
History education as used in this study is the teaching and learning of history in school
classrooms with the goal of extending the promise of national reconciliation to the wider
citizenry (Cole, 2007). History education provides an opportunity for students to engage in a
democratic, civic dialogue on controversial and painful past in order to increase the knowledge
of the past as well as promote understanding, respect and coexistence that is guided by the
principles of justice.
Controversial Public Issues
The concept of controversial issues as used in this study is guided by Hess’ (2002)
definition of controversial public issues (CPI). According to Hess, controversial public issues
(CPI) are unresolved questions of public policy that spark significant disagreement. This study
therefore considers the Nigeria-Biafra War history as a controversial public issue in Nigeria.
According to the author, by learning how to discuss divisive public topics, young people are
prepared for democratic citizenship. However, teachers face many challenges in teaching
controversial public issues in school classrooms.
Transformative Learning
This study proposes the use of the transformative learning method to teach the NigeriaBiafra War history in school classrooms as a controversial public issue. Mezirow (2009) defined
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transformative learning as a type of “learning that transforms problematic frames of reference to
make them more inclusive, discriminating, reﬂective, open, and emotionally able to change” (p.
22). Intrapersonal and behavioral changes accompanied by action (personal, collective, group or
social) as well as consensus and relationship building are at the heart of the transformative
learning outcome. Transformative learning as a process is ‘‘predicated on the idea that students
are seriously challenged to assess their value system and worldview and are subsequently
changed by the experience’’ (Quinnan, 1997, as cited in Taylor, 2009, p. 3) of engaging in a
respectful and open-minded dialogue and communicative learning with others. This research
assesses transformative learning process and outcome using the Transformative Learning Survey
(TLS) instrument developed by Stuckey et al. (2013).
Conflict Styles
Conflict styles refer to how people react or behave in conflict situations, and which
conflict management style(s) they are consciously or unconsciously inclined to use in resolving
their conflict. This study adopts the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument developed by
Thomas and Kilmann (1974) which assesses five conflict styles (or conflict-handling modes).
These conflict styles are competing (or forcing), collaborating (or integrating/problem solving),
compromising (or sharing), avoiding (or withdrawing), and accommodating (or smoothing).
In the next chapter, chapter 2, I reviewed relevant scholarly literature on the NigeriaBiafra War. In chapter 3, I used history and memory theories to explain the core issues
embedded in the Nigeria-Biafra War. This is followed by a critical reflection on the method and
benefit of learning the Nigeria-Biafra War as a controversial public issue, which is the
preoccupation of chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to methodology and presentation of
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results. In the last chapter, chapter 7, I reflected on the meaning(s) of the research findings, as
well as their implications and limitations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
For a research on the implications of revealing the hidden narratives about the NigeriaBiafra War through transformative learning to achieve its goals, a substantial and thorough
review of relevant scholarly literature is needed. Since this study explores the correlation
between transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and the conflict styles used in
managing the persistent agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra, a
reconstruction of the full history of the war is crucial to achieve this goal. This is what I have
done in this chapter using available literature.
From the theoretical, practical, and global perspectives, many scholarly literature have
been written on the importance and role of history and memory in conflict, conflict resolution
and peace education (Wagoner & Brescó, 2016; Duckworth, 2015), and how collective memory
could either make interethnic conflicts more intractable and protractible (Duckworth, 2014;
Lemarchand, 2013) or help in creating an opportunity for conflict transformation and
reconciliation (Lederach, 1997; Winslade & Monk, 2001; Charbonneau & Parent, 2013;
Silberman & Vatan, 2013).
A review of major research databases shows that significant research has been conducted
particularly on the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War and the memory it has engendered, some of
which are published in peer-reviewed or scholarly journals (Shepherd, 1968; Post, 1968;
Mustafa, 1969; Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970; Essack, 1970; Perham, 1970; Tamuno, 1970; Dent,
1970; Herskovits, 1973; Oguibe, 1998; Omeje, 2005; Diamond, 2007; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009;
Owen, 2009; Onuoha, 2011; Onuoha, 2013c), while others are published as edited volumes,
books, biographies or speech collections (Falola, 2016; Efiong, 2016; Offodile, 2016; Venter,
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2015; Alabi-Isama 2013; Achebe, 2012; Imoh, 2012; Nkwocha, 2010; Korieh & Ezeonu, 2010;
de St. Jorre, 2009; Anwunah, 2007; Forsyth, 2007; Efiong, 2007; Sherman, 2002). Also,
enkindled by a burning desire to make sense of what happened during the war so as to be better
equipped to confront this traumatic memory, share lessons learned, and preserve its legacies,
many Nigerian writers have reconstructed the narratives about the Nigeria-Biafra War in fiction
books and other forms of artistic works (Adichie, 2007; Okparanta, 2016).
An important aspect of the available literature on the Nigeria-Biafra War examines how
the federal government of Nigeria has systematically and consistently implemented the politics
of oblivion regarding the Nigeria-Biafra War (Heerten & Moses, 2014; Maiangwa, 2016; Ejiogu,
2013; Korieh, 2012; Oloyede, 2009; Bird & Ottanelli, 2014; 2011).
Within the past decade, scholarly research on the Nigeria-Biafra War has recorded a
resurgence of interest in the question of genocide against Biafra during the war (Heerten &
Moses, 2014; Doron, 2014; Anthony, 2014; Njoku, 2013; Korieh, 2013, 2012). These scholars
and intellectuals emerging from various academic disciplines reexamine competing narratives
and historical evidence of the Nigeria-Biafra War in order to determine whether a genocide was
committed against Biafra by the military government of General Yakubu Gowon, and if yes, to
understand why the truth was buried in eternal oblivion without any acknowledgement by the
international community. The pioneering project on the Asaba massacre of October 1967 by the
Asaba Memorial Project, a collaborative work of the University of South Florida’s researchers
in Anthropology and History, together with the people of Asaba has been instrumental in
breaking the silence over the hidden stories about genocidal incidents during the Nigeria-Biafra
War (Bird & Ottanelli, 2014; 2011).
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Most recently, a few researchers have looked at “the relationship between trauma,
memory and the Nigeria-Biafra War” and argue “that the silence in the archive indicates a
trauma that has yet to be worked through and resolved. This unresolved trauma creates a
perpetual unease, distrust and lack of belief in the Nigerian project amongst Igbos” (BakareYusuf, 2012; Oloyede, 2009). For this reason, Bakare-Yusuf (2012) recommended that research
aimed at understanding the effect of this silence and the impact of existing narratives about what
happened on the disposition or state of mind (introspection) of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin
should begin, “just as the challenge to ensure the Nigeria-Biafra War becomes part of the school
curriculum must be taken up” (p. 243).
Other researchers have adopted a reactionary position against the removal of history from
the Nigerian school curricula, and argue strongly that history, including the Nigeria-Biafra War,
should be taught in the Nigerian school classrooms. Ejiogu (2013) strongly argued that “Biafra
and the tragedy it represents for humankind is compounded by the official code of silence that
Nigeria’s military decreed in the 1970s to ensure that the Nigeria-Biafra War is not taught in
schools in Nigeria” (p. 741). The author eloquently invites scholars and intellectuals “to subvert
that code of silence in order to educate humanity on the tragedy and the atrocities that led to it”
(Ejiogu, 2013, p. 741).
But this author and others who have written on this issue have not sufficiently addressed
the question of why this history education is important and how it will help in managing, if not
resolving, the continuous agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra. What
implication will the knowledge of the truth about what happened during the Nigeria-Biafra War
through history education have on the conflict styles of Nigerian citizens of Biafran descent?
This important question has not yet been answered by researchers.
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After an announcement was made to bring back history education in Nigerian
classrooms, a decision that was proclaimed by the Nigerian Minister of Education, Adamu
Adamu (Obi, 2016), scholars, researchers, policymakers and ordinary citizens are currently
engaged in an endless debate over which narratives of the Nigeria-Biafra War should be included
in the history curricula and taught in school classrooms (Onuoha, 2016). Should this war history
be about a necessary evil that needed to be combatted in order to preserve the unity of Nigeria as
narrated by the federal government of Nigeria? Or should the war history focus on the claims of
genocide against the Biafrans as narrated by the Igbos and their sympathizers? Godwin Onuoha
published an important research article in Africa Today entitled: “Shared histories, divided
memories: Mediating and navigating the tensions in Nigeria–Biafra War discourses” (Onuoha,
2016). In this article, Onuoha (2016) revealed,
the contested narratives engendered by the teaching and writing of the Nigeria–Biafra
War. Drawing on the domain of education, [the author] interrogated official and
hegemonic narratives forged by the Nigerian state to shape the history, memories, and
narratives of the war to suit its own vision, interests, and politics, in the light of
marginalized ethnic groups that contest these narratives and reject them as the sole
legitimate framework for remembering and interpreting the war. The [author’s] analysis
interrogated the extant education–reconciliation nexus, exploring the kind of education
that will best serve the needs and processes of conflict resolution, reconciliation, and
nation building in Nigeria. (p. 3)
Since the previous national reconciliation efforts in Nigeria failed to yield sustainable
peace and transformation of traumatic memories and grievances accumulated from the NigeriaBiafra War, Maiangwa (2016) recommended that a new set of national reconciliation initiatives
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should be adopted. These include “an acknowledgement of and apology for past wrongdoing,
memorialization, and mediation” (Maiangwa, 2016).
This study goes beyond these specific recommendations proposed by Maiangwa (2016)
to exploring the realm of history education. The study explores how history education,
particularly the teaching and learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War, is an indispensable mechanism
for restarting, continuing, deepening, and extending national reconciliation and its promises to
school classrooms as a democratic space where students are training to become good and wellinformed citizens.
To prepare for this gigantic and long awaited task, a thorough review of research
literature on the important pillars of the study is done. In the subsequent sections, I present a
comprehensive review and analysis of scholarly research on the historical memory of the
Nigeria-Biafra War. This is accomplished by going back in time to the precursors of the war and
the trauma engendered (which I entitled ‘about the war’). By implication and as discussed in the
chapter on theories (see Chapter 3), the historian whose duty is to reconstruct the memory of the
Nigeria-Biafra War as deposited in the archives will have to commute from the site of memory,
passing through important historical periods, to discovering the convincing and trustworthy
testimony: “I was there [which] is added the affirmation this happened ‘before,’ ‘during,’ ‘after,’
‘since,’ ‘during so much time” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 154).
In its structure, therefore, this review adopts, in addition to the precursors of the war,
Henry Rousso’s (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004) four stages of chronological ordering in terms of
memory and recollection: the phase of collective mourning (or unfinished mourning) as a result
of traumatic affliction; phase of repression and the establishment of a dominant myth; phase of
the return of the repressed to consciousness; and finally, phase of obsession with the past. These
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will be followed by an analysis of research literature on the need to teach the Nigeria-Biafra War
history in schools despite the controversial narratives and issues it provokes, as well as a critical
examination of literature on the contents of this history and how it will be taught. In this regard,
history education, teaching the Nigeria-Biafra War history as a controversial public issue, and
transformative learning are thoroughly examined and analyzed in chapter 4.
Precursors of the War
A thorough understanding of the Nigeria-Biafra War cannot be acquired without an
explanation of the historical events that preceded it. Oguibe (1998) had argued that
understanding the Nigeria-Biafra War requires an understanding of “the political upheavals that
convulsed the country during that tumultuous year; [as well as] the history of that amalgam of
nations, peoples, sensibilities, and interests that had come to be known as Nigeria” (p. 86). For
this reason, it is important to first review key milestones or conflict triggers in the prewar period
that when put together contributed to the manifestation and escalation of dormant conflicts into a
full-blown war. In my article, “Ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria: Analysis and resolution”
(Ugorji, 2017a), I argued that “the events that took place during the formative years of the new
nation called Nigeria prepared the ground for the numerous ethno-religious conflicts that have
tormented Nigeria” (p. 167).
Guided by Sandole’s (2008, as cited in Ugorji, 2017a) definition of conflict as “a process
characterized by stages of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, de-escalation and some
kind of termination (e.g., settlement, resolution)” (p. 168), and inspired by the three “stages of
conflict manifestation, namely: pre-manifest conflict processes (pre- MCPs), manifest conflict
processes (MCPs), and aggressive manifest conflict processes (AMCPs)” (as cited in Ugorji,
2017a, p. 167), I categorized the evolution of ethnic conflict in Nigeria by identifying three
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phases. Phase one, pre-manifest conflict era, is from 1914 to 1945, a period known as the time of
“amalgamation and the problem of nationhood” (Final Draft of Nigeria National Conference
Report, 2014, as cited in Ugorji, 2017a, p. 168). Phase two, manifest conflict era, is from 1945 to
1966 depicting a period of “struggle for decolonization, the agitation for constitutional reform,
and the early years of independence” (Final Draft of Nigeria National Conference Report, 2014,
as cited in Ugorji, 2017a, p. 168). Phase three, aggressive manifest conflict era, begins from
1966, the most consequential and devastating year in Nigerian history. This was the year when
the first democratically elected government (what is known in Nigerian history as the First
Republic) collapsed “following a bloody military coup that ushered in the first military regime”
(Final Draft of Nigeria National Conference Report, 2014, as cited in Ugorji, 2017a, p. 168).
This finally escalated into a three-year deadly war from July 1967 to January 1970.
In order to understand phase three, especially the 1966 coup and counter coup as well as
the Nigeria-Biafra War that ensued in 1967, it is imperative to briefly examine what went wrong
from phase one (1914-1945) to phase two (1945-1966). In other words, important events before
Nigerian independence in 1960 and during the first six years after independence are carefully
examined before a review of war literature.
Pre-Manifest Conflict Era (1914-1945): Amalgamation Period and the Problem of
Nationhood
During the pre-colonial period, the indigenous communities who inhabited the former
territory known today as Nigeria encountered the British and other Europeans at different times,
in different places and for different purposes. A few historians and scholars have carefully
studied and documented early indigenous societies of Nigeria from their formative years (Falola
& Heaton, 2008; Campbell & Page, 2018; Siollun, 2021). Particularly fascinating is Falola and
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Heaton’s (2008) historical analysis “from the period of the earliest archeological findings in the
Late Stone Age to the coming of European traders in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries”
(p. 16) up to the transition to British colonial rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries which culminated in the amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates with
the Lagos Colony in 1914. According to Falola and Heaton (2008), “the borders of modern-day
Nigeria were established in 1914 by British colonizers” (p. 1) through an amalgamation decree.
In his description of how Nigeria was invented, Richard Bourne (2015) stated:
On 1 January 1914, the mix of peoples in a large part of West Africa became ‘One
Nigeria’. The announcement in the humid city of Lagos, which had been a British colony
since the Treaty of Cession was agreed in 1861 between Great Britain and Oba Dosunmu,
King of Lagos, was made by Frederick Lugard, later Baron Lugard. He was now
Governor-General of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, and he never liked Lagos.
The name ‘Nigeria’ had been coined by his wife and admirer, Flora Shaw, colonial editor
of The Times, in a letter she wrote to her paper in January 1897. She used it to define the
territories abutting the River Niger that were then being traded in or claimed by the Royal
Niger Company. (p. 3)
Detailed explanation about how “palm oil ruffians” along the coastal areas of southern Nigeria
toward the end of slave trade led to the creation of Royal Niger Company along with its private
army in 1886, how it was taken over by Lever Brothers Ltd in 1920 and how it merged with its
rival, the African and Eastern Trade Co-operation, to become the United Africa Company in
1929 is found in Geoff Baker’s (1996) “Trade winds on the Niger: The saga of the Royal Niger
Company 1830-1971.”

28
The above quotation from Bourne (2015) reveals three themes that constitute the major
problematic to which most of the Nigerian ethnic conflicts, particularly the Nigeria-Biafra War,
could be traced. The first is that the name ‘Nigeria’ is alien to the indigenous peoples of Nigeria.
This means that the name was coined by an outsider and imposed on the people without mutual
deliberation and agreement. The second is that the 1914 amalgamation of the north with an
overwhelming Muslim population and the south dominated by Christian population as well as
the merger of over 250 ethnic groups present within these regions was decreed and implemented
without the consent of the indigenous peoples.
In my earlier research article on this subject, I defined amalgamation “as a uniting or
combining action by somebody or an agency on two or more separate, dissimilar entities or
groups. In other words, it is the action, process, or result of merging, combining or uniting two or
more separate, autonomous groups, entities, ethnicities, regions, or nations into one “Nation”
(with the uppercase “N”)” (Ugorji, 2017a, p. 169). I went further to distinguish two types of
amalgamation – consented amalgamation and forced amalgamation. On the one hand, consented
amalgamation is based on the ethical principle of well-informed consent and respect for groups
and their people. As I noted,
respect for these group rights presupposes that before an amalgamation is executed and
implemented, the groups ought to have clarity and full understanding of the terms,
expectations, implications, risks and opportunities that are associated with amalgamation.
The groups’ consent to be a part of a new nation should be a well-informed decision
based on complete availability of needed ‘information,’ their full understanding or
‘comprehension’ of the information provided, and a condition or situation that
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encourages free ‘voluntariness’ and discourages coercion or influence of power. (The
Belmont Report, 1979, as cited in Ugorji, 2017a, p. 169)
On the other hand, forced amalgamation is a process by which different regions with
different ethnicities and faith traditions “are coerced or compelled to unite as one nation…
against their will” (Ugorji, 2017a, p. 169).
Lugard’s argument for the forced amalgamation of the north and south with the Lagos
Colony is that he wanted “to provide a unified railway policy” (Bourne, 2015, p. 3). Similar to
this argument, Campbell and Page (2018) stated that the reason for the amalgamation is “for
administrative convenience” (p. 26). In other words, amalgamation helped in relieving “His
Majesty’s [King George V] government’s budgetary and tax processes” (Campbell & Page,
2018, p. 26). However, Akinola (2014) affirmed that the 1914 amalgamation was motivated by
the fact that “the Northern protectorate could not generate sufficient funds to maintain its own
administration in spite of the annual grants from the Imperial Treasury and from the Southern
Administration” (p. 3), and had to depend on the southern protectorate’s growing economy. By
coercively merging the north and south, the British was relieved of its growing financial
commitment to the north (Ojiako, 1981, as cited in Akinola, 2014).
Because of the coercive nature of the 1914 amalgamation of the north and south in
Nigeria, I concluded that “the use of force by the colonialists eliminated the possibility of choice,
and institutionalized a denial of freedom, of autonomy, of self-determination, and of [regional]
territorial integrity” (Ugorji, 2017a, p. 170). The implication of this assertion is discernible from
the conflicts that emerged during the periods of decolonization, constitutional reform, and the
early years of independence which are analyzed in the subsequent sections of this literature
review.

30
The third problematic theme emerging from the above quotation drawn from Bourne
(2015) is that Frederick Lugard to whom the amalgamation of 1914 is attributed preferred the
north to the south. Bourne (2015) argued that “Lugard was sympathetic to the feudal, horseloving north, which he had conquered in a series of military campaigns, concluding with the
defeat of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903” (p. 4).
A combination of these three problematics – imposition of an alien name, Nigeria, by the
British without the consent of the indigenous peoples, forced amalgamation of the north and
south, and the British preference for the north – are at the heart and soul of what Falola and
Heaton (2008) referred to as a “national question. What is Nigeria? Who are Nigerians? How
does a country go about developing a meaningful national identity?” (p. 158). As will be
analyzed later, this national question constitutes “the underlying cause of all the problems that
Nigeria experienced in the 1960s and has experienced since then” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p.
158). This, of course, is also due to the artificial nature of Nigeria as country. According to
Hailey (1957, as cited in Post, 1968), Nigeria is “perhaps the most artificial of the many
administrative units created in the course of the European occupation of Africa” (p. 27). One
thing is true. Without the activities of the British in Nigeria through Frederick Lugard and his
colleagues, the future of the indigenous peoples of Nigeria would have taken a different turn.
Who then was Frederick Lugard? Lugard was a British military officer hired by the Royal
Niger Company in 1894 with a mandate to conquer and occupy northern Nigeria for Britain. To
achieve this purpose, Lugard formed the West African Frontier Force and in 1900, after the
Royal Niger Company’s license was revoked by the British, Lugard declared northern Nigeria a
protectorate of Britain and became its first high commissioner before conquering the Sokoto
Caliphate in 1903 and killing the Sultan (Falola & Heaton, 2008). This final defeat took place
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one hundred years after the Caliphate was founded in 1803 through the jihad of Usman dan
Fodio. According to Campbell and Page (2018), the British occupied the north in order to “block
possible French penetration and to end the slave trade” (p. 26).
Europeans, including the British, were already involved in slave trade in the coastal areas
of the south from the late fifteenth / early sixteenth century until 1807 when slave trade was
abolished in theory by the British (Bourne, 2015; Falola & Heaton, 2008). This is why Mustafa
(1969) argued that “the first contact the south had with foreigners was with the European slave
traders who carried on an expensive business along the coastal region of West Africa, the north
developed independently under the influence of the Muslim invaders who came from Egypt and
the Maghreb” (p. 136). As a substitute to slave trade, the English embraced palm oil commerce
and other native products arriving in the coastal areas.
While Lagos was conquered and annexed by the British in 1861 as a colony of Britain to
sustain ongoing Christian missionary work in the area as well as to promote British economic
interest, the southeast was occupied by the British some twenty years after “under pressure from
the Royal Niger Company and to preclude German expansion of their Kameron (now Cameroon)
colony” (Campbell & Page, 2018, p. 26). From 1885 it was called the Oil Rivers Protectorate in
southeastern Nigeria and in 1893 it was renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate, the same year a
protectorate was established in southwest Nigeria (Falola & Heaton, 2008).
Lugard’s preference for the north was as a result of Northern Region’s backwardness,
cohesiveness, and existing Islamic autocracy at that time which made it easier for the British to
manipulate the Fulani emirs (kings) to achieve their goals compared to the critical, more
democratic and advanced southerners that were increasingly embracing western education. As
Diamond (2007) appraised it, “the north, two thirds of the territory, was easily subdued, and
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provided England with the basis for the political formation of Nigeria” (p. 346). By this it means
that the north was viewed by Lugard as being capable of loyalty to the Crown while the south
was seen as being “incapable of loyalty to the Crown” (Ejiogu, 2007, p. 105).
The northern backwardness, Bourne (2015) argued, was exacerbated by Lugard’s
prohibition of “Christian missionaries in the north and not doing much else to promote modern
education in that large region” (p. 26). Ken Post (1964, as cited in Akinola, 2014) had revealed
that “the missionaries were discouraged from entering the north, except for non-Muslim areas,
lest they should offend Islamic susceptibilities” (p. 8). Sharing very little in common with the
south, the north’s dominant Islamic “culture and religion led them to look northwards across the
Sahara, along the old trading routes, and east via Cairo and Khartoum towards Mecca” (Bourne,
2015, p. 26). Mustafa (1969) attested that “while the south readily embraced western culture and
religion, the north turned to the Islamic East where lay the source of its religious and cultural
heritage” (p. 136).
Indirect rule, a system of administration with which the British administered and
governed their newly acquired protectorates and colonies through existing local traditional kings
and chiefs, was developed by Lugard after he became the first high commissioner of northern
Nigeria protectorate. Ejiogu (2007) stated that:
due to the alliance that subsequently evolved between British rule and the Fulani rulers,
Lugard’s defeat of the Fulani could not result in the abolition of their autocratic political
system, which denied the majority in Hausaland full participation in the affairs of their
society. Lugard let the Hausa-Fulani ruling classes remain in power as indirect rulers
after they had sworn to remain loyal to the Crown. (p. 103)
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Indirect rule was quickly implemented in southern Nigeria protectorates and in all the
colonial territories when Lugard became the Governor-General of the Colony and Protectorate of
Nigeria, especially after the amalgamation of 1914 (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Diamond, 2007).
Obafemi Awolowo (1968, as cited in Akinola, 2014) described the three different units of
colonial administration as:
1. The colony and protectorate of Lagos, [which consisted of the areas of authority of

the present six states in the South-West geopolitical zone, excluding former Egba
Division].
2. The protectorate of Southern Nigeria [which comprised roughly the areas of authority

of the present five states in the South-East and six states in the South-South
geopolitical zones, respectively].
3. The protectorate of Northern Nigeria [which was more or less the same as the present

nineteen states of North-East, North-West, and North-Central geo-political zones, as
well as the capital territory, Abuja. (p. 2)
Having merged “the colony and protectorate of Lagos and the protectorate of Southern
Nigeria… into a simple unit known as the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1906” (Akinola,
2014, p. 2), the northern and southern protectorates were amalgamated in 1914 to create modern
day Nigeria (Nafziger, 1973). Nevertheless, Lugard and his colonial administrators continued to
rule the north and south as separate entities (Nafziger, 1973), with limited contacts between the
two regions until 1946 when the Richards Constitution integrated all the regions into one central
legislative council.
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Bourne (2015) described indirect rule as “an imposed system, backed by the Maxim gun”
(p. 14). Post (1968) noted that indirect rule perpetuated and reinforced existing differences
between the north and south. He went further to argue that:
indirect rule, Lord Lugard’s baleful gift to Africa, created the Native Authority system,
which envisaged Nigeria developing as a hotch-potch of local government units of
varying sizes: far from creating any sense of transcending loyalties, it even emphasized
differences within ethnic groups. Thus, much of the ‘nationalism’ which developed took
as its focus the ethnic group as such, rather than Nigeria as a totality. (Post, 1968, pp. 2728)
As a governing tactic designed to benefit both the British and the native authorities,
Falola and Heaton (2008) confirmed that “indirect rule in the north derived colonial and native
authority revenue primarily from the direct taxation of the population. This tax was collected by
the emir and placed in the native treasury. The emir and his servants all received salaries paid”
(p. 118). While there were no significant uprisings against the colonial indirect rule system in the
north, the southerners were quick to voice out their concerns and challenge the system (Akinola,
2014; Ejiogu, 2007). Ejiogu (2007) made it clear that:
colonial policies that succeeded in the upper Niger [northern] region quickly provoked
anti-colonial riots when they were extended to the lower Niger [southern] region. One
such policy was direct taxation, which was introduced with success in the upper Niger
[northern] region, which but provoked extensive riots amongst the Yoruba, the Igbo, and
others in southeast areas of the lower Niger [south] in 1929-30. (p. 105)
Also, according to Bourne (2015), “the southerners resented the bogus structures imposed
on them by indirect rule” (p. 27). The feudal hierarchy that existed in the north was non-existent
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in the southeast. According to Margery Perham’s book, “Native Administration in Nigeria,”
(1962, as cited in Diamond, 2007), “the headship of any [Igbo] group is never autocratic; it is
representative in an exceptionally full sense... The Igbo were never bound by mere forms to
incompetent leadership” (pp. 346-347). The existing socio-political organization in the southeast
prior to colonization was akin to democracy (Diamond, 2007). Even the traditional authority and
social organization that existed in the southwest was incomparable to the feudal hierarchy in the
north. Akinola (2014) argued that “in the Yoruba land, the experiment met initial confrontations
in some areas, but such impediments were quickly suppressed by the British, and the natural
rulers, who loved the new administrative power bestowed upon them by their colonial masters,
quickly established their grip over the system” (p. 4).
To implement indirect rule in the southeast and southwest, the colonial administrators
had to “build up the status of chiefs who were dependent on them” (Bourne, 2015, p. 14). As
Bourne (2015) noted, “the earliest attacks on indirect rule came from the first generation of
western-educated Africans: they saw it as a ruse to ally conservative traditional leaders with
imperial authority to restrain their advance” (p. 14). Just as many Yorubas in southwestern
Nigeria resented the colonial administration, Bourne (2015) noted that southeasterners,
especially “Igbos and those in the Niger Delta were not persuaded by Lugard’s warrant chiefs, a
system of tax-collecting noblemen invented by the authorities” (p. 27). Also, Diamond (2007)
opined that in Igboland, “the British residents and district officers found themselves in a maze of
subtly organized autonomous hamlets” (p. 346).
The Igbos resented the imposition of foreign authorities on their existing and well
diffused democracy. As a result, the imposition of warrant chiefs was met with an unprecedented
rebellion known in Nigerian history as the Aba women’s riot of 1929 (Diamond, 2007). Igbo
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women marched in Aba, a commercial city in the present day Abia State in southeastern Nigeria,
to protest against colonial high taxation (Ejiogu, 2007) and the fall in the price of palm produce.
Nevertheless, even with Lugard’s final departure from Nigeria in 1918, indirect system of
governance continued in different parts of Nigeria “until the early 1950’s” (Akinola, 2014, p. 5).
Lugard’s 1914 amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates with the Lagos
Colony which defined the boundary, gave a name to modern-day Nigeria and allowed for the
imposition of indirect rule system on the natives would not have been possible without the Berlin
Conference which started on November 15, 1884 and ended on February 26, 1885 in Berlin,
Germany. With no African representatives at the table, and initiated and hosted by German
Chancellor Bismarck, major European countries (the United States was absent although invited)
“established the rules for the conquest and partition of Africa, in the process legitimizing the
ideas of Africa as a playground for outsiders, its mineral wealth as a resource for the outside
world not for Africans and its fate as a matter not to be left to Africans” (Gathara, 2019, para. 3).
This made it possible for the indigenous communities of West Africa to be fragmented
and separated by the European colonizers into different artificial boundaries. Heterogeneous
ethnic groups were coercively united into a single national administrative and political entity.
Falola and Heaton (2008) described the geographical territory of the Nigerian state, which is not
completely different from how it was when it was created in 1914, and stated that the area
covered 356,668 square miles. Post (1968) estimated that the area of Nigeria was “almost
357,000 square mile” (p. 26). In terms of size, Falola and Heaton (2008) opined that:
Nigeria is roughly twice the size of California and three times the size of the United
Kingdom. The country is bordered to the south by the Bights of Benin and Biafra, which
are on the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic Ocean. On the west Nigeria is bordered by
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Benin, on the north by Niger, and on the east by Cameroon. In its extreme northeastern
corner, Lake Chad separates Nigeria from the country of Chad. Nigeria stretches roughly
700 miles from west to east and 650 miles from south to north, covering an area between
3° and 15°E longitude and between 4° and 14°N latitude. (p. 2)
Mustafa (1969) have argued that the partition of indigenous communities “created an
anomalous situation which exists till today” (p. 136). The Igbo nation was partitioned into
different modern day countries with the highest population located in southeastern Nigeria where
the Igbos became the dominant ethnic group. Smaller Igbo populations are also native to the
present-day Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon. The Yorubas are native to the present-day
southwestern Nigeria where they constitute the most populous and dominant ethnic group.
Smaller Yoruba populations are also native to the modern day Republics of Benin and Togo. The
Hausa-Fulani were partitioned among many countries with the highest number in northern
Nigeria where they dominate other ethnic groups and significant population in Niger. According
to Mustafa (1969), “these ethnic and cultural divisions in Nigeria gave rise to serious problems
of maintaining a balance of power between the various groups. Instead of serving as an
integrating factor British rule accentuated the pre-existing differences” (p. 137).
Tekena Tamuno (1970), an erudite scholar and historian who had studied separatist
agitations in Nigeria since 1914, argued that “it was easier to establish the Nigerian state than to
nourish the Nigerian nation. Though the former was to a large extent achieved through the I914
Amalgamation, the latter eluded both British officials and Nigerians for several decades
thereafter” (p. 564). The challenge Nigerians encountered in nation building prior to and after
independence could be explained by what Tamuno (1970) called “centrifugal and centripetal
tendencies in Nigerian history” (pp. 563-564).
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Centrifugal, because the ethnic identity of each amalgamated nation or ethnic group
predominated over the new national identity, especially since the British governed the different
regions separately without a unified political administration until in 1946 when the Richards
Constitution made it possible for the northern representatives to join the southern representatives
in the Nigerian Legislative Council. However, and as Tamuno (1970) pointed out, “the
amalgamation of such key central departments as customs, railways, education, police, and
prisons proceeded gradually from I912 through the I930s. Separate secretariats existed in the
Northern and Southern Provinces until the I920s” (p. 566).
Centripetal, because since the affairs and resources of the new country was to be decided
and controlled by the center, there was an intense power struggle or competition over which
ethnic group will dominate at the center (Herskovits, 1973). As I had argued before, “what led to
the manifest conflicts among the different ethno-national regions was the hidden interest and
goal of each region regarding the question about which ethnic group will emerge as the new
national leader with power, influence and control over the wealth of the new nation” (Ugorji,
2017a, p. 178).
Both the centrifugal and centripetal forces made it difficult for the emergence of a united
national identity that transcends ethnic cleavage and patronage. According to Tamuno (1970) “a
common national identity in Nigeria was a plant of slow growth. Attempts to cultivate it have
met with serious obstacles from separatist agitations in Nigerian history, which go back as far as
1914” (p. 564). Although the 1914 amalgamation was imposed on the natives by force against
their will, it has been documented by historians that northern Emirs were vehemently opposed to
amalgamation, but later accepted it “on economic grounds, since the North required an outlet to
the sea for much of its external trade” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 566). The seaports that facilitate
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international trade are located in Lagos (southwest) and Port Harcourt (southeast). As a result,
“the northern dependence on southern outlets increased” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 566).
Also, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello who was the Sardauna of Sokoto at the time of Nigerian
independence in 1960 and during the early years of independence “considered himself foremost
a Hausa and described his autobiography as the ‘attempt of a Northern Nigerian to do his duty by
his people’” (Bello, 1962, as cited in Mustafa, 1969, p. 135). Similarly, Chief Obafemi
Awolowo, who was a Yoruba political leader and leading voice for the Western Region in the
years leading to Nigerian independence and thereafter, had argued that “Nigeria is not a nation. It
is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria
from those who do not” (Awolowo, 1947, as cited in Mustafa, 1969, p. 135). These perceptions
by local and regional leaders probably stemmed from their colonial experiences in the hands of
the British administrators. As stated before, Lugard’s 1914 amalgamation decree just like the
Clifford Constitution of 1922 and the Richards Constitution of 1946 were all imposed on
Nigerians without their consent.
Few years before Arthur Richards became the Governor of Nigeria and introduced his
constitution, Bernard Bourdillon, who was the Governor of Nigeria from 1935 to 1943, divided
Nigeria in 1939 into three regions, namely Northern Region, Western Region and Eastern
Region. As Akinola (2014) emphasized:
the year 1939 is another significant date in Nigeria’s history. The Southern provinces
were bifurcated into the Western and Eastern provinces, each under a Chief
Commissioner, with headquarters at Ibadan and Enugu. These two provinces, together
with the Northern province ‘headquartered’ at Kaduna, marked the birth of three
geographically distinct and politically hostile cultures. (p. 5)
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It was therefore this hostility that existed among the three distinct regions that created the
condition for the escalation of dormant conflicts to their most visible forms.
Manifest Conflict Era (1945-1966): Period of Decolonization Struggle, Agitation for
Constitutional Reform, and Early Years of Independence
Based on his assessment of the heightened competition among the Northern Region (with
a Hausa-Fulani hegemony), Western Region (with a Yoruba hegemony) and Eastern Region
(with an Igbo hegemony), “Sir Arthur Richards who was the Governor of Nigeria, on the 6th of
December 1944, had in a dispatch to London, stated clearly that the problem of Nigeria was how
to create a political system that would advance political development in line with the interests
being pursued by various Nigerian groups” (Final Draft of Nigeria National Conference Report,
2014, as cited in Ugorji, 2017a, p. 178). In 1946, Arthur Richards crafted and imposed his
constitution on Nigerians without prior consultation with Nigerians and against the will of the
people. This constitution known as the Richards Constitution legislatively integrated the north
and south in one Legislative Council and was severely criticized by Nigerians. Six years after
Arthur Richards’ assessment of the Nigerian problem and following a disagreement over what
the constitution should entail, the clash of positions and interests among the north, west and east
intensified. As Akinola (2014) noted, “with the various cultures neither exposed to each other,
nor given a direction of unity, suspicion was likely to develop” (p. 6).
Delegates from the north, west and east met in Ibadan in 1950 to discuss the contents of a
proposed constitution. According to Tamuno (1970), one of the controversial and divisive issue
in Richards Constitution was the allotted number of seats for each region in the Nigerian
Legislative Council which were 45 for the north, 33 for the west, and 33 for the east. This
proposal was vehemently rejected by northern delegates. Tamuno (1970) revealed that the Emir
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of Zaria and the Emir of Katsina, delegates from the north, argued that “unless the Northern
Region was allotted 50 per cent of the seats in the Central Legislature, it would ask for separation
from the rest of Nigeria on the arrangements existing before I9I4” (p. 567).
The British responded favorably to the northern demand, justifying their decision based
on the disparity in population figures between the north and south. The British government
allotted 68 seats to the Northern Region, 34 to the Western Region, and 34 to the Eastern Region.
Delegates to the House of Representatives were to be elected from their regional houses. These
figures reflect the 136 elective seats for the House of Representatives included in the 1951
Constitution (known as the Macpherson Constitution), in addition to “provisions for special and
official members” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 568). According to Akinola (2014), one major issue
associated with the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 is not only that it granted too much power
to the regions, “the North controlled half of the seats [in the federal Legislative Council]” (p. 22).
Another controversial and divisive issue discussed in the House of Representatives was
the issue of self-government by the Nigerian people. This was explicitly part of an ongoing
agitation for independence of Nigeria from Britain between the late 1940s and mid 1950s
championed especially by southern leaders. According to Tamuno (1970),
the ‘self-government’ debate in the House of Representatives in April 1953 led to a chain
of events which again put Northern leaders in a mood for secession. In place of the
Action-Group-sponsored motion seeking self-government for Nigeria in 1956, the
Northern Members of Parliament demanded self-government ‘as soon as practicable’. (p.
568)
Action Group was a regionally based political party of the Yorubas in western Nigeria.
The pre-independence political parties, their formation and how they bred conflicts and crises
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that escalated to the 1966 coups and finally the 1967-1970 Nigeria-Biafra War (Diamond, 1988)
are briefly discussed below. This motion for Nigerian independence by 1956 was put forward by
an Action Group representative, Chief Anthony Enahoro, and supported by the members of the
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) (Akinola, 2014). For the members of
the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), Nigeria was not yet ready for independence.
Knowing that the southerners were more advanced in western education and were
occupying leadership positions in the civil services and military, it is possible that the northern
leaders wanted an extension of British rule to be able to raise the status of their people in order to
be in a better position to compete for federal government jobs with the eastern and western
educated elites after independence when the British expatriates were required to withdraw.
Akinola (2014) argued that “because the South had produced more educated men, well-nurtured
in the dynamics of Western democracy, a feeling of suspicion and political incompatibility was
developed by the North against the South” (p. 9). This was a “legitimate fear that the North
might be subordinate to the South in an independent Nigeria” (Coleman, 1963, as cited in
Akinola, 2014, p. 15). As Oguibe (1998) noted, “the result was a culture of ethnic suspicion and
distrust” (p. 88). Nafziger (1973) argued that this disagreement between the north and south over
self-government constituted one of the early signs of security threat in the country.
In the midst of an intense hostile atmosphere driven by rigid disagreements and totalizing
description of the other (Winslade & Monk, 2000) between the northern and southern leaders, it
was alleged that northern members of parliament were attacked by mobs in Lagos (Tamuno,
1970). In retaliation to the alleged harassment of northern members of parliament in Lagos, a riot
erupted in Kano in May 1953 “following the arrival in that city of an Action Group delegation,
led by S. L. Akintola, on a political tour of the North” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 568). Coleman (1958,
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as cited in Akinola, 2014) revealed that in Kano there were “277 casualties, including 36 deaths
(15 Northerners and 21 Southerners)” (p. 32).
Both the alleged harassment in Lagos and the retaliatory riot in Kano were early signs of
a tug of war between the north and south that eventually resulted in the collapse of the First
Republic in 1966 (Diamond, 1988) and escalated into the Nigeria-Biafra War in 1967. This tug
of war could be well understood through Steven Watt’s (2010) war gaming and thinking model,
“action — reaction — counteraction” and Philippa Strandberg-Long’s (2019) research on
“reaction in counter-action.” I shall return to this tug of war later by analyzing the actions of
politicians, especially those of the northern-led federal government, that precipitated the 1966
military coup and counter coup as well as the pogroms of the Igbos which gave rise to the
Biafran secession in 1967.
Meanwhile, it is important to note that in May 1953 Northern Region, in a bid to
compromise on the self-government issue, proposed a full autonomous regional government
arrangement with a less powerful center (Tamuno, 1970). This is akin to a federal system of
government. Reacting to the northern proposal, and in order to resolve pending constitutional
issues, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies invited Nigerian House delegates to
London. According to Tamuno (1970), during the meetings in London “which took place
between July and August I953, the delegates agreed on a federation consisting of autonomous
regions” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 569). The implication of this agreement was analyzed by Nafziger
(1973). According to this author, “British influence and Southern impatience for early selfgovernment resulted in an agreement during I953-4 to leave the Northern Region intact with a
majority of representatives in the Federal legislature” (Nafziger, 1973, p. 510).
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Having resolved the constitutional issue about the system of government desirable by the
Nigerian people – that is, the issue of federation –, two other controversial issues needed to be
addressed by the delegates. The one is the status of Lagos (the federal government headquarters
and principal commercial city in Nigeria). The other is the issue of secession, that is, to agree on
when it is appropriate or legal for any federating region or ethnic group to secede from federal
Nigeria if they wish to do so.
To the first issue, delegates from Eastern Region argued that Lagos should be “a noman’s land” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 569). By this, they mean that Lagos should be a federal
government territory and not a property of any regional government. This proposal was
supported by the northern delegates inspired by their interest in unrestricted access to the seaport
in Lagos, although they had in 1950 argued in favor of allowing Western Region to administer
Lagos (Tamuno, 1970). According to Akinola (2014), “the question over the status of Lagos was
to consummate an alliance between the NCNC [National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons]
and the NPC [Northern People’s Congress], both of which had supported the separation of Lagos
from the West” (p. 33). Being a Yoruba city, the Action Group delegates from Western Region
insisted that Lagos and its municipal districts should be part of Western Region and administered
by them.
To resolve this issue, a third party intervention was needed, and as usual, the British
played that role of an arbiter. According to Tamuno (1970), in order to solidify the unity of
Nigeria through federalism, “Oliver Lyttelton, the Secretary of State at the time, in consideration
of the over-all interests of Nigeria, decided, when approached by the Nigerian delegates, that
Lagos should be the federal capital of Nigeria, and that the municipal area of Lagos should be
regarded as ‘Federal Territory’” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 569).
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The British decision was rejected by Western Region through its base political party,
Action Group. Like Northern Region that had previously threatened secession during the
conferences on self-government or at other times, Western Region responded to the British with
a threat of secession from federal Nigeria (Akinola, 2014). Around October 1953, “Awolowo
claimed, among other things, the freedom of the Western Region ‘to decide whether or not they
will remain in the proposed Nigerian Federation’” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 570). Western Region’s
threat of secession was met with a counter threat from the British Secretary of State, Oliver
Lyttelton. As Tamuno (1970) noted, the Secretary of State ordered “that any attempt to secure
alteration of that decision by force will be resisted, and in this context, …any attempt to secure
the secession of the Western Region from the Federation would be regarded as the use of force”
(p. 570).
To discuss and address the second issue, that is, the question about including the right to
secession in the Nigerian constitution, Tamuno (1970) stated that a Resumed Conference on the
Nigerian Constitution was convened from January to February I954 in Lagos. Having threatened
and contemplated secession as a result of the British imposed decision on the status of Lagos,
Western Region through its party, Action Group, argued for the recognition and inclusion of the
right to secession in the Nigerian constitution. Four principles discernible from Tamuno’s (1970)
article were used by the delegates from Western Region to support their argument.
Any form of unity imposed from without would invariably lack enduring cohesion… The
‘dream’ of a united Nigeria would fail unless the principle of freedom of association implying freedom to dissociate - were conceded… Whenever the terms of the association
displeased any of the federating units, the constitution should allow that territory the right

46
of ‘contracting out’ of the Federation… The principle of basing federalism on the consent
of the people [should be upheld]. (Tamuno, 1970, p. 570)
The Western Region’s proposal for secession right was strongly opposed by Eastern
Region through its regional party, National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) led
by its Premier, Nnamdi Azikiwe. Early proponents of self-determination, Nigerian independence
from Britain and true Nigerian nationalism, eastern delegates through their NCNC leaders, who
once advocated for a unitary system of government, argued that “Nigerian federation differed
from a league of nations, which could allow its members to contract out whenever they so
desired” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 570). In the end, delegates at the I954 Resumed Conference in Lagos
voted that the right of secession should not be written into the Constitution (Tamuno, 1970). This
constitution is generally referred to as the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954.
By establishing a federation in Nigeria, the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 gave more
autonomy and power to the regions, while distributing powers within the federal government
(Akinola, 2014; Nafziger, 1973; Post, 1968). In addition, and as Post (1968) affirmed, increasing
regional autonomy reinforced “the control of each of the three main ethnic groups over a region
and at the same time increased demands by various minority groups to be separated from them”
(p. 28). Another implication of regional autonomy which will be later discussed is that:
the North was allowed to remain far bigger than the rest - nearly four-fifths of the land
area and over half the population - a superiority in size which, contrary to its fears in
1954, it was able to translate, via the workings of the electoral system, into political
domination of the whole federation. (Post, 1968, p. 28)
Inspired by the United States federalism, Nnamdi Azikiwe was quick to publicly state
four principles on which the NCNC’s rejection of the right of secession is based. “(I) Secession
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from a federation is incompatible with federalism. (2) Secession from a federation is an illegal
act. (3) Secession from a federation is an invitation to anarchy. (4) Secession from the Nigerian
Federation… would be suicidal” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 571). As will be discussed later, these
arguments made by Eastern Region through its regional party, NCNC, were used by the federal
government of Nigeria to reject Eastern Region’s decision and attempt to secede from Nigeria in
1967 to create an Independent Republic of Biafra.
Although the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 established the Nigerian federation, helped
clarify the issue of secession, empowered and recognized regional premiers as well as
established the office of the speaker of the House of Representatives among other things, it failed
to establish the office of the Prime Minister. Instead, it retained the office of the GovernorGeneral at the center who still maintained veto power. To amend this constitution and correct the
mistakes in preparation for independence in 1960, a new series of constitutional conferences was
called for and held. The long awaited independence from Britain “was finally realized during the
Nigerian Constitutional Conference that took place in London from September 29 to October 27,
1958. At this conference, internal self-government [from] 1959, Independence Constitution…,
and full independence starting from October 1, 1960 were granted and ratified” (Ugorji, 2017a,
p. 179).
The Independence Constitution of 1960 was articulated like a monarchy, modeled after
the British government where the Queen is the head of state, but represented in Nigeria by the
Governor-General. Of significant importance is the creation of the Senate although its members
were to be appointed by the regional governments and not elected by the people, making the
federal legislature bi-cameral since it already had a House of Representatives. The same was
established in the regional governments, but in lieu of the House of Representatives and Senate,
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the regions had a House of Assembly as well as a House of Chiefs, especially in the north
(Akinola, 2014). The constitution also allowed for the appointment of the Supreme Court Judge,
although the final decision-making or ruling was the responsibility of the British Privy Council
in Britain.
In 1963, the government leadership agreed to change the Nigerian Independence
Constitution from a monarchy to a republic. To this effect, an all-party constitutional conference
was held in Lagos in July 1963. The outcome of this conference was the Republican Constitution
of 1963 which provided for, among other things, the removal of the Queen of England as the
head of state and a replacement with an elected Nigerian president who will no longer be
accountable to the Queen. This indigenous president, nonetheless, was more or less ceremonial
in nature like the Queen. The prime minister had most of the governing and policymaking
powers. The 1963 constitution also detached the Supreme Court from the British Privy Council
and made it the highest court in Nigeria, although it hardly performed its official functions.
Relevant to this study is that new states creation procedure was established by the 1963
Republican Constitution.
As the agitation for the recognition of minority ethnic groups within the three regional
governments – north, west and east – increased, a policy discussion on the needs and interests of
minorities became absolutely indispensable. Analyzing minority fears and agitations after the
Nigerian independence, I (Ugorji, 2017a) stated:
The independence constitution of 1960 did not take into consideration the agitations and
fears of the minority ethnic groups in Nigeria. And so, the attainment of independence
opened a new wave of manifest conflict both within the regions and at the federal center.
Within the regions, the minority ethnic groups feared the domination of the three
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dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the Northern Region, the Yoruba in the
Western Region, and the Igbo in the Eastern Region… And so, to be able to have equal
participation in the new government and access to the economic and political
opportunities it brings, the minority ethnic groups within the three regions demanded for
the creation of new states. (p. 180)
Although minority ethnic groups within the three regions had cogent reasons for
demanding the creation of new states (Akinola, 2014), the federal government was very slow to
grant their request. Nevertheless, “both the NCNC and the AG supported this issue…, the NPC
did not favor any attempt to create a new state out of the North, arguing that the North would be
seriously harmed if the minorities, who constituted the bulk of administrative expertise in the
Civil Service, were allowed to go” (Akinola, 2014, p. 39). The Colonial Secretary supported the
position of the northern region on states creation. According to Frederick Schwarz, Jr. (1965, as
cited in Akinola, 2014), the British decided that “if Nigeria would be independent in 1960, no
new states could be created” (p. 39).
Instead, a new region, the Mid-West Region, was carved out from the Western Region
and created on August 9, 1963 “by constitutional means through a referendum” (Final Draft of
Nigeria National Conference Report, 2014, as cited in Ugorji 2017a, p. 180). Since the creation
of the Mid-West Region did not address the needs, concerns and fears of many minority ethnic
groups in the north and east, new waves of minority agitations erupted. As will be discussed
later, the abolition of the regional structure and the division of Nigeria into twelve states on May
27, 1967 was one of the drivers that catalyzed the Biafran secession from Nigeria on May 30,
1967 (Mustafa, 1969).
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After the 1960 independence of Nigeria and 1963 constitution that moved Nigeria from a
monarchy to a republic, one would have expected a decrease in interethnic rivalry and violent
conflict. In a previous research, I had argued that “the attainment of independence was an end
(an end in the sense of a goal) that led to a new beginning of, and serves as a precursor for, new
forms of conflict with different layers and levels of intensity, issues, and parties” (Ugorji, 2017a,
pp. 179-180). The conflicts that ensued were fermented by the very nature of the Nigerian
constitution. For example, and as stated before, members of the senate were appointed by the
various regional governments whose political parties were more or less regionally based. As
expected, parliamentarians only represented the interests of their region to the total exclusion of
others’ interests.
Also, having a regionally based political party not only led to hostile and intense power
struggle over which region or ethnic group will dominate or control the center. It also made it
easy for politicians to engage in corruption, as well as census and election malpractices in order
to have advantages over the other regions, maintain power at the center or form a favorable
coalition government with another regionally or ethnically based political party in pursuit of their
own advantage. As Akinola (2014) put it, “loyalty to the ethnic group took precedence over
national loyalty” (p. 7).
Another point that is worth noting is Post’s (1968) assertion that:
The ‘political frame’ left by the British proved unable to withstand the centrifugal
pressures of the ‘political facts’. That is, the parliamentary institutions of government and
values associated with them (such as free elections and the right of opposition) left
behind by the British, which had been evolved for the manipulation of a quite different
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system, proved totally unable to survive the demands of three central features of Nigerian
political life. (Post, 1968, pp. 28-29)
The three features discussed by Post (1968) include the manipulation of the system to the
exclusive benefit of one’s region or ethnic group; exploitation of existing structures as imposed
or created by the British to dominate other regions or ethnic groups; struggle over which region
or ethnic group will control the center for increased advantage over federal revenue allocation
and other resources. These points will be elaborated in the following paragraphs since they
constitute the expressed reasons for the January 15, 1966 coup.
Meanwhile, to mitigate conflicts between the regions and the center since the regions
enjoyed some concurrent powers with the federal government, Tamuno (1970) stated that “the
Constitutions of I960 and 1963 explicitly provided that, where a law passed by the Federal
Parliament conflicted with one made by any regional legislature, the federal law should prevail
while the regional law should be void to the extent of the inconsistency” (p. 572). As noted
before, the right of secession from the federation by any region was not included in the
constitution. This became a controversial issue in 1967 when eastern region decided to separate
from Nigeria.
The 1966 coup and counter coup as well as the 1967 Biafran secession were preceded by
the crises that erupted during the first few years of the Nigerian independence. These include the
1962/1963 crisis in the western region, the census crisis of 1963/1964, the 1964 general strike
and federal election crisis, and the western region election crisis of 1965 (Diamond, 1988). Each
of these early independence crises is briefly discussed. A brief explanation of a combination
of these crises is important for discerning the motivation for the January 1966 coup to which
a counter coup escalated to the Nigeria-Biafra War.
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The political crises that erupted during the early years of independence were a
product of inter (or intra) political party and regional conflict. A brief and qui ck review of
how the independence political parties were formed, structured and operated should suffice.
Although the beginning of political party formation in Nigeria could be traced to 1922
(Nnamdi Azikiwe, 1957, as cited in Akinola, 2014), it was only in the 1940s and 1950s that
the parties that negotiated Nigerian independence and its constitutional arrangements were
formed by the elites of the different regions. It is true that the independence era saw a
proliferation of political parties from various interest groups and regions, the three main
parties whose actions resulted in the early independence crises are the National Council of
Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) which was later renamed the National Council of
Nigerian Citizens, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), and the Action Group (AG). As
noted by Akinola (2014) and explained below, “most of the political parties… were formed
along regional lines and strengthened by the nature of Nigerian federalism” (p. 21).
Created on August 26, 1944 by the leading proponents of Nigerian independence and
nationalism, Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe, the National Council of Nigeria and
the Cameroons (NCNC) “was the only political party [until 1951] which claimed to be
national [in its structure and goals]” (Akinola, 2014, p.12). Nafziger (1973) described the
NCNC as “the prime vehicle for the nationalist movement [and] a pan-regional organization” (p.
509).
The national goal of the NCNC reflected the life of Nnamdi Azikiwe, who, not only
was born and raised in the northern city of Zungeru and later lived in Lagos, was also fluent
in the three major Nigerian languages – Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo (Oguibe, 1998). In addition,
it reflected the efforts of Igbo migrants present in all the regions of Nigeria “to achieve internal
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coherence and the idea of a Nigeria unified from the inside” unlike the Hausa and Yoruba who
“accepted the colonial definition of Nigeria and, in that sense, remained provincial” (Diamond,
2007, pp. 348-349). However, and as ethnic or regional politics kicked in, the NCNC only
succeeded in establishing a stronghold in Eastern Region and later within its neighbor, the
Mid-West Region. This is why the NCNC was later viewed as an Igbo dominated political
party (Akinola, 2014). If the NCNC had succeeded in its national and patriotic mission,
Post’s (1968) assertion that “the major political parties should have acted as a centripetal
force, operating at a national level to integrate the federation” (p. 31) would have
materialized.
The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) known in Hausa language as Jami’iyyar
Mutanen Arewa was founded in 1948 through a merger of various northern cultural
organizations and interest groups. Although the majority of northerners are Muslims, “Dr R.A.B.
Dikko, a Christian and the North’s first medical doctor, became its President” (Akinola, 2014, p.
17). Nevertheless, its name presupposes a northern first ideology to the exclusion of other
regions. According to Akinola (2014), the stated objectives of NPC implied “that membership
was not extended to the South, and that the preservation of Northern regionalism predominated
national concerns” (p. 18). However, and as will be discussed later, the NPC gradually became
“the most powerful party, with various opportunities to exert meaningful influence in both
domestic and external politics” (Akinola, 2014, pp. 15-16).
The Action Group (AG), officially launched on March 21, 1951 by Obafemi
Awolowo, was created from a Yoruba “cultural organization, Egbe Omo Oduduwa, which
was founded in 1947” (Akinola, 2014, p. 14). From its founding, the AG was designed to
represent the interests of the Western Region, especially the Yoruba people, but membership
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was extended to people from other regions. This is evident in Awolowo’s (1960, as cited in
Akinola, 2014) description of the party’s primary objective: “to devise plans for organizing
the people of the Western Region so that they may be able to play an influential and effective
role in the affairs of Nigeria under the New Constitution” (p. 14).
Having discussed the formation of political parties during the pre-independence era, it is
time to return to the causes of the crises that erupted in Western Region during the first few years
of the Nigerian independence and how these crises resulted in the 1966 coups and eventually the
Nigeria-Biafra War which started in 1967.
Duruji (2012) argued that “the emergence of these parties increased ethnic consciousness
and turned the politics of decolonization into contests for ethnic superiority” (p. 535). Because
the Nigerian constitution granted autonomy and absolute power to the regional governments,
Akinola (2014) argued that “each of the major parties, with the exception of the National Council
of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), concentrated its efforts on controlling the regional
legislatures: the Action Group (AG), the Western; the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the
Northern; and the NCNC, albeit begrudgingly, the Eastern” (p. 25).
As regionally based parties, it was easy for the NPC, AG and NCNC to maintain and
protect their political influence over the north, west and east respectively, while trying to either
secure some level of recognition and electoral seats in the other regional legislature or build a
coalition government at the federal level when possible. As rightly noted by Akinola (2014), “the
tendency was for leaders to jealously guard their individual regions against any incursion by
‘external’ political parties. At this time, symbols of tribal antagonism were the mobilizing tools
employed to confine the influence of ‘intruding’ political parties to their regions of origin” (p.
23).
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The first sign of political crisis caused by regional politics surfaced after the December
1951 regional elections. The NPC and NCNC won all the seats in their respective regional
Houses of Assembly. According to Akinola (2014), the outcome of this election was different in
the Western Region. While AG won 44 seats, the NCNC won 5 seats, particularly in Lagos.
However, members of the NCNC who had won the 5 seats under the NCNC platform left their
party and joined the AG on January 7, 1952 during the first Western House of Assembly session
probably after some consultations with the AG leadership under Obafemi Awolowo. Akinola
(2014) affirmed that “it was apparently a major surprise to the NCNC leaders that some of the
members elected on the party’s platform had decided to cross over to the A.G. side, thus
increasing the latter’s strength to 49, for a convenient control of the Western House of
Assembly” (p. 26).
This is how Nnamdi Azikiwe and his NCNC were robbed of seats in the Western House
of Assembly. Dennnis Osadebay (1982, as cited in Akinola, 2014) had posited that some people
advised Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the NCNC and an Igbo who had contested for a seat in Lagos
during the December 1951 Western House election, to “resign from the Western House of
Assembly where he was regarded as a stranger and seek a seat in the Eastern House of
Assembly” (pp. 26-27). According to Oguibe (1998), Nnamdi Azikiwe and his NCNC were
treated this way “because of his ethnic origins. It was one of the most humiliating moments in
the country's political history” (p. 90).
Nnamdi Azikiwe later moved back to the Eastern Region and got elected into the Eastern
government. For detailed information about how the NCNC’s disappointment in the Western
Region led the party leaders to turn against the MacPherson Constitution and how an internal
party disagreement and crisis in 1953 over the MacPherson Constitution resulted in the
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dissolution of the Eastern House of Assembly, see Akinola (2014). Akinola (2014) stated that
“following the 1953 crisis in the East, the House of Assembly was dissolved, and a new election
conducted, which swept the NCNC back into power” (p. 34). Nnamdi Azikiwe emerged as the
Premier of the Eastern Region.
Another political surprise came after the December 1954 federal elections. Given the
tripartite regional nature of the Nigerian political parties at that time, it was unanticipated that
any of the political parties will win a majority of the votes in another region. This was the case
with the NCNC. According to Akinola (2014), “the NCNC won the majority of seats in the East
and in the West, while the NPC had also won 79 of the 92 seats in the North. It was only the AG
that had not established an effective control over ‘their’ region, the West” (p. 35). Given the
outcome of the 1954 federal elections and irrespective of their ideological differences, the NCNC
and NPC entered into a coalition “to form the Federal Government, while the AG became the
official opposition” (Akinola, 2014, p. 36). The NPC-NCNC coalition continued even after the
1959 federal elections, extending into the first few years of independence which relegated the
AG to an unhappy opposition in the federal house.
In preparation for the 1960 independence government, many milestones needed to be
accomplished, among which are regional self-government and the 1959 federal elections. For the
first, Akinola (2014) opined that “the East and the West decided to become self-governing in
1957, while the North preferred to wait until 1959” (p. 38). For the second, federal elections
were held in December 1959. Out of a total of 312 federal house seats contested, the NPC won
142 seats only in the north. The NCNC with its northern affiliate party, Northern Elements
Progressive Union (NEPU), won a total of 89 seats, 8 in the north, 58 in the east, 21 in the west
and 2 in Lagos. The AG won a total of 73 seats, 24 of which came from the north, 14 from the
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east, 34 from the west and 1 from Lagos. The remaining 8 seats were won by independents in the
western region.
Since the NPC did not win a majority of seats in the other regions, and given that neither
the NCNC nor AG won a majority of seats in the other regions, “a coalitional government
became inevitable” (Akinola, 2014, p. 42) between two parties in compliance with the
constitution. Having enjoyed a coalition government since1954, and “in the interest of national
unity” (Akinola, 2014, p. 42), the NPC led by Ahmadu Bello and the NCNC led by Nnamdi
Azikiwe formed a coalition government, which again relegated Obafemi Awolowo’s AG to an
excruciating opposition in the federal house.
The position of the Prime Minister was the most important of all. The NPC insisted on
occupying this position during a meeting with the then British Governor-General, Sir James
Robertson (Akinola, 2014). Although the NCNC members believed their higher western
education status will give them an advantage over the NPC members, Akinola (2014) noted that
“the NPC men ‘proved extremely able politicians,’ and asserted themselves as de facto leaders of
the alliance” (p. 58). Contrary to Ejiogu’s (2007) assertion that “the British consciously entrusted
political power [to the Hausa-Fulani political leaders]” (p. 108), it was after negotiations with the
NCNC that former headmaster, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a Hausa-Fulani Muslim and a
member of the NPC, became the first Prime Minister of Nigeria. “Seven ministerial
appointments were conceded to the NCNC, while the NPC retained ten” (Akinola, 2014, p. 43).
As part of the NPC-NCNC coalition agreement, Prime Minister Balewa recommended
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the NCNC, to the Queen of England for the position of the
Governor-General. On November 16, 1960, Nnamdi Azikiwe became the first indigenous
Governor-General of Nigeria, six weeks after Nigeria gained its independence (Akinola, 2014).
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In 1963, a constitutional amendment changed the title of Governor-General to that of a
ceremonial President, making Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe the first President of Nigeria, while Alhaji
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa remained in his official position as the Prime Minister of Nigeria.
With the Western Region based party, AG, relegated to a virulent opposition in the
federal house, and the Eastern and Northern parties, NCNC-NPC, in an incompatible coalition
characterized by mutual suspicion (Perham, 1970), the latent conflicts that were previously
suppressed or managed by the colonial administrators were doomed to fully manifest during the
first few years after independence. This is because the arbiter – colonial administrators – have
withdrawn from the government and power has now been placed in the hands of the natives. In
my previous article on this subject (Ugorji, 2017a), I had argued that:
while the British colonial administrators served both as an external judge and a mediator
– judging and mediating between the various ethnic groups in Nigeria –, such an external
third party, possessing constitutional power, military might, and mediation skills as well
as economic influence, was absent after the independence of Nigeria on October 1, 1960.
From 1960 to 1966, Nigeria was able to manage and prevent its manifest conflict
processes from escalating to the aggressive manifest conflict processes because the
warmth and influence of the powerful external arbiter and mediator, and the mastermind
of the amalgamation architectural experiment – the British colonial administrators – were
still felt. But this did not last long. What happened from 1966… is an indication that a
house built on a weak foundation cannot stand. No matter how much the builders try to
prevent it from falling, it will surely collapse. (pp. 177-178)
Putting this in a conflict analysis perspective, the independence era manifest conflicts that
will be discussed below could be summed up using Coser’s (1956) definition of conflict as “a
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struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the
opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals” (p. 8). The situation becomes worse
when each of the groups, in this case, regionally based political parties or ethnic groups, “have a
common identity and a capacity for coordinated action” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, p. 27).
To be able to neutralize or even paralyze the NPC-NCNC coalition government, the AG
began its coordinated action. According to Akinola (2014), “the Action Group maintained an
uncompromising opposition, both in domestic and foreign policy matters, and was soon to
endear itself to militant segments of the population” (p. 46). In reaction to the AG’s virulent
opposition and the intense criticisms launched against the NPC-NCNC coalition government by
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the AG, coalition government leaders took provocative
actions.
First, Obafemi Awolowo was censured by the House of Representatives in order to
silence him (Akinola, 2014). Second, leveraging on the persistent minority agitation for the
creation of new states, the coalition government, championed by the NCNC and supported by the
NPC, agreed to split Western Region by creating from it the Mid-West Region (Akinola, 2014;
Falola & Heaton, 2008). The goal was to weaken Western Region politically and infiltrate the
NCNC in the Mid-West Region through the region’s Igbo indigenes who were closely affiliated
to the NCNC.
Akinola (2014) labeled the NPC-NCNC coalition agreement that created the MidWestern Region “the greatest conspiracy in Nigeria’s ‘trilateral’ relations” (p. 48). This is
because both the NPC and NCNC ignored minority agitations for states creation in their own
regions – Northern Region and Eastern Region. Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) had argued that
minorities in all the three regions, about 250 ethnic groups and tribes, tirelessly “sought creation
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of more regions in order to be freed from the domination of their more numerous and cohesive
neighbors” (p. 1). Instead of granting their demands, the NPC-NCNC coalition government
decided to divide only the west “which was then the smallest of the three regions” (Akinola,
2014, p. 48).
Nafziger (1973) posited that the AG had agitated “for the creation of new states in
minority areas in the North and East during the 1950s. These actions bitterly antagonized the
ruling coalition - especially the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the instrument of the
powerful aristocracy whose survival depended upon dominance in an undivided North
hegemonic at the center” (p. 510). However, it was not only the AG that was pro-minority
regions creation in the 1950s. Minorities themselves fiercely agitated for new regions. As
Herskovits (1973) stated, “a ‘Minorities Commission’, authorized by the British government and
headed by a British civil servant, concluded in 1958 that even if the fears were not entirely
groundless they were not worth delaying independence to assuage” (p. 393). What this means is
that new regions were to be created for minorities after independence. The only problem with the
NPC-NCNC coalition decision is that by creating Mid-West Region they split Western Region
while keeping their respective regions – Northern Region and Eastern Region – intact in order to
maintain political and economic advantage over Western Region.
The creation of Mid-West Region, although a way to punish the AG, was guided by an
already established constitutional procedure for creating new states. Following Schwarz Jr.
(1965), Akinola (2014) summarized this procedure as follows:
1. Two-thirds of the members of both Houses of the Federal Parliament had to approve a

resolution supporting the new region;
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2. Both the Houses of the regional legislature in a majority of the existing regions had to

approve the same resolution;
3. The Federal Parliament had to pass a more detailed bill providing for the creation of

the new region;
4. The bill had to be approved by resolutions of each legislative House in at least two

regions; and
5. 60 percent of those entitled to vote in the proposed new region had to vote for its

creation in a plebiscite. (p. 49)
A referendum was conducted and its outcome, “an average of 75.6 percent in favor of the
new region” (Akinola, 2014, p. 50), concluded the creation of Mid-West Region on July 18,
1963. As will be discussed later, this same political tactic employed by the NCNC to weaken the
AG in the west was used in May 1967 by the northern-led federal military government with the
support of the western leaders after the 1966 coups to divide Eastern Region into three states in
order to weaken the NCNC supported move toward the secession of Biafra.
The cause of the January 1966 military coup which ended the Frist Republic and ushered
in the era of aggressive manifest conflict processes in Nigeria of which the Nigeria-Biafra War is
the apex (Ugorji, 2017) could be traced to the 1962 intra-Action Group (AG) party conflict in
Western Region (Nafziger, 1973; Nafziger, 1972). Akinola (2014) corroborated this view and
argued that the 1962 intra-AG party crisis is significant because “it was an important ‘remote’
cause of military intervention in Nigerian politics” (p. 51). Other crises that unfolded include
arbitrary removal of elected officials in Western Region who appeared to be anti-northern
agenda and replacement with pro-northern elements in 1962; census malpractices and fraud in
1962 and 1963; the December 1964 federal elections marred by kidnapping, assassination,
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rigging and intimidation of some candidates, as well as boycott by the southern parties; the
October 11, 1965 Western House of Assembly elections marred by fraud and murder (Nafziger,
1972). Each of these crises is briefly examined below beginning with the 1962 intra-Action
Group (AG) party conflict.
Although there was an inter-personal conflict between the leader of the AG, Obafemi
Awolowo, and the Western Region premier, Samuel Ladoke Akintola, who “succeeded Chief
Awolowo as Premier of the Western Region in 1959” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 167), the 1962
intra-Action Group party conflict was caused by the two leaders’ differences in political ideology
and vision for their party, Action Group. Having observed the failure of Action Group in the
federal elections of 1954 and 1959, the exclusion of the Action Group from the federal
government coalition and positions, and the impact of these on the people of Western Region,
Premier Akintola became a staunch advocate for a regional conservatism just like the NPC in the
north (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Nafziger, 1973).
In Premier Akintola’s view, with a regional conservative party ideology, the Action
Group will be able to join the NPC and NCNC in forming a federal government coalition
(Akinola, 2014; Falola & Heaton, 2008). As a federal government coalition partner, Premier
Akintola believed the AG will “have greater access to federal power and to the resources that the
NPC doled out as the ruling party” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 167). Nafziger (1973) opined that
Premier Akintola’s vision for AG was “supported particularly by conservative business elements
who wished to protect their regional economic interests” (p. 510).
Premier Akintola’s goal for the Action Group was interpreted by Obafemi Awolowo as
inimical and deleterious to the main objectives of the Action Group, which are democratic
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socialism and party expansion to all the regions (Ezera, 1964, as cited in Akinola, 2014; Falola &
Heaton, 2008). In Akinola’s (2014) assessment,
Chief Akintola seemed to be considering the interest of the Yorubas within the national
context, and was of the opinion that the politics of confrontation at the center was not
rewarding. Joining the coalition would mean that party competition would be traded for
political sensitivity, as the three major parties would not want to offend each other. (p.
53)
Ojiako (1981) argued that Premier Akintola’s break from Awolowo’s agenda initiated a fierce
and disastrous “battle between the young radicals led by Awolowo and the businessmen and
traditional rulers led by Chief Akintola” (p. 96).
This ideological battle manifested itself in different ways. These range from a walk out
from the AG convention in Jos by Premier Akintola and his faction, to the AG party members’
vote of no confidence against Premier Akintola, and finally to Akintola’s removal from the
position of the premier “by the Governor of the West, Oba Adesoji Aderemi, who replaced him
with Alhaji Dauda Adegbenro” (Akinola, 2014, p. 55). Falola and Heaton (2008) confirmed that
Alhaji Dauda Adegbenro was “Awolowo’s ally” (p. 167).
Rejecting the decision of the governor of Western Region, and with the backing of the
northern and eastern premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Dr. Michael Okpara, aggrieved Akintola
“asked the Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa, to revoke the Governor’s appointment” (Akinola,
2014, p. 55). Although the northern-led federal coalition government was hostile to Awolowo
and his opposition party, Action Group, it was the violent confrontation that broke out between
Akintola’s faction and Awolowo’s faction in the Western House of Assembly on May 25, 1962
during the confirmation of the newly appointed premier that contributed to the declaration of a
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state of emergency in Western Region by the federal government (Tamuno, 1970). Falola and
Heaton (2008) argued that the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, wanting to “align with Akintola
and gain a foothold in the Western Region, declared a state of emergency, and suspended the AG
government for six months” (p. 167). To help mitigate the conflict, Akinola (2014) noted that “a
care-taker committee was appointed to administer the West for six months… [until] January
1963 [when] Chief S. L. Akintola was asked to resume his position as Premier” (pp. 55-56).
Nafziger (1973) affirmed that “during the next two years the ruling alliance used several politicolegal measures to crush the Action Group, to depose its leader, and to facilitate the rise of a more
compliant party in the West” (p. 511).
Two consequential events took place at this time. The one is the formation of a new
political party, the United People’s Party (UPP), by Akintola and his followers which was allied
to the NCNC (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Based on this alliance, Akintola began to govern under
the UPP/NCNC coalition (Akinola, 2014). The other is that the state of emergency imposed on
the Western Region unlocked another opportunity to unleash a more severe punishment on
Awolowo and his party, Action Group. The NPC-NCNC federal coalition government “alleged
that Awolowo had plotted to overthrow the Federal Government, to establish a more
‘progressive’ administration (Akinola, 2014, p. 57). On charges of “corruption and treason,”
Awolowo and his colleagues were “found guilty by the court, and… jailed” (Akinola, 2014, p.
57).
Falola and Heaton (2008) cautioned that the corruption charges against Awolowo and his
AG members were initiated by the interim government that the NPC-led federal government
established during the Western Region state of emergency. Awolowo was “found… guilty of
diverting regional funds in the amount of over N£ 5 million [Nigerian pounds], which he was
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accused of using for political purposes to strengthen the AG in the Western Region. Several
other AG leaders, including Chief Anthony Enahoro and Alhaji Lateef Jakande, were tried for
treasonable felonies and imprisoned along with Awolowo in 1962” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p.
167). Nafziger (1973) stated that Awolowo’s prison sentence was ten years. The punitive move
of the NPC-led coalition government against their political opponent, AG, was highly criticized
by the public as a higher level of corruption, and it made matters worse and more complicated
(Tamuno, 1970).
The punishment of the AG as described above and the imprisonment of Awolowo were
early signs of the corruption of the NPC-led federal government and a system built on rewarding
political allies and punishing political opponents. Nevertheless, the mutually suspicious coalition
of the NPC and NCNC was not immune to rupture. The first crack in the NPC-NCNC federal
coalition was seen after the 1963 national census (Tamuno, 1970; Perham, 1970).
It was a known fact that the north outnumbered the south. Due to the north’s numerical
strength as was evident from the 1953 census figures, the north occupied almost half of the seats
in the federal House of Representatives and enjoyed more revenue allocation from the federal
government than the eastern and western regions (Falola & Heaton, 2008). This is probably why
the east and west were looking for an opportunity to increase their population figures in order to
enhance their representative powers and economic opportunities at the federal level.
Prior to the 1963 census, a census was conducted in 1962 and the north accused both the
east and west of inflating their population figures (Falola & Heaton, 2008). “Accusations from
the North concerning the inflation of figures, especially in the East, led to the results being
suppressed” (Nafziger, 1973, p. 511). According to Falola and Heaton (2008),
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when the census figures were released in May, they indicated an incredible 70 percent
increase in the population of the Eastern and Western Regions since 1953, compared to a
30 percent increase in the Northern Region. These figures were no doubt grossly
inaccurate, and the NPC-led government refused to ratify them, instead ordering another
census to be held the next year. (p. 168)
However, the NCNC which had already established its stronghold in Eastern Region and
Mid-West Region, and was gradually becoming popular in Western Region never anticipated
that the result of the 1963 census will dramatically show an increase in the population figures of
the north. The census revealed that the population increase in the north was far greater than in the
south. As Falola and Heaton (2008) noted, “some 8 million new northerners had been
discovered… The results were widely regarded as fraudulent. There were even reports that in
some areas livestock had been counted as people” (p. 168). The NCNC therefore accused the
NPC of manipulating and inflating the census figures in the north (Akinola, 2014; Tamuno,
1970). Falola and Heaton (2008) also argued that while,
the NCNC bitterly opposed the ratification of the new census figures, …[it] failed to
prevent them [from] becoming official. Akintola, who was in the pocket of the NPC,
accepted the figures on behalf of the Western Region, while the newly formed MidWestern Region’s premier, Dennis Osadebey, accepted the figures ‘for the sake of
national unity’. (p. 168)
According to Tamuno (1970),
the NPC and AG made similar charges against the NCNC leaders in the Eastern Region.
Despite such charges and counter-charges, it was generally believed that Nigeria’s I963
census figure of 55-6 million was an over-count. Though bitterness over this issue was
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nationwide, no one Region was above reproach in the counting of ‘ghosts’ during the
1963 census exercise. (p. 574)
Out of 55,620,268 people counted and recorded by the 1963 census as the official
population of Nigeria, the north’s population was 29,758,875 which was more than half the
Nigerian population (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The Hausa-Fulani, the dominant ethnic group in
the north, estimated to be 16 million outnumbered the 11.7 million Yoruba in the west and the
10.3 million Igbo in the east. The total number of minorities in all the regions were about 20
million people (1963 census, as cited in Post, 1968).
The implication of this census result was that “the proportional allocation of federal
representation and revenues continued to favor the Northern Region” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p.
168). The conflict over the census figures, in addition to the NCNC’s resentment against the
NPC, resulted in the termination of the NPC-NCNC federal coalition in 1964 before the 1964
federal elections.
The 1964 federal elections caused the emergence of new forms of federal coalitions. In
Western Region, Akintola’s United People’s Party (UPP) broke ties with the NCNC and seized
the opportunity provided by the rupture of the NPC-NCNC federal coalition to ally itself with the
national ruling party, NPC (Akinola, 2014). To formalize this new alliance, and given the
negative perception of the Yorubas about the UPP, Akintola lured influential Yoruba “NCNC
leaders in the West to join forces with him to form a brand new party, the Nigerian National
Democratic Party (NNDP)” (Akinola, 2014, p. 59). After the formation of the NNDP and the
crossing over of some Western Region based leaders of the NCNC to the NNDP, the NCNC
began to lose its influence in Western Region. This cemented an alliance between the NPC and
Akintola’s new party, NNDP.
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The NPC-NNDP alliance was known during the 1964 federal elections as the Nigerian
National Alliance (NNA) (Akinola, 2014; Falola & Heaton, 2008), “the main goal of which was
the prolongation of the status quo” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 169). Having both accused the
NPC of inflating the 1963 census figures in the north, the NCNC had no other choice than to
reconcile with the AG, and together with the Northern Elements Progressive Union and United
Middle Belt Congress, they formed their own alliance which was called the United Progressive
Grand Alliance (UPGA) (Akinola, 2014; Falola & Heaton, 2008; Nafziger, 1973). UPGA’s
campaign message in Western Region was centered around the release of Obafemi Awolowo
from prison as well as the removal of the NPC from the federal government, a party they both
considered to be “a feudalistic and ultra-conservative party” (Akinola, 2014, p. 60). Falola and
Heaton (2008) also argued that “the main goals of the UPGA were the ousting of the NPC from
control of the federal government and the reinstatement of AG supremacy in the Western
Region, and deposing the highly unpopular regime of Premier Akintola and his newly formed
Nigerian National Democratic Party” (p. 169).
The tensed political climate in Nigeria before and after the December 30, 1964 federal
elections was exacerbated by a mutually harbored fear of domination (Falola & Heaton, 2008).
This mutual fear of domination was further elaborated by Uche (2008). This author argued that
“in the struggle over the national wealth, control depended on who dominated the government at
the center” (p. 116). Falola and Heaton (2008) argued that:
Southerners feared that an NPC-controlled government representing the interests of the
Northern Region would divert resources to the north, cut southerners out of their
positions in the administration and the military, and gradually Islamize the country.
Northerners feared that southern ‘domination’ by Awolowo’s Action Group and
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Azikiwe’s newly renamed National Convention of Nigerian Citizens would allocate
resources to the more developed Western and Eastern Regions, which would prevent the
north from ever developing in a competitive way. They also feared that southern
‘domination’ would mean that southerners would come to control the civil service and
educational institutions of the north, since northerners would continually be denied the
resources to develop an educated class to compete on merit with southerners. (p. 165)
Among many examples cited by the southern-based NCNC and AG of how the NPC-led
federal government was using federal funds to promote “a northern agenda” to the detriment of
the south was the use of the First National Development Plan (FNDP) funds to develop the north.
Falola and Heaton (2008) stated that “although the FNDP claimed to be a national development
plan, in actuality the bulk of the allocations went to projects in the north. Nearly all the funds
earmarked for defense and a majority of the funds for health, education, and roads went to
projects in the north, while the Niger Dam project, estimated at £68.1 million but ultimately
costing over £88 million, accounted for over 10 percent of all federal spending” (p. 166).
Other southern grievances against the north was that “the NPC-led government regularly
handed out appointments and promotions to underqualified northerners at the expense of more
qualified southerners” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 166). Although, at the dawn of independence,
the Nigerian military was “staffed predominantly by northerners but led predominantly by
southerners, particularly by Igbos from the Eastern Region. In 1961 the NPC reversed this trend
by extending the quota system to officer recruitment. Thereafter, 50 percent of all officers came
from the Northern Region, regardless of their relative qualifications vis-a`-vis those of their
southern compatriots” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 166). Ejiogu (2007) also noted that “when
northern politicians assumed state power in 1960, they enacted policies that increased the
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number of northerners in the corps. For instance, they lowered entry qualifications and
drastically slashed failure rates in selection tests into the Nigerian Military Training College with
the aim of attracting more northern enlistees” (p. 109).
Due to this quota system policy, the percentage of Eastern Nigerian officers in the
Nigerian officer corps drastically reduced from about 68% before independence to 31% after
independence, while the north saw a rapid increase from 14% to 48%. The west enjoyed a slight
increase from 17% to 21% (Ejiogu, 2007). Ejiogu (2007) also argued that the NPC-led federal
government’s decision to implement a quota that increased the number of northern officers could
be understood from the fact that “irrespective of the predominance of northerners in the rank and
file, the [NPC] politicians were troubled by the sparse presence of northerners in the corps” (p.
110). Falola and Heaton (2008) contended that “policies such as these infuriated southerners,
who saw their hard-won skills disregarded by a federal system that increasingly seemed to value
ethnicity over merit” (p. 166).
Nonetheless, it is always easy to point accusatory fingers at others. As Uphoff and
Ottemoeller (1970) noted, “no tribe could claim that it did not discriminate in favor of ‘its own’”
(1970, p. 1). The western educated and highly industrious Igbos making up about 60 percent of
the population of the east, many of whom were living in the north and west, were viewed by
northerners and westerners as a threat to their economic survival as a result of their
competitiveness and clannishness. Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) stated that the “Hausas found
Igbos giving job preference to Igbos in the North; Yoruba traders found Igbos giving special
prices to Igbos in the West. In a country where material means are scarce, conflicts over
economic resources are more serious than elsewhere, especially when overlaid with tribal
differences” (p. 1).
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Because of the northern resentment against the southerners especially the Igbos in the
north and enabled by “the policy of Northernisation instituted in late I955, which gave priority in
many positions to the local ethnic communities…, from June I958 to October I 959, the number
of Southerners in the Northern public service declined from 294 to one” (Nafziger, 1973, pp.
526-527). Nonetheless, the southerners, particularly the Igbos, still dominated the private
economy in the north during the pre– and post– independence periods. Anthony (2010) provided
a comprehensive explanation of the Northernisation policy.
Northernization [was] aimed to reduce the region’s reliance on southern civil servants
and professionals by expanding educational opportunities for northerners and curtailing
employment of southerners, often by replacing them with more expensive expatriates
while northerners received training. The policy became a major issue in inter-regional
relations, and remained an open wound well beyond Nigerian independence. (Anthony,
2010, p. 48)
As will be explained later, it was these ethnically skewed “recruitment patterns… [that] were
largely responsible for the evolution of factionalism in the officer corps” (Ejiogu, 2007, p. 112).
This in turn facilitated the planning of military coups of January 15, 1966 and July 29, 1966.
In addition to the above discriminatory practices and ethnically skewed recruitments
within the military, there were ethnically motivated political maltreatments and voter
intimidation that had devastating consequences. Prior to the December 30, 1964 federal
elections, especially in the north, “UPGA candidates were denied entry into towns where rallies
were planned. Often UPGA candidates and supporters were arbitrarily detained or arrested, as in
Kano in October 1964, when local police arrested a reported 297 UPGA supporters” (Falola &
Heaton, 2008, p. 169). Also, one of the leading members of UPGA in the north, Joseph Tarka,
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who was the leader of the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), was arbitrarily arrested on
October 17, 1964 and was accused of “incitement, further hampering the UPGA campaign in the
north” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 169).
These arrests and harassments were analyzed by Nafziger (1973). The author confirmed
that “although the UPGA started the campaign with confidence, its candidates and spokesmen
encountered harassment and violence, and some were arrested while making their nominations in
the North” (Nafziger, 1973, p. 511). In Western Region where the NNA main ally, NNDP, was
in power, Falola and Heaton (2008) stated that there were noticeably high level of “violence and
corruption as the NNDP tried to quash the UPGA and its supporters. Thugs regularly beat up
UPGA supporters, destroyed UPGA property, and promoted a general atmosphere of fear” (p.
169).
With all these intimidation, violence, corruption, voter suppression and obstruction, the
UPGA suspected a planned rigging of the election by the NNA (Akinola, 2014). As a result, Dr.
Michael I. Okpara, the Eastern Region premier, during an interview he granted on December 24,
I964, threatened that Eastern Region will “secede from the federation” (Daily Times, January 13,
I965, as cited in Tamuno, 1970, p. 574). Tamuno (1970) also noted that before Premier Okpara’s
threat of secession, President Azikiwe had “warned of the dangers of disintegration arising from
the allegations made about the conduct of the I964 federal election” (p. 574). During his
December 10, 1964 address to the nation, President Azikiwe stated:
I make this suggestion because it is better for us and for our admirers abroad that we
should disintegrate in peace and not in pieces. Should the politicians fail to heed this
warning, then I will venture the prediction that the experience of the democratic [sic]
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Republic of the Congo will be child’s play if it ever comes to our turn to play such a
tragic role. (Daily Times, January 13, I965, as cited in Tamuno, 1970, p. 574)
Although not related to the 1964/1965 federal elections, the people of the Middle-Belt
within Northern Region led by the Tiv also threatened secession in 1965. “The major Tiv
grievances arose mainly from deeply felt frustration with the maladministration of the Tiv area
from colonial times to independence” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 575). In addition, the United Middle
Belt Congress (UMBC)’s demand “for the creation of more states were stoutly opposed by NPC
leaders” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 575).
Against the idea of disintegrating Nigeria at this time, Northern premier, Ahmadu Bello,
“emphasized that the 1963 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria had ‘no provision for
secession or disintegration’” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 574). This view was echoed by Mid-West
premier, Dennis Osadebay, an NCNC member, who, “in a public statement on December 19,
I964, regretted the talk of ‘secession’ and called upon Nigerians to affirm ‘that Nigeria is one
and indivisible’” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 575).
The UPGA’s fear that the NNA planned to rig the December 30, 1964 federal elections
led to an election boycott in Eastern Region’s 51 constituencies, as well as in 3 Lagos
constituencies within the federal capital territory (Akinola, 2014; Falola & Heaton, 2008;
Nafziger, 1973). Nafziger (1973) insinuated that:
the UPGA staged an election boycott, anticipating that President Nnamdi Azikiwe, an
Igbo sympathetic to the NCNC, would use this as a pretense for postponing the elections
and installing a caretaker Prime Minister - presumably favorable to the UPGA - with the
support of the army, led by a disproportionate number of Igbo officers. (p. 512)
This calculation did not materialize. As Nafziger (1973) also explained:
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the army and the police supported Prime Minister Balewa and the winning NNA
coalition. Major-General Welby-Everard, soon to be retired as General Officer
Commanding the Nigerian Army (GOC), had no inclination to act contrary to the legal
advice from the Chief Justice which supported the Prime Minister. Although MajorGeneral J. T. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the highest Nigerian officer, was an Igbo, he had no reason to
jeopardize his possible promotion to GOC with the departure of British personnel the
following month. Balewa’s consultation with top officers in the armed forces helped
ensure their loyalty, as there was still some survival of the legacy of their communal
neutrality and the shreds of legitimacy attached to the civilian Government. (p. 512)
Unfortunately, the army’s neutrality did not last long. “Communal affiliation in the army became
especially crucial after its politicization, which was particularly strong after the departure of the
last British officer in early 1965” (Nafziger, 1973, p. 529).
Elections were however held in the north, west, and mid-west, and the NNA won the
highest number of federal seats (Akinola, 2014; Falola & Heaton, 2008). Falola and Heaton
(2008) opined that “Prime Minister Balewa called upon President Azikiwe to invite the creation
of an NNA government, but Azikiwe, loyal to the NCNC that he had helped to found, refused to
do so. A constitutional stalemate ensued, which was ended by negotiations between Azikiwe and
Balewa” (p. 170). The outcome of the negotiations which Falola and Heaton (2008) called the
“Zik-Balewa Pact” is in threefold: the NNA was to include UPGA in its broad-based federal
coalition; an election was to be conducted only in the constituencies that boycotted the December
30, 1964 elections; and an election was to be held in Western Region in 1965 for the Western
House of Assembly.
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After conducting a supplementary election in March 1965 for those constituencies in the
east and Lagos that boycotted the December 30, 1964 election, the NNA still won the majority of
the seats both in Northern Region and Western Region, with a total of “198 of the 312 seats in
the federal assembly” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, P. 170). This put the NNA in a favorable position
to form a federal coalition government. Since Eastern Region and Mid-West Region were the
stronghold of the NCNC, UPGA was able to win the majority of the seats in both regions.
The implication of this was that after the Nigerian President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who
was also an NCNC member, reluctantly authorized Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the NNA
leader, to form a broad-based federal coalition government, the NNA decided to include the
NCNC in their coalition government as a sign of compromise in order to avert looming violence
and disintegration of Nigeria. Akinola (2014) opined that “the so-called broad-based government
was formed to the exclusion of the Action Group” (p. 62). Falola and Heaton (2008) contended
that “although this was a clear victory [for the NNA], the conduct of the election had been
disastrous, causing resentment among UPGA supporters and causing many Nigerians to question
the fairness of the country’s democratic system” (pp. 170-171).
The trend from 1954 to 1965 shows that the Action Group was the victim of the Nigerian
federal government coalitions during this period. This marginalizing and exclusivistic trend
culminated in the October 1965 Western Region House of Assembly election malpractice and
rigging by Premier Akintola’s NNDP (Falola & Heaton, 2008). According to Akinola (2014), “it
was an open secret that party elites were prepared to rig the elections. Electoral malpractices
were at their peak. Many NNDP candidates were declared to have won unopposed, without
giving their opponents the chance to register” (p. 63). Falola and Heaton (2008) stated that:
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reports on election day, October 11, 1965, indicated cases of multiple voting and stuffing
of ballot boxes in the NNDP’s favor. Also, in a highly irregular move, Akintola decided
that the results of the elections were to be disseminated only from the central
headquarters in Ibadan and were not to be announced at local polling places, as was
normal practice, giving NNDP electoral officials the time and secrecy to alter results as
necessary. (p. 171)
Premier Akintola’s unflinching effort to cling to power in Western Region by openly
rigging the election, compounded by the detention of UPGA leaders, led to a mass resistance and
an uprising (Falola & Heaton, 2008). “Across the Western Region, people took to the streets to
protest the election results. Throughout November and December the Western Region was a
battle zone, as UPGA supporters rioted, clashing with police, looting and burning the homes of
NNDP supporters, and even killing them in some cases” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 171).
Akinola (2014) also noted that during this crisis, “political opponents were slaughtered and their
houses burnt” (p. 63).
There was a suggestion that to avert the crisis, NNDP should form a government in
Western Region with UPGA which was a coalition between the AG and NCNC. Akintola’s
NNDP and its ally, the NPC with the backing of the northern leader, Ahmadu Bello the Sardauna
of Sokoto, rejected a comprise solution (Akinola, 2014). “Rather than call a state of emergency
in the Western Region, Prime Minister Balewa instead decided to send forces for the sole
purpose of supporting his ally Akintola, but to little avail” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 172).
Both the rigging of election and refusal to form a broad-based coalition regional
government reopened the NCNC’s grievances against the NPC. The NCNC at this time
concluded that the NPC was out to exclude its party members from holding elected office in
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Western Region, a region that is “vital in a North-South confrontation” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 575).
In reaction, Tamuno (1970) stated that “N. A. Frank Opigo, then an NCNC parliamentarian in
the Federal House of Representatives, called for the secession of the Eastern Region from the
Federation ‘without any further delay’. But the NCNC wisely refused to carry out Opigo’s
proposal in I965” (p. 575).
Falola and Heaton (2008) summarized the political ills of the Nigerian First Republic as
“official corruption, rigged elections, ethnic baiting, bullying, and thuggery” (p. 159). These,
they argued, “dominated the conduct of politics in the First Republic, which existed from 1960 to
1966” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 159). It was in the aftermath of a deadlock over the rigged
results of the Western Region election and the destructive crisis it engendered that a bloody
military coup was executed on January 15, 1966 which escalated the existing conflict to an
aggressive manifest conflict processes (Sandole, 2008, as cited in Ugorji, 2017).
Aggressive Manifest Conflict Era (1966 -)
Reflecting on the precursors of the January 15, 1966 military coup, Post (1968) argued
that “the weakness of the Nigerian political system, then, was that it never developed centripetal
forces capable of counteracting the centrifugal ones” (p. 30). Similarly, Falola and Heaton (2008)
explained that:
since regional identities were strong and national identity was weak, the greatest fear of
most Nigerians in the 1960s was that their region would become ‘dominated’ by another.
Southerners from the Eastern and Western Regions feared northern domination, and
northerners feared southern domination. These fears led to severely flawed elections in
1964 and 1965, in which all kinds of dirty tricks were used by every side. Under these
circumstances, many Nigerians came to believe that the federal system was dysfunctional
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and that Nigeria should cease to exist in its present form. These attitudes led directly to
the overthrow of the civilian democratic regime by several military officers in January
1966. (p. 159)
The January 15, 1966 coup. Planned by young army officers popularly known as the
Five Majors or young Igbo majors (Oguibe, 1998; Nafziger, 1973) which include Major
Emmanuel Ifeajuna with his fellow conspirators, Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu,
Major Donatus Okafor, Major Chris Anuforo and Major Adewale Ademoyega -, the January 15,
1966 military coup which abruptly ended the First Republic was the most consequential event in
Nigerian history. Consequential because, as will be discussed later, it resulted in a more deadly
and bloody counter coup on July 29, 1966 which was accompanied by months of mass execution
or ethnic cleansing (popularly known as the pogroms) of Eastern Nigerians, especially the Igbos
in Northern Nigeria. This led to the flight of Easterners back to Eastern Nigeria and paved the
way for the secession of Biafra on May 30, 1967, culminating in the Nigeria-Biafra War of July
6, 1967 – January 15, 1970.
As eyewitness accounts and experts posited, there were many other army officers who
participated in the planning and execution of the January 15, 1966 coup such as Major Timothy
Onwuatuegwu and Deputy Adjutant-General Humphrey Chukwuka along with Second
Lieutenant Godwin Onyefuru and Sergeant Donatus Anyanwu (Siollun, 2009; Ejiogu, 2007).
Table 1 below shows a detailed list of the key planners and executors of the coup and their ethnic
origins as was carefully prepared by Ejiogu (2007).
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Table 1
List of Key Planners and Executors of January 15, 1966 Military Coup
Rank/Name
Major Nzeogwu
Major Ifeajuna
Major Okafor
Major Anuforo
Major Chukwuka
Major Aghaya
Major Onwuatuegwu
Major Ademoyega
Captain Gbulie
Captain Nwobosi
Captain Oji
Captain Udeaja
Captain Ude
Lieutenant Oyewole
Lieutenant Adeleke
Lieutenant Ezeigbo
Second Lieutenant Azubuogor
Second Lieutenant Nwokocha
Second Lieutenant Ojukwu
Second Lieutenant Onyefuru
Second Lieutenant Igweze
Second Lieutenant Egbibor
Second Lieutenant Ngwuluka
Second Lieutenant Nweke
Second Lieutenant Ikejiofor
Second Lieutenant Olafimihan

Ethnic Origin

South (Igbo)

South (Yoruba)

South (Igbo)

South (Yoruba)

South (Igbo)

South (Yoruba)

Note. Adapted from Ejiogu (2007, pp. 113-114).
Ben Gbulie (2016) who was a captain during the January 15, 1966 coup published what
he considers as an insider account about the coup in his memoir, “Nigeria’s Five Majors: Coup
d’etat of 15th January 1966, first inside account.” Ben Gbulie (2016) revealed that he was a key
planner and executor of the coup and explained why the coup was carried out, how it was
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planned and executed, who the actors were, who their targets were, and why their ultimate
objective to take over the government did not materialize in Lagos. Before Gbulie’s (2016)
account, Adewale Ademoyega, one of the nicknamed Five Majors who led the planning and
execution of the coup, had published what is generally considered as an authoritative account of
the coup execution in his book, “Why we struck: The story of the first Nigerian coup”
(Ademoyega, 1981).
Oguibe (1998) affirmed that the Five Majors who led the coup planning were inspired by
“the Egyptian Free Officers Movement which had put an end to Egypt’s corrupt monarchy some
fifteen years earlier” (p. 92). Diamond (2007) stated that “census rigging, electoral corruption,
financial scandals, led to the first military coup of January 1966 and the end of the First
Republic” (p. 349). With the goal of bringing “an end to the tribalism and corruption that had
characterized the First Republic” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 172), in addition to a specific
objective which was “to rescue the country from the autocracy of Hausa-Fulani rule” (Ejiogu,
2007, p. 113) and return power to the people (Oguibe, 1998), the January 15, 1966 coup was
orchestrated in strategic cities of Kaduna (capital of Northern Region), Ibadan (capital of
Western Region) and Lagos (Federal Capital Territory).
Nafziger (1973) articulated a hypothesis that could explain the main drivers of the coup.
The author argued that:
perhaps the conspirators perceived that their positions and promotions were endangered
by policies of regional quotas for lower ranks, and regional balance for officer recruits,
which enhanced the share of the educationally backward North. In addition, some radical
and Southern soldiers resented the way in which the army was used by the ruling
coalition for political purposes in the Western party struggle in I962, the riots of the Tivs
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(a dissident lower Northern community) in 1964, the election crisis during 1964-5, and
finally the repression of opponents in connection with the rigged Western election of
October 1965. (Nafziger, 1973, p. 513)
Top government and military leaders primarily from the north and west were killed
(Mustafa, 1969; Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970). These include the Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Northern Region, NPC), Nigerian Minister of Finance, Chief Festus
Okotie-Eboh (Mid-West Region, NCNC), Northern Premier and the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir
Ahmadu Ibrahim Bello and his wife (Northern Region, NPC), Western Premier, Chief Samuel
Ladoke Akintola (Western Region, NNDP), Brigadier Samuel Adesujo Ademulegun and his
wife (Western Region), Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari (Northern Region), Colonel Ralph
Shodeinde (Western Region), Colonel Kur Mohammed (Northern Region), Lieutenant Colonel
Abogo Largema (Northern Region), Lieutenant Colonel James Pam (Northern Region),
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Unegbe (Eastern Region), as well as many others (Ejiogu, 2007;
Nafziger, 1973). Table 2 is a list of some of the targeted victims of the January 15, 1966 coup
along with their official government and military positions.
Table 2
Some of the Targeted Victims of the January 15, 1966 Coup

Name
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa
Ahmadu Ibrahim Bello

Festus Okotie-Eboh
Samuel Ladoke Akintola

Civilian Leaders
Position
Prime Minister (NPC)
Northern Region
Premier, NPC
President
Finance Minister
(NCNC)
Western Region
Premier (NNDP)

Ethnic/Regional
Origin
North
North

Fate
Killed
Killed

Mid-West (South) Killed
West (South)

Killed
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Military Officers
Position

Name
Major General J.T.U
Aguiyi-Ironsi
Brigadier Samuel Adesujo
Ademulegun
Brigadier Zakariya
Maimalari
Colonel Kur Mohammed
Lieutenant Colonel James
Pam
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur
Unegbe
Lieutenant Colonel Abogo
Largema
Colonel Ralph Shodeinde

Fate

GOC

Ethnic/Regional
Origin
Igbo (East)

CO 1st Brig.

Yoruba (West)

Killed

CO 2nd Brig.

North

Killed

Chief of Staff
Adj. Gen.

North
North

Killed
Killed

Q/M Gen.

Igbo (East)

Killed

CO 4th Btn.

North

Killed

Yoruba (West)

Killed

CO Nigerian Mil.
College Dep. CO
Nigerian Defence
Academy
Note. Adapted from Ejiogu (2007, pp. 116-117).

Escaped

Oguibe’s (1998) account of the assassinations carried out by the coup executioners is
very graphic and troubling.
On the morning of the appointed day, the Five Majors, each leading a group of soldiers,
turned the Republic on its head. In Kaduna, Major Nzeogwu walked from his command
post to the residence of Premier Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, fetched him from his bed, and
summarily executed him, along with his protesting head-wife. Another party killed the
Western Premier in Ibadan before heading off eighty miles to Lagos, where they executed
Prime Minister Balewa. Across the country, the scene was replayed with various
members of the discredited Nigerian leadership. At noon, Nzeogwu took to the airwaves
to announce the formation of a Revolutionary Council, declaring: ‘Our enemies are the
political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in the high and low places that seek bribes and
demand 10 percent; those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they

83
can remain in office as ministers and VIPs of waste; the tribalists; the nepotists’. (Oguibe,
1998, p. 92)
Perham (1970) affirmed that Nzeogwu not only graphically described how they killed the
Sardauna of Sokoto, Premier Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, but he boasted about it during this television
interview. Another research is needed to thoroughly study how the coup victims were killed, who
killed them, and to understand the lived experiences of the witnesses and family members of
both the victims and perpetrators.
There were signs of jubilation and relief in many cities in the aftermath of the coup
(Achebe, 2012). “Trade unions, student assemblies, church leaders, and traditional chiefs gave
their support” (Oguibe, 1998, p. 92). However, to ordinary Nigerians who can easily identify
fellow Nigerians’ ethnic identities by their names, and especially for the northerners, it was
obvious that the coup planners and executioners were “mostly of Igbo descent” (Bird &
Ottanelli, 2011, p. 3). The exception was Major Adewale Ademoyega who was Yoruba.
Also, there is a sharp disparity between the ethnic identity of the coup executioners and
the ethnic identities of those they killed (Uche, 2008; Post, 1968). Majority of those killed were
northern political and military leaders, including the leaders of the NPC, the Prime Minister
Balewa and the Sardauna of Sokoto, Northern Premier Bello (Nafziger, 1972). With the
exception of one NCNC member from the Mid-West, Finance Minister Okotie-Eboh, the rest
were important military and political leaders from the West, including the Western Premier
Akintola whose party, the NNDP, was in a coalition with the ruling party, the NPC.
This sharp disparity between the ethnic identity of coup perpetrators and victims
prompted some early scholars on the January 15, 1966 coup to label it an Igbo coup (Luckham,
1971; Dent, 1971; Diamond, 1988, as cited in Ejiogu, 2007). This argument had been rejected by
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Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) who “do not believe that it was an ‘Igbo coup’ as alleged by
many Northerners, but its consequences were the same as if it had been” (p. 1). One of the
consequences is that this unexpected military intervention in a young, ethnically challenged
Nigerian democracy only resulted in the polarization of the military “along ethnic lines, as a
section of the military interpreted the action of their colleagues as ethically motivated” (Duruji,
2012, p. 536).
Granted that one Igbo - Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Unegbe, the Quartermaster General died in the process of carrying out the coup due to his professional duty, the identities of the
perpetrators and victims still raise the question of ulterior motive for carrying out the military
coup (Akinola, 2014; James, 1983). Also, given that the federal government until the January 15
1966 coup was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, the ethno-religious identity of the coup executioners
and those killed provoked sentiments and suspicion as to the political, economic and security intention
of the coup plotters (Perham, 1970). The fact that the Igbo NCNC federal ministers, the Eastern
Premier, and top military leaders of Igbo origin were spared or reprieved by the coup executioners for
whatever reason further justifies the need to examine the intention for killing northern and western
political cum military leaders. In addition, the sudden vacation of the Head of State, President Nnamdi
Azikiwe, in the Caribbean at the time of the coup (Anthony, 2014) makes the question of intention,
conspiracy, knowledge and coordination indispensable.
Responding to the accusation that “the coup was an Igbo attempt to kill prominent
politicians from other ethnic groups, especially the North” (Akinola, 2014, p. 65), Ademoyega
(1981) emphasized that:
contrary to the load of wicked propaganda that has since been heaped upon us, there was
no decision at our meeting to single out any particular ethnic group for elimination or
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destruction. Our intentions were honorable, our views were national and our goals were
idealistic. We intended that the coup should be national in execution so that it would
receive nationwide acclamation. (p. 60)
James (1983), who argued that “Ademoyega’s book appears to be an authentic insider’s account
of the events of January 15, 1966” (p. 325), does not agree that the intentions of the
revolutionary officers were honorable, national and idealistic. According to James (1983)
Ademoyega’s analysis of the political and military prelude to army intervention…
suggest that the revolutionary officers’ aims were not the universal humanitarian
objectives of freeing all Nigerians and their institutions through radical political,
economic and social change, but the narrow parochial objectives of tilting the political
pendulum in favor of their respective regions. The fundamental objective was to redress
the imbalance in power and in the allocation of rewards to make them commensurate
with the educational levels of development, supposedly the standard yardstick for social
mobility and social stratification. (p. 325)
Since Ademoyega (1981), Gbulie (2016), and other perpetrators of the coup with their
supporters explain the objective of the coup in terms of a revolutionary change, it is important to
distinguish between a coup and a revolution. McGowan (2003) argued that “a coup d’état
involves the sudden, often violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group - in
contrast to ‘revolutions’ achieved by large numbers of people working for basic social, economic
and political change” (p. 342). Given this distinction, one can easily conclude that what the
young officers referred to as a revolution was nothing but a coup since: 1) it was executed by a
small group of soldiers; and 2) it simply resulted in “the abrupt replacement of leading
government personnel” (McGowan, 2003, p. 342). Probably this coup would have materialized
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into a revolution had the coup plotters succeeded in Lagos or had the July 29, 1966 counter coup
been unsuccessful. This is because, as will be explained later, the policies of General AguiyiIronsi, who emerged as the head of state after the coup and was killed during the counter coup,
altered the “state’s fundamental social and economic policies [aimed at] a significant
redistribution of power among political groups” (McGowan, 2003, p. 342).
One salient question still needs to be addressed. If the nucleus of their ideology and goal
was a revolutionary change that will end corruption and flamboyant lifestyle of ministers and
politicians in Nigeria, why was the bloody purge limited to only the north and west? James
(1983) posited that the group of coup soldiers Ademoyega (1981) labeled revolutionary officers
were:
a random gathering of like-minded young officers drawn predominantly from one broad
geographical region and held together by a superficial consensus rather than any
profound, coherent ideology or philosophy. In contrast, most ideologically-based
movements typically cut across traditional ethnic, racial, religious or regional barriers.
The nucleus for the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 is a case in point: Lenin,
Russian; Troksky, Jewish; Stalin, Georgian. The Nigerian revolutionary officers’
movement failed to cut across such traditional barriers, and in this failure lies its major
limitation. (p. 326)
Akinola (2014) agreed with James (1983) and argued that “the seemingly refusal of the
coup planners to extend the ‘cleaning exercise’ to Eastern Nigeria suggests some elements of
prejudice within the nobility of this plot” (p. 66). Falola and Heaton (2008) believed that:
in many ways, circumstantial evidence corroborated such a view. In the first place, four
of the five majors who led the January coup were Igbo. Of all the officers and politicians
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killed in the coup, only one had been Igbo, while the majority had been northerners.
While the two most prominent figures in northern politics – Balewa and Bello – had been
murdered along with their ally Akintola, the Igbo premiers of the Mid-Western and
Eastern Regions had been arrested but later released. To many, this pattern indicated that
the coup was primarily an Igbo strike against the north. (p. 173)
While it is crucial to investigate in another research why the premiers of the Mid-West
Region and Eastern Region were let off the hook, Ejiogu (2007) cautioned that “in a situation
where most Northern officers owed their enlistment in the army to the same political leaders who
were in power at the center, it would be unrealistic to expect that the extensive disaffection felt in
the country against the policies of the NPC-led federal government could have permeated
officers from the North – if at all – as deeply as they permeated those from the South” (p. 114).
This, according to Ejiogu (2007), explains why the coup planners were mainly Igbo.
Whatever the ulterior motives of the young Igbo officers were, this tragic coup, despite
its bloody nature, sparked off excitement and feelings of relief in the south (Falola & Heaton,
2008; Perham, 1970) and within some migrant communities in the north, especially among the
Igbos (Ogundipe, 2016). Oguibe (1998) stated that “though the news came as a shock, the coup
itself was welcomed by many” (p. 86). Nafziger’s (1972) research revealed that “despite the fact
that the ethnic composition of the mutineers and victims led some to suspect that the coup was an
attempt to establish Ibo suzerainty, initial reactions were not unfavorable to the new regime,
because of the disillusionment with the corruption, favoritism, and disorder accompanying
civilian rule” (p. 224). According to Diamond (2007), “the new military government was
generally hailed throughout Nigeria as the beginning of a new era” (p. 350). This was
corroborated by Perham’s (1970) research who stated that “the first public reaction to the
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murders, especially in the South, and in spite of sorrow for the murdered Prime Minister, was
one of hope of a new and cleaner order” (p. 233).
However, for the northern victims and some aggrieved westerners, bringing the
perpetrators to justice, how they will be tried, and the policies of the first military head of state,
Major General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi (an Igbo) who emerged as the new
president of Nigeria after escaping his assassins and mobilizing his forces to halt the coup and
carnage in Lagos (Uche, 2008; Oguibe, 1998), were to serve as a test of the erstwhile northern
hypothesis and fear that the Igbo ardently and adamantly want to dominate other ethnic groups in
Nigeria. However, Falola and Heaton (2008) noted that “to many southerners, the removal of the
civilian government marked the end of an agenda of northern domination” (p. 173). Oguibe
(1998) also asserted that the military intervention of the coup plotters in a civilian government
“effectively ended the nation’s youthful experiment with democracy” (p. 92).
After the January 15, 1966 coup was halted in Lagos by General Ironsi, “the terrified
leaders of the Federal Government called upon the General Officer Commanding, General Ironsi,
to take over control of the administration” (Mustafa, 1969, p. 139). Before becoming the
Nigerian head of state on January 17, 1966, General J.T.U Aguiyi-Ironsi was the first Nigerian to
serve as General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the whole Nigerian Army from 1965 to January
15, 1966. Although General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s cabinet was a bit diverse, for instance, he appointed
Brigadier General Babafemi Olatunde Ogundipe from Western Region to be his chief of staff at
the Supreme Headquarters and Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon from Northern Region to
succeed him as the military chief of staff, Aguiyi-Ironsi’s policies and nonchalant attitude toward
the young Igbo revolutionary officers were inimical to the northern interests.
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Falola and Heaton (2008) affirmed that “the main goals of the Ironsi regime… dovetailed
with those of the coup leaders: re-establishing law and order, maintaining essential services,
eradicating regionalism and tribalism, and ending corruption” (pp. 172-173). Mustafa (1969) had
also stated that General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s goal for the military “was to act as an agent of reform to
usher in a new era devoid of corruption and tribalism” (p. 139). These were corroborated by
Diamond (2007) who opined that the goal of the Aguiyi-Ironsi regime was “to end corruption,
centralize the regionally duplicated machinery of government, overhaul the electoral system, and
undertake national planning” (p. 350).
However, it took General Aguiyi-Ironsi some time to arrest some of the coup plotters and
executioners. An exception was Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, one of the mastermind of the coup
and the most vocal among them, who was arrested on January 17, 1966 under the direction of
General Ironsi (Nafziger, 1973; Nafziger, 1972). Even after they were apprehended, many of
them were imprisoned in Eastern Region. Achebe (2012) stated that “all the coup plotters were
eventually transferred to the Eastern Region” (p. 80).
Northerners were angry that the coup plotters and executioners were allowed by General
Aguiyi-Ironsi “to remain in detention, rather than bringing them to trial for the crimes that
northerners believed they had committed” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 173). General AguiyiIronsi’s failure to hold a trial and punish the coup plotters and executioners infuriated northerners
(Nafziger, 1973; Perham, 1970). Mustafa (1969) also noted that the northern indignation was due
to the fact that “the Igbo officers who had organized the massacres were not brought to book and
the clique which came to wield power was Igbo-dominated” (p. 139). Nafziger (1973)
corroborated by asserting that the “dependence of Ironsi on advice from fellow Igbos” (p. 513)
generated suspicion and anger from the north.
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General Aguiyi-Ironsi “outlawed political parties and placed military governors in each
of the regions” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 173). Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu
Ojukwu was appointed the military governor of Eastern Region. Lieutenant Colonel Hassan
Usman Katsina was appointed the military governor of Northern Region. Lieutenant Colonel
Francis Adekunle Fajuyi was appointed the military governor of Western Region; and Lieutenant
Colonel David Akpode Ejoor was appointed the military governor of Mid-West Region.
Even though a prosecution or court trial of the perpetrators of the coup was lagging, the
main policy that exacerbated northern fear of Igbo domination or Igbo hegemony (Nafziger,
1973), or what some termed “southern ambition to recolonize the north” (Mustafa, 1969, p. 139),
was Aguiyi-Ironsi’s ban on the constitution with its federal system and political parties. The
fragile situation in the north was made worse by General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s May 24, 1966 ‘Decree
no. 34’ also known as ‘Unification Decree’ (Korieh, 2013; Achebe, 2012; Duruji, 2012;
Nafziger, 1972; Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970). Through this decree, General Aguiyi-Ironsi
officially abolished the Nigerian federal structure on which its four federating regions were
based and imposed a unitary system of government or unitary rule, as well as a unified civil
service (Akinola, 2014; Bird & Ottanelli, 2011; Falola & Heaton, 2008; Uche, 2008; Oguibe,
1998; Nafziger, 1973; Herskovits, 1973; Mustafa, 1969).
Bird & Ottanelli (2011) posited that the main reason put forward for a change to unitary
rule was to foster “national unity” (p. 3). Akinola (2014) stated that one of the implications of
Ironsi’s unitary rule is that “federal appointments would be based on standardized and uniform
criteria. It further meant that the relatively few graduates from the North would face competition
‘from far larger number[s] of Southern graduates’” (p. 66). Also, “both the military and the civil
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service, which had previously been administered regionally, were to be integrated and
administered from the center” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 173).
Mustafa (1969) pointed out that “this move which represented a deliberate reversal of the
trend towards federalism was designed to benefit the Igbos who by virtue of their superior
education and economic position would have monopolized a unified civil service” (p. 139). This
argument was supported by Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) who had affirmed that General
Aguiyi-Ironsi’s Unification Decree “opened up the Northern civil service to Igbo officers” (p. 2).
In addition, it permitted General Aguiyi-Ironsi to decree that military governors and army
battalions be rotated among the regions, a policy move that was interpreted as helping the Igbos
“acquire political, administrative and military power in the North” (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970,
p. 2).
For these and similar reasons, Falola and Heaton (2008) affirmed that the north viewed
“the coup and Ironsi as part of a plan by southern – specifically Igbo – officers to use the military
as a means of imposing a new era of Igbo domination” (p. 173). Nafziger (1973) argued that:
this decree was introduced at a time of fear of Igbo hegemony, present since the coup…
The unification of the civil service, when added to the earlier repudiation by the Northern
Military Governor of the policy of ‘Northernisation’ of the private and government
sectors, aroused anxieties in the North concerning the loss of jobs to better-educated
Nigerians. (p. 513)
Allowing this to happen would imply that the northerners will lose “their control of the affairs of
the country” (American Society of International Law, 1967, p. 667).
Contrary to public opinion, violent opposition against the Aguiyi-Ironsi administration
was heralded not by the northerners or coup survivors in the west, but surprisingly by non-Igbo
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minorities in Eastern Region. Against the Igbo-led coup of January 15, 1966, and as a sign of
disloyalty to the Ironsi-led unitary government, Ijaw nationalist leaders of Niger Delta Volunteer
Service, Isaac Boro, Samuel Owonaro and Nottingham Dick, spearheaded a revolution in the
Niger Delta that culminated in the establishment and declaration of the Niger Delta Republic on
February 23, 1966 (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009). This violent opposition by a group of people from
the Niger Delta area took the form of a minor secession attempt, what Lieutenant Sam Owonaro,
one of the secessionist leaders, called “a sort of secession” (New Nigerian, Kaduna, May 14,
I969, as cited in Tamuno, 1970, p. 577). The leaders of the Niger Delta secessionist movement,
Isaac Boro, Sam Owonaro, and Nottingham Dick, “feared that the establishment of the Ironsi
regime, strongly supported by Igbos, prejudiced the longstanding demand for the creation of a
Rivers State, an agitation which had begun seriously in the late I940s” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 577).
The agitation for a new state within the Niger Delta region was probably fueled by “the
potential for economic growth…, buoyed largely by the discovery of commercial quantities of
petroleum in the Niger Delta region in 1958” (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 158). As Falola and
Heaton (2008) noted, “production of crude oil grew from 46,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1961 to
600,000 bpd in 1967” (p. 163). The Niger Delta secessionists resorted to a militant action and
declared the independence of the Delta Peoples Republic from Nigeria. After a few days – some
authors stated “after just twelve days” (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009, p. 58) – they were conquered
through a combination of police and military actions, and their leaders, “Boro, Owonaro, and
Dick were condemned to death for treason” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 577).
However, they were never executed, rather they were granted pardon in August 1967 and
released from prison (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009) by a new military head of state, General Yakubu
Gowon, who succeeded General Aguiyi-Ironsi after his assassination on July 29, 1966. In return,
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and as will be discussed later, they volunteered to help the Nigerian military defeat Biafra.
According to Tamuno (1970), “Boro, Owonaro, and Dick volunteered for military service in
order to liberate the newly created Rivers State and safeguard Nigeria’s territorial integrity” (p.
577). Nwajiaku-Dahou (2009) corroborated by affirming that “Boro, Owonaro and Dick were
granted clemency [in August 1967] and all joined the Nigerian army, in Boro’s words to ‘free
people from Biafran occupation’” (p. 58).
The July 29, 1966 counter coup. It took up to two months after General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s
May 24, 1966 abolishment of the federal structure and imposition of a unitary system of
government before the northern soldiers orchestrated a counter coup against the Aguiyi-Ironsi’s
government on July 29, 1966 (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970). As Post (1968) stated, “the North
brooded on its grievances, then, in July 1966, northern officers carried out a counter coup” (p.
29).
The coup took the form of a revenge (Diamond, 2007; Ejiogu, 2007). Ejiogu (2007)
argued that the goal of the northern soldiers who planned and executed the coup was “to avenge
the deaths of their benefactors in the January 15 coup and to excise the North from the rest of
Nigeria” (p. 117). In addition, the group of military officers of northern origin who plotted the
counter coup also acted in fear of Igbo domination on all the regions and ethnic groups in
Nigeria (Bird & Ottanelli, 2011). According to Perham (1970), “it was this feeling which led to
the massacre of Southerners, especially lgbo, in the North - in May 1966, and to the assassination
in July by Northern soldiers of General Ironsi, the military governor of the Western Region, and
many Igbo officers” (p. 233). These mutinies ended with the ethnic cleansing (or pogrom) of the
Igbos in the months that followed.
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Granted that accurate data on the July 29, 1966 coup plotters is not available, it is
estimated that about 72 northern officers were directly involved (Ejiogu, 2007). Among these
include 34 Hausa-Fulani soldiers and 38 soldiers from the northern minority ethnic groups
(Ejiogu, 2007). Diamond (2007) argued in his research that the British helped these northern
officers “behind the scenes” (p. 350). This accusation needs to be further researched and verified.
The purported mastermind of the counter coup, Murtala Mohammed, was the acting Chief of
Signals of the Army during the January 15, 1966 coup, while his uncle, Alhaji Inuwa Wada, was
the Minister of Defense in the NPC-led federal government (Ejiogu, 2007). In April 1966,
General Aguiyi-Ironsi had promoted Murtala Mohammed to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and
made him the Inspector of Signals at the Army Headquarters in Lagos.
Prior to the July 29, 1966 counter coup, there were riots in Northern Nigeria instigated by
northern elites against the policies of General Aguiyi-Ironsi and also linked to the assassinations
of northern political and military leaders during the January 15, 1966 coup. At this time, many
southerners, particularly people from Eastern Region, majority of whom were Igbos, were living
in the north. According to Mustafa (1969), northern leaders “met at Kaduna and demanded a
repeal of the newly enacted measures. The same day the first of a series of riots against the
Easterners, principally the Igbos, broke out in the major cities of the North” (p. 140).
Another source attributed to a speech delivered by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Azikiwe, 1968,
as cited in Anthony, 2014) confirmed that the Kaduna meeting Mustafa (1969) referred to
actually took place at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, Kaduna and was attended by, among
other participants, “certain indigenous and expatriate members of the academic and
administrative staff” (p. 215). Achebe (2012) also confirmed that the Ahmadu Bello University
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meeting resulted in the activation of “area boys” by the Northern leaders “to attack Igbos in an
orgy of blood” (p. 69).
Nafziger (1973) affirmed that General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s May 24, 1966 ‘Unification
Decree’ “was followed by a weekend of riots there against Igbos and other Southerners” (p.
513). Eastern Nigeria Ministry of Information, Publicity Division (1966, as cited in Anthony,
2014) stated that “on the morning of Sunday, 29th May, the Northerners pounced on Eastern
Nigerians praying in churches or relaxing in the privacy of their homes. That the slaughter which
followed took place simultaneously in several Northern towns testifies to the careful planning
and deep involvement of Northern leaders” (p. 210). Sabon Gari, a northern town where majority
of migrants resided, was one of the epicenters of the anti-Igbo massacres between June and
October 1966 (Heerten & Moses, 2014). Nafziger (1973) argued that “the uneasiness concerning
the impact of [Aguiyi-Ironsi’s Unification Decree] on economic opportunities for Northerners in
their own Region helped to ignite the disorders in May” (p. 527).
During these riots, the Igbos were mainly targeted (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970), and
thousands of Igbos were killed (Oguibe, 1998). The Eastern Region government affirmed that as
the riots became aggressively violent, thousands of easterners were killed by northern civilians
aided by northern officers on May 29, 1966 followed by days of looting and violence (American
Society of International Law, 1967). In Ejiogu’s (2007) view, “the timing and pattern of
execution of the revolt indicate that it was the continuation of an on-going cleansing of Igbo
residents of northern cities, in riots orchestrated by aggrieved Northern political leaders to
avenge the death of their colleagues killed in the January 15 coup” (p. 119).
Oguibe (1998) graphically described how the Igbos in the north and west were killed in
July 1966.
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And so they took to the streets, rounding up military men of eastern descent and shooting
them point blank. Throughout the North and West, eastern civilians were pulled out of
crowds and murdered. It was killing time, and when the frenzy peaked and the slaughter
began in earnest, no one from the East was spared, whether Igbo or not - neither man nor
woman, adult nor child. It was July now, and the long-buried seed of hate had sprouted.
(p. 94)
Unlike the January 15, 1966 coup which was aimed at changing a corrupt government
and implementing revolutionary policies for all Nigerians, the primary objectives of the July 29,
1966 counter coup were revenge for the killing of northern elites and secession of Northern
Region from Nigeria (Ejiogu, 2007). Uche (2008) corroborated this view by saying that “the
initial intention of the coup plotters was the secession of the North from the Nigerian Federation”
(p. 119). Scholars like Diamond (2007) argued that secession of Northern Region from Nigeria
was the reason why Gowon “publicly announced that the federation was not workable” (p. 350).
While the former objective (i.e., revenge) was accomplished, the latter (i.e., secession of
Northern Region) was not. The idea of northern secession from Nigeria at that time was opposed
by senior military officers from the Middle Belt, a minority region in the north. “Non-HausaFulani senior officers from the Middle Belt argued strongly against secession” (Ejiogu, 2007, p.
119). Contrary to this view, other scholars and analysts posited that it was the British that
“persuaded the new military government that it was in their mutual interests to maintain the
structure that they had invented. The federation had, for example, provided the North with access
to the sea” (Diamond, 2007, p. 350).
Since the secession of Northern Nigeria did not receive the anticipated support from high
ranking military and civilian leaders from the minority areas of the north or the British, the coup
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plotters decided to hand over power to a 32-year old Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a
Christian from Angas in the Middle Belt area of Northern Region, to lead Nigeria as the new
Supreme Commander and Military Head of State (Achebe, 2012; Ejiogu, 2007; Nafziger, 1973).
As stated above, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon was the Chief of Army Staff in General
Aguiyi-Ironsi’s administration. With the emergence of a northerner as the new Nigerian Head of
State, secession of the north from the federation was no longer necessary.
The total number of casualties from the July 29, 1966 coup is still unknown. It is
estimated that hundreds of junior soldiers of Igbo origin were killed. In addition, about 39 senior
officers were killed, 27 of whom were Igbo, as well as 4 Yoruba officers and 8 officers from
other ethnic groups in the south (Ejiogu, 2007). This is why Anthony’s (2014) research stated
that “more than 200 officers and men, the majority Igbos, were systematically killed by their
comrades, mostly in military barracks outside the Eastern Region” (p. 210). Citing Robin
Luckham’s (1971) book, “The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and
Revolt 1960-67,” Achebe (2012) stated that 185 Igbo officers were murdered by northern
soldiers. Many accounts on this counter coup indicate that almost all the high-ranking Igbo
military officers were killed (Mustafa, 1969). Among these Igbo officers was the Military Head
of State, General Aguiyi-Ironsi, who was abducted and killed in Ibadan during his visit to
Western Region.
Theophilus Oluwole Akindele who was the Director of Communications during the
Aguiyi-Ironsi regime narrated in his memoire, “Memoir of Mixed Blessings” (2009), how he had
a close friendship with General Aguiyi-Ironsi and Brigadier General Babafemi Olatunde
Ogundipe, Ironsi’s Chief of Staff at the Supreme Headquarters, an equivalent position to that of a
Vice President. A day before the counter coup, Akindele (2009) stated that he met with Aguiyi-
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Ironsi at the State House. Aguiyi-Ironsi was taking a walk at the garden while meditating on the
situations in Nigeria. At this time, it seemed that Aguiyi-Ironsi already heard that a counter coup
was being planned by northern officers.
Aguiyi-Ironsi “was planning a trip to Ibadan the following day to try to make peace with
the rank and file in the armed forces” (Akindele, 2019, para. 32). Other sources claim that the
primary objective of Aguiyi-Ironsi’s visit to Ibadan was to meet with traditional rulers from all
over the country (James, 2020, July 29). Achebe (2012) was of the view that Aguiyi-Ironsi’s visit
to Ibadan was a part of “a nationwide tour to calm growing fears of a permanently fractured
nation and to promote his notion of a unitary republic” (p. 81). Unfortunately, he did not return
to Lagos alive.
After many hours had passed without contacting Aguiyi-Ironsi, coupled with information
about ongoing mutiny led by northern officers, his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Babafemi
Olatunde Ogundipe, ordered some soldiers loyal to him to go and secure the Lagos airport
hoping that Aguiyi-Ironsi was going to fly back in. Tragically, those soldiers were ambushed and
killed by the counter coup executioners (Akindele, 2019). As he was trying to send more
soldiers, he realized that some of the officers were no longer loyal to him. He then managed to
escape to the house of Theophilus Oluwole Akindele who later dropped him off at a naval jetty
in the Marina area of Lagos. This is how Brigadier General Ogundipe along with his wife and
two children escaped by the MV Aureol ship to Las Palmas (Akindele, 2019).
One high-ranking Yoruba officer who was killed was the military governor of Western
Region, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Adekunle Fajuyi, who hosted General Aguiyi-Ironsi in his
government guest house in Ibadan during General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s visit (American Society of
International Law, 1967). According to Oguibe (1998), northern military officers “surrounded
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Aguiyi-Ironsi at the home of the governor of the Western Region. A respectable Nigerian host,
the governor refused to give up his guest. Both men were taken away by the officers, tortured,
and then killed” (p. 94). More research is needed to uncover what led to the intelligence and
security failures both before General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s visit to Ibadan and while at the Western
Region governor’s house, as well as why General Aguiyi-Ironsi was not able to receive a rapid
rescue assistance.
It took about three days, that is, 72 hours, after the counter coup before Lieutenant
Colonel Yakubu Gowon addressed the nation and announced that a change of government had
taken place. He finally did it on August 1, 1966 when he officially became the third head of state
of Nigeria. Akindele (2019) revealed that shortly before he fled to Las Palmas, Brigadier General
Ogundipe was instructed to attend an important “meeting at Lion Building so that he would
voluntarily relinquish power to Gowon who was junior to him. As long as Ogundipe was around,
Gowon could not assume leadership” (para. 101). This was probably what caused the 72 hour
delay after the coup before Gowon addressed the nation and took over power as the next head of
state. As the head of state, Gowon rewarded Brigadier General Ogundipe and made him the
Nigerian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom (Akindele, 2019).
Gowon’s gesture to his seniors in the military as revealed above contradicts many
people’s perception of him and the events surrounding his emergence as a head of state. In his
open letter to General Yakubu Gowon published in the Guardian newspaper, Nze (2016, August
22) accused Gowon of elevating himself to the office of the president, the highest office in the
land, to the dismay of his senior military officers and against military command structure. Nze
(2016, August 22) and many others have argued that presidential powers should have been
handed over to one of Gowon’s seniors in the military such as Brigadier General Babafemi
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Olatunde Ogundipe, Commodore Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey, Colonel Robert Adeyinka
Adebayo, Lieutenant Colonel Hillary Njoku, Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Effiong, Lieutenant
Colonel George Kurubo, Lieutenant Colonel Ime Imo, and Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Dibia
Nwawo.
The argument has centered mostly on why Ironsi’s Chief of Staff at the Supreme
Headquarters (or second in command in ordinary language), Brigadier General Babafemi
Olatunde Ogundipe, did not take over as the head of state. Against this view, one will argue that
Lieutenant Colonel Wellington Bassey who was the most senior and the first commissioned
Nigerian officer having joined the military in 1944 was neither promoted to replace Major
General Sir Christopher Welby-Everard (a British) as the General Officer Commanding (GOC)
nor allowed to become the head of state after the January 15, 1966 coup (Luckham, 1971).
However, Aguiyi-Ironsi who joined the military in 1947, three years after Wellington Bassey,
was promoted to become the first Nigerian General Officer Commanding (GOC) and later a head
of state of Nigeria after the first coup (Luckham, 1971).
The pogroms of Eastern Nigerians and the great flight. The July 29, 1966 counter
coup did not end the anti-Igbo massacres (Oloyede, 2009). It continued for many months even
after Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon became the Nigerian military head of
state. He was not able to prevent or stop the pogroms or ethnic cleansing of the Igbos in Northern
Nigeria and other cities in the west and mid-west (Bird & Ottanelli, 2011; Perham, 1970;
American Society of International Law, 1967). Uche’s (2008) study of British archival materials
revealed that “the British High Commissioner at the time made spirited efforts to get Gowon to
do more to stop the killing of Igbos. Gowon, however, refused ‘to face up to the stark facts of the
scale of brutalities in the North, and the extent of the Army’s… responsibilities for them” (p.
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120). As Achebe (2012) put it, the issue was “not only because mobs were hunting down and
killing innocent civilians in many parts, especially in the North, but because the federal
government sat by and let it happen” (p. 71).
According to Heerten and Moses (2014), “whether representatives of the Nigerian state
systematically organized the killings remains disputed. At the very least, the Nigerian
government failed to halt the riots” (p. 173). Dent (1970) who was sympathetic toward the
federal military government of Nigeria argued however that Gowon’s “weaknesses lie in his
failure to take firm and decisive action against those who act contrary to the national interests”
(p. 108). Nafziger (1973) interpreted the pogroms as “a desperate last-ditch strike by the insecure
upper Northern elite at the most vulnerable group available” (p. 527).
The northern motivation to systematically exterminate and purge the Igbos from the north
and other regions of the federation may have been connected to the fact that their initial decision
to secede from Nigeria did not materialize. In other words, if they were to remain in Nigeria,
then the Igbos needed to be totally eliminated from their region or pushed out of the federation.
This hypothesis is supported by Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) who argued that the ruthless and
brutal systematic killings of the Igbos in the north “may have been so intended by some
Northerners who wanted the Igbos out of Nigeria” (p. 2).
Oguibe (1998) graphically and succinctly captured the sufferings of the northern-based
easterners in the month of August 1966 in his article, “Lessons from the killing fields.”
Thousands of our kin from the eastern part of the country had been slaughtered in the
cities of the North: whole families set ablaze by their neighbors in the middle of the
night, children hacked to death in their sleep, women violated by men who only the
previous day would have doffed their hats to them or helped them across the street. Some
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men were burnt at the stake, some decapitated, others hounded through the streets and
stoned, while their adversaries gambled for their clothes. It has been estimated that ten
thousand men, women, and children from Eastern Nigeria were murdered in the streets
and in their sleep in the single month of August 1966. (Oguibe, 1998, p. 86)
Similarly, Mustafa’s (1969) account is both revealing and troubling.
There followed a strong anti-Igbo reaction in the North and a frenzy of killings in which
soldiers joined the civilian population in attacking Igbos living in Northern cities. In
September, widespread massacre of the Igbos occurred again as a result of which there
was a mass exodus from the North to the East. It has been estimated that by October 1966
over a million Igbos had fled as refugees to the Eastern Region and 20,000 to 30,000 of
them had been killed. As the mass frenzy abated, the Igbos struck back, forcing the
Yorubas and the Hausas in the East to flee from the Region. This paved the way for the
East’s secession. (Mustafa, 1969, p. 140)
“The Price of Nigerian Victory,” an article written by an American applied sociomusicologist, Charles Keil (1970), contains another graphic and disturbing testimony narrated
based on the author’s personal and direct experience of the pogroms in some parts of the north.
The pogroms I witnessed in Makurdi, Nigeria (late Sept. 1966) were foreshadowed by
months of intensive anti-Igbo and anti-Eastern conversations among Tiv, Idoma, Hausa
and other Northerners resident in Makurdi, and, ﬁtting a pattern replicated in city after
city, the massacres were led by the Nigerian army. Before, during and after the slaughter,
Col. Gowon could be heard over the radio issuing ‘guarantees of safety’ to all Easterners,
all citizens of Nigeria, but the intent of the soldiers, the only power that counts in Nigeria
now or then, was painfully clear. After counting the disemboweled bodies along the
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Makurdi road I was escorted back to the city by soldiers who apologized for the stench
and explained politely that they were doing me and the world a great favor by eliminating
Igbos. ‘They eat dogs, they must die like dogs’. ‘We ﬁnd ‘em, we kill ‘em, and they do us
the same, na be so?’. ‘They are born with greed in their hearts’. ‘They are the only people
spoiling Nigeria ever since—One Nigeria without Igbo!’. ‘We make sure they will never
worry us again’. I am paraphrasing the kernels of conversations with dozens of soldiers
conducted at nightclubs, roadblocks and in their barracks during the ten months between
the pogroms and July, 1967, when I left Nigeria. I met a few soldiers, mostly ofﬁcers,
who were not convinced that the Igbos were innately evil, expendable, exterminable, but
they were exceptions. (Keil, 1970, as cited in Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 188)
Some scholars stated that “between 7,000 and 30,000 Igbos were killed and thousands
more were terribly wounded” (Uphoff and Ottemoeller, 1970, p. 2; Perham, 1970, p. 233).
Others opined that “about thirty thousand easterners were killed in the north, and another 1.8 to 2
million were forced back to the east as refugees” (Onu, 2001, as cited in Duruji, 2012, p. 536;
Diamond, 2007, p. 350). Post (1968) estimated that about 40,000 easterners in the north were
killed during the pogroms, and over a million expelled from the north. Heerten and Moses (2014)
posited that tens of thousands lost their lives and more than one million refugees fled to Eastern
Region as a result of the pogroms. Oguibe (1998) affirmed that about two million refugees fled
to Eastern Region and that “by the end of 1966, almost every family in the East had lost someone
in the pogroms” (p. 95). Achebe (2012) stated that “thirty thousand civilian men, women, and
children were slaughtered, hundreds of thousands were wounded, maimed, and violated, their
homes and property looted and burned – and no one asked any questions” (p. 82).
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The differing figures above show that the exact number of refugees who returned to
Eastern Region from the north and west as well as Lagos and mid-western cities is unknown due
to inadequate records at that time. Nevertheless, some scholars posit that “between April 1966
and April 1967, due largely to violence directed against easterners in other regions, about I.6
million returned to their ethnic homelands. As a result, the east, which previously had about 12
million inhabitants, increased its population by 15-20 percent between January 1966 and the
Biafran secession” (Aluko, 1967, as cited in Nafziger, 1972, p. 241).
It should be mentioned that some easterners, especially the poor, remained in the north
because they were not financially able to buy train, bus, or flight tickets to return to the east.
Some scholars estimated that about “60,000 Easterners remained in the North by April 1967”
(Aluko, 1967, as cited in Nafziger, 1973, p. 528). “These unfortunate people,” Uphoff and
Ottemoeller (1970) affirmed, “were killed by the Northerners” (p. 2). A thorough research,
however, is needed to understand the condition of those easterners who remained in the north, to
know how many of them were killed, and to hear the stories of those who survived.
On the other side of the aisle, non-easterners living in the east were asked to leave
Eastern Region in retaliation (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970; American Society of International
Law, 1967). With a massive number of Igbos and other easterners returning to the east, noneasterners living in the east at that time had no other choice than to flee to their own regions.
Duruji (2012) revealed that “the central government’s failure to stop the pogrom or bring the
perpetrators to justice sparked reprisal killings in the east” (p. 536). Another research is needed
to understand how non-Igbos were expelled from the east, how many, if any, were killed during
their revengeful expulsion, and to know the condition of those non-easterners who remained in
the east.
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The pogroms of Eastern Nigerians in the north and other parts of the Nigerian federation
as well as the return to Eastern Region and parts of Mid-West Region of millions of eastern
refugees including the wounded who fled the sites of massacres, coupled with the return of the
bodies of those killed, prompted eastern leaders to conclude that easterners were no longer safe
in Nigeria (Bird & Ottanelli, 2014; American Society of International Law, 1967). According to
Tamuno (1970), “these were sad events, which then encouraged Igbos to think that they were
unwanted persons whose security was in peril” (p. 577).
With the return of refugees, and the repatriation of Nigerian soldiers of eastern origin,
especially the Igbos, who were serving in the north and west, Mustafa (1969) affirmed that “the
Igbos came to be concentrated entirely in the Eastern Region which found itself virtually with a
separate army” (pp. 139-140). The great flight to their homeland in Eastern Region highlights the
importance of territory as a symbol of security and collective identity (Oloyede, 2009).
Nevertheless, some scholars have stated that about 500,000 Igbos remained in different
parts of the federation at this time, and some stayed even after Biafran secession (Nafziger,
1973). A research should be done to understand the experiences of Igbos who remained in the
federation.
For the leaders of Eastern Region, these devastating events served as an urgent call to act
for self-defense. Nigeria was at this time on the brink of disintegration and war.
Dispute resolution efforts and why they failed. With the “collapse of the rule of law”
(American Society of International Law, 1967, p. 669), and the prevalence of partisanship within
the judiciary, alternative dispute resolution in the form of negotiation and mediation became an
acceptable mechanism for trying to prevent the looming disintegration and war, and resolving the
core issues in the conflict. Three of those dispute resolution efforts - meeting of military

106
governors, Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference, and a mediation in Aburi, Ghana - were made but
all failed in the end.
The first is the August 9, 1966 meeting of military governors from different regions held
in Lagos to create a pathway for peace and security. The outcome of this meeting was “that
troops be all repatriated to their region of origin” (American Society of International Law, 1967,
p. 669). At this time, there was mistrust and mutual suspicion among military officers, for the
military was becoming increasingly polarized along ethno-religious lines. Eastern leaders argued
that this decision was dismissed by the Gowon administration (American Society of International
Law, 1967). Faced with a threat of assassination, eastern soldiers fled to eastern region just as
other soldiers returned to their regions of origin. However, Lagos, Nigerian federal capital
territory, was highly fortified with the presence of northern soldiers.
Nafziger (1972) affirmed that “the East recognized the Gowon Government as only an
interim regime, on the grounds that Gowon was not the highest-ranking army officer, and on the
basis of an understanding by the Eastern Government that he was to retain power only until the
military had the opportunity to decide on the country’s future” (Nafziger, 1973, p. 514). Other
scholars like Perham (1970) stated that “Colonel Ojukwu, the Igbo military governor of the
Eastern Region since the January assassinations, had not recognized Gowon’s appointment” (p.
234). Ojukwu who was 33 years old at this time was trained as an officer at the Royal Military
Academy Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, the same military academy that the 32-year old
Nigerian military head of state, Gowon, attended (Achebe, 2012). As Achebe (2012) noted,
Gowon had appointed Ojukwu to continue to serve as the military governor of Eastern Region
which Ojukwu reluctantly accepted.
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The second is a three-week Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference held in Lagos that started
on September 12, 1966 and ended in mid-November 1966. This Constitutional Conference was
preceded by Gowon’s August 31, I966 decree which abolished General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s
unification decree and restored federalism (Nafziger, 1973; Nafziger, 1972; Tamuno, 1970).
According to Mustafa (1969), this was another period of “constitutional warfare” (p. 140).
To manage the crises, there was an urgent need for a national deliberation on the
foundation and principles of the Nigerian constitution in order to guarantee the safety, justice and
rights of all Nigerians and the federating units. Delegates discussed the best system of
government and interethnic relations appropriate to Nigeria. During this Constitutional
Conference, “Gowon… advised the delegates to rule out not only ‘a complete break-up’ but also
‘a unitary form of government’” (Federal Ministry of Information, Nigeria, 1966, as cited in
Tamuno, 1970, p. 579).
Against General Gowon’s wish and advice, Tamuno (1970) stated that except the MidWest Region and the Northern Region which had earlier wanted to secede but later gave in to
one Nigeria, all the “delegates from the Eastern Region, the Western Region, and Lagos
proposed that each component unit of the federation, confederation, or commonwealth which
they advocated should be allowed to secede unilaterally whenever it so desired” (p. 580).
Another major issue that was discussed by regional delegates during the three-week Ad
Hoc Constitutional Conference in Lagos was a proposal to create new states. The position of
Eastern Region leadership regarding the creation of new states was that:
splitting up of the country at this stage is not what is needed to normalize conditions of
life in the country and provide a sense of security for its inhabitants, and that immediate
constitutional arrangements for the country as a whole should be made on the basis of the
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existing regions in order to save the country from impending disintegration. (American
Society of International Law, 1967, p. 672)
At the end of the Constitutional Conference, members of the Eastern Region Consultative
Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders met on October 7, 1966 and
endorsed the report of the Eastern Region delegates to the Constitutional Conference. To provide
a sense of security and normalcy, the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly and the Advisory
Committee of Chiefs and Elders demanded for the implementation of the agreement reached by
the representatives of military governors during their meeting in Lagos on August 9, 1966. At the
center of this agreement was the repatriation of troops to their various regions of origin. In
addition, the federal military government was required to pay compensation “for the lives and
property of Easterners lost in the disturbed areas of Nigeria” (American Society of International
Law, 1967, p. 673). The easterners argued that unless the federal government fulfills these
conditions, Eastern Nigeria will no longer participate in any Constitutional Conference.
On November 23, 1966, the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly and the Advisory
Committee of Chiefs and Elders clearly articulated and discussed other important issues at the
heart of the conflict between Eastern Nigeria and the federal government. These include
massacres of Eastern Nigerians, exclusion of Eastern Nigerians from key positions in the federal
government, peace and unity in Nigeria, dignity of Eastern Nigerians, indefinite and arbitrary
suspension of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference by Yakubu Gowon, non-implementation by
the Gowon administration of agreements unanimously reached during the Constitutional
Conference and Supreme Military Council meeting, and fear of an imposition of a constitution
and other policies on the people of Nigeria by the Gowon administration (American Society of
International Law, 1967).
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The ultimate outcome of this November 23, 1966 meeting was a vested support given to
Ojukwu, the Eastern Nigeria military governor, “to take any measures he considers appropriate
for the defense and protection of the integrity of Eastern Nigeria, the lives and property of its
inhabitants” (American Society of International Law, 1967, p. 674). It has been argued that
Eastern Region minority representatives who “with doubtful loyalties were excluded” (Okara
1970, as cited Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009, p. 60) from participating in these important meetings by
Ojukwu.
Granted that the pogroms of Eastern Nigerians, especially the Igbos in the north, must
have influenced the decision of Eastern Region to insist on inserting a secession clause in the
Nigerian constitution during the September 1966 Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference in Lagos, it
is important to underline the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu,
Eastern Region’s military governor, had until June 1966, prior to the July 29, 1966 counter coup
and the pogroms that ensued, advocated for the unity of Nigeria (Tamuno, 1970; Uphoff &
Ottemoeller, 1970). This is understandable. The military head of state at that time, General
Aguiyi-Ironsi, was Igbo. As a military governor of Eastern Region appointed by the military
head of state (who was of Igbo origin) after the so-called Igbo coup of January 15, 1966, it was
necessary or normal for Ojukwu to promote the unity of Nigeria.
Ojukwu’s speech in June 1966, when the Emir of Kano was installed as a new Chancellor
of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, confirmed his support for the kind of unity sought for by
General Aguiyi-Ironsi.
For years this country has striven for unity. In this they have met and passed many
hurdles. All the danger points of disintegration have been passed. The common generality
of the people of this country have come to regard one another as brothers and sisters. The

110
conscious and unconscious apostles of disunity are not the common men and women of
this country. They are the few with vested interests, selfish and inordinate ambition for
power and wealth, men who fear losing their positions and privileges, who care more for
self than for the nation and the common good. These men have tried to exploit our
differences to the detriment of this country, when they should be expected to work for the
removal of those differences. They have tried to make unhealthy capital of our diversity,
when a healthy perception of our diversity could be turned to our national advantage as a
source of strength, diversity of culture, of background, of outlook, of experience, of our
education, of our upbringings. (Eastern Region Ministry of Information, Nigerian Crisis,
1966, as cited in Tamuno, 1970, pp. 579-580)
It should be clarified here that Eastern Region like Western Region was not seeking to
secede from Nigeria during the September - November 1966 Ad Hoc Conference on the Nigerian
Constitution. Their demand at this particular time was to insert the secession clause in the
constitution so that, according to Tamuno (1970), each federating unit can “secede unilaterally
whenever it so desired” (p. 580). This motion was rejected by the federal military government,
the north and the mid-west.
Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, the military governor of Eastern Region, called for a loose
association within Nigeria, a sort of confederation. By this, it meant that “the regions would be
sovereign except for a common infrastructure of railways, airlines and telecommunications”
(Mustafa, 1969, p. 140). General Gowon, the military head of state, who saw this as a way to
weaken his power and the control and oversight of the federal government over the regions did
not concede (Mustafa, 1969). It was this deadlock, coupled with the fear and belief that the
safety and security of easterners, particularly Igbos, cannot be guaranteed in the other regions of
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the federation that resulted in a gradual isolation of Eastern Region from the rest of the
federation (Post, 1968). At this time, “Ojukwu could no longer resist demands for secession”
(Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970, p. 2).
According to Mustafa’s (1969) account, Eastern Region elites “slowly but surely instilled
in the Igbos the belief that they could not live safely in Nigeria and that the earlier massacres of
the Igbos were part of a planned campaign to exterminate them. …Inflammatory speeches made
by Igbo leaders depicted the Northerners as planning to conquer the East and annihilate the
Igbos” (p. 140). A prominent Ikwerre writer, Elechi Amadi (1973, as cited in Nwajiaku-Dahou,
2009) had argued that “Ojukwu ‘over used’ photographs of the massacres to manipulate public
opinion in the East and buoy up secessionist feelings on the part of the Igbo and minorities who
had also been forced to return from the North, creating a refugee crisis” (p. 60).
These conspiracies along with documented and circulated lived experiences or narratives
of the victims and survivors of the pogroms in the north and other parts of the federation further
isolated the easterners from the federation. Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) believed that at this
time:
plans had already been laid by some Igbo intellectuals and politicians for Eastern
secession. Seeing their welcome becoming attenuated outside the East, they realized that
the tremendous human resources of the Igbo people combined with the oil resources of
Ijaw territory, the facilities of Port Harcourt (inhabited mostly by Igbos but in Ijaw
territory), and the plentiful land of the Ogoja people would make a viable state. (p. 2)
There was a belief that “an independent Biafra could become the second richest nation in
Africa outside South Africa, for not only has it the resources but also the trained personnel to
manage the economy” (Essack, 1970, p. 10). Perham (1970) affirmed that at this time, “it is
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probable that they [the Igbos] have collected proportionately more Ph.D. degrees in British and
American universities than any other African tribal group” (p. 235).
Although the leaders of Eastern Region had lost confidence in the unity of Nigeria at this
time due to safety and security concerns, and the Gowon administration was intent on
forestalling any rebellion, leaders of both parties were still willing to give each other a last
minute benefit of the doubt in order to prevent a calamitous and tragic disintegration of Nigeria.
This brings us to the third alternative dispute resolution process utilized by both parties to
manage their conflict.
Between January 4 and 5, 1967, what seemed to be a mediation or negotiation summit
was organized in Aburi, Ghana for the members of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria.
Leaders of all the regions, and most importantly, the federal military government and Eastern
Region government, participated in this mediation meeting. Perham (1970) stated that there were
nine men who directly participated in the negotiations. These include the military head of state,
military governors of the North, West, East, Lagos and Mid-West as well as the heads of the
army, navy and police (Perham, 1970). The Ghanaian head of state at the time, General Joseph
Ankrah, was the lead facilitator/mediator.
It has been noted by Perham (1970) that “in the record Colonel Ojukwu is revealed as
dominant both in argument and determination” (p. 234). Mustafa (1969) summarized the main
outcome of the Aburi meeting which is popularly known as Aburi Accord as follows: “the two
leaders [Gowon and Ojukwu] condemned the bloodshed of 1966, renounced force as a means of
settling disputes, reaffirmed faith in Nigeria as a political unit, accepted the principle of
increased regional autonomy and agreed to consider the resettlement of the refugees as a joint
responsibility” (p. 140). The principles and terms of increased regional autonomy or
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confederation was not thoroughly clarified. As a result, Gowon and Ojukwu had different
interpretations and understandings of its constitutional implication and application after the
Aburi meeting (Achebe, 2012).
The three constitutional and peace efforts discussed above, including the Aburi Accord,
were not successful in restoring peace, security and unity, leading to further escalation of the
conflict. Each party to the conflict accused each other for the failure of the implementation of the
Aburi Accord. Disagreement over one core issue appears to have caused the failure of these three
dispute resolution attempts. A constitutional arrangement or framework that best addresses the
interests and needs of the federating units or regions was the fundamental issue. It was a
disagreement over the meaning and principles of confederation or increased regional autonomy
as a system of government, which of course continues to resurface in today’s public debate in the
guise of restructuring Nigeria.
On the Biafran side, Diamond (2007) reiterated:
the Biafran regime, while insisting upon protective political sovereignty, proposed a
common market with Nigeria at large, as well as a customs union, common currency,
transport and communications systems, shared educational facilities, and even common
diplomatic representation in receptive countries. Furthermore, the regime had suggested
plebiscites in Nigerian-Biafran border areas, so that people might determine their political
allegiance for themselves. (pp. 350-351)
On March 25, 2015, General Yakubu Gowon delivered a convocation lecture at the
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University (formerly Anambra State University), Igbariam
Campus, Anambra where he reflected on the reasons why the Aburi Accord failed to prevent the
war. Gowon (2015) emotionally emphasized that:

114
One of the critically misunderstood and misjudged part of our story as a nation pertains to
the place of the Aburi Accord and its failure to stop the Civil War. For the avoidance of
doubt, the Aburi Accord was meant to enable the principal parties break the ice and to get
back together as officers and gentlemen: discuss and solve our problems in our homeland,
at home, in our land. The spirit of ‘The True Aburi Accord’ was ultimately encapsulated
in Decree No. 8 of 1967. The only addition outside the spirit of the Accord was my
insistence that a clause bars any part of Nigeria from seceding. This perhaps was what
made Ojukwu to reject the Decree, otherwise what we agreed to in Aburi was enshrined
in that Decree and we were to implement them to the letter, having given Ojukwu almost
all that he wanted. We did that in order to achieve peace and return normalcy to Nigeria.
Unfortunately, Ojukwu was the one to renege on our agreement. In fact he did not attend
our meeting at NIFOR in Benin City. (p. 4)
Gowon (2015) also clarified his prewar position on the proposed confederation. He
argued that Ojukwu’s post-Aburi Accord media broadcast stating that a confederation was
unanimously agreed upon by all the parties present in Aburi prompted him and his staff to
immediately ratify the Aburi Accord and issue Decree No 8 on March 17, 1967. Decree No 8
among other clauses prohibited any federating unit from secession, and also empowered the
federal government to unilaterally declare a state of emergency in any region that attempted
secession.
Before we left Ghana, we had agreed that on return to Nigeria, l, as Nigeria’s Head of
State should make the first broadcast after which the other Regional Governors would
make theirs. Unfortunately, I was down with serious malaria that I could not make my
broadcast but Ojukwu went on air as soon as he got back and claimed that we agreed to a
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Confederation to which I had always strongly objected. That and other actions taken by
him and his government made us to carefully review the Aburi Agreement. I got the
Secretary to the Government and some Nigerian Senior Civil Servants to review it. They
did and pointed out some serious ramifications of it. Those points were carefully
considered and taken into account in drafting the Decree No 8 mentioned earlier.
Whoever said that the Aburi Accord failed as a result of pressure mounted on the Federal
side (i.e. me and the Federal Government team) to repudiate it was absolutely mistaken.
(Gowon, 2015, p. 4)
Nafziger (1973) and other authors like him had argued that Gowon’s change of mind with
regard to confederation and his objection to secession were due to the British influence.
According to the author,
British foreign policy throughout the Nigerian crises was consistent with support for an
economically integrated area that would leave the Federation open to international trade
and investment… After the July I966 coup, British and (in some cases) American
diplomats were influential in dissuading Gowon from announcing the disintegration of
the Federation, and in discouraging those who attended the September constitutional
conference and the January 1967 Aburi conference from agreeing on confederation.
(Nafziger, 1973, p. 519)
An important reflection on the failure of the Aburi Accord made by Philip U. Effiong, the
son of General Philip Effiong who was the Vice President of Biafra, is very relevant here and
cannot be ignored. Effiong (2017) noted that:
While it is true that, largely due to the scrutiny of the document by federal permanent
secretaries, the federal side failed to adhere to all provisions of the Accord, those who are
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quick to emphasize this fact are seldom detailed in their criticism. One fundamental point
that they typically ignore is the fact that the permanent secretaries had recommended
amendments as opposed to a complete negation of the contract. This, therefore, means
that the East was still in a position to consolidate some of the gains of the Aburi meeting.
The late Colonel Joseph Achuzia, a former Biafran officer, reiterated this point in a
conversation I had with him in 2011. Essentially, we can only speculate on how Nigeria’s
history and inter-ethnic relations would be different if the Eastern Region, under General
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu’s command, had agreed to work with the federal side
on whatever was left of the Aburi Accord. This is because, at the end of the war, all
tenets of the Accord were essentially abandoned. The alternative might have been no war,
a prevention of the massive loss of life and property and some compliance with the
agreement. None of this, however, exonerates Gowon’s regime for not adhering to the
mandates of the agreement to the letter. (para. 17)
The ensuing disagreement over the meaning of the Aburi Accord and how it should be
implemented further led to a negotiation breakdown, cutting off the communication channels
between the federal government and Eastern Nigeria. This situation deteriorated after the
military governor of Eastern Region suspended his participation in the Supreme Military
Council.
Cutting off the lines of communication between the two leaders translated into little or no
humanitarian aid or assistance from the federal government to support and rehabilitate internally
displaced people or internal refugees who fled to the east as a result of the pogrom of the late
1966. The eastern government accused Gowon of deliberately refusing to give them their “share

117
of the statutory revenues” (American Society of International Law, 1967, p. 670) so they can use
it to help refugees in the east.
Meanwhile, there was an urgent need to mitigate the refugee crisis and provide support to
millions of refugees who, as a result of the pogroms in the north and other parts of the federation,
returned to their ancestral towns and villages in Eastern Region. These Igbo refugees were the
engine of the economy in different regions of Nigeria including the north. Through their
entrepreneurship as civil servants, technicians, “transport owners, small manufacturers, and
especially petty traders,” Post (1968) affirmed that the Igbo “had contributed most, and thus had
most to lose” (pp. 30-31). Oguibe (1998) posited that some of these Igbo refugees were
“merchants, soldiers, and teachers” (p. 90) in the north and west. These refugees, affirmed
Nafziger (1973), later “constituted a combustible and easily manipulated group for the pursuit of
military mobilization, secession, and territorial extension” (p. 530).
In order to assist them, policy decisions were made by the government of Eastern Region
from April 1, 1967 to raise funds and prepare for their future survival. These controversial
policies named “Survival Edicts” include: “the Revenue Collection Edict, the Legal Education
(Eastern Nigeria) Edict, the Statutory Bodies Edict and the Court of Appeal Edict” (American
Society of International Law, 1967, p. 670). The Survival Edicts empowered Eastern Region
government whose capital was in Enugu to start collecting federal government revenues in the
east for its own use against the approval of the federal government in Lagos (Mustafa, 1969).
This meant that “payments of royalties and taxes to Lagos were stopped” (Uphoff &
Ottemoeller, 1970, p. 2). Nafziger (1972) provided a direct corroboration by affirming that:
On 1 April 1967 the East seized a portion of the federal revenues collected within the
Region, in response to alleged delays in payment of their share of the pool and of salaries
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to Eastern refugees in federal employment. The Gowon Government retaliated with a
suspension of certain services, and the imposition of increased restrictions on
international currency convertibility in the Eastern Region. Further action by the East to
take over federal statutory bodies led to additional economic sanctions, including a
limited embargo, against the East. (p. 226)
This move by Eastern Region posed financial challenge to the federal government. In
1966, about two-thirds of Nigerian oil was produced in Eastern Region, accounting for about
“32.4 percent of Nigeria’s exports” (Post, 1968, p. 32). Nafziger (1973) corroborated this fact by
opining that Nigeria in 1966, “with an output of… 415,000 barrels per day, about two-thirds of
which was in the East, ranked I5th in the world on the basis of crude oil production in that
Region alone” (p. 530). Essack (1970) stated that oil production in 1966 was about 20 million
tons which grew to 52 million tons in 1969 irrespective of the war. International oil companies in
Nigeria at that time were British Shell and BP; American Tennessee, Mobil and Caltex; and
French SAFREP (Essack, 1970). The projected Nigerian oil revenue in 1967-1968 was about
£23.3 million (£ being Nigerian pound). This meant that when redistributed, £7.7 million was to
go to the federal government, £7.8 million to the east, £3.4 million to the mid-west, £2.6 million
to the north, and £1.8 million to the west (Post, 1968). See Table 3.
Table 3
Oil and Public Finance, Projections 1967-68
Beneficiaries
Oil Revenue (£m)
Federal Government
7.7
East
7.8
Mid-West
3.4
North
2.6
West
1.8
Note. Adapted from Post (1968, pp. 32-33).

Recurrent Budget(£m)
90.1
40.0
10.0
34.7
21.4
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By seizing federal revenues from oil as well as collecting federal rents and royalties, the
existing conflict between Eastern Region and the federal government was escalated to its peak.
Another provocation that brought the conflict to a point of no return was the seizure or
commandeer by Eastern Region of two planes belonging to the Nigeria Airways (Uphoff &
Ottemoeller, 1970). As Gowon (2015) corroborated, “the hijacking of Nigeria Airways plane,
confiscation of railways rolling stock; annexation of branches of the Central Bank and post
offices in Eastern Region as well as the approbation of Federal revenue in the Region [constitute]
illegal actions against the country” (p. 4).
Across the River Niger, Mid-West Region with its Igbo minority indigenes was caught in
the middle of the conflict between the federal government and Eastern Region. Efforts were
made by Mid-West Region to prevent the looming armed conflict, but to no avail. Orobator
(1987) noted that “the mid-west hosted a peace conference in Nifor near Benin City to find a
peaceful solution to the crisis” (p. 367). According to Mustafa (1969), cognizant of its Igbo
minority indigenes, Mid-West Region “pressed for the loosening of federal ties in order to
prevent an armed conflict” (p. 141).
In addition to the Igbo minorities in Mid-West Region, the Ijaws “beneath whose
uncongenial creeks and mangrove swamps the oil lies” (Post, 1968, p. 34) were also divided
between Mid-West Region and Eastern Region. As Post (1968) noted, a third of the Nigerian oil
is located in the Mid-Western Ijaw area, while Eastern Region Ijaw area where an oil refinery
and the second largest sea port in Nigeria were located saw a rise in oil production. These
realities made both Mid-West Region and minority communities within Eastern Region areas of
interest in the Nigeria-Biafra War that ensued.
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The Western Region on its part was not disengaged from the conflict situation. Obafemi
Awolowo, the founding leader of the Action Group imprisoned on charges of treason by the
NPC-led federal government, was later released by General Yakubu Gowon to join his federal
government cabinet as Finance Minister. Having been a staunch critic of the NPC, and sharing
similar concerns with the NCNC leaders, Obafemi Awolowo decided to organize a peace
mission in Eastern Region’s capital, Enugu. The peace mission led by Awolowo was called the
National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) (Achebe, 2012). This last-minute peace effort
failed.
According to Mustafa (1969), Awolowo had earlier declared that “the Igbos should be
encouraged to remain in the Federation, but if they were allowed ‘by acts of omission or
commission to secede from or opt out of Nigeria, then the Western Region and Lagos must also
stay out of the Federation’” (p. 141). Awolowo may have threatened that the west and Lagos will
leave the federation if the east left because the west and Lagos had advocated for the insertion of
the secession clause in the constitution along with Eastern Region during the September November 1966 Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference. It was also speculated that “the Biafran
precedent would almost certainly encourage pressure in the western states to follow suit
(probably reuniting in the process), and the northern states would then have no access to the sea,
except on the sufferance of a sovereign West which would certainly take over Lagos” (Post,
1968, p. 34). Nevertheless, and as will be discussed later, Western Region and Lagos did not
leave the federation when Eastern Region seceded and declared independence of Biafra. As
Nafziger (1973) noted, Western Region “remained in the Federation, where their economic
interests lay” (p. 515). The Igbos were infuriated by this and many of them began to view the
Yorubas and their leader, Awolowo, as traitors (Akinola, 2014).
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Within Eastern Region, minority ethnic groups feared continuous marginalization and
domination by the Igbo majority. “The Igbos, constituting the largest ethnic group in Eastern
Region and dominating the economic and political structures of the region, discriminated against
minority ethnic groups and tribes within their region” (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970, p. 1). This is
why Post (1968) stated that minorities in Eastern Region disliked the Igbos. They lobbied the
federal government to remove them from Eastern Region and give them their own state(s) so
they can manage their own affairs. Seeing this as a way to weaken the strength, morale and
capability of the Eastern government, General Gowon was quick to act by leveraging on the
existing agitation by minorities for the creation of new states.
One of the steps taken by Gowon was to try to prevent “any unilateral declaration of
secession in any part of the Federation” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 581) through constitutional
amendments which were accomplished between March and May 1967 without the consent of
Eastern Region. The Gowon administration, following the recommendations of the National
Conciliation Committee which was set up to make peace between the federal government and the
government of Eastern Region, lifted its sanctions against Eastern Region on May 23, 1967.
In addition, Gowon sent a telegraph to Ojukwu requesting his consent for a simultaneous
creation of states all over Nigeria as agreed upon by the Supreme Military Council that held in
the absence of Ojukwu’s participation. He also wanted Ojukwu to consent to a creation of a
Revenue Allocation Commission “to find new formula on the basis of principle of derivation and
need to provide adequate funds for essential central government functions [and] ensure fair play
and justice for all sections of the country” (American Society of International Law, 1967, p.
676). Gowon ended this important telegraph with an appeal to Ojukwu to stop his plans to secede
from Nigeria while highlighting the need for representatives of all the regional governments to
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urgently meet to plan the implementation of the above mentioned policies in order to maintain
the unity of the Nigerian federation.
In the absence of a positive response from Ojukwu, General Gowon hastily issued a
decree on May 27, 1967 “establishing twelve states in lieu of the four regions” (Mustafa, 1969,
p. 141). While Eastern Region was split into three states namely East-Central State, Rivers State,
and South Eastern State; Western Region into two; and Northern Region into six; the Mid-West
was converted into one state (Nafziger, 1973; Mustafa, 1969; Post, 1968).
The estimated population of East-Central State where the Igbos were confined was about
nine million, and minorities in Eastern Region such as Ibibio, Ekoi, Ikwere, Efik, Ogoja, Ijaw,
Andoni, Agbo, Degema, Egbema, Eket, Ibeno, Ikom, Iyalla, Kana, Mbembe, Uyanga, and Yako
now divided into Rivers State and South Eastern State, were estimated to be about five million
(Achebe, 2012; Tamuno, 1970; Post, 1968). The entire Eastern Region had twenty provinces
with an estimated population of 14 million (American Society of International Law, 1967b; Post,
1968; Melbourne, 1973).
East-Central State was “bordered on the south by Rivers State, a territory of the Ijaw and
other less numerous ethnic groups and on the east and southeast by land belonging to the Ekoi
and Ibibio groups of the South Eastern State” (Udo, 1970, p. 9). See Figures 1 and 2.
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Figure 1
Map of Nigeria in May 1967 Showing the 12 Newly Created States

Note. Taken from Maiangwa (2016, p. 48).
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Figure 2
East-Central, Rivers, and Southeastern States

Note. Map taken from Udo (1970, p. 9).
Mustafa (1969) noted that:
the Igbos who were for the most part concentrated in the newly created East-Central State
were denied access to the sea and lost control of the oil deposits which lay in the former
Eastern Region. The major sea-port of the East, Port Harcourt, was incorporated in the
new Rivers State and the oil fields which accounted for 65 per cent of Nigeria’s oil
production went to the South Eastern State. (p. 141)
Uche (2008) corroborated this fact and affirmed that splitting Eastern Region into three
states “excised the main oil-producing areas from the core Igbo state (East Central State)” (p.
123). This had serious economic implications for the Igbos. Based on existing revenue allocation
formula, Nafziger (1973) argued that “the share of the East in the oil revenue originating in its
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Region was £N6.3 million, or 21 per cent of approved revenue in 1967. With the creation of new
states, the Igbo-dominated East-Central State would have received only £NI.8 million, 10 per
cent of the oil revenue from the old Eastern Region” (p. 532).
Gowon’s decree that split Eastern Region into three states was immediately rejected by
the leaders of Eastern Region government (Post, 1968). They characterized Gowon’s strategic
move as a threat to their territorial integrity and regional autonomy, economic development, and
security. Nafziger (1972) opined that “this arrangement was considered by the Eastern leaders to
be a violation of the agreement at Aburi to effect greater regional autonomy” (p. 226). In
addition, Post (1968) contended that “this was obviously an attempt to set the minorities in the
East against the Igbo” (p. 30). Nwajiaku-Dahou (2009) argued that Gowon’s states creation “was
used as a tool for undermining possible minority support for Biafra” (p. 49).
The most consequential implication of Gowon’s abolition of the regional structure and
creation of twelve states through which Eastern Region was split into three states was well
articulated by Nafziger (1972). It was one singular action that “triggered secession” (Nafziger,
1972, p. 226). Herskovits (1973) agreed by affirming that “just as the prospect of national
centralization touched off the May 1966 crisis, however, regional decentralization helped
precipitate Biafran secession a year later” (p. 393).
Secession of Biafra from Nigeria. Contrary to public perception, Lieutenant Colonel
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, military governor of Eastern Region, did not determine the
fate and future of Eastern Nigerians unilaterally. He acted in consultation with the Consultative
Assembly as well as the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders from various administrative
divisions. According to Oha (2000), “Igbo political philosophy emphasizes communalism,
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democracy and egalitarianism, and Odumegwu Ojukwu’s political philosophy (partly) inherits
these” (p. 74).
On the evening of May 27, 1967, the same day that Gowon split Eastern Region into
three states, the 300-member Eastern Regional Consultative Assembly and the Advisory
Committee of Chiefs and Elders passed a resolution mandating and authorizing Ojukwu to
withdraw Eastern Region from Nigeria (Mustafa, 1969) and formally declare it “a free, sovereign
and independent state by the name and title of the Republic of Biafra” (American Society of
International Law, 1967, p. 678). With this purported unanimous decision by the elders and
leaders of Eastern Region, a new country was born waiting for an official declaration of
independence.
Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) and Jervis (1967) are opposed to the notion that there was
a unanimous decision by all easterners to secede. For these authors, the decision to secede was
nothing but a “manufactured unanimity” (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970, p. 2). They argued that
“the non-Igbo people of the East, who bore no love for the Igbos because of decades of
manipulation and neglect, were not consulted on secession. Through the minority leaders
previously co-opted by the NCNC, however, it was possible to present an ‘Eastern’ facade to
secessionist plans” (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970, p. 2). Jervis (1967) had also stated that “the
provincial administrators were government appointees… with few exceptions the men chosen for
minority provinces were discredited politicians without local support. The Consultative
Assembly which gave Ojukwu his ‘mandate’ for secession was a ceremonial gathering in which
no dissenting voice could be raised” (p. 16).
Onuoha (2016) stated that “out of the eight provinces that comprised the Eastern Region,
five (Abakaliki, Enugu, Onitsha, Umuahia, Owerri) were Igbo; the remaining three (Port
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Harcourt, Ogoja, Calabar) were homes of the Ijaw, Efik, Ibibio, Ikwerre, Ogoni, and other
minority ethnic groups” (p. 9). Elechi Amadi (1973, as cited in Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009) who
participated in this assembly as a delegate from one of the minority areas affirmed that “many
minority leaders expressed fears of a Biafran state in which they would remain dominated by
Igbos, but Ojukwu claimed that ‘Easterners’ gave their support” (p. 60).
In addition, Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) went further to assert that “non-Igbo leaders
who disagreed with this position and desired creation of separate states for their people were
detained” (p. 2); and some were “tortured in detention” (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009, p. 62). Elechi
Amadi (1973, as cited in Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009) confirmed that “from September 1966 onwards
detention camps sprung up all over the region” (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009, p. 60). Jervis (1967)
also revealed that “several newspapers were banned… Any disagreements with Enugu were
strictly private; most of the more daring dissenters cleared out or were detained by the then
regional government… If there was opposition to Ojukwu’s secessionist course - and there was it could hardly be made public in the increasingly repressive atmosphere of pre-independence
Biafra” (pp. 16-17).
Many analysts without a deeper knowledge of the conflict dynamics believed that all
Biafrans, especially all Igbos, supported Biafran secession. However, the reality is that some
people in Biafra who secretly did not support Biafran secession were reluctant to speak out for
fear of being labeled saboteur, killed or detained. Brigadier Hilary Njoku who was the
Commander of the Biafran Army had spoken out against secession and the ensuing war, arguing
after his assessment that Biafra was not militarily prepared and equipped to prosecute a war
against Nigeria. Njoku was arrested and imprisoned by Ojukwu for speaking the truth. Ojukwu
thought that Njoku was against him. He was kept in prison almost for the entire period of the
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war. Major General Alexander Madiebo was asked to replace Njoku as Commander of the
Biafran Army (Adegbamigbe & Anjorin, 2020; Elokaon, 2019; Effiong, 2017).
Since Biafra was not prepared for a conventional warfare, other professional military
officers in Eastern Region also urged Ojukwu, the Eastern Region military governor, to delay the
declaration of the Biafran independence (Adegbamigbe & Anjorin, 2020; Yesufu, 2017). Fola
Oyewole, a military officer of Yoruba origin imprisoned in Eastern Region at the time of the war
for his alleged participation in the January 15, 1966 coup and later released by Ojukwu to join
the Biafran army, stated in an interview: “I was not the only one who, given the chance, didn’t
believe in secession, more so because we were not ready, we did not have enough arms. We had
manpower, yes, credible manpower was there, but manpower alone doesn’t do it” (Adegbamigbe
& Anjorin, 2020, April 16).
Another Yoruba military officer detained in Eastern Nigeria for allegedly participating in
the January 15, 1966 coup was Brigadier Victor Banjo. Achebe (2012) stated that although he
accepted Ojukwu’s military adverser position at the State House in Enugu after he was released
from prison by Ojukwu, “Victor Banjo… was not in favor of Ojukwu’s secessionist aspirations
but favored a solution to Nigeria’s problems that would result in the ‘deamalgamation’ of the
country back into Southern and Northern Nigeria” (p. 130). Even Major Patrick Chukwuma
Kaduna Nzeogwu who helped plan the January 15, 1966 coup and Major General Philip Effiong
who was the Biafran second in command were all against Biafran secession, although they later
helped Biafra fight the war in self-defense (Effiong, 2017).
Igbo intellectuals and ordinary people who vehemently opposed the secession of Biafra
from Nigeria were and are still viewed as saboteurs (Jeffs, 2012; Post, 1968). This was the case
with Dr. Ukpabi Asika who was a well-known scholar at the University of Ibadan (Jeffs, 2012).
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According to Herskovits (1973), Dr. Asika was “one of the rare Igbo intellectuals who not only
opposed secession but were willing to accept a conspicuous and exposed responsibility with the
FMG [federal military government] in helping to defeat the secessionists” (p. 396). As will be
discussed later in the postwar reconstruction section, Dr. Asika played a pivotal role in
implementing Gowon’s postwar reconstruction policies as the administrator of East Central State
(Jeffs, 2012).
According to Jervis (1967), Biafra had a cogent reason to secede from Nigeria, but
secession was not a viable option since minorities in Eastern Region were against secession. To
illustrate this view, Jervis (1967) stated:
the arguments for Biafra are simple and compelling. Its people, educated and able, have
been driven out of other parts of what used to be their country - not merely driven out but
terrorized and killed. No official sorrow was expressed over these crimes, no punishment
dispensed for the guilty. For more than a year Lagos has failed to acknowledge the
grievances of the refugees or recompense them for their suffering. What right has the
federal government to compound its sins by violent opposition to the secession which it
has made inevitable? But even granting all this - which Lagos of course will not - it is
still difficult to view the recognition of Biafra as an acceptable way out of the current
crisis. Secessionist arguments depend upon a unanimity within Biafra which does not
exist… Far from being all Igbo, close to 40% of its people come from the so-called
‘minority areas’ along the coast and near the Cameroun border. Nor are the Igbos
confined to the old Eastern Region: 500,000 live across the Niger in the Mid-West. Thus
the East was by no means synonymous with Igboland… The point requires emphasis
because, contrary to the claims of Biafran spokesmen, there was little sentiment for
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secession outside Igboland. Such unanimity as prevailed was not regional but tribal. (p.
16)
If these accounts are true as the authors affirmed, then I will go further beyond the theory
of “manufactured unanimity” to arguing that what the process produced was a “coercive
unanimity.” More research is therefore needed to thoroughly understand what really happened at
the meeting of the Eastern Regional Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of
Chiefs and Elders and how the reported unanimity was achieved. Also, another important
question that needs to be answered is why Ojukwu, the Eastern Region military governor,
refused to listen to the advice of the professional military officers who, after their assessment of
the Biafran military, asked him to delay the declaration of Biafran independence.
Nevertheless, the official proclamation that Eastern Region has seceded from the rest of
Nigeria was made on May 30, 1967 when the military governor of Eastern Region, Lieutenant
Colonel (later General) Ojukwu, officially declared the independence of the entire Eastern
Region as the Republic of Biafra (Heerten & Moses, 2014; Bird & Ottanelli, 2014; Bird &
Ottanelli, 2011; Uche, 2008; Diamond, 2007; Nwachuku, 1998; Nafziger, 1973; Tamuno, 1970;
Mustafa, 1969; American Society of International Law, 1967). To read the full text of Biafran
independence declaration, see “Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra” (American Society of
International Law, 1967).
According to Heerten and Moses (2014), the Republic of Biafra was “named after the
Bight of Biafra, a bay on the country’s Atlantic coast” (p. 173). De St Jorre (1989, as cited in
Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009) posited that “the name Biafra was allegedly suggested by Frank Opigo,
an Ijaw NCNC stalwart, but the vision for ‘Biafra’ was articulated by Eastern, mainly Igbo,
intellectuals, who envisaged a new, self-reliant society” (p. 55).
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With an estimated population of about 14 million people (Diamond, 2007) and twenty
administrative provinces (Achebe, 2012), Biafran territory covered an area of about 30,000
square miles and endowed with natural resources, including mineral oil, natural gas, coal,
limestone, lead, zinc and iron ore, as well as different types of agricultural produce: palm oil and
kernel, cocoa, timber, rubber, copra, cashew, and live-stock (American Society of International
Law, 1967b). With the ingenuity and talent of its people, and a population of about 14 million,
Post (1968) stated that Biafra was “about twice the size of Ghana, whose viability is never called
into question, and bigger, in fact, than any of the present other countries of West Africa” (p. 37).
In the Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra document, the authors presented their
claims and deplored how, although Eastern Nigerians were instrumental in, and pioneers of, the
development of Nigeria and the struggle for independence, the independence constitution was
framed in a way that placed the north in perpetual domination over the rest of the country.
According to the authors, this constitution contained:
the seeds of factionalism and hate, of struggle for power at the Center, and of the worst
types of political chicanery and abuse of power. One of two situations was bound to
result from that arrangement: either perpetual domination of the rest of the country by the
North, not by consent, but by force and fraud, or a dissolution of the federating bond.
(American Society of International Law, 1967, p. 666)
By separating from Nigeria, Biafrans attempted to dissolve that federating bond.
In his canonical book, There was a country: A personal history of Biafra, Achebe (2012)
reflected on the implication of the Biafran secession.
On May 30, 1967, Ojukwu, citing a variety of malevolent acts directed at the mainly Igbo
Easterners—such as the pogrom that claimed over thirty thousand lives; the federal
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government’s failure to ensure the safety of Easterners in the presence of organized
genocide; and the direct incrimination of the government in the murders of its own
citizens —proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Biafra from Nigeria, with the
full backing of the Eastern House Constituent Assembly. By taking this action Ojukwu
had committed us to full-blown war. Nigeria would never be the same again. (Achebe,
2012, p. 92)
The events that resulted in the Biafran secession from Nigeria could be summarized as
follows. “The severe loss of lives and property in parts of the Federation in September 1966,
growing refugee problems, serious misunderstandings over the implementation of the Aburi
‘decisions’ between January and March 1967, and the creation by decree of 12 States on 27 May
I967 provided an atmosphere which did not promote timely and well-meaning concessions in
order to avert the imminent threat of secession and civil war” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 580). Similarly,
Post (1968) posited three main reasons for the secession of Biafra from Nigeria and the
declaration of war on Biafra by the federal government. They are: 1) growing revenue from oil;
2) position of minorities in the former Eastern Region now called Biafra “on whose lands are
situated the wells which produce most of its oil (the exact proportion is a matter of dispute, but
probably at least two-thirds); [and] 3) the preservation of the unity of Nigeria” (Post, 1968, p.
33).
Some officials within the Federal side held that one of the key drivers for Biafran
secession could be traced to the discovery and production of oil in Eastern Nigeria. Championing
this view was the then Commissioner for Economic Development, Alhaji Yahaya Gusau, who
argued in March 1969 that “the root cause of the present civil war is really an economic one. For
example, I am convinced that if there were no petroleum discovered in large quantities in parts of
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the former Eastern Region, the secessionist leaders would not have tried to break up Nigeria” (as
cited in Nafziger, 1972, p. 234).
By examining the decade before the Biafran secession, Nafziger (1973) carefully
analyzed economic factors that contributed to the escalation of ethnic rivalries and military coups
into a bloody war between Nigeria and Biafra. According to Nafziger (1973), “economic
variables and political disintegration are linked in several ways” (p. 505). This means that the
root causes of Biafran secession could be traced to the prewar economic variables. Nafziger
(1973) identified five of these economic variables which he claimed to be the root causes of the
Biafran secession that eventually escalated into war.
1. Growing contradictions between the vital economic interests of the various regional

elites, and the rapidly worsening political enmity and violence ensuing from the
unrestrained pursuit and defense of these interests, portended the likelihood of the
break-up of the Nigerian Federation.
2. The low priority the political elite placed on the alleviation of poverty and income

inequality, and the growth in consciousness of this fact on the part of the wageearning classes, provided some of the impetus for the general strike, Federal election
boycott, constitutional crisis and Western election disturbances of I 964-5, the
accumulation of which contributed to the I966-70 crises.
3. Regional competition for employment and business activity lay behind the violence

directed against Easterners in the North, and their subsequent flight to their ethnic
homelands in 1966, which strengthened the forces touching off the Biafran secession.
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4. The rapid growth of the crude petroleum industry in the East prior to 1967 increased

the benefits of its autonomy and the costs of its continued membership in the
Federation.
5. Finally, the inter-regional allocation of revenue and distribution of funds became a

major bone of contention between the East and the rest of the Federation. (Nafziger,
1973, pp. 505-506)
Post (1968) had also argued that “oil is an issue from the point of view of the Federal
Government because, although the bulk of the proceeds from the industry go back to the region
of origin, taxes and its own share of rents and royalties are no doubt a welcome part of its
revenue” (p. 33). As Nafziger’s (1972) assessment of the causes and drivers of the Nigeria-Biafra
war shows, “the expansion of the Eastern crude-oil industry and its implications for the levels of
living, foreign-exchange position, and government finance, and further, for the international
politico-economic power of an independent Region, was a major factor contributing to the civil
war” (p. 234).
As has been previously discussed or will be discussed later (especially in the case of
foreign intervention), other contributing and controversial factors and drivers of the NigeriaBiafra conflict as identified by Tamuno (1970) include but not limited to:
1. The ‘right’ of poorly protected and deeply aggrieved people to secede from their

former state.
2. The legality or illegality of any unilateral declaration of secession in Nigeria.
3. The fate of ethnic minorities in the Nigerian federation.
4. The control of the federal machinery of government.
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5. The honor, dignity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of an independent African

state.
6. The obligation of the Organization of African Unity to safe-guard the territorial

integrity of member states.
7. The special interests of foreign states and organizations, which sought, through

intervention in the Nigerian conflict, to influence the political decision-making
processes in the Federal-controlled and former secessionist territories. (pp. 577-578)
The fundamental question that many researchers and scholars have sought to address is
whether the Biafran secession from Nigeria was an indispensable solution to the problem of the
easterners, especially the Igbos. For the Biafran leaders, since the Nigerian federal government
failed in its principal duty to safeguard and protect the lives and properties of its Igbo citizens,
establishing a country of their own empowers them to protect themselves “against all aggressors”
(Biafra Newsletter (Enugu), November 24, 1967, as cited in Tamuno, 1970, p. 581). Achebe
(2012) argued that the pogroms of Eastern Nigerians in Northern Nigeria “compounded by the
involvement, even connivance, of the federal government in those evil and dastardly acts” (p.
125) made secession and the war that ensued inevitable.
Duruji (2012) stated that “the declaration of the former Eastern Region as the Republic of
Biafra was premised on the argument that the Nigerian state could not guarantee the security of
the Igbo and other easterners” (p. 536). This is why authors like Nwachuku (1998) affirmed that
Biafran secession from Nigeria “was the existential act of a people to preserve themselves from
annihilation” (p. 578). For the Biafrans, “independence was a necessary response to an
existential threat” (Anthony, 2014, p. 209).
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This conclusion was probably drawn from, among other sources, the Crisis series
publication of which the third volume entitled “Nigerian pogrom: The organized massacre of
Eastern Nigerians” included “graphic descriptions of northern violence, including nine firstperson accounts offered to an Enugu panel remembered as the ‘atrocities tribunal’” (Onyiuke et
al., 1967, as cited in Anthony, 2014, p. 209). A comparison was made by Igbo leaders between
the pogroms they suffered in the hands of northern elements and the Holocaust perpetrated
against the Jews by the Nazis (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970). Contrary to this analogy, Uphoff
and Ottemoeller (1970) argued that “the situation in Nigeria is in many ways uniquely Nigerian”
(p. 1).
The declaration of Biafran independence was for the Biafran leaders a revolution against
the federation of Nigeria which Ojukwu characterized “as corrupt, as unprogressive and as
oppressive and irreformable as the Ottoman Empire was in Europe over a century ago” (C.
Odumegwu Ojukwu, The Ahiara Declaration, I969, as cited in Tamuno, 1970, p. 582). Ojukwu
(1969) went further to argue that:
the Nigerian Federation in the form it was constituted by the British cannot by any stretch
of imagination be considered an African necessity. Yet we are being forced to sacrifice
our very existence as a people to the integrity of that ramshackle creation that has no
justification either in history or in the freely expressed wishes of the people. (The Ahiara
Declaration, I969, as cited in Tamuno, 1970, p. 582)
For this reason, the Biafrans concluded that the war was a war of liberation against “the forces of
feudalism and foreign domination” (Essack, 1970, p. 10).
Ojukwu and his advisors maintained that “a Biafran today is a Biafran forever” (Biafra
Newsletter (Enugu), November 24, 1967, as cited in Tamuno, 1970, p. 581). By this statement he
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meant that all the peoples – the Igbos as well as the minority ethnic groups which included the
Efik, Ibibio, Ijaw, and Ekoi – within the new country called Biafra must remain Biafrans forever.
Unfortunately, and as will be examined later, these minorities, with the exception of a few people
from their communities, pledged their allegiance and support to the federal military government
of Nigeria (Tamuno, 1970; Melbourne, 1973). As Nwajiaku-Dahou (2009) noted, minorities
welcomed Gowon’s states creation “as a means of freeing themselves from Igbo political
domination within the regional system” (p. 49).
Also, contrary to the calculation of the Eastern leaders, Western Region pledged
allegiance to the federal government of Nigeria. Nafziger (1973) argued that “the appointment of
Chief Awolowo (freed from prison in I966) to be Vice-Chairman of the Federal Executive
Council and Federal Commissioner for Finance, together with the Biafran attack on a Western
city, may have been important factors in the West’s decision to opt for the Federation” (p. 515).
Eastern Region, no doubt, was disappointed over the west’s allegiance to the federal
government for many reasons. First, both the east and the west had previously voiced out their
anger over what they referred to as northern hegemony and feudalism. Second, the two regions
had argued for the inclusion of a secession clause in the constitution during the Constitutional
Conference. Third, sympathetic to the cause of easterners, “Chief Awolowo requested in a letter
to Colonel Adebayo (Governor of the West) that Northern troops in the West and Lagos be
removed on the grounds that they ‘constitute an army of occupation, and that their non-removal
has virtually reduced the said territories to the status of a protectorate’” (Akinola, 2014, p. 74).
Fourth, Awolowo, speaking on behalf of Western Region, had affirmed that “if the Eastern
Region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede from or opt out of Nigeria, the
Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the Federation” (Akinola, 2014, p. 75).
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The easterners were surprised and disappointed that after their secession and declaration
of Biafran independence, the west was unable to keep to their word and instead pledged
allegiance to the federal government in support of the unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria.
This is why the Igbos regarded “the Yorubas in general, and Awolowo in particular, …as
traitors” (Akinola, 2014, p. 75).
General Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian military head of state, “did not believe that secession
provided the answer to the Nigerian problem” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 579). According to him, “there
is no alternative to a Federation of Nigeria. The only possible alternative is the emergence of
several armed groups in the country...” (New York Times, 1968, as cited in Tamuno, 1970, p.
579). According to Njoku (2013), “while Ojukwu described the declaration of Biafra as an act of
liberation from death, insecurity and ethnic hegemony, Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria’s military head
of state, articulated it as rebellion that must be crushed to drag the east back into Nigeria” (p.
718). Gowon, who constantly referred to Biafra’s secession as Ojukwu’s rebellion, believed that
by fighting the war the federal government’s ultimate goal was to preserve the territorial integrity
and unity of Nigeria (Gowon, 2015; Gowon, 1970, as cited in Kirk-Greene, 1971). This was
based on “the premise that if Biafra was allowed to secede then a number of other ethnic
nationalities within Nigeria would follow suit” (Achebe, 2012, p. 96).
In addition, Anthony (2014) stated that “Nigeria claimed it was defending the integrity of
the republic (‘keeping Nigeria one’) and safeguarding citizens trapped behind ‘rebel’ lines” (p.
209). Nevertheless, Gowon conceded in 2015 when he recognized that:
Emeka Ojukwu could be justified in taking a stand for the defense and protection of his
people in the circumstances of the country at the time. I was trying to do the same at the
national level (that included them and his people) at that time. I understand and respected
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his position but not the extreme position he took which I felt was misguided. I wished we
had toiled more to avoid secession. (Gowon, 2015, p. 8)
Despite the pros and cons of the security and safety arguments of the Biafrans or the
Nigerian unity and indivisibility arguments of the federal military government, the events that
later erupted as a result of the negotiation deadlock did not allow for the prevention of the
looming violence and war. “One point has become increasingly clear, as it was in the beginning;
there is no community of confidence left in which men can live side-by-side in the same nation”
(Shepherd, 1968, p. 3). As Tamuno (1970) rightly pointed out, “the issues of secession and
territorial integrity in Nigeria were settled not through plebiscites but on the battlefield” (p. 582).
About the War
Declaration of War and Fall of Biafra
The declaration of war against Biafra, Gowon (2015) emotionally recalled, “was a direct
result of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and secession of the Eastern Region
from Nigeria. If there was no secession, there would not have been civil war” (p. 4). There is a
conceptual disagreement among scholars on the appropriate name that should be given to this
war. This is why different names are used in scholarly literature to refer to the same war. For
example, such names as Nigerian Civil War, Nigeria-Biafra War, Biafran War, the Brothers’
War, War of National Unity, War against the Infidels, War of Liberation, and so on, have been
used by various scholars (Onuoha, 2013b; Anthony, 2010).
Anthony (2010) argued that “calling it the ‘Nigerian Civil War’ – as is conventional –
invites the critique of denying Biafra equal rhetorical footing with Nigeria and re-inscribing
Federal claims that Biafra was little more than a rebellious region of Nigeria” (p. 41). Onuoha
(2013b) affirmed that the ‘Nigerian Civil War’ “is the official name recognized by the
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government and linked to official narratives of the war” (p. 2197). On the other hand, using the
term ‘Biafran War’ could be interpreted by some “as an indication of political sympathies”
(Anthony, 2010, p. 41).
The use of Nigeria-Biafra War in this research points to the fact that there were two
conflict parties at war, each with known territory and well-organized military that swore
allegiance to their own states. By virtue of its secession, proclamation of independence and selfgovernment for almost three years, and with diplomatic recognition by some countries, Biafra,
Achebe (2012) opined, was a country. If there was a country called Biafra as Achebe (2012)
affirmed, then it may be justified to use the term Nigeria-Biafra War in this study. Onuoha
(2013b) had opined that:
the depiction of the war as the ‘Nigerian-Biafran War’ captures the views of those who
saw the Republic of Biafra as an independent entity between 1967 and 1970 by virtue of
the fact that it had its own institutions of governance (army, territory, currency, flag and
anthem) and was officially recognized by other African countries like Ivory Coast,
Gabon, Zambia and Tanzania. (p. 2197)
In response to the declaration of independence of Biafra by General Ojukwu, Mustafa
(1969) stated that General Gowon, with the backing of Nigerian leaders, “proceeded to tighten
the screw on the Eastern Region and declared a blockade against the secessionist State” (p. 141).
Nafziger (1972) stated that the Gowon administration severed “communication and postal
services to Biafra, officially banning foreign-exchange transactions, and imposing a limited
economic blockade on Biafran ports” (p. 226).
The Nigeria-Biafra War officially started on July 6, 1967 “with the advance of federal
troops into secessionist territory” (Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 173). As Achebe (2012) stated,
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“the move to capture the Biafran border towns of Ogoja and Nsukka proved to be a declaration
of war” (p. 128). Initially, the Gowon military government launched what they referred to as a
“police action” or “quick surgical operation” against Eastern Region in order to capture their
capital, Enugu, and to stop Biafran rebellion (Njoku, 2013; Achebe, 2012; Oguibe, 1998;
Nafziger, 1972; Essack, 1970; Mustafa, 1969).
The Nigerian forces also attempted to cross over to Biafra in July 1967 through the River
Niger Bridge but were halted by the Biafran army (Achebe, 2012). After facing resistance from
the Biafrans, an all-out war was declared against Biafra by General Gowon in August 1967
(Nafziger, 1972). In one of his reflections on the war, Gowon (2015) corroborated: “the
secession, more than anything else, left me with no other option than to take ‘Police Action’ that
was later upgraded to full ‘Military Action’ after the Biafran Army ventured into and overran the
hitherto ‘neutral’ Mid-West Region” (p. 4).
The sudden shift in strategy, Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) argued, was due to “the
occupation of non-Igbo territories by the Biafran army once secession was declared. Nigeria’s
ignoring Ijaw, Efik, Ogoja and others’ interests would have been like the world’s ignoring those
of Germany’s occupied neighbors some thirty years ago” (p. 2). In addition to occupying nonBiafran territories, for example, Mid-West Region as discussed below, Uphoff and Ottemoeller
(1970) affirmed that “it was Biafra which opened the air war on civilian targets. Using a B-26
purchased in Europe, it bombed Lokoja, Idah and Makurdi in the opening months of the war” (p.
2).
Nafziger’s (1972) recapitulation of the evolution of the war in July and August 1967 is
illuminating.
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In July the blockade, which was effectively enforced by Nigeria’s small navy, became
total when it was extended to oil tankers. In the same month the Gowon Government
announced a ‘police action’ to crush the secession, after which several towns in northern
Biafra were captured. The Federation declared total war in August after the Biafran
occupation of the Mid-West and attack on a city in the West. (Nafziger, 1972; p. 226)
The notion that Nigeria’s navy effectively enforced the blockade early on as stated by
Nafziger (1972) was rejected by Mustafa (1969). Mustafa (1969) believed that “in the early
stages, the small Nigerian navy failed to enforce the blockade of Eastern Region effectively as a
result of which Biafra managed to obtain arms and ammunitions in large quantities” (p. 142).
The reasons for the alleged bombing of Lokoja by the Biafrans and the resultant casualties
require further study.
It should also be noted that Nigeria’s initial ‘quick surgical operation’ or what it referred
to as a ‘police action’ against the Biafran rebels was probably due to the fact that there was an
asymmetry in terms of military capability between Nigeria and Biafra. The Biafrans, Shepherd
(1968) confirmed, were “outmanned and out-gunned by the Federal troops” (p. 3). The Nigerian
military superiority over Biafra was well described by Essack (1970).
In the civil war the scales are on paper weighted overwhelmingly in favor of the Nigerian
Federal Government. [Before the start of the war] Nigeria had a population of 53 million
against 12 million in Biafra. At the start of the war the rebel army numbered only 35,000
as against Nigeria’s 100,000. In every other respect, from logistics and armaments to
economic strength, the Federal government had a crushing superiority. (p. 8)
Achebe (2012) clarified that “Biafra had only 2,000 troops at the beginning of the war
[and later they] recruited an additional 20,000 men” (p. 153). On the Nigeria side, Nafziger
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(1973) affirmed that “from 1965 to I971 the armed forces expanded from about 10,500 to around
250,000” (p. 534). Nevertheless, Heerten and Moses (2014) argued that “the Federal Military
Government’s major strategic advantage was not its military force, but its diplomatic status:
internationally recognized statehood. That the FMG could argue that it was a sovereign
government facing an ‘insurgency’ was decisive” (p. 174). As will be discussed later, Nigeria’s
diplomatic status abroad made it easy for the Gowon administration to purchase “weapons on
international markets. Due to their ‘rebel’ status, by contrast, the Biafrans were forced to use
black market channels to buy arms” (Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 174).
In August 1967, the hastily assembled and ill-equipped Biafran military, empowered to
some extent by the locally manufactured arms of university professors (Oguibe, 1998) in
addition to the leftover of Nigerian military stockpile in Eastern Region, launched an offensive
against Nigeria (Heerten & Moses, 2014). Hastily assembled and ill-equipped, because when the
war broke out Biafra had no organized military of its own and no adequate stockpile of arms and
military equipment ready to engage the well-trained, well-equipped and British backed federal
forces in a conventional warfare. Achebe (2012) confirmed that after many young men were
recruited into the People’s Army of Biafra with the help of a motivating song (mantra), “Ojukwu
nye anyi egbe ka anyi nuo agha – Ojukwu give us guns to fight a war… sadly Ojukwu had no
guns to give to those brave souls” (p. 171).
Christopher Ejike Ago, a Biafran veteran, who like many others joined the Biafran army
as a student from the University of Nigeria Nsukka (UNN), stated in an interview for the BBC
news: “the Nigerians who were pursuing us were trained soldiers. We were not. We were drafted
into the war, given two days’ training. Plus the fact that we were hungry. Some of us, our skin
was getting rotten. Nobody can fight a war like that” (Nwaubani, 2020, January 15).
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Felix Nwankwo Oragwu, who, as a physics professor at the University of Nigeria Nsukka
(UNN) when the war started, decided to transfer his scientific and technological skills to help
manufacture arms for Biafra. Mr. Oragwu was the head of the Research and Production (RAP)
group, a group of Igbo scientists tasked with the manufacture of arms and other military
equipment for Biafra, including the famous “ogbunigwe, a weapons launcher of remarkable and
devastating effect which influenced the outcome of many battles in Biafra’s favor” (Nwaubani,
2020, January 15). Reflecting on the war several decades after, the 85-year-old Mr. Oragwu
stated: “Without us, the war would have lasted only about 30 hours. When the war started, there
was not a single weapon either in a store or anywhere throughout Biafra. They only had knives
and cutlasses. No gun, no bomb, no nothing” (Nwaubani, 2020, January 15). According to
Diamond (2007), “These ‘science boys’, as they were called, were the most systematically
‘radical’, that is to say, they viewed the war as both a national and a social revolution” (p. 351).
Nevertheless, courageous Biafran soldiers crossed the River Niger Bridge in Onitsha,
passed through Asaba, invaded Mid-West Region, seized its capital city, Benin, as well as its
government house, and declared Mid-West an Independent Republic of Benin (Mustafa, 1969).
Lieutenant Colonel David Ejoor, the Governor of Mid-West Region, escaped and entered the
Nigerian side.
The Mid-West Region was the most ethnically heterogeneous region among the four
regions in Nigeria during the war. According to Orobator (1987), “the Region obviously was
most favorably disposed to agitate for the unity of the country” (p. 367). As previously stated,
Mid-West Region played a peacemaking role to prevent the conflict between Eastern Region and
the federal government from escalating into war. Although the government of Mid-West Region
appeared to be neutral, Mid-Westerners were “apparently sympathetic to the Biafran cause. But
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the situation changed from August 9, 1967 following the Biafran invasion of the Region”
(Orobator, 1987, p. 368).
Orobator (1987) described how and why the Biafran troops invaded and occupied MidWestern Region from August 8 to September 20, 1967. According to the author, the invasion and
occupation of Mid-Western Nigeria was authorized by Ojukwu and led by Brigadier Victor
Adebukunola Banjo to achieve specific tactical purposes. Among these tactical purposes are:
1. To forestall the use of the region by federal troops against Biafra;
2. To enlist the assistance of all Mid-Western sympathizers to the Biafran cause;
3. To ensure an uninterrupted supply of essential commodities needed to sustain the

secessionist state; and
4. To use the Mid-West as a launching pad in their effort to ally with Western Region

against the north. (Orobator, 1987, p. 371)
The grand calculated plan of the Biafran soldiers was to quickly go all the way to the
Western Region capital, Ibadan, to coerce the west to leave the Nigerian federation (Uphoff &
Ottemoeller, 1970), and probably join forces with the west to attack and take over Lagos,
Nigeria’s capital. This explains why Brigadier Victor Adebukunola Banjo, a Yoruba military
officer detained in Eastern Nigeria’s Ikot Ekpene Prison for allegedly participating in the January
15, 1966 coup, an accusation he and many others refuted, was chosen to lead the invasion of
Mid-West Region and Western Region after he was released by Ojukwu (Orobator, 1987).
After Banjo’s troop seized Mid-West Region, Ojukwu appointed Major Albert Okonkwo
on August 17, 1967 to be the region’s military administrator (Orobator, 1987). With this
takeover, Banjo and his men were free to move toward Lagos as a liberation army for their so-
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called operation liberation of Nigeria. Banjo and his liberation army, however, did not go beyond
the town of Ore for some logistical and tactical reasons (Achebe, 2012).
The invasion of Mid-West Region and the advance of Banjo’s liberation army toward
Western Region inspired “an exhortation on the part of the Yorubas to liberate themselves from
the Hausa-Fulani domination” (Akinola, 2014, p. 75). However, some Yoruba leaders were
against Banjo’s request and unwilling to cooperate. According to Akinola (2014), Chief Obafemi
Awolowo, a prominent Yoruba leader, went on the radio to persuade the Yorubas “to lose no
time and spare no efforts in giving every conceivable support to the Federal troops in defense of
their homeland, and of the fatherland” (p. 75). The refusal of the western leaders to cooperate
with Banjo’s liberation army is the reason why Perham (1970) opined that the Biafran “race
across the Mid-West Region failed to reach Lagos, and so failed also in its presumed hope of
winning the collaboration of the Yoruba against the North” (p. 237).
Orobator (1987) argued that “the declaration of the ‘Republic of Benin’ on September 20,
1967 represented perhaps one of the most intriguing measures taken by the Okonkwo
administration” (p. 380). Intriguing and perhaps upsetting to the Nigerian troops because the
declaration was announced “when the Biafran forces were on the run, having lost most of the
Mid-West to the Federal Army and on the very day Benin City fell to the Federal Government”
(Orobator, 1987, p. 382). Mustafa (1969) opined that since they were “unable to retain their
position, the Biafrans retreated to the Eastern Region” (p.142).
Whether the Biafran invasion and brief occupation of the mid-west was supported by the
Igbo speaking mid-western military officers and civilian leaders are still up for a debate. What is
certain is that this invasion had many consequences. Among these are those identified by
Orobator (1987):
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1. First, it led to the upgrading of the ‘police action’ initially taken by the Federal

Government against the secessionists to a full-scale war of hostile dimension;
2. Second, it culminated in the breakdown of the mutual trust that had existed between

the Igbos and the non-Igbos of the Region;
3. Third, the apparent sympathy for the Igbo or Biafran cause which had prevailed

largely amongst the mid-west youth suffered an irreparable dent. (p. 373)
The apex of these was a resolve by Mid-West Region to commit to and abide by the
blockade imposed by the federal government against Biafra (Orobator, 1987). In addition,
Akinola (2014) stated that as a result of the Biafran invasion of the mid-west and their initial
goal of taking over the west and Lagos, Chief Awolowo asked the Yorubas to pledge allegiance
to the federal government of Nigeria. The Yorubas were told in a media broadcast by Awolowo
to “lose no time and spare no efforts in giving every conceivable support to the Federal troops in
defense of their homeland, and of the fatherland” (Akinola, 2014, p. 75).
After declaring their support and allegiance to the federal military government of Nigeria,
the non-Igbo mid-westerners in Benin City, aided by the Nigerian troops, committed “the worst
killings of Igbos… in retaliation for the conduct of the Biafran army” (Uphoff & Ottemoeller,
1970, p. 3). The nature and extent of the Benin massacre of the Igbos are reserved for discussion
in the traumatic memories section of the study. The most important lesson from the Biafran
invasion of the mid-west was well articulated by Jervis (1967). According to the author,
the Mid-Western adventure, however cleverly executed, produced a decisive reversal for
Biafra. The plan to gain Western and Mid-Western support for a grouping against the
North collapsed, while Biafra’s military advances galvanized Nigerian opposition. MidWesterners were deeply embittered and a toughening anti-Igbo tone became everywhere
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evident. With the retaking of the Mid-West and the capture of Calabar, Biafra soon lost
all territory outside Igboland. (Jervis, 1967, p. 17)
Conscious of what the Biafrans have done in Benin City and other mid-western towns,
the Nigerian troops were now determined more than ever to fight to the end until Biafra is
defeated. As Bird and Ottanelli (2011) explained, “following the retreat of the Biafrans back
across the Niger, the federal government imposed a blockade, effectively starving the east into
submission between 1968 and 1970” (p. 13). Heerten and Moses (2014) confirmed that “air and
sea ports were blockaded, foreign currency transactions banned, incoming mail and
telecommunication blocked and international business obstructed” (p. 174).
In early 1968, the Nigerian authorities abruptly changed their currency banknotes. This
sudden change of currency banknotes “rendered worthless millions of Nigerian pound notes in
the Biafran treasury” (Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 174). With all these measures put in place,
“Biafra’s lines of communication with the outside world” (Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 174) was
gradually disrupted and cut off.
After the recapture of the Mid-West capital, Benin, Nigerian soldiers quickly and
strategically chased the Biafrans through Asaba passing through the River Niger after an intense
fighting, and finally making their way into Biafra. As will be revealed in the traumatic memories
section of this study, the Nigerian troops massacred in a heinous fashion hundreds of Asaba
indigenes who, although Igbos by ethnicity, were from Mid-Western Region. Also, there were
reports of sporadic killings committed by the Biafran troops within the mid-west as they
retreated back to Biafran territory.
The federal troops came into Biafra from all sides through multiple routes. Colonel
Mohammed Shuwa, Commander of the First Infantry Division, with his troop came into Biafra
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through the Middle Belt which is closer to Biafran cities of Ogoja, Nsukka and Enugu. Colonel
Murtala Mohammed, Commander of the Second Division, with his troop came in from the midwest through Asaba into Onitsha. Colonel Benjamin Adekunle (also known as the Black
Scorpion), Commander of the Third Marine Division, with his troop came through the sea into
the minority inhabited Biafran areas of Calabar and Port Harcourt (Achebe, 2012; Aneke, 2003).
Mustafa (1969) noted that “in October 1967, the Federal forces occupied Enugu and
Calabar, forcing the Biafrans to shift their headquarters first to Aba and then to Umauhia”
(p.142). Achebe (2012) who provided the exact date of Enugu’s fall – October 4, 1967 –
affirmed that Biafra’s capital was moved to Umuahia after the fall of Enugu. Post (1968) stated
that it was Colonel Mohammed Shuwa and Lieutenant-Colonel Danjuma, both northerners, that
led the conquest of Enugu.
While Enugu was captured by Shuwa’s First Division, Onitsha was captured by Murtala
Mohammed’s Second Division on March 25, 1968 after suffering severe casualties in the hands
of the Biafran army commanded by Colonel Achuzia (Achebe, 2012). Even with this setback
caused by the breakthrough of the Nigerian forces, the Biafrans were relentless in their resolve to
fight to the end.
On the Biafran side, Diamond (2007) stated that the fall of Enugu marked significant
change in the war, a shift from an all-professional military combat phase to military-civilian
recruit combat phase. In this second phase of the war, “the people took up whatever arms they
could find and bolstered the demoralized officers” (Diamond, 2007, p. 351).
Since the oil producing areas were strategically important for both Nigeria and Biafra,
serious fighting occurred in minority inhabited territories in the newly created Rivers state and
South-Eastern state. Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) stated that in these minority areas, “any
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resistance to Biafran commands was dealt with harshly. In Ibibio territory, for example, many
atrocities against the civilian population occurred” (p. 3). Udo (1970) identified three main
reasons why the Ibibio of South-Eastern state were targeted by the Biafrans.
1. Firstly, the war front in this sector remained virtually fixed for 18 months when

considerable looting of property and farms went on. During this time interval Ikot
Ekpene, one of the worst hit towns in the war, changed hands several times.
2. The second important cause of destruction had its roots in the long-standing land feud

between those Igbo and Ibibio groups sharing a common boundary. During the war,
border land Igbos from Aba and Umuahia Division raided and burnt many Annang
Ibibio villages.
3. Thirdly, the lack of support for the secessionist cause by the non-Igbo groups, who

had been agitating since 1952 for separate states to be created for them from the Igbo
dominated state of Eastern Nigeria brought about great persecutions and destruction
of non-Igbo properties by over-zealous Igbo administrators and troops. (Udo, 1970, p.
10)
With the military support of the British government, the Soviet Union, and other
international players, “within a month of full military conflict, the Nigerian government captured
the important Island of Bonny from the Biafrans” (Uche, 2008, p. 131). As Uche’s (2008)
research revealed, the major installations of Shell-BP were in the Island of Bonny located near
the city of Port Harcourt in the newly created Rivers State.
From May through November 1968, the cities of Port Harcourt, Aba and Owerri fell “to
the Nigerian Third Marine Commando Division, led by Colonel Benjamin Adekunle (aka the
Black Scorpion)” (Doron, 2014, p. 234). Mustafa (1969) had stated that it was in May 1968 that
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“Port Harcourt, Biafra's sole outlet to the sea, fell to the Nigerian troops. This left the Igbos
squeezed into a small area, besieged from all sides” (p. 142). Achebe (2012) posited that while
the fall of Port Harcourt was exactly on May 12, 1968, Aba was captured in August 1968 and
Owerri in September 1968. Some authors have asserted that the retreating Biafran soldiers “took
hostages along to ensure that non-Igbos would vote the ‘right’ way if a plebiscite were held”
(Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970, p. 3).
The capture of Port Harcourt and other oil producing areas of the minority territories by
the federal forces implied that the Biafrans lost control of oil production. Before this time,
Biafrans experienced a drastic drop in oil production partly due to the fighting in the region and
partly due to a disagreement between oil companies and Biafran leaders over royalty payments.
This situation was well described by Nafziger (1972).
In June 1967 one month after secession, Biafra demanded a payment of £UK 7 million oil
royalties from Shell-B.P., the major firm producing crude oil in the East. Although ShellB.P. offered a token payment of £UK 250,000 under protest, pleading force majeure
under international law, the British Treasury refused to permit the company to transfer
the funds to the Biafran account in Switzerland. In July 1967, after Nigeria instituted a
blockade on oil tankers and Shell-B.P. halted its output in the East, Biafra’s crude-oil
output, produced only for refining for local requirements, dropped to 5,000 barrels per
day - slightly more than I percent of prewar output - before ceasing in subsequent months
as a result of the fighting. (Nafziger, 1972, p. 236)
Like Shell-BP that abandoned Biafra and switched over to the federal military
government of Nigeria, Diamond (2007) affirmed that “after the first 6 months of the war,
foreign investors in the secessionist area completely dissociated themselves from the Biafran
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regime” (p. 345). To recover the oilfields under the control of Biafra, Shell-BP made advance
royalty payments to the Federal government to buy arms from Britain. As Uche (2008) noted, the
first advance payment of this sort was in the amount of £5.5 million. Uche (2008) also affirmed
that after the capture of Port Harcourt by the federal forces in May 1968, “it was adjudged safe
by Shell-BP to send an advance team to both Bonny and Port Harcourt to assess the state of their
production facilities” (p. 132).
Indeed, in the midst of a war of this nature, oil facilities would be damaged. This partially
happened. Having committed their support to Nigeria, it was no longer possible for oil
companies to “run the risk of switching their support to Biafra” (Post, 1968, p. 33). This helped
the federal government to continue its oil production in the Mid-Western off-shore wells, and
later extended to Rivers and other locations recaptured from the Biafran military. According to
Uche (2008), “while Nigeria generated immense revenue from oil, which helped it finance its
war efforts, the same could not be said of Biafra. Oil exports for Biafra throughout the war were
almost non-existent” (p. 133).
The early success achieved by the Nigerian forces made many people in Nigeria and
abroad believe that the end of the war was very imminent. This belief was promoted by the
statement of the federal military government in August 1968 announcing “that the final assault
on the Igbo heartland had been mounted and the war would be over in a few weeks” (Mustafa,
1969, p.142). This announcement by the Nigerian government generated lots of excitement on
the Nigerian side, especially when Aba and Owerri, two major Biafran cities, were captured by
September 1968 by the Nigerian troops, and Umuahia, another strategic city which served as
Biafra’s administrative capital, was captured on April 22, 1969 by the federal forces (Momoh,
2002, as cited in Doron, 2014; Achebe. 2012; Essack, 1970).
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The fall of these important cities in Igbo heartland was attributed to “the lack of supplies
and ammunition that sorely hampered [Biafran] war effort” (Doron, 2014, p. 234). According to
Peter Marson (1981, as cited in Doron, 2014), the shortage in Biafran arms and military supplies
during this time were, among other factors, caused by “an engine failure that forced [American
gun runner Hank] Wharton’s crew to jettison eleven tons of arms and ammunition” (p. 235). In
addition to this incident, Jim Townsend (2007) narrated how in early June 1968 at an airport in
Guinea Bissau a bomb explosion destroyed the plane carrying two French Mystere fighters that
the Biafrans purchased from the French which he was trying to deliver to Biafra from Lisbon
through Guinea Bissau. This plane was also carrying Biafran money.
No doubt, the fact that these French Mystere fighters were not delivered to Biafra as
planned hampered the ability of the Biafran soldiers to prevent the Nigerian troops from
capturing the Igbo cities of Aba and Owerri. This is how Townsend (2007) narrated his
experience of this incident.
I learned that a US Captain (no names) flying the other Connie [Lockheed Constellation]
had been bribed by the Nigerians to stop our flight at any costs. It was he that planted the
bomb on our airplane and it should have exploded while we were flying – so we were
damned lucky to have been delayed in Bissau. I later met, entirely by accident, this same
captain in Miami. He nearly had a heart attack on the spot and I feel sure that he thought I
was after him” (paras. 33-34).
The Biafrans, however, argued that the British bribed Hank Wharton, the American arms dealer,
to stop flying arms and other military supplies into Biafra (Doron, 2014). By blaming Britain for
the capture of Igbo cities, Biafran propaganda helped “to stop the panic and reinforce the troops’
will to fight” (Doron, 2014, p. 235).
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Contrary to the expectation of Nigerians and their foreign allies, Biafran forces received
tactical reinforcements that helped them launch a major counter-attack against the Nigerian
forces, and recaptured Owerri in April 1969 (Melbourne, 1973; Mustafa, 1969). The Owerri
siege lasted approximately six months. It was the fiercest battle between Nigeria and Biafra. The
Biafran troops were able to recapture Owerri in April 1969 by harassing and cutting off the
supply chain of Colonel Benjamin Adekunle’s 3 Marine Commando Division (Essack, 1970).
Another research is needed to further investigate how Owerri was recaptured, the Biafran
officers that led the offensive, and why they were not able to sustain the defeat.
Essack (1970) noted that General Gowon was infuriated by Nigeria’s defeat in Owerri,
and in a move to retake Owerri, he quickly replaced the First, Second and Third Divisions
Commanders. Achebe (2012) affirmed that Gowon replaced the First Infantry Division
Commander, Colonel Mohammed Shuwa, with Brigadier Iliya Bisalla. The Second Division
Commander, Ibrahim Bata Malgwi Haruna who had succeeded Colonel Murtala Muhammed due
to accusations of intentional massacres levied against Murtala Muhammed (The Nigerian and
Africa magazine, March 1998, as cited in Aneke, 2003), was replaced with Lieutenant Colonel
Gibson Sanda Jalo. Colonel Benjamin Adekunle (aka the Black Scorpion), Commander of the
Third Marine Division, was replaced with Olusegun Obasanjo who later became a two-time head
of state of Nigeria, first as a military dictator and second as a democratically elected President.
Another strategy was to demoralize the Biafran troops and leadership by leveraging on
the defection of well-known and highly respected Biafran leaders to “appeal to the people of
Biafra to end resistance” (Essack, 1970, p. 9). Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, a prominent Nigerian leader
of Igbo origin, who had once supported Biafran secession, was one of the Biafran leaders who
defected in support of the unity of Nigeria that he championed starting from the pre-
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independence era (Effiong, 2017; Anthony, 2014; Doron, 2014). Before his defection to the
Nigerian side, Dr. Azikiwe had resigned from his position as peace envoy for Biafra due to a
disagreement he had with Ojukwu, the Biafran head of state (Effiong, 2017). In his resignation
letter to Ojukwu, Dr. Azikiwe stated:
Since you refuse to go to the conference table to negotiate for peace, since you prefer that
the civil war should end on the battle field and not on the conference table; since you said
that the sovereignty of Biafra is not negotiable, I am afraid I cannot continue as a peace
envoy because you have destroyed all the vestiges of any optimism for peace. (Effiong,
2017, para. 27)
Doron (2014) argued that “Azikiwe’s defection to Nigeria in August 1969 signaled a
symbolic beginning of the end of the Biafran state” (p. 243). In fact, Dr. Azikiwe’s defection to
Nigeria was preceded by former Biafran representative in France, Raphael Uwechue, who
defected to Nigeria in early 1968 (Anthony, 2014). A compelling argument why Ambassador
Raphael Uwechue lost hope in Biafran leadership is made in “Reflections on the Nigerian Civil
War: Facing the Future,” which is Uwechue’s (2004) canonical book about the war.
Nevertheless, Shepherd (1968) stated that “political moderates like Dr. Francis Ibiam, Sir
Louis Mbanefo, …Dr. Kenneth Dike and Cyprian Ekwensi… remained loyal to the Biafran
cause, despite the tragic losses” (p. 3). Another research should be devoted to defections during
the Nigeria-Biafra War. This is important to understand why some Biafran leaders and
supporters defected to the Nigerian side, when and how they did that, and the impacts their
defections had on the war outcome. The same study is needed for the Nigerian side.
Occupying only a territory of about “25 by 75 mile area which contains the major town of
Owerri and the vital airstrip of Uli,” the Biafrans had no other choice than to threaten “to resort
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to guerilla warfare rather than surrender to the federal forces” (Mustafa, 1969, p.142). Essack
(1970) posited that it was “after the fall of Port Harcourt in June 1968 [that] Colonel Ojukwu…
committed his forces to a guerilla type of struggle” (p. 9). Whatever was the case, the point here
is that the Biafran territory was shrinking drastically compared to the territory it occupied at the
start of the war. “At the outset Biafra claimed 29,000 square miles” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 33).
As will be discussed later, one factor that boosted the morale of the Biafran forces to
persist was the conspiracies and propaganda disseminated by their leaders that the ultimate goal
of the federal military government was a total extermination or genocide of the Igbos. Heerten
and Moses (2014) explained it this way: “realizing their slim chances on the battleﬁeld, the
Biafran leadership moved the conﬂict into the propaganda domain” (p. 174). Ojukwu, the
Biafran leader, accused Gowon, the head of state of the federal military government of Nigeria,
“of a calculated war of destruction and genocide” (Achebe, 2012, p. 210).
Having been immersed in and saturated with the disseminated propaganda emanating
from their leaders, Biafran forces “fought with a fervor born of the belief that for them the war
means a choice between survival and extermination” (Mustafa, 1969, p. 143). Shepherd (1968)
observed at this time that “the majority of the Biafrans [were] ready to die rather than surrender,
and Nigeria seem[ed] prepared to impose its authority at any price” (p. 3).
No matter how propagandist the genocide belief appeared to be, there was, as will be
discussed later, some sorts of evidence suggesting that some of the Nigerian forces deliberately
targeted and bombed civilians and contemplated on killing all the Igbos within their reach. This
is probably why scholars like Shepherd (1968) affirmed at that time that “this massacre could
become genocide” (p. 3). Even Achebe (2012) who witnessed the war inside Biafra revealed that
because the Biafran forces refused to stop their guerrilla warfare, “the Nigerian army openly
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attacked civilians in an ill-advised, cruel, and desperate attempt to incite internal opposition to
the war and build momentum toward a quick surrender” (p. 212).
Having been forced to retreat into a smaller enclave in the Igbo heartland and encircled
by the federal forces, coupled with the effects of the blockade imposed by the federal military
government on Biafra, starvation became a major issue conditioning the fate of Biafran citizens.
Mustafa (1969) noted that “severe shortage of food” was noticed from “mid-1968, when the
federal forces closed in upon the Igbos” (p. 143). Samuels (1969) and Kirk-Greene (1971) as
cited in Nafziger (1972) all corroborated this and argued that “by the middle of 1968 food was
scarce in parts of Biafra as a result of the blockade and war destruction… Food shortages
reached a crisis in mid-I968, when Biafra was a shrinking enclave surrounded by Nigerian
territory, and continued until several months after the war” (p. 241).
Heerten and Moses (2014) elaborated that “in the ﬁrst half of 1968, ever more religious
groups and humanitarian organizations were alerted to the event, due in large measure to the
presence of western missionaries. These religious ties were conduits for the transnational
networks through which the conﬂict would be turned into an object of international humanitarian
concern” (p. 175). As will be explained later, a dispute between the leaders of Biafra and Nigeria
over a safe corridor or method by which food and other relief supplies will be sent to Biafra
exacerbated the starvation situation in Biafra (Mustafa, 1969; Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970). This
happened despite large quantities of relief supplies stockpiled for the Biafran people in strategic
locations such as Calabar, Enugu, Fernando Po, Libreville, Abidjan, and so on.
According to Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970), “Ojukwu insisted that planes come in only
at night and certain relief agencies agreed” (p. 3). The night airlift to Biafra by some
humanitarian agencies as well as the risks they took and the price they paid will be examined
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later in the humanitarian disaster section. On the other hand, Gowon insisted on “daytime flights
and [was willing] to open up a neutralized land corridor so that massive shipments of food could
be brought in at a fraction of the cost and risk” (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970, p. 3). To allow
daytime flights and land corridor, Gowon required that “shipments be inspected to ensure that no
military supplies were being smuggled in” (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970, p. 3).
It is not completely known why Biafra rejected Gowon’s shipment inspection condition.
Perhaps, and as Biafran leaders stated, they feared being poisoned by their enemies, the
Nigerians (Achebe, 2012; Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970). Another hypothesis which was not
obvious could be that in addition to their fear of food poisoning, the Biafran leaders did not want
an immediate end to starvation “which held world opinion in ransom [and attracted international
sympathy toward the Biafran cause] and they did not want to lose the cover for arms shipments
which food relief planes provided” (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970, p. 3). There were also
speculations that the Biafrans wanted “to avoid any act that would show a dependence on the
Nigerian government” (New York Times, 1968, July 3, as cited in Anthony, 2014, p. 216). It is
important to underscore the fact that “the airlifts of aid to Biafra, partly used for humanitarian
purposes and partly for military purposes, prevented Biafra’s fall for some months” (Heerten &
Moses, 2014, p. 176).
With the devastation caused by increasing starvation on Biafran citizens as well as a
looming military defeat caused by the reduction of arms supply to Biafra by the French, General
Ojukwu and his cabinet realized that they had no choice than to surrender to Nigeria. The
realization that the war was over for Biafra, no doubt, was discerned “after Owerri had been
recaptured by the federal troops and Uli airport was under heavy air and land assault by federal
troops led by Olusegun Obasanjo” (Achebe, 2012, p. 223).
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In order to save face and avoid humiliation, Ojukwu fled to Ivory Coast in the first week
of January 1970 (Heerten & Moses, 2014) after announcing on the radio that “he was ‘leaving
the People’s Republic of Biafra to explore alternative options for peace’” (Achebe, 2012, p. 223).
Detailed description about the collapse of Biafra, the flight to Abidjan in Ivory Coast, and the
sudden collapse of the Biafran army is presented in “The Struggle for Secession, 1966-1970: A
Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War” (Akpan, 2013). This memoir was written by Mr.
Ntieyong Udo Akpan, an Ibibio indigene and the Chief Secretary of the Government and Head of
the Civil Service of former Eastern Nigeria, and one of the Biafran leaders who fled to Abidjan
in Ivory Coast along with Ojukwu.
On January 12, 1970, Ojukwu’s second in command, Major General Philip Efiong, who
took over from Ojukwu as the Biafran head of state, ended the war after a radio broadcast
encouraging calm and urging his troops to lay down or surrender their weapons (Achebe, 2012;
Perham, 1970). He then “led a delegation of Biafran leaders to accept defeat” (Oguibe, 1998, p.
97). Biafra’s surrender to the federal military government of Nigeria was officially announced on
January 15, 1970 (Nafziger, 1972).
A thorough account of the role of the 3rd Marine Commando Division commanded by
Colonel Benjamin Adekunle and later Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo in capturing Uli-Ihiala which
led to the fall of Biafra is narrated by Alabi-Isama’s (2013) “The tragedy of victory: On-the-spot
account of the Nigeria-Biafra War in the Atlantic theatre.” Lieutenant Colonel Godwin AlabiIsama (later Brigadier General) was the Chief of Staff for the 3rd Marine Commando Division.
As is thoroughly analyzed in the return of the repressed to consciousness section, Alabi-Isama’s
(2013) memoir is an antithesis of Obasanjo’s (1980) “My command: An account of the Nigerian
civil war, 1967-1970.”
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Nonetheless, it is important to underscore the fact that without the intervention of foreign
powers and the various roles they played before and during the war Nigeria’s victory against
Biafra would not have been possible.
Foreign Interventions
Organization of African Unity (OAU). Since Nigeria was the largest and most
influential country on the continent of Africa, the Nigeria-Biafra War posed many challenges to
African countries. Although the war was regarded by the federal military government as an
internal conflict that needed to be resolved by the Nigerian people without foreign intervention
(Mustafa, 1969), the OAU was obliged to intervene before the destructive wind of secession
blew across the entire continent. The OAU’s intervention in the conflict was supported by the
United Nations under the leadership of the Secretary-General U Thant who, through his
noninterventionist policy, deferred the mitigation of the conflict he perceived as an African issue
to the OAU, while relieving the United Nations of its principal duty (Achebe, 2012).
Daddieh and Shaw (1984) analyzed the reactions of different African states to the Biafran
secession from Nigeria. The authors found that “unless vital interests are perceived in danger,
African countries are reluctant to get entangled in conflicts outside their frontiers” (Daddieh &
Shaw, 1984, p. 21). Panter-Brick (1968, as cited in Daddieh & Shaw, 1984) explained that “the
majority of African states appeared, initially at least, to perceive events in Biafra as a challenge
to Nigeria’s territorial integrity with wider continental implications rather than just an assertion
of Biafra’s right to self-determination” (p. 26). According to Post (1968), “African leaders
fear[ed] that successful secession by Biafra would be an ominous precedent for any dissident
sections of their own countries” (p. 34).
Mustafa (1969) noted that:
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in September 1967, when the OAU met at Kinshasa, the majority of African leaders
insisted that the Nigerian war was an African problem and that the reputation of the OAU
would be lowered if it did not take a collective stand on the conflict. Hence a resolution
was adopted condemning ‘any act of secession in any member State’. (p. 144)
In light of this, it was safe for some African states to resort to conciliatory efforts in order
to prevent the war. Most African states aligned with the federal government of Nigeria due to
“the presumption that any encouragement given to Biafran independence would unleash
centrifugal forces that might prove impossible to contain” (Daddieh & Shaw, 1984, p. 28) within
Africa. In other words, ethnic groups or regions experiencing real or perceived marginalization
will resort to secession as the only solution to their problem. This is why Daddieh and Shaw
(1984) concluded that in the Nigeria-Biafra War, or as they named it, “in the brothers’ war the
federal side was heavily favored by African decision-makers in part because of their collective
aversion toward secession” (p. 31). For some African states, “the overwhelming support for the
federal side was reflective of a pervasive perception that Biafra would not succeed as a viable
proposition” (Daddieh & Shaw, 1984, p. 32).
The OAU’s resolution which supported “the territorial integrity, unity and peace of
Nigeria” (Nagel & Rathbone, 1967, as cited in Mustafa, 1969, p. 144) was a morale booster for
the federal military government. This was a public gesture in favor of Gowon’s Nigerian Unity
policy. The OAU held that “the eventual settlement, whatever its nature, should maintain and
respect the unity of Nigeria” (Uche, 2008, p. 130). As a result, General Gowon, the Nigerian
military head of state, was motivated in November 1967 to welcome six OAU representatives
from Ghana, Liberia, Cameroun, Niger, Ethiopia, and the Congo (Kinshasa) who visited Lagos
on “a mission of consultation” (Mustafa, 1969, p. 144). Since the OAU’s resolution advocated
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for the unity and indivisibility of Nigeria, as well as condemned Biafran secession, it was normal
for the Biafran leaders to view the OAU’s consultation mission to Lagos as “too pro-Nigerian to
be effective” (Mustafa, 1969, p. 144).
Influenced by the interests of the super powers – France, Britain, Soviet Union, USA,
China and other European countries – as will be discussed later, there were noticeable division
among the OAU member states on the question of Biafran secession. As Mustafa (1969)
asserted, this division paralyzed efforts to achieve “a uniform approach to the Nigerian war” (p.
146). The rift was between those African countries that, for humanitarian reasons, expressed
sympathy toward Biafra and those that supported Nigeria.
In fact, many African countries neither recognized the independence of Biafra nor offered
support to the Biafran people. However, four African countries officially recognized Biafra in
1968 (de St. Jorre, 1972, as cited in Daddieh & Shaw, 1984; Melbourne, 1973; Perham, 1970).
Biafra’s military and diplomatic status was strengthened by the diplomatic recognition it
received between April and May 1968 from Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Zambia (Heerten
& Moses, 2014; Achebe, 2012; Daddieh & Shaw, 1984; Orobator, 1983; Perham, 1970; Mustafa,
1969; Shepherd, 1968). These African states recognized Biafran independence on humanitarian
grounds. They “were all deeply moved by the suffering in Biafra” (Daddieh & Shaw, 1984, p.
34).
Also, Dr. François Duvalier, popularly known as ‘Papa Doc’ who was President of Haiti
from 1957 to 1971, officially recognized Biafra as a sovereign state on March 22, 1969 (Ogbo,
2020; Heerten & Moses, 2014). Shepherd (1968) was of the view that the recognition given to
Biafra by francophone countries such as Gabon, Ivory Coast and Haiti could be explained by
“the growing interest of France in the Biafran plight” (p. 3). Without according an official
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diplomatic recognition, Heerten and Moses (2014) affirmed that South Africa and Rhodesia also
offered their support to Biafra.
These countries “extended full diplomatic recognition to Biafra on the ground that the
Igbos had sufficiently demonstrated their claim to the right of self-determination” (Mustafa,
1969, p. 146). Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who was the first to recognize Biafra in April 1968
cited “humanitarian concerns as the grounds for this decision” (Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 176).
Although they did not officially grant recognition to Biafra nor supported its secessionist agenda,
“President Adou Ahidjo of Cameroun and President Emile-Derlin Zinsou of Dahomey [presentday Benin Republic] joined Kaunda and Nyerere [to] put pressure on Lagos for a compromise
settlement” (G. W. S., 1968, p. 2).
It has been noted that many other countries would have accorded a diplomatic
recognition to Biafra had it not been for false and embarrassing claims made by Biafra at the
outbreak of the war. Stremlau (1977, as cited in Daddieh & Shaw, 1984) opined that:
the acute embarrassment caused by a Radio Biafra newscaster’s announcement on the
very day of secession that Ghana, Togo, the Gambia, Ethiopia and Israel had all extended
diplomatic recognition to the new republic and that more recognition could be expected
shortly, damaged the chances of revisionist policies. Ojukwu was said to be furious about
the announcement. As soon as the federal government learned of the announcement it
demanded that the identified governments publicly repudiate the Biafran claims and
pledge their support for Nigeria. The five quickly complied. (pp. 32-33)
Nonetheless, the diplomatic recognitions received by Biafra along with military and
humanitarian assistance that came with them emboldened Biafra to engage in negotiations with
the federal military government on an equal footing. On the federal side, Mustafa (1969) stated
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that “Biafra’s success in winning recognition from four African countries induced the Federal
Government to drop its insistence on Biafra’s renunciation of secession as a prerequisite to talks
between the two sides” (p. 144).
Through the peace efforts of the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, mediated talks
were held in London and Kampala, Uganda. While the London talk was organized to set an
agenda, the Kampala mediation held in May 1968 was very symbolic in the sense that delegates
from the Nigerian federal government and Biafra met face to face after one year of Biafran
secession and almost ten months of a bloody war. Nigerian federal government was represented
by the Information Minister, Chief Anthony Enahoro, and the Biafran delegation was led by Sir
Louis Mbanefo. As expected, both parties were entrenched in their rigid positions and totalizing
descriptions of the other.
Shepherd (1968) affirmed that “the breakdown of the Kampala negotiations on a
settlement of the Nigeria-[Biafra]… War is to be deeply regretted” (p. 3). What led to the failure
of the negotiations in Kampala was the stringent positions of both sides. “Biafra insisted on her
sovereignty, while Nigeria demanded submission” (Shepherd, 1968, p. 3). Leveraging on the
documentation of Mustafa (1969), I have summarized in Table 4 the opposing positions of the
federalists and Biafrans as a result of which the Kampala mediated negotiation ended in a
deadlock.
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Table 4
Positions of the Federalists and Biafrans at the Kampala Mediation
Federal Military Government of Nigeria
Biafrans must renounce secession before a
cease-fire is honored
Biafran soldiers must be disarmed under outside
supervision
Eastern Region must be placed under federal
administration

Biafran Government
Nigerians should agree with us on an immediate
cease-fire
Federal forces must be withdrawn from Biafra

Nigerian federal military government should lift
the blockade they imposed on Biafra
A group of international forces should supervise
the cease-fire and it should be followed by
negotiations on economic cooperation between
the two parties and referenda in the areas
inhabited by minority tribes in Biafra
Note. Adapted from Mustafa (1969, pp.144-145).

After the failed May 1968 Kampala mediation, the consultative committee of the OAU
convened a meeting in Niamey, Niger, in July 1968. At this meeting, Mustafa (1969) stated that
the two heads of state at war – General Gowon of the federal government of Nigeria and General
Ojukwu of the republic of Biafra – “agreed to meet at Addis Ababa to negotiate the terms of a
cease-fire, arrange for a permanent settlement and discuss concrete proposals for the transport of
relief supplies” (p. 145). The mediated negotiation that was later held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
in August 1968 also ended in a deadlock (Achebe, 2012). Table 5 below is a summary of the
positions of the federalists and Biafrans at the Addis Ababa mediation.
Table 5
Positions of the Federalists and Biafrans at the Addis Ababa Mediation
Federal Military Government of Nigeria
The only basis of a settlement acceptable to
us is a united Nigeria
The Igbos must renounce secession and
disarm their forces
Note. Adapted from Mustafa (1969, p. 145).

Biafran Government
The federal government of Nigeria must
accept Biafra as an independent State
Biafra will enter into economic cooperation
with Nigeria if Nigeria accepts Biafra as an
independent State
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Faced with the unyielding or stringent positions of the Nigerians and Biafrans, and in
order to prevent a spillover effect of secession threats into their own countries, many OAU
member states that gathered at the OAU Summit in Algiers, Algeria, on September 13, 1968
called on “secessionist leaders to cooperate with the Federal authorities in order to restore peace
and unity in Nigeria” (Whiteman, 1968, as cited in Mustafa, 1969, p. 145). Since lines were
already drawn and each party was increasingly receiving military support from its international
super power ally or allies, it was not possible for Biafra and the federal government of Nigeria to
reach agreement under the OAU-led mediations. According to Uche (2008), “there were,
however, other interests that had the potential to extend the conflict. The war indeed… became a
focus for rivalries among some European powers” (p. 127). G. W. S. (1968) had also posited that
“one of the ugly characteristics of this kind of war is that powers intervene to fight another
antagonist indirectly” (p. 2).
Great Britain. Given the colonial and post-colonial relationship between Nigeria and the
Great Britain, it will be a mistake to ignore the role of the British in the escalation and deescalation of the Nigeria-Biafra War. During the years preceding the war, Nigeria relied on the
British for both economic and military assistance while the British had vested interest in the
Nigerian oil, two-third of which was produced in the Biafran held territory (Mustafa, 1969).
According to Smith (2014), “Shell-British Petroleum was a major investor in Nigeria, and over a
tenth of British oil imports came from Nigeria” (p. 250). Diamond (2007) stated that “the British
government owns 49% of BP; the Shell BP consortium is the largest Nigerian oil producer” (p.
356).
The initial policy of Whitehall (the British government) on the Nigeria-Biafra War,
Mustafa (1969) stated, could be characterized as “one of wait and see” (p. 146). Like many other
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countries, the British was hesitant at the beginning to give full support to Nigeria. Although
Britain was in favor of Nigerian unity at this time, the possibility of recognizing Biafra was not
completely ruled out. This ‘wait and see’ attitude toward the war did not last long. “Once the
situation became more clear-cut, with the Federalists regaining physical control of the oil regions
in the Mid-West and Rivers States, and the Soviet Union putting its full weight behind the
Federal side, the only honorable option left for Britain was to back Lagos” (Ogunbadejo, 1976,
p. 15). As Mustafa (1969) explained, “the British attitude was gradually modified in favor of the
Federal Government and the concept of a United Nigeria was forcefully upheld” (p. 146). This
change in policy in support of the federal military government of Nigeria, coupled with the fact
that Nigeria was turning to the Soviet Union for help, allowed the British to increase its supply of
arms to Nigeria.
Through an in-depth examination of the archives, Uche’s (2008) research revealed that
the decision of the British government to support the Federal government of Nigeria’s One
Nigeria policy against Biafran secession was highly influenced by the British economic interest
in Nigeria, especially Britain’s interest in oil and gas, and the protection of the investments made
by Shell-BP in Nigeria. Uche (2008) argued that “British oil interests contributed to the decision
of Britain to shift from its neutral stance to side with Nigeria” (p. 114). As a memo given to the
British High Commissioner in Nigeria shows, the British believed that “separation of Nigeria
into states of doubtful economic viability would jeopardize the substantial commercial and
investment interests we [the British] have in the country” (Commonwealth Office, September 30,
1966, as cited in Uche, 2008, p. 121).
Uche (2008) also noted that “one of Britain’s main interests was to ensure a conducive
environment for the flow of Nigeria’s oil to its territories. Nigerian oil was particularly important
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to Britain at the time given the disruptions in the Middle East” (p. 124). As a result of the Six
Day War in the Middle East during this time, followed by “Arab oil ban on UK destinations”
(Uche, 2008, 124), Britain resorted to policies that would not jeopardize the flow of oil and gas
from the Niger Delta to the United Kingdom (Smith, 2014).
As stated above, after the imposition of oil blockade by Gowon in response to the royalty
paid to Biafra by Shell-BP, the British government tried to convince Gowon to lift the ban during
a meeting between Gowon and George Thomas, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs,
held in Lagos on July 8, 1967. To their surprise, Gowon maintained his blockade policy on oil
(Uche, 2008). This made the British to relax their military and arms support to the federal
government of Nigeria. As Uche (2008) explained, “given the failure of the July 8, 1967
meeting, the British government not surprisingly refused to commit itself with respect to the
earlier request of Nigeria for military assistance” (p. 125).
Although the British had reasons to support Biafra, they finally decided to offer their
support to the federal government discretely on the grounds that “supporting Nigeria was its
safest option if it were to preserve its oil interests in the country, largely because the Cold War
and the rivalry among some Western European states made it likely that other foreign powers
would wade into the conflict” (Uche, 2008, p. 126). On this geopolitical strategy, Smith (2014)
argued that the British sided with Nigeria for two reasons. The first was to check the influence of
France in Nigeria being that the French government openly declared its support for Biafra. The
second was to disrupt and balance the power distance or asymmetrical relationship between
Nigeria and the Soviet Union. However, Diamond (2007) argued that “England…, the former
colonial power could not afford an independent Biafra, hostile to the trading and investment
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interests which Nigeria had accommodated” (p. 352). The British therefore saw a viable Biafran
state as an economic threat to their interests.
According to Ogunbadejo (1976), “Britain supplied the bulk of Nigeria’s ground
weapons, and, in spite of all the emphatic ministerial denials in the House of Commons, supplied
many more arms than the British people realized” (p. 15). Ojo (1976) also affirmed that “the
U.K. no doubt supplied nearly all the arms and ammunitions despite the opposition of about twothirds of the British public” (p. 55). Cronje (1972, as cited in Smith, 2014) had also revealed that
“British supplies made up 79.19 per cent of Nigerian imports in 1968 and an astonishing 97.36
per cent in 1969” (p. 250). Another important point made by Ogunbadejo (1976) is that the
British military, diplomatic, and moral support for the federal military government of Nigeria no
doubt influenced the foreign policies of many other countries toward the war. This made
“Britain’s role… one of the critical factors that helped the Federalists to achieve victory”
(Ogunbadejo, 1976, p. 15).
Nevertheless, public opinion in Britain on the issue was divided, with some British
citizens calling for their government to support Biafra. As Perham (1970) characterized this
division, “the claims of pity and religious affiliation clashed with those of economic self-interest
and of detached political judgment” (p. 241). Following media reports in Britain and many other
countries that millions of Biafran civilians, particularly children and nursing mothers, were dying
of starvation, and the news that the Nigerian forces were committing genocide against the
Biafrans, the Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s government policy on the war was highly
criticized by British citizens (Heerten & Moses, 2014; Smith, 2014).
The criticism was due to the fact that the British was playing a deadly double standard
role. There was a “strange situation in which British weapons, including Saladin armoured cars,
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were destroying Biafran lives, while British food and medical supplies were being dangerously
flown in to preserve them” (Perham, 1970, p. 241). Mustafa (1969) stated that “the Labour
backbenchers have been most vocal in their attacks, forcing the Government to confine the
supply of arms to only defensive weapons” (p. 147). Others, for example, the Archbishops of
Westminster and Canterbury, the Church of Scotland assembly, and newspapers such as the
Times and the Guardian demanded that the British government should completely terminate its
supply of arms to Nigeria in order “to save Biafrans from both slaughter and starvation” (Smith,
2014, p. 252).
Faced with these criticisms and increasing drop in public support for military aid to
Nigeria, the British government initiated an international fact finding mission to Nigeria to
investigate the claims of genocide against Biafra in order to justify to its citizens and the world
that the Nigerian forces were not using its military supplies to commit genocide. The Federal
Military Government of Nigeria, Smith (2014) revealed, accepted to allow the International
Observer Team into Nigeria “under some pressure: the British government had signaled strongly
that its continued support for the FMG, including arms supplies, would depend on the FMG’s
acceptance of observers” (p. 247).
The mission, work and report of the International Observers’ Team to Nigeria are
discussed under the traumatic memories section of this chapter. Meanwhile, there was a real or
manufactured consensus among the members of the international observers’ team that Nigeria
was not committing genocide against Biafra. Smith (2014) argued that although the international
observer team proposed by the British government and accepted by the Nigerian government in
late August 1968 encountered difficulties in providing an objective proof regarding the question
of genocide in Biafra, the British government leveraged on the report of the observer team to
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justify their support for the federal military government of Nigeria. In addition, Achebe (2012)
stated that Prime Minister Harold Wilson later visited Nigeria on March 29, 1969 to try to
mediate a cease-fire and peace between the parties at war. Unfortunately, he was only able to
meet with General Gowon. General Ojukwu declined his invitation for a meeting because Harold
Wilson was not willing to meet inside Biafra (Achebe, 2012).
This report helped booster support for the British arms supply to Nigeria in order to not
only maintain British economic interest, but also to prevent Nigeria from depending solely on the
Soviet Union. Uche (2008) demonstrated that “increased Soviet influence in Nigeria no doubt
threatened British economic interests in the country. It was, for instance, argued that, if the
British withdrew support from Nigeria: the Federal Government would have no alternative but to
turn to the Soviet Union for ever-widening support” (pp. 127-128). This is why Ogunbadejo
(1976) had cleverly argued that “Russian involvement helped to assure continued British support
for the Federal cause” (p. 24).
The Soviet Union. During the early years of decolonization in Africa, the Soviet Union
gradually but steadily began to infiltrate its socialist ideology in some African states. The case of
Nigeria was not different. Nigerian students had been awarded scholarships to study in Russia
and some other USSR nations. Also, there were existing economic relations between Nigeria and
the USSR prior to the Nigeria-Biafra War (Ojo, 1976). Ojo (1976) explained that Nigeria had
already entered into a trade agreement with the Soviet Union prior to the start of the war in 1967.
According to Ojo (1976), WAATECO, a Nigeria-Soviet company, “was formed in 1964 as the
sole agent of the Soviet AVTOEXPORT to sell and service motor vehicles, motorcycles, and
bicycles, garage equipment, tractors, and other agricultural machinery” (p. 50).
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In addition to trade, manufacturing and diplomatic agreements reached by Lagos and
Moscow, Ojo (1976) opined that Nigeria collaborated in many ways with the Soviet Union on
scientific, cultural and educational initiatives in the years preceding the war. According to Ojo
(1976), the outbreak of the Nigeria-Biafra War opened a window of opportunity for the Soviets
to “realize their political, ideological, economic, and technical hopes” (p. 55) in Nigeria.
In pursuit of its interests in Nigeria, the Soviet Union was quick to declare its support for
the unity of Nigeria thereby allying itself with the federal military government (Orobator, 1983).
Diamond (2007) argued that the Soviet Union wanted to use this opportunity “to neutralize the
British, lessen the influence of the North Atlantic powers generally in Africa, and clarify the
lines of division between the Soviet and North Atlantic spheres of influence” (p. 353). According
to Diamond (2007), it seemed “the Russians did not need Nigerian oil but they did feel the need
to deepen their Mediterranean and Islamic associations in their strategic confrontation with the
North Atlantic powers” (p. 357). Although it was a surprise to Britain and the United States
when Nigeria turned to the Soviet Union for military support in order to defeat Biafra, to those
who understood that Nigeria’s foreign diplomacy after its independence was based on the
principle of non-alignment, Nigeria’s relation with the USSR did not surprise them at all.
Given that Britain’s arms supply to Nigeria was limited having declined to “supply
heavy, sophisticated weapons like jet air-craft” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 36), and disappointed by
the United States arms embargo, the Nigerian leaders turned to the USSR. In fact, one of the
major factors that motivated Nigeria to turn to the Soviet Union was “Britain's refusal to supply
Lagos with air force equipment” (Ogunbadejo, 1976, p. 24).
As Mustafa (1969) noted, it was in August 1967 that “a military mission visited Moscow
where it successfully made a deal for fifteen MIG-15” (p. 147). Mustafa (1969) affirmed that by
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the end of 1969, “the Russians supplied £10 million worth of military hardware to Lagos” (p.
147). This was corroborated by Ogunbadejo (1976) who affirmed that:
by mid-August 1967, the first batch of Soviet combat planes had arrived in Nigeria. But
even at that stage, caution was still essential and it was not until two months later before
Moscow publicly committed itself irrevocably to the Federal cause. From this time on,
arms supplies were steadily increased, and Soviet journals, newspapers, and radio
broadcasts began a sustained bitter campaign of condemnation against the Biafran
leaders. (p. 24)
Russia also granted both economic and diplomatic support to Nigeria. An Economic and
Technical Assistance Agreement was concluded between Russia and the federal military
government of Nigeria in which Russia pledged to give Nigeria “$140 million worth of
economic aid” (Mustafa, 1969, p. 148). In order to help Nigeria promote its territorial integrity
position at the international level, the USSR and Nigeria issued a joint communique in July 1968
during the visit of Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Nigerian Foreign Minister, to Moscow. Through this joint
communique, the USSR affirmed that “attempts to dismember the Federal Republic of Nigeria
run counter to the Nigerian people’s national interests and the interests of peace” (Lapter, 1969,
as cited in Mustafa, 1969, p. 148).
In total, it is estimated that “from 1967 to 1970, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and
Poland sold Nigeria twelve L-29 Delfin training aircraft, forty-seven MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter
jets, and five Ilyushin-28 bombers, two of which Egypt transferred to Lagos” (Levey, 2014, p.
273). Many experts have posited that “the Soviet bloc supplied almost all the military aircraft,
the extent of which remains a matter for speculation” (Africa Diary, February 19-25, 1970, as
cited in Ojo, 1976, p. 55).
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Melbourne (1973) stated that Egyptian pilots did not just transfer these aircraft bombers
to Lagos. They were mercenaries, flying them for the Nigerian air force. According to
Melbourne (1973), “the Egyptians sought to expand their influence and (as users of Soviet
equipment) gave what was deemed questionable support such as aircraft pilots or trainers” (p.
36). Diamond (2007) contended that the collaboration between the “Egyptian pilots [who] flew
Soviet planes maintained by Soviet technicians against Biafra” (p. 354) was very symbolic to the
Middle East who interpreted and viewed the Soviets “as champions of Islam” in their fight
against the so-called infidels – the Biafrans who were not only Christians but closely associated
themselves with Judaism.
The defeat of Biafra by the federal government of Nigeria is attributed to the immense
military support Nigeria received from the Soviet Union. The most important part of this military
aid was delivered toward the end of the war which included heavy 122 mm guns (Ogunbadejo,
1976). The supply of these guns, Ogunbadejo (1976) confirmed, “undoubtedly, boosted the
morale of the Federal troops and played a crucial part in the capture of Owerri, Orlu, and the Uli
airstrip” (p. 24). This important fact about the Nigeria-Biafra War history was also corroborated
by Perham (1970) who argued that “the Russians sold bomber planes and are said to have
produced, just at the end, long-range guns, and the very prospect of their use is said to have
finally induced the Biafrans’ surrender” (p. 242).
Even the Nigerian Ambassador to Moscow, Brigadier Kurubo, who had earlier spoken
out against the assassination of General Ironsi and the pogroms that ensued and for that reason
aligned with Ojukwu before he decamped and crossed over to the federal side due to his
objection to Biafran secession, attributed the Nigerian victory to Russian support (Ogunbadejo,
1976). This was corroborated by Ojo (1976) who stated that “Brigadier Kurubo, head of the air
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force and ambassador to Moscow during the war has observed that the Soviet military aircraft
‘was the most important factor in the defeat’ of the secessionists” (Africa Diary, February 19-25,
1970, as cited in Ojo, 1976, p. 55).
Czechoslovakia. In collaboration with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia offered military
assistance to Nigeria at the start of the war. “Four Czech L-29 jet trainers” (Mustafa, 1969, p.
147) were sent to Nigeria. Orobator (1983) opined that Czechoslovakia delivered to Nigeria “the
first consignment comprising six L-29 Delfin trainer aircraft, a few hundred crates of
Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifles and some heavy mortar guns was from that country” (p.
202). However, against the policy of the USSR, the Antonin Novotny Czech’s administration
changed its policy toward the war and adopted a neutral position. Orobator (1983) believed that
it was the pressure mounted on the Novotny administration by Czechoslovak Writers Union that
made the Czech lean toward a neutral posture in September 1967.
When Alexander Dubcek succeeded Antonin Novotny as the First Secretary of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party on January 5, 1968, support for Biafra was openly adopted by
the Czech government (Orobator, 1983). “Convinced that Biafra was fighting a war of ‘selfdetermination and survival as a nation’, Czechoslovakia shifted sides from her declared
neutrality and began offering moral support to Biafra, while becoming more and more hostile to
the Lagos Government, in spite of Moscow’s backing for the latter” (Orobator, 1983, p. 203).
Diamond (2007) opined that “for the first year of the war, Czech arms [to Biafra], about
one quarter of the foreign supply, were purchased through black market traders, presumably with
the knowledge of the Czech government. After the fall of Dubcek, in August 1968, this source
dried up” (p. 344). As expected, the federal military government of Nigeria was disappointed and
angry while the news of Czech support was celebrated by the Biafran government (Orobator,
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1983). The Czech’s decision also made the Russians “nervous over the future prospects of
escalation” (G. W. S., 1968, p. 2). This further resulted in an increase in the supply of military
equipment and arms to Lagos by Moscow (Orobator, 1983).
G. W. S. (1968) argued that the change of policy by the Alexander Dubcek’s Czech
government in favor of Biafra was influenced by France. However, Orobator (1983) identified
three other factors that must have influenced the position of the Czech government.
1. First, there was the increasing ‘propaganda’ mounted all over the world by Biafra that
the Lagos Government was using the weapons supplied by the socialist countries of
Europe to execute a planned massacre of the Igbo people.
2. Second, the Czechoslovaks became reluctant to continue contributing to what they
felt was an oppression of a less privileged state struggling for survival, especially
when they themselves had always been victims of the harsh policies of their more
powerful neighbors even from ancient times.
3. And third, Czechoslovakia wanted to demonstrate her ability to adopt and pursue a
policy independently of the USSR, in line with her determination to democratize
socialism. (Orobator, 1983, p. 204)
This caused heightened friction between the Soviet bloc and Czechoslovakia. It was not
too long before the Soviet invaded Czechoslovakia later that year in 1968 (Griffin, 2015).
The United States. When the Nigeria-Biafra War broke out, it was anticipated that the
United States was going to take sides. Instead, the U.S. policy and role were those of passivity
and neutrality (G. W. S., 1968). The U.S. upheld a neutral position even though American oil
and gas company, Gulf Oil Nigeria, was operating in the Mid-Western Region of Nigeria,
“producing roughly 9 percent of Nigerian oil at the time” (Uche, 2008, p. 127).
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According to Melbourne (1973), “while Great Britain had by far the largest investment
and most resident nationals in Nigeria, the U.S. had made a substantial commitment to
development aid for Nigeria and was operating size-able economic and Peace Corps programs”
(p. 33). In support of Nigeria’s 6-year development plan after independence, “the U.S.
government provided economic and military assistance with loans and grants that ranged from
$25 million in 1962, $30.2 million in 1963, $51.6 million in 1964, $36.4 million in 1965, to
$30.5 million in 1966” (U.S. Agency for Inter-national Development, 1972, as cited in
Nwachuku, 1998, p. 576). Keil (1970) stated that the total U.S. investment in Nigeria at this time
was equivalent to about $300 million. The number of U.S. citizens in Nigeria prior to the start of
the war was about 7,000 (Melbourne, 1973).
Having taken a neutrality stand, the U.S. felt it was an internal conflict that needed to be
resolved internally or with the help of the OAU (Stremlau, 1977, as cited in Daddieh & Shaw,
1984). The U.S. government policy at this time was in alignment with that of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) which sought to maintain the territorial integrity and unity of Nigeria.
According to Melbourne (1973), “The U.S. government deplored the violence and affirmed its
strong hope that a settlement would be negotiated which would preserve a single, democratic
Nigeria” (p. 33). Melbourne (1973) further stated that “the American position… was that
Washington would not identify with any particular solution, but preferred to see a federal system
continue. This position was reportedly conveyed to both the federal administration and the
Biafran regime” (p. 33). It was noted by Ngoh (1982, as cited in Nwachuku, 1998) that “Joseph
Palmer II, the first U.S. ambassador to Nigeria and later assistant secretary of state for African
Affairs …assured General Gowon that it was the wish of the American government that this
Federal Republic of Twelve States remains a united and indivisible country” (p. 580).
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Since Nigeria was a British colony, the U.S. relied instead on the British to take the lead.
Given that the U.S. intervention in the Congo and Vietnam did not yield positive results, and
Nigeria being a British colony, the U.S. relied on the leadership of the U.K. and OAU to mitigate
the Nigeria-Biafra War and negotiate peace (Nwachuku, 1998). According to Mustafa (1969),
the U.S. “preferred to relegate the issue to the background describing Nigeria as a British ‘sphere
of influence’ and in order not to tarnish its self-created image of neutrality it placed an embargo
on the sale of arms to either side” (p. 148).
The U.S. placed arms embargo on Nigeria and Biafra at the beginning of the war. As
Ogunbadejo (1976) noted, “four days after the outbreak of hostilities in July 1967, Washington
announced that it would neither sell nor otherwise supply arms to either side, 'in order not to
deepen the conflict” (p. 18). Melbourne (1973) articulated the reasons for the arms embargo this
way: “determined not to get directly involved politically and militarily in the war, the U.S.
announced in July 1967 - despite federal resentment and Biafran pleasure - that it would not
license the export of arms for Nigerians to kill Nigerians” (p. 33).
Many reasons have been enunciated to explain the U.S. neutral position on the war.
Shepherd (1968) posited that the United States did not want to “unnecessarily prolong a bloody
conflict and one that contains explosive elements of the cold war, as the Russians… back[ed] the
Federal Government” (p. 3). Another set of plausible reasons were postulated by Ogunbadejo
(1976).
Washington was naturally wary about any deep involvement in another civil war, with
the Vietnam war still on, the internal difficulties which it had created, and the memory of
the American involvement in the Congo. Even when the Soviet Union stepped into the
conflict by effectively arming the Federalists, the US did not find it necessary to reverse
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its declared policy partly because it felt that Britain’s commitment to the Federal cause
would check, if not neutralize, Moscow’s efforts, and partly because it had worked out
the Nigerian equation and came to the conclusion that as General Gowon was hardly a
Bolshevik, there were obvious limitations to the extent to which he would flirt with the
Russians. (Ogunbadejo, 1976, p. 18)
Jervis (1967) who sounded sympathetic to the sufferings and fate of the Biafran people
was reserved when it came to American recognition of the Biafran state. This reservation was
due to a lack of unanimous agreement for secession within the Biafran territory. Some minorities
within Eastern region showed little or no enthusiasm for Biafran secession. Because of this
division in the east, it was not a viable option for the United States to extend official recognition
to Biafra.
Nevertheless, the U.S. later provided humanitarian assistance to the Biafrans following
the pressures mounted on Washington by American citizens who were sympathetic to the
suffering of the Biafran people. Mustafa (1969) stated that “Washington supplied eight C-97
Stratofreighters to transport food to the besieged areas, in the face of protests from the Federal
Government which feared that the aircraft would be used to carry arms to the Biafrans” (p. 148).
The U.S. humanitarian assistance to Biafra made the federal military government uncomfortable
and suspicious of the activities of the American organizations in Biafran controlled territories.
This revealed how ambiguous and ambivalent the U.S. policy on the Nigeria-Biafra War
was. This ambivalent position could be justified by President Johnson’s statement: “while we
have no intention of interfering in Nigerian affairs, we do not believe innocent persons should be
made the victims of political maneuvering” (Ogunbadejo, 1976, p. 19; Melbourne, 1973, p. 36).

180
Delancey’s (1991) review of Thompson’s (1990) book, “American Policy and African
Famine: The Nigeria-Biafra War, 1966-1970,” shows a serious divide on the part of U.S.
policymakers over the Biafran conflict. Following the British government policy on the Biafran
conflict, the U.S. Department of State was in favor of one Nigeria - that is, preserving the unity
of Nigeria. However, “Congress and, eventually, the president were more supportive of relief aid
to Biafra” (Delancey, 1991, p. 176). The move by Congress and the President to consider
offering humanitarian aid to Biafra, Delancey (1991) argued, could be explained by the
sympathy expressed by the American people on seeing the images and videos of dying Biafran
children and women who were suffering from starvation as a result of the Nigerian government’s
total blockade on Biafra. Whatever purpose Gowon’s blockade was originally implemented to
accomplish, to the Biafrans and many international humanitarian observers, it had only one goal:
“the use of hunger as a weapon” (Delancey, 1991, p. 177).
This is why President Johnson stated in his message to Emperor Haile Selassie, former
Emperor of Ethiopia, who facilitated the OAU-led talks that “the political aspects of the problem
obviously must be settled by the parties concerned, with the help of their African neighbors. But
feeding the starving and easing the suffering of civilian populations are the most basic
obligations of common humanity” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 36). In addition to President Johnson’s
decision to offer humanitarian assistance to Biafra, Nixon, the Republican presidential candidate
at the time, also stated on September 9, 1968 that “America should use its enormous wealth and
power and ability to meet the crisis now involving genocide. This is not the time to stand on
ceremony or to go through channels or to observe diplomatic niceties” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 37).
On October 4, 1968, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa headed by Senator Eugene
McCarthy held a hearing on the Nigeria-Biafra War. According to Melbourne (1973), “the
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October 4 hearing captured the emotions of those moved by the suffering and events of the war.
Movie stars, relief agency representatives, government officials, and self-designated experts all
jammed into the room” (p. 38). During this hearing, Senator Edward Kennedy, who was the
chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees at that time, “requested a major government
commitment to the private relief agencies” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 38) sending relief aid to Biafra.
Influenced by “the foreign military observers’ report that there was no evidence of genocide”
(Melbourne, 1973, p. 38), and following the leadership, peace negotiations, and One Nigeria
position of the OAU, the Department of State presented the administration’s official policy
which included “support for OAU efforts to end the fighting and for ‘relief on both sides of the
battle line’” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 38).
An African American civil rights activist, James H. Meredith, also testified before the
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa. While arguing in favor of the federal military government,
Meredith “stated that he had found no evidence of genocide in areas controlled by the federal
government” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 39). According to Melbourne (1973), Meredith’s “answer to
the relief question was ‘for those people who want to help to stop giving aid and comfort to the
rebels so that the war can be ended and all the suffering can stop’” (p. 39).
Hansen and Aronson (1995) confirmed that African American leaders at that time
“wanted a strong, unified black African country, as well as a counterweight to South Africa” (p.
499). Diamond (2007) affirmed that the reason why African American civil rights activists did
not support the state of Biafra “can be attributed to the ‘nationalist’ identification with the feudal
civilizations of Moslem Africa as exemplars of ‘black’ historical achievement” (p. 355).
However, Achebe (2012) argued that some African American leaders, for example, Roy Wilkins,
the then leader of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)

182
“implored the Nigerians especially to be more humane in their treatment of the Biafrans” (p.
104).
Senator Kennedy was against this non-humanitarian proposal by James H. Meredith. A
staunch advocate for U.S. humanitarian support for Biafra, Senator Kennedy sent a letter to both
President Johnson and President Elect Nixon to make Biafra a priority for U.S. foreign aid
(Melbourne, 1973). According to Senator Kennedy, “the great powers were to blame for the war
and starvation in Nigeria” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 40). The Nigeria-Biafra War, Senator Kennedy
argued, was “a great power dispute, not a tribal conflict” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 40). For this
reason, divine or natural law on which the principles of humanitarianism are anchored demand
that relief flights be sent to Biafra against the opposition of the federal military government of
Nigeria (Melbourne, 1973).
As elaborated in the humanitarian disaster and assistance section of this study, pressures
such as these resulted in an increase in the United States relief aid to Biafra. The U.S.
Department of State announced on December 28, 1968 that:
the United States government would sell at nominal cost (approximately $3,670 each)
eight C-97G cargo planes with an 18-20 ton capacity; four would go to Joint Church Aid
and four to the ICRC. The planes were to be flown by chartered civilian crews and no
American military personnel were to be involved. (Melbourne, 1973, p. 40)
A careful reflection on the effects the relief aid had on Biafra shows that although
providing humanitarian assistance to Biafra was needed and useful in alleviating hunger, healing
the wounded and saving lives, its negative impact should not be ignored. The United States’
“support for Biafran relief (and the resulting food aid, however inadequate) actually prolonged
the war and caused more suffering than might have otherwise been the case” (Delancey, 1991, p.
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177). Probably, if the United States and some other countries had not provided relief aid to
Biafra, Ojukwu and his military would have surrendered earlier than they did thereby reducing
the death toll and the suffering of the Biafran people.
Nevertheless, humanitarian organizations, and many American people, were ethically
obliged to provide relief aid to dying Biafrans. This, according to Delancey’s (1991) review, is
the reason why they “directed pressure on their government to aid these dying people regardless
of the effects such aid would have on Nigerian military strategy, the survival of Biafra, and USNigerian relations” (p. 176).
France. Contrary to the pro-Nigeria positions of Britain and the Soviet Union, and the
neutral or passive attitude of the United States toward the war except for its humanitarian gesture
to Biafra, France openly declared its support for Biafra (Heerten & Moses, 2014; Ogunbadejo,
1976). Prior to declaring its support for Biafra, Levey (2014) posited that France had sold
Panhard light armoured cars to Nigeria and later suspended “all arms transfers to Lagos” (p.
274).
The French position which was declared in July 1968 and restated in April 1969 made it
clear “that the Igbos had proved their will to assert themselves as a people, hence the dispute be
settled on the basis of their right of self-determination” (Mustafa, 1969, p. 148). Griffin’s (2015)
research confirmed that on July 30, 1968, President de Gaulle stated that “the identity of the
Biafran people needed to be recognized, and it was perhaps time to begin considering a
‘confederal solution’” (p. 124). Although France was reluctant to officially recognize Biafra as
an independent state, the French nonetheless leveraged on the diplomatic recognition of Biafra
by Ivory Coast and Gabon – two French colonies in Africa – to supply arms and military
equipment to Biafra (Heerten & Moses, 2014; Mustafa, 1969). Perham (1970) stated that “in the

184
later part of 1968 regular supplies of arms were flown by night into Biafra, especially from
Gabon, where French influence was strong and French troops were stationed” (p. 240).
Drawing on the diaries of Jacques Foccart, de Gaulle’s African advisor who was the
Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs, to study how the French government
provided covert military assistance to Biafra without officially recognizing it as an independent
state, Griffin (2015) explained the French government’s motivation for supporting Biafra during
the Nigeria-Biafra War. Based on its broader strategy in Africa, Griffin (2015) revealed that the
French government’s supply of mercenaries and weapons to Biafra, although for a limited
period, served three purposes. 1) Secession of Biafra was for General Charles de Gaulle a way to
disintegrate Nigeria, reduce its influence and power in the region, and protect former West
African colonies of France from Nigeria. 2) To stop Soviet subversion. 3) To gain access into the
Niger Delta oil and gas which was seen as a great opportunity to boost the French economy. As
Griffin (2015) stated in his well-researched article, “De Gaulle chose a limited strategy for two
reasons. If Biafra won the war, France would be Biafra’s greatest ally. If Nigeria won the war,
France could extricate itself from the situation relatively easily and re-establish relations with the
Nigerian government, which is what ultimately occurred” (p. 114).
Having colonized many West African countries, France’s interests in the Nigeria-Biafra
War were both political and economic. According to Uche (2008),
given the relatively small size of Francophone West African countries, the existence of a
large Nigerian Federation in the region became a definite threat to the influence of
France. It was in this context that General de Gaulle saw the Biafran secession as an
opportunity to reduce the potential threat of Nigeria to French hegemony in the area. (p.
128)

185
Mustafa (1969) also noted that the French support of Biafran secession was as a result of the
French resolve to “counter the influence of the British in West Africa and of the Nigerians in the
neighboring…French-speaking [countries]” (p. 149).
Not only that the French had vested interest in oil production within the Biafran territory,
they also wanted to weaken Nigeria “because it was the largest and potentially most powerful
state in France’s principal sphere of inﬂuence in West Africa” (Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 176).
A French oil company, Société Anonyme Française de Recherches et d'Exploitation de Pétrole
(SAFRAP) Nigeria Limited, was also present in Eastern Region, although it controlled “only 7
percent of oil production in Nigeria… [and] most of its oil reserves lay inside the newly created
East Central State, which was the core Igbo region” (Uche, 2008, pp. 128-129). Based on these,
France had no other option than to offer both military and economic support to Biafra. In
addition to the above reasons for the French support of Biafra, Ogunbadejo (1976) argued that
“de Gaulle’s distrust of the Anglo-Saxons; his general dislike of Federations; and the roles of
President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast and M. Foccart, the Secretary-General for African
Affairs at the Elysee, were all important factors” (p. 21).
Griffin’s (2015) research revealed that “de Gaulle’s decision to send military assistance
to Biafra was made on 27 September 1967, when the General met personally with HouphouëtBoigny, who was Biafra’s most important African ally throughout the war” (p. 119). This
decision was in part inspired by Biafran early war success, particularly their invasion of the MidWest Region from August 9, 1967 which made them appear “to be capable of winning the war”
(Griffin, 2015, p. 121).
Like the British and Soviet Union, the French military assistance to Biafra consisted of
mercenary operations and shipment of arms. According to Griffin (2015), “the mercenary
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networks that had fought in Katanga were reactivated” (p. 121). Griffin (2015) stated that
although the French military operation in Biafra was coordinated in Abidjan by MauricheauBeaupre´, “the first French weapons (German Mauser pistols) arrived in Libreville on 8
November 1967 for trans-shipment to Biafra” (Griffin, 2015, p. 122). Afterwards, Libreville
continued to be used as the main transit point between Europe and Biafra. Although the Biafrans
were receiving arms from the French, it was revealed in early 1968 that the Biafran military was
disorganized causing doubt on their ability to win the war (Griffin, 2015). This revelation was
made possible through the visit of some French military operatives and a member of the Service
de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE) to Biafra.
With the French military support, Biafran soldiers were able to resist the occupation and
activities of the heavily armed and British and Soviet backed Nigerian forces through the arms
and ammunitions Biafra received from France until President de Gaulle's resignation as French
President in April 1969. Some analysts and observers believed that “French aid in summer 1968
saved Biafra from destruction in the Federal offensives” (Griffin, 2015, p. 125). Others argued
that “the French intervention which evidently saved the Biafrans from defeat in September 1968
and prolonged the war, also played its part in their final defeat” (Ogunbadejo, 1976, p. 22).
The French aid to Biafra seemed to have been made possible through President de
Gaulle’s personal sympathy toward Biafra. Nonetheless, Ivory Coast “played an ambiguous role
in determining French policy… its President, Houphouet-Boigny, had strong feelings for the
Igbo regime and it was even said that he persuaded De Gaulle to take an active pro-Biafran
position” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 36). French aid to Biafra was implemented through the
Secretariat of African Affairs led by de Gaulle’s ally, “M. Jacques Foccart, who was directly
responsible to President de Gaulle” (Mustafa, 1969, p. 148). Shepherd (1968) noted that “the

187
growing concern of the Pope for the lives of Biafrans” (p. 3) also contributed to President de
Gaulle’s decision to support Biafra.
Since some diplomats at the French Foreign Office had opposed supporting Biafra, it was
not surprising that the French military aid to Biafra drastically reduced after the resignation of
President de Gaulle in April 1969 and the removal of his ally, M. Jacques Foccart from the
Secretariat of African Affairs (Mustafa, 1969).
Some events occurred in 1969 that led to the termination of both humanitarian aid and
supply of arms and ammunition by the French government. First, in early March 1969, the
French people lost interest in the Biafran cause. “Only 34% of the population thought the French
government needed to do more to help Biafra (Le Figaro, 1969, March 14, as cited in Griffin,
2015, p. 127). Second, De Gaulle was disappointed with Ojukwu’s stringent refusal to enter into
another round of negotiation with Nigeria even as the Biafran military was gradually becoming
weak. As a result, De Gaulle “stopped arms shipments in order to force him to the negotiating
table” (Griffin, 2015, p. 127). Third, De Gaulle’s presidency ended on April 27, 1969, and his
Biafran policy was suspended (Griffin, 2015).
Seeing the visible devastating effects of Gowon’s blockade on Biafra, particularly on
children and women who were dying daily as a result of starvation, the French government
pushed for peaceful negotiations and talks between Nigeria and Biafra. Some scholars argued
that “encouraging a negotiated settlement was France’s proactive way of ensuring that its
economic interests were protected in postwar Nigeria” (Uche, 2008, p. 129).
The resignation of President De Gaulle did not completely end French military aid to
Biafra. France resumed its military assistance to Biafra after Georges Pompidou was elected
President on June 15, 1969. This new phase of assistance to Biafra was in “cooperation with the
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South African secret services” (Griffin, 2015, p. 128) who flew in weapons with the French to
Biafra. “France also supported Swedish Count von Rosen’s aerial assault on the Nigerian Air
Force and armed his planes with rockets” (Griffin, 2015, p. 128).
In all, Ogunbadejo (1976) stated that “France remained the secessionists’ principal
support in the civil war” (p. 21). Diamond (2007) summarized the two phases of French military
aid to Biafra as follows.
For the first 18 months of the war, French arms comprised only 10%, half of which
consisted of black market cash purchases made in France, presumably with the
knowledge of the French government… In the last year of the war, however, French arms
rose to about half of the foreign total. With francs from the Ivory Coast (which
recognized Biafra), Biafra purchased from the government of Gabon (which also
recognized Biafra) arms originally bought from the French government, and resold at
cost. They were shipped to Libreville and flown to Biafra by French commercial pilots on
chartered planes. (Diamond, 2007, p. 343)
What this means is that “by indirectly selling arms for French francs, the French government
profited from its former colonies” (Diamond, 2007, p. 343) without selling arms directly to
Biafra.
Preempting the fall of Biafra on January 12, 1970, the French military operatives with
their South African partners suspended their operation on January 6, 1970 (Griffin, 2015). The
French operatives “moved quickly to rescue Ojukwu and brought him to safety in Abidjan”
(Griffin, 2015, p. 128). The French also helped to set up a refugee camp in Libreville, Gabon,
where some Biafran refugees were resettled (Akpan, 2013).
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Israel. Levey’s (2014) research revealed a double-standard role played by Israel during
the Nigeria-Biafra War. By seeking to maintain diplomatic relations with the federal military
government of Nigeria, Israel sold weapons to Nigeria. At the same time, and based on what it
considered as its moral obligation inspired by the Holocaust experience, Israel secretly supplied
weapons and humanitarian aid to Biafra.
In late 1966, many months before the start of the war, both Nigeria and Biafra were in
contact with Israeli officials to make arrangements for arms supply. “In mid-August, Ojukwu
sent two representatives from the Eastern Region on a clandestine visit to Israel in a bid to
purchase military hardware” (Levey, 2014, p. 267). The Israeli officials, in an effort to avoid
open collusion with the Biafrans, did not tell the Nigerians about Biafran requests.
Israel’s double standard policy toward Biafra is reflected in a statement made by an
Israeli official, Nirgad, in early 1968.
As a Jew who lived under Nazi rule, I feel keenly for the bitter fate of the secessionists.
[Yet] as a state we are bound by the political calculus and hypocrisy upon which modern
statecraft is built. We are too vulnerable ... to permit ourselves a policy based on
sentiment ... and the chances of an independent Biafra are exceedingly slim ... while it is
clear that Nigeria will continue to exist. We must not assist our enemies in bringing about
a break in relations with Nigeria, and it is clear that any act of disloyalty toward the
federal government jeopardizes our position there and in other [African] countries.
(Levey, 2014, p. 269)
After the failure of the January 4–5, 1967 Aburi Accord, and having “promised his
people that the East was ‘militarily ready’ to resist any threat” (Levey, 2014, p. 268), Ojukwu,
through his Washington DC’s representatives turned to the Israeli embassy requesting that Israel
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agree to supply arms to Biafra. When the federal military government of Nigeria declared war
against Biafra on July 6, 1967 following Biafra’s declaration of independence on May 30, 1967,
“the Biafrans drew great inspiration from Israel’s victory of several weeks earlier in the June
1967 Six Day War, viewing it as a harbinger of their own salvation” (Levey, 2014, p. 268). In
order to boost the morale of its population and garner support for the war, Biafran media falsely
announced that, in addition to some other countries, “Israel had granted it diplomatic
recognition” (Levey, 2014, p. 269). This false claim by Biafra was upsetting to Israel since it
wanted to keep secret its dealings with Biafra. Levey (2014) stated that “Israel withheld
recognition of Biafra not out of deference to OAU policy, but because pragmatism dictated that it
adopt the ‘wait and see’ approach” (p. 269).
Upon the request of the federal military government of Nigeria, and in order to gain the
trust of Nigeria and prove that it had not recognized Biafra, Israel began in mid-1968 to sell
weapons and military equipment to Nigeria (Levey, 2014). Levey’s (2014) research revealed that
“Israeli military sales to the Lagos government during the civil war reached $500,000” (p. 270).
At the same time, Israel still had a moral question to answer regarding the fate and suffering of
the Biafran people. Faced with this moral dilemma, Israel finally decided to offer military
support to Biafra. Levey (2014) stated that it was on August 26, 1968 that “the Israeli foreign
ministry reached agreement with the Abidjan government; Israel would supply arms to Biafra at
no charge, with the Ivory Coast providing transport planes” (p. 272).
As will be discussed in the humanitarian assistance section of this study, Israel also
provided humanitarian aid to Biafra in addition to military aid. Levey’s (2014) study of the
Israeli “foreign ministry records reveal that from July 1968 to January 1970 Israel provided aid
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in various forms worth $73,750,110 in addition to two transfers of $100,000, to which Bar-On
had made separate reference” (p. 275).
China. Like the Soviet Union, China’s influence in Africa was gradually growing prior
to the start of the Nigeria-Biafra War. The total amount of economic and technical aid given to
some African countries, including Zambia and Tanzania, by the Chinese government by the end
of 1965 was estimated to be $842 million, in addition to military support (Mustafa, 1969). When
the Nigeria-Biafra War broke out, it was easy for China to leverage on its growing influence in
Africa to counter the Soviet Union’s influence by clandestinely giving its support to Biafra
(Heerten & Moses, 2014). As Ogunbadejo (1976) opined, by giving its military and diplomatic
support to Nigeria, the Soviet Union “transferred the Sino-Soviet differences to Nigeria, and
quite naturally, the Chinese sided with Biafra (p. 14).
According to Mustafa (1969), “Chinese leadership… expressed its support for Biafra,
which Colonel Ojukwu promptly acknowledged by writing to Mao Tse-tung conveying his deep
gratitude for China’s ‘increasing sympathy and understanding’ for Biafra in its struggle against
‘Anglo-American imperialism’ and ‘Soviet revisionism’” (p. 149). The Peking Review of July
1969 (as cited in Diamond, 2007) presented the Chinese view and official position on the
Nigeria-Biafra War.
Ganging up with the U.S. and British imperialists, the Soviet revisionist clique supports
the Nigerian federal military government in its large-scale slaughter of the Biafran people
who have announced their secession from the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Since the
outbreak of the war in August 1967, Soviet revisionism, openly supplying the federal
military government with large numbers of military aircraft, warships, bombs, rockets
and other military equipment and dispatching large numbers of military personnel, has
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helped it massacre the Biafran people. By providing the military government with
generous ‘aid’, Soviet revisionism is attempting to infiltrate this country with the largest
population in Africa and pave the way for establishing a bridgehead for aggression and
expansion in West Africa. (pp. 357-358)
Just like the French that supplied arms to Biafra through its African colonies, it was
reported that the Chinese government assistance to Biafra was delivered through its African
allies, Tanzania and Zambia, which had recognized Biafra (Diamond, 2007; Melbourne, 1973).
Mustafa (1969) also noted that there were reports “that Chinese arms have been supplied to the
Igbos through Tanzania” (p. 149). Ogunbadejo (1976) argued that “there is insufficient evidence
to back the allegation that the Chinese supplied arms to the Biafrans, this was widely believed at
the time” (p. 27). However, Diamond (2007) strongly believed that although the arms and
ammunition the Chinese sent to Biafra was small, they “were made available via Tanzania” (p.
344). Another research is needed to understand the nature and extent of Chinese support of
Biafra during the war.
Other Countries. China’s Asian neighbor, Pakistan, gave its support to the federal
military government of Nigeria. The Pakistani government declared its support to Nigeria during
the visit of Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Foreign Minister of Nigeria, to Pakistan on March 1-6, 1968
(Mustafa, 1969). “Troubled with constitutional problems of the same nature as Nigeria
encounters, the Pakistan Government… unequivocally expressed support [and] sympathy for the
people of Nigeria in their struggle to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria”
(Pakistan-Nigeria Joint Communique of 5 March 1968, as cited in Mustafa, 1969, pp. 149-150).
There were reports that citizens of some other European countries such as Sweden and
Portugal were sympathetic toward Biafra (Griffin, 2015; Diamond, 2007; Perham, 1970). Chinua
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Achebe who was a Biafran emissary also narrated his positive experience traveling to the
Scandinavian countries and Canada to secure humanitarian aid (Achebe, 2012). More research is
needed to understand the depth and extent of the support Biafra received from these countries.
Nevetheless, Griffin (2015) stated that “Portugal provided weapons to Biafra” (p. 122).
Melbourne (1973) also noted that “the Portuguese and the South Africans were helping Biafra in
pursuit of a policy to fragment Nigeria so that it would pose no threat to the white-dominated
regions of Africa” (p. 36). Perham (1970) who was very familiar with the war also asserted that
“Portugal, by providing the jumping-off station for Biafra and the staging post in her island of
Sao Tome, was in a position at once to profit financially and to injure her African enemies and
critics” (p. 240). The most interesting account of how Portugal sent military aid to Biafra is from
Diamond (2007) who opined that:
Portugal supplied about one quarter of the foreign military supplies throughout the war,
mostly small arms and ammunition, including some automatic weapons. These were
strictly cash, commercial transactions. Most of these arms had initially been sold to the
Portuguese government by Spain, which also supplied Nigeria directly via commercially
registered flights from Madrid through Las Palmas to Lagos. The arms supplied by the
Portuguese were flown into Biafra from Lisbon, on Biafran-owned or chartered transport
planes. Among the dozen or so pilots involved, five were Biafran, the remainder were
American, Rhodesian, South African, and Portuguese. (p. 344)
The role of Sweden should not be underestimated although a thorough study needs to be
carried out on this subject. According to Diamond (2007), “half a dozen single-engined planes
were purchased through private Swedish sympathizers, fitted with arms in France, and flown by
Swedish pilots until they were replaced by Biafrans” (pp. 344-345).
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There were European mercenaries in Biafra at some point during the war. However,
Diamond (2007) argued that the small number of European mercenaries in Biafra in the early
months of the war “were subsequently expelled for insubordination and misbehavior toward their
hosts” (p. 345). Mustafa (1969) had revealed that the Biafrans hired mercenaries “such as the
Frenchman Roger Faulkes, the German Rolf Steiner and the Italian Georgio Norbiatti to help in
the fighting. But the mercenaries’ role in Nigeria has not been as significant as it was in the
Congo in the early ‘sixties’” (p. 144). On the Nigerian side, Orobator (1983) was of the view that
East Germany provided pilots to help the federal military government while Poland “shipped
large quantities of field artillery to Lagos” (p. 210). Achebe (2012) also noted that it was a wellknown fact that the federal military government of Nigeria “increased the recruitment of a great
number of mercenaries from the neighboring countries of Chad and Niger, and from far away
Mali, to supplement their numbers” (p. 222).
In sum, the devastating effects that the arms, military hardware, mercenaries and war
planes sent to Nigeria and Biafra by foreign powers had on the civilians and military are both
shocking and disturbing, and cannot be fully described and comprehended. In the next section, I
reflected on the traumatic memories engendered by the war.
Traumatic Memories: Collective and Unfinished Mourning
The devastations caused by the Nigeria-Biafra War are still felt in different communities
in Nigeria, especially within the Igbo ethnic group. Through their research on the Asaba
massacre, Bird and Ottanelli (2014) revealed that “since the events of 1967–68, the trauma is still
felt, leaving a pervasive sense of unresolved grievance” (p. 390). The authors posited that
“surviving individuals still mourn the loss of so many loved ones” (Bird & Ottanelli, 2014, p.
390).
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For this reason, it is important to review literature on the traumatic memories of the war –
both collective and individual. To do this, five thematic areas of inquiry are examined: mortality
and its impacts, propaganda and the genocide claim of Biafra, humanitarian disaster and
assistance, economic change and impact, and finally the irony of General Gowon’s no victor, no
vanquished policies, including rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration (3Rs). These five
thematic areas are not exhaustive given the complexity of the Nigeria-Biafra War. However, they
constitute the gateway through which an exploration into the entire repertoire of traumatic
memories of the war could begin.
Other authors, like Heerten and Moses (2014), have proposed a similar set of thematic
areas of inquiry into the traumatic memory of the Nigeria-Biafra War. According to them,
“Biafra needs to be situated within the complex histories of humanitarianism, ideas about
sovereignty, genocide, human rights and the right to self-determination, as well as the rise of
NGOs in the last decades of the twentieth century” (Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 178). These
important issues are all integrated into the five thematic areas of inquiry discussed below.
Mortality and its Impacts
Contrary to what the pro-Biafra authors have written, and although former Eastern
Region territories and Igbo areas in the Mid-West Region suffered the most, the wartime killings
and devastation examined in this research are from both the Biafran and Nigerian sides. Heerten
and Moses (2014) noted that “throughout the conﬂict, federal aircraft shelled towns and other
targets on Biafran territory, frequently inﬂicting numerous civilian casualties” (p. 175). These
civilian casualties were frequently reported by international media which continuously “alleged
that federal troops have massacred Igbos in large numbers and that the Nigerian air force has
bombed civilian targets” (Mustafa, 1969, p. 143). However, and as noted by Uphoff and
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Ottemoeller (1970), “it was Biafra which opened the air war on civilian targets. Using a B-26
purchased in Europe, it bombed Lokoja, Idah and Makurdi in the opening months of the war” (p.
2).
Even though accurate data on the human costs or mortality rate of the war is non-existent,
Mustafa (1969) had argued that “in terms of human suffering, the Nigeria [-Biafra] War has
proved to be more grievous than the Vietnamese one” (p. 135). Conflicting mortality figures
abound in research literature and other published works on the war. Irrespective of these
contradictions, there is a growing consensus among scholars and observers that more than two
million people - both civilians and soldiers - died during the Nigeria-Biafra War (Oguibe, 1998;
Diamond, 2007). Achebe (2012) stated that “the head count at the end of the war was perhaps
three million dead, which was approximately 20 percent of the entire population. This high
proportion was mostly children. The cost in human lives made it one of the bloodiest civil wars
in human history” (p. 227).
During his “national broadcast on the eve of the official surrender,” General Gowon
claimed that the number of mortality was “over one hundred thousand military service men and
women and over three million Biafrans” (Achebe, 2012, p. 226). My uncle, Onyekwere Ugorji
(i.e., my father’s brother) from Umuosi village in Okporo Ahaba community, Isiala Ngwa South
local government area of Abia state, who fought as a Biafran soldier was one of the Biafran
soldiers killed in battle by the Nigerian forces. His body was never recovered, meaning that we
do not know where he was buried if indeed he was buried. His innocent children who were kids
at that time grew up without knowing their father and have not reached closure because they
have not yet found their father’s final resting place. Majority of the dead victims were civilians
in Biafra who were either directly killed by the Nigerian forces or died as a result of starvation
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and other war related diseases caused by a total blockade imposed on Biafra by the federal
government of Nigeria (Diamond, 2007).
In 1969, Zubeida Mustafa stated in her article that “already over a million lives have been
lost in the Eastern Region alone, with kwashiorkor, starvation and bombing taking the highest
toll” (Mustafa, 1969, p. 135). This was corroborated by Oguibe (1998) who affirmed that “the
death toll in Biafra topped one million in 1968 alone” (p. 95). Essack (1970) stated at the end of
the war that “over a million Biafrans have perished from hunger” (p. 8). UNICEF (as cited in
Nafziger, 1972) “estimated that at least two million persons on both sides died of starvation
alone from the beginning of the war to early I969” (p. 242).
Another unavoidable first-hand testimony is the one told by Achebe (2012) who was an
eyewitness of the war in Biafra. Achebe (2012) recollected that:
By the beginning of the dry season of 1968, Biafran civilians and soldiers alike were
starving. Bodies lay rotting under the hot sun by the roadside, and the flapping wings of
scavengers could be seen circling, waiting, watching patiently nearby. Some estimates are
that over a thousand Biafrans a day were perishing by this time, and at the height of
Gowon’s economic blockade and ‘starve them into submission’ policy, upward of fifty
thousand Biafran civilians, most of them babies, children, and women, were dying every
single month. (p. 210)
These figures, many observers and researchers believe, are not propaganda as General
Gowon (2015) still posited. They represent the worst devastation that could have befallen any
nation. My grandmother’s nephew was one of those who died of kwashiorkor. My older sister,
Chioma Bernadette Ugorji, told me her lived, traumatizing experience of how our grandmother’s
nephew who was suffering from kwashiorkor slumped from a bicycle carriage and died
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immediately as the whole family members – my parents, Bernard Wogwugwu Ugorji (aka
Deorji) and Maria Ezinwanyi Ugorji, with my three older siblings Chioma (5 years old), Oluchi
(3 years old), and Chibuike (1 year old) as well as my grandmother, Janet Chigbu, and other
extended family members – were running away from the Nigerian troops after they had captured
our home town, Umuosi, Okporo Ahaba in the present day Isiala Ngwa South local government
area of Abia state. Even though she remembers seeing decaying dead bodies on the road side as a
5 year old at that time, she told me that the manner in which our grandmother’s nephew slumped
from a bicycle carriage and died in her presence was the most traumatizing experience she had
during the war. She is still tormented by it and carries the unhealed scar within her.
Mr. Glen E. Haydon, an American Red Cross humanitarian worker who served as an
ICRC delegate in Nigeria during the war used the phrase, “the quiet children of Nigeria,” to
describe the agony and death of starving, undernourished children during the war. According to
Haydon as cited in International Committee of the Red Cross (1969), “the quiet children of
Nigeria bring home a truly staggering burden for mankind to bear, the burden of man’s
inhumanity to man” (p. 19).
In addition, it is almost forgotten that many people went missing after the war and were
never found, and some committed suicide (Achebe, 2012). As Achebe (2012) put it, “loved ones
in the thousands were reported missing by families. There were stories of scores of suicides” (p.
227).
Gowon’s (2015) reflection on the mortality rate of the war revealed that the death toll
would have been worse than what his government reported. According to Gowon (2015),
from all indications, God and fortune was at work on behalf of our nation during this
trying period. Had it not been so, the harvest of deaths and the destruction of property
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would not only have been mind-boggling/troubling but it would have caused extreme
bitterness that would have made post-war reconciliation difficult, if not impossible. (p. 5)
To be exact, the devastating and traumatic memories of the war caused extreme bitterness
especially to the survivors and affected communities. Even the so-called 11-point Code of
Conduct given to the Nigerian troops by General Gowon did not prevent the unnecessary
massacres that ensued. These code of conduct are:
A) Under no circumstances must a pregnant woman be ill-treated or killed.
B) Children will not be molested or killed; they will be protected and cared for.
C) Youths and school children must not be attacked unless they are engaged in open
hostility against the Federal Government Forces. They should be given all protection
and care. Hospitals, hospital staff and patients should not be tampered with or
molested.
D) Soldiers who surrender will not be killed. They are to be disarmed and treated as
Prisoners- of-war. They are entitled in all circumstances to humane treatment and
respect for their person and honor.
E) No property, building and so on will be destroyed maliciously. Churches and
Mosques must not be desecrated.
F) No looting of any kind because a good soldier never loots.
G) Women will be protected against any attack on their person, honor, and in particular
against rape or any form of indecent assault.
H) Male civilians who are hostile to the Federal Forces are to be dealt with firmly but
fairly. They must be humanely treated.
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I) All military men and civilians wounded will be given necessary medical attention and
care. They must be respected and protected in all circumstances.
J) Foreign nationals on legitimate business will not be molested, but mercenaries will
not be spared. They are the worst enemies. (Gowon, 2015, pp. 4-5)
As has been described before and will be discussed later, most of these codes of conduct were
not adhered to. There were no recorded repercussions for disobeying the code of conduct. None
of the federal soldiers was tried for the abominable and heinous massacres they committed
during the war.
The wartime massacres began after the invasion of the Mid-West Region by the Biafran
forces (Orobator, 1987). As a result of the Biafran invasion of the Mid-West in
August/September 1967, there were visible signs of anti-Igbo hostilities which were translated
into violence after the federal forces recaptured Benin City, Mid-Western capital. Orobator
(1987) made it clear that the anti-Igbo hostilities “were sown not so much by the Biafran
invasion of the Region, but by the activities of the occupation forces thereafter” (p. 379).
One of the triggers to the massacres that ensued could be attributed to the Biafran
sponsored and orchestrated September 20, 1967 declaration of the entire Mid-West Region as the
independent Republic of Benin. The non-Igbo mid-westerners neither were attracted to the idea
of independence nor supported it. It appeared to the mid-westerners that the Biafrans were trying
to pitch the federal forces against them by making it seem as if they were in support of the
secession of the Mid-West Region from Nigeria. This infuriated the non-Igbo mid-westerners.
This anger was translated into violence against their Igbo-speaking neighbors when the federal
forces recaptured the Mid-West Region.
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Bird and Ottanelli (2011) narrated how “during the liberation of Benin City in late
September [of 1967] …[federal] troops stood by as local mobs went on a bloody rampage
against the city’s large Igbo community” (p. 6). According to Alfred Friendly Jr.’s New York
Times report (as cited in Bird & Ottanelli, 2011), “in Warri, four hundred to five hundred Igbos
were killed by civilian mobs, with a similar number slaughtered in Sapele” (p. 7).
On the other side of the aisle, Biafran troops, seeing the non-Igbo speaking midwesterners who opposed their secessionist agenda as saboteurs and pro-Hausa, were accused of
killing “scores of non-Igbo-speaking mid-westerners in the towns of Abudu and Agbor Boji-Boji
as well as near Asaba” (Bird & Ottanelli, 2011, p. 7). Orobator’s (1987) description of the
killings of non-Igbo speaking mid-westerners by the Biafran troops is revealing.
At Abudu, over 300 bodies, including those of children, were found in the Ossiomo river
as the Biafrans withdrew. Similarly, on September 20, 1967, ‘there was a mass killing of
non-Igbo mid-westerners at Boji-Boji Agbor’, and on September 23, ‘non-Igbo speaking
mid-westerners were apprehended by rebel soldiers at Asaba, Ibusa and Agbor and taken
[in two lorries] to a rubber plantation along Uromi-Agbor road and massacred’. The more
minor cases of rape, extortion, seizure of properties, and other punishments featured
abundantly. For instance, a Warri-based lawyer, E. K. Iseru, testified at the Tribunal that
he was stripped naked and detained for three days without food for agitating for the
Rivers State, and, when he complained of hunger, he was promptly told: ‘there is no food
for Hausa friends’. (p. 379)
Perham (1970) also confirmed that the Biafran troops committed atrocious crimes against the
non-Igbo mid-westerners during their mid-west campaign.
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Infuriated by what the Biafrans had done in the mid-west coupled with boiling grievance
over the January 15, 1966 coup which was plotted by Igbo military officers, the federal forces
went on a bloody rampage, hunting down Biafran sympathizers particularly in the Asaba area of
the mid-west after the retreating Biafran troops blew up the River Niger Bridge upon reentering
the Biafran territory of Onitsha, a neighboring town of Asaba located at the other side of the
bridge. The massacre that ensued from October 5 to October 7, 1967 in Asaba is known today as
the Asaba massacre.
Through their work on the Asaba massacre which was carried out against Igbo civilians
of Asaba by the Nigerian troops, Bird and Ottanelli (2011) examined and revealed the traumatic
memory of the Igbo community of Asaba. The authors described how federal troops entered
Asaba on October 5, 1967 and hastily began to hunt down Igbos from their homes and brutally
kill them. These brutal killings at Asaba was confirmed by Perham (1970), a British scholar who
was very instrumental in bringing the Biafrans and Nigerians to negotiated talks in the United
Kingdom. Perham (1970) stated:
One of my earlier experiences in the war was a call from an Igbo friend whose children
were in Biafra. He brought his kinsman, a Roman Catholic priest, who read to me a letter
from his mother, written from Asaba. This described how Federal soldiers, in capturing
this town on the Niger, had collected all the males, even the boys, and massacred them.
Her own young son had been killed before her eyes. (p. 236)
In an effort to stop the killings, Asaba elders summoned their people on October 7, 1967
to come out en masse for a show of support for One Nigeria in order to appease the federal
forces. Men, women and children dressed up in white attire, marched in a public procession
(parade) while singing and dancing pro-One Nigeria songs. As the singing and dancing crowd
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approached a junction, federal troops who appeared to be friendly separated male adults and
teenagers from women and children. These male adults and teenagers were redirected to meet the
federal battalion stationed with machine guns at an open square in a village called Ogbe-Osowa.
As these vulnerable Igbo civilians neared the federal battalion, Major Ibrahim Taiwo, the
Second-in-Command (for the Second Division), was said to have ordered his men to open fire.
An estimated 700 or more Igbos of Asaba were killed only in that incident that occurred on
October 7, 1967 (Bird & Ottanelli, 2011; Bird & Ottanelli, 2014).
It is estimated that over one thousand Igbos of Asaba died in all the massacres that
occurred from October 5, 1967 (Bird & Ottanelli, 2011; Bird & Ottanelli, 2014). There were
pillage, rapes and destruction of infrastructure committed by the federal troops (Bird & Ottanelli,
2014). The massacres and destructions, Bird and Ottanelli (2014) opined, not only left Asaba in
ruins, but also the trauma it engendered destroyed and disrupted family structure, gender roles,
educational opportunities and social structure. During their research in Asaba, Bird and Ottanelli
(2014) found that “bullet holes still scar many buildings, and survivors pointed out homes that
had never been repaired; the main boys’ secondary school, St. Patrick’s College, was only
restored in 2012” (p. 393).
As it is the case in many post-war societies, survivors of the Asaba massacre are still
trying to understand the motivation of the federal forces that committed this heinous crime
against the Igbo population of Asaba. Based on the accounts of the survivors as well as key
leaders involved in the Nigeria-Biafra War at the policy level, it is believed that the massacres
and brutal killings of the Igbos and the attempt to annihilate them were motivated by a
premeditated vengeance or revenge or, as Bird and Ottanelli (2011) described it, “acts of
retaliation and opportunistic actions on the part of undisciplined [federal] troops” (p. 15).
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In the testimonies collected by Bird and Ottanelli (2011), it is narrated by many
witnesses, including Philip Asiodu who held a key position in General Gowon’s government and
was a member of the Nigerian government war cabinet, that the federal troops committed the
massacre in Asaba “in reprisal for their perceived role in or sympathy for the January 1966 coup”
(p. 15). As previously discussed, the January 15, 1966 coup was executed by mostly Igbo
officers from the Asaba area under the leadership of Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna
Nzeogwu, an Igbo whose original town, Okpanam, is a few miles north of Asaba. In Philip
Asiodu’s description of the heinous crimes of massacre committed against the Asabans, General
Murtala Mohammed who was the divisional commander (Second Division) and his assistant,
Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo, as well as other military officers from the north who survived the
January 15, 1966 coup, “must have said, when we reach Asaba, we shall wreak punishment”
(Asiodu, 2009, October 8, p. 13; Bird & Ottanelli, 2011, p. 15).
In addition to the federal troops’ intent to revenge the death of those killed in the January
15, 1966 coup, the Asaba massacres and similar killings of the Igbos during the war “can be
attributed to the same hatred of Igbos that had driven the earlier massacres in the north and west,
especially the resentment of Igbo education and success” (Bird & Ottanelli, 2011, p. 16).
According to the testimonies of the Asaba massacre survivors, federal, particularly northern,
“soldiers made comments about hating Igbo people and wanting to kill them” (Bird & Ottanelli,
2011, p. 16). Murtala Mohammed who was the divisional commander (Second Division) and his
assistant, Ibrahim Taiwo, are said to be responsible for the massacres in Asaba (Bird & Ottanelli,
2011).
Against the view that all federal troops that went to Asaba participated in the Asaba
massacres, eyewitness testimonies revealed that there were “instances in which individual
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officers and common soldiers intervened directly to save and protect civilians” (Bird & Ottanelli,
2011, p. 17) from being killed. One example out of many eyewitness testimonies is the one of
Medua Uraih’s family. According to Uraih (2009, as cited in Bird & Ottanelli, 2011), one
Captain Matthias who “prevented the killing of a Red Cross worker… gathered an entire family
in their home and told them not to join the march to Ogbeosawa” (p. 17) where the federal troops
massacred Asaba civilians on October 7, 1967. They listened to his advice and survived. Another
example is the heroic act of Joseph, a federal soldier, who saved a man when other federal
soldiers were trying to kill him as he was burying his “five relatives shot earlier” (Okonkwo,
2010, as cited in Bird & Ottanelli, 2011, p. 17). As the names of these two federal soldiers are
Christian names, it is plausible to conclude that Christian federal soldiers showed more sympathy
toward the Igbos who are mostly Christians than Muslim federal soldiers.
On the Biafran side, it should be mentioned that some of the top military officers who
fought alongside Biafra were intentionally killed not by their enemies, but following the order
and bullet of the Biafran leader. These Biafran officers were accused of sabotage and treachery,
but a closer look at these charges by some researchers revealed disturbing connections with the
disappointment and frustration of Biafran leader, Ojukwu (Achebe, 2012). For example, about
one week after the federal troops recaptured the Mid-West Region from the Biafrans, Brigadier
Victor Banjo, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Major Phillip Alale and Samuel Agbamuche were
accused of treason by General Ojukwu, the Biafran leader. They were immediately executed by
the Biafran authorities on September 25, 1967 after a purported brief court martial hearing
(Achebe, 2012). It was reported that these Biafran officers attempted to conspire with the
Nigerians and the British to overthrow Ojukwu, the Biafran leader (Achebe, 2012).
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However, Orobator (1987) stated that Ojukwu “suspected treachery because the Biafran
forces in Benin were ordered [by Banjo] to leave the city when the enemy was still 33 miles
away” (p. 382). Orobator (1987) went on to argue that “Banjo’s execution along with Emmanuel
Ifeajuna, John Alale and Sam Agbam… barely a week after the collapse of the Biafran
government in the Midwest, cannot be unconnected with his performance as the commander of
the invasion force” (p. 383). It is these types of actions taken by the Biafran leader that made
Jervis (1967) argue that “the irony of Biafra is that it lays claim to ideas of progress, yet is
animated by the most regressive kind of tribal chauvinism” (p. 17).
The ‘tribal chauvinism’ Jervis (1967) made reference to also manifested itself in the
atrocities Biafran forces committed against minorities of Eastern Region during the war even
though many of them were holding important positions in the Biafran government. In addition to
Major General Philip Efiong who was Biafra’s second in command (Vice President), NwajiakuDahou (2009) provided a list of prominent minorities who served in the Biafran government.
Ignatius Kogbara, a prominent member of the Ogoni elite, was a member of the Biafra
Public Service Commission and later Biafran Ambassador to the UK. Obi Wali, an
Ikwerre, was originally hostile to Ojukwu’s Biafran project but later became part of
Biafra’s propaganda machine. Okoko Ndem, an Efik, broadcast humorous and popular
programmes on Radio Biafra. He swapped sides after the capture of Radio Biafra in
1968. (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2009, p. 62)
It must be noted that minority elite support for Biafra, Nwajiaku-Dahou (2009) argued, “was not
determined by ethno-political loyalties, but by past trajectories” (p. 64).
Nonetheless, Biafran forces committed atrocities in the minority areas. Perham (1970), a
notable historian and scholar of this war, confirmed receiving long lists of non-Igbo minorities
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from the southern part of Eastern Region abducted or massacred by the retreating Biafran troops.
The same was true of Calabar where serious fighting and destruction of lives and property
occurred (Perham, 1970). General Alexander Madiebo who was the Commander of the Biafran
Army admitted in his memoir, “The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War” (1980) that the
Annangs were seriously attacked by Biafran soldiers, their homes burned and some were brutally
murdered in an effort to fish out those they labeled saboteurs. Nwajiaku-Dahou (2009) also
revealed that “the Delta minorities were seen as the ‘weakest link’ in Ojukwu’s strategic and
military calculations, and were targeted as ‘saboteurs’ behind the Biafran front line” (p. 49).
In mid-1969, the Biafran military accused foreign expatriates who were working in Okpai
oil fields located in the Niger Delta area of Kwale of espionage (Achebe, 2012). The workers of
Eni, an Italian oil company, were accused of “providing sensitive military information to the
federal forces – about Biafran troop positions, strategic military maneuvers, and training”
(Achebe, 2012, p. 218). Following this accusation, the Biafran troops invaded Okpai oil fields.
While eleven workers were killed on the spot, ten of whom were Italians, and one was Jordanian,
eighteen Eni workers became hostages of war in the hands of the Biafran military, among whom
were fourteen Italians, three Germans, and one Lebanese (Achebe, 2012). Through the
interventions of Pope Paul VI from the Vatican, the governments of Italy, Portugal, Germany,
Ivory Coast, and Gabon, these hostages were reluctantly released by Ojukwu, the Biafran leader
(Achebe, 2012). As Essack (1970) put, Biafra’s military operation in the Niger Delta,
specifically the Kwale incident, “became known to the outside world only when 18 Europeans
were captured by its forces” (p. 9).
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In his memoir, “The Caged Bird Sang No More: My Biafra Odyssey, 1966-1970” (2016),
Major General Philip Efiong, an Ibibio indigene, who was Biafra’s second in command (Vice
President) stated:
Refugees from the minority areas were not readily welcomed into the Igbo heartland. In
fact, a number of refugees, particularly those coming from Uyo, Ikot Ekpene and Abak,
were attacked and killed as they tried to cross into Aba and other Igbo towns. The
situation…had degenerated to such an extent that it became necessary for me to
personally intervene. I gave a speech at Aba Town Hall, drawing the attention of the Aba
provincial administrator, chiefs, elders, and leaders of Aba community to the enormous
harm their attitude could do to the Biafran cause. I put the blame for the killings squarely
on the shoulders of the leaders of Aba community. (p. 173)
Nwajiaku-Dahou (2009) narrated how some minorities who survived managed to escape
from the Biafran soldiers. Chief Abule who was a primary school teacher during the war
described their escape as follows:
We pretended to be fools … when they said ‘about turn’, we would sit down … when
they asked ‘what is the time?’, we would say ‘the long hand of the clock is on top of the
small hand’ … they would then say ‘Come on, get out … these are bush people’. … So
we managed to escape conscription and the sudden killing of soldiers. (Nwajiaku-Dahou,
2009, p. 63)
Similar to the heinous massacre of Igbos in Asaba, it was also reported that the Nigerian
forces committed atrocious killings in the former Eastern Region minority area of Calabar in
early 1968, what is now known as the Calabar massacre. Achebe (2012) revealed that “the
Nigerian forces decided to purge the city of its Igbo inhabitants. By the time the Nigerians were
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done they had ‘shot at least 1,000 and perhaps 2,000 Igbos, most of them civilians’” (p. 137).
The manner in which these killings were carried out in Calabar needs to be further studied. What
is certain is that Colonel Benjamin Adekunle’s Third Marine Division was responsible for the
Calabar massacre.
The Nigerian forces also suffered many casualties in the hands of the Biafrans (AlabiIsama, 2013). Perham (1970) narrated her experience of the sufferings of the federal forces in
Port Harcourt during her visit in late August 1968. “At Port Harcourt I saw the wounded Federal
soldiers just behind the front, and waiting to be flown to Lagos, a sight that made me realize how
little thought has been given to the price in human suffering the Federal side has paid in defense
of unity” (Perham, 1970, p. 238).
Eastern Region minorities also experienced some forms of horror in the hands of the
federal forces. Nwajiaku-Dahou’s (2009) research presented “a picture of the multiple Ijaw
experiences of the Biafran War, on both sides of the frontline, with some examples of how
particular individuals by force or volition switched sides at particular moments” (p. 65).
Another major traumatic incident that requires examination is the aerial bombings in
Biafra on civilian targets. Diamond (2007) stated that there was “open presence of Soviet
technicians, British military advisers, and Egyptian and East German pilots who bombed Biafra
in Soviet planes” (p. 345). Against the basic tenets of Gowon’s code of conduct, the Nigerian air
force along with their foreign allies sporadically bombed and killed civilians in strategic Biafran
locations such as civilian residences, markets, hospitals and churches or houses of worship as
well as refugee camps, food distribution centers and schools (Njoku, 2013; Achebe, 2012).
Achebe (2012) affirmed that “in February 1969 alone nearly eight hundred civilians were
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massacred by targeted Nigerian air force strikes on open markets near Owerri – Umuohiagu and
Ozu-abam” (p. 212).
Achebe (2012) also described how in the second month of the war the Nigerian air force
bombed his apartment building in Enugu, Biafran capital. This is how Achebe (2012) explained
this bombing incident:
At the house I saw a huge crowd and realized that it was my apartment complex
that had been bombed! I pushed my way through the assembly to the edge of a
huge crater in the ground beside the bulding, about a hundred feet from my
children’s swing set. Luckily Christie [my wife] and the children had left in the
nick of time. Had there been anyone in the house they would not have survived.
(p. 182)
Shepherd (1968) described the heinous massacre of church members in Onitsha, a city
near the port of entry to the east through the River Niger Bridge. “In one case, in Onitsha, 300
members of an apostolic sect fled to their church to pray for deliverance instead of fleeing, (as
reported by Frederick Forsyth of the London Sunday Times,) they were all executed by Federal
troops” (Shepherd, 1968, p. 3). The manner in which these innocent civilians were killed needs
to be further investigated. Nonetheless, it has been noted that the Second Division of the
Nigerian military commanded by Colonel Murtala Mohammed was responsible for the killing of
300 Biafran civilians who were praying in that church. Probably this incident is not unrelated to
the Abagana ambush in which about 500 Nigerian troops were killed by the Biafran forces on
March 31, 1968 (Achebe, 2012).
The Abagana ambush, according to Achebe (2012), occurred just a week after Colonel
Murtala Mohammed’s Second Division captured Onitsha. In an effort to link up with Colonel
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Shuwa’s First Division that captured Enugu, “Colonel Murtala Mohammed hastily deployed a
convoy of ninety-six vehicles and four armored cars to facilitate this plan on March 31, 1968” (p.
173). Intelligence about this plan reached the Biafran forces, and Major Johnathan Uchendu
“commanded his troops to lie in ambush in the forest near Abagana” (Achebe, 2012, p. 173). The
Biafran troops then opened fire and killed “Muhammed’s entire convoy…about 500 casualties”
(Achebe, 2012, p. 173). As was often the case during the war, some of the wounded federal
troops who survived attacks and wandered away into the bush were captured by an angry Igbo
village mob who, according to Achebe (2012), “cut their captives into pieces” (p. 174).
Oguibe (1998) whose father was drafted into the Biafran army narrated how his mother
narrowly escaped bombing at a market place in Biafra. Since men were drafted to serve in the
Biafran army, these markets were full of women traders and buyers, who were determined to
feed their children in the absence of their husbands. Based on this reality, one of the market
bombing incidents in which many Biafran women and children were killed was named
“Mother’s Day in Biafra” (Oguibe, 1998, p. 99). Reflecting on this particular bombing incident,
Oguibe (1998) left us with a disturbing example of the traumatic experiences many families had
during the war.
In 1969, my family moved again, farther and farther from the theaters of war, in a
seemingly endless exodus, until we were sandwiched between the sea and death, and the
theaters of war were brought home to us. My father was drafted into the dwindling rebel
army, though he had been judged unfit when he volunteered for military service as a
youth, and despite being officially exempt because of his sacred calling. He left behind a
small boy and a smaller girl, hardly more than an infant, and an aging sister who vowed,
despite soldiers’ guns and the pounding of mortars and bombs, never to move from the
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spot she had called home for forty years. And he left behind a young woman, a mother of
two with no respite or refuge in the midst of war. There is little that a child’s eyes can
recognize, yet there is so much that the child’s mind can register. Of all the horrors that I
witnessed as a war-child - the relentless droning of the bomber aircraft and the mutilated
bodies of other children on the sidewalks, which left me with five straight years of
nightmares - I carry with me one memory deeper than all the rest: of the day my mother
failed to come home. To raise her children and extended family, she had taken to trading
behind enemy lines; upon securing her goods, she would travel long distances to market
them. Most of the men had been taken to the front, and only women were left to keep
families alive. My mother had traveled dozens of miles, a long trek of several days, to a
popular market where the Nigerian Air Force decided, one day, to drop their bombs. We
heard about it on the radio: a slaughter had taken place, pregnant women had been cut in
half and their fetuses hauled through the air, market women had been buried in the rubble
of their own stalls, children had been seen crying beside the mutilated bodies of their
mothers. My mother was there. We waited and wept and prayed, then we despaired.
Suddenly, the war was in our midst, my family’s and mine; the loss was ours, and no loss
is greater than your own. Several days later, my mother returned, a wreck but alive, her
mind and soul shredded by what she had witnessed. Inside she bore her own wounds, the
terror of standing face to face with death, the anguish of thinking that her children would
grow up or perish without a mother, the agonizing feeling that she had abandoned us. I
can imagine no terror worse than this, no horror more devastating, no anguish more
corrosive than a woman’s fear that she might never again see her young. For her to
survive that moment was a wonderful miracle, yet we may never survive the acid that it
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left in the crevices of our hearts… Such was my people’s fate, and my former country’s
gift to a child. Such was the fate of my mother, and of countless others whose husbands
and teenage sons were taken to the front, never to return; who were violated and saw their
children violated; who watched their suckling die at their breasts. Such was the fate of
mothers in Biafra. Several years ago, as an artist and a man, I returned to Biafra and the
traumas of my childhood. But memory was still too heavy, the wound too fresh to open.
What became of my mother’s wound, I will never know. (Oguibe, 1998, pp. 95-96)
Professor Christie Achebe, the wife of Chinua Achebe, also narrated her experience of
the Nigerian air force bombing at a market in Ezinifite, Aguata local government area of
Anambra state, just a day after she went to this market. According to Mrs. Achebe,
the bombardment from the Nigerian Air Force on this day was particularly heavy, as if
the pilots had been upset at not discovering the market sooner. Most of the bombs fell
before dawn. In the morning we discovered the most harrowing of sights. One image still
haunts me till today: that of a pregnant woman split in two by the Nigerian blitz. That
was a horrendous experience for most of us, and we were all very frightened after that.
(Achebe, 2012, p. 189)
The Nigerian Air Force bombings on hospitals and refugee sites occurred multiple times
and in many locations in Biafra. One of these hospital bombings was reported by a delegation of
the International Committee of the Red Cross. The bombing took place at the Awo Omamma
hospital on December 9, 1968 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1969). According to
the ICRC report,
the attack took place at 6:10 pm. After a reconnaissance sweep over the hospital at about
6:05 pm an aircraft belonging to the Nigerian air force made a low level attack, dropping

214
six bombs on the hospital and gunning it. Three people were killed and several other
persons, including children and local Red Cross personnel, sustained wounds of varying
severity… Moreover, the hospital is far from any military objective and there were no
troops in the region. (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1969, p. 4)
It was these types of bombing by the Nigerian air force that motivated mercenary pilots
like Carl Gustaf von Rosen, a World War II veteran from Sweden, to intervene in support of
Biafra. According to Achebe (2012), Carl Gustaf von Rosen led “a five-plane assault on Nigerian
aircraft in Port Harcourt, Benin City, Ughelli, Enugu, and some other locations [destroying]
several Soviet-supplied aircraft in the process” (p. 155).
In fact, before the Awo Omamma hospital bombing on December 9, 1968, there were
other targeted killings of healthcare workers and patients in hospitals. One of these was reported
in Oji River where “the Nigerian forces opened fire and murdered fourteen nurses and the
patients in the wards” (The Times of London, 1968, August 2, as cited in Achebe, 2012, p. 137).
Given the frequency and barbaric nature of these killings, and based on their collective
experience of the 1966 pogroms, the Biafrans concluded that the federal forces were on a
genocide mission against them.
Propaganda and the Genocide Claim of Biafra
The frequent massacre and bombing of Biafran civilians coupled with the lethal effect of
starvation caused by the federal blockade of Biafra prompted Biafran leaders to transition to a
different type of warfare against Nigeria and its supporters – the propaganda warfare. Given the
pogroms of 1966, the Asaba massacre of October 1967, and many other instances of killings of
Biafran civilians, it appeared that the federal forces, especially northern troops, came into Biafra
to annihilate the Igbos. According to Heerten and Moses (2014), “allegations of genocide against
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federal Nigeria—in particular casting Muslims as ‘savages’—became the core of secessionist
propaganda” (p. 178).
The Biafran propaganda was created and disseminated by the Directorate for Propaganda,
a division within the Ministry of Information (Anthony, 2010). With the help of Biafran
intellectuals and a radio called Radio Biafra as a propaganda medium, the Directorate for
Propaganda was able to skillfully transmit Biafran account of the events daily to millions of
people at home and abroad. According to Harneit-Sievers (1997, as cited in Anthony, 2010),
Radio Biafra “transmitted a sense of security in a situation full of rumours and unfamiliar
events” (p. 43). While Radio Biafra primarily targeted Biafran citizens and those in Nigeria
within their reach, the Directorate for Propaganda partnered with the Swiss firm Markpress News
Feature Service to spread their account of the war in strategic countries around the world,
particularly in Europe and North America (Anthony, 2010).
Biafran propaganda made it seem as if the war was between the northern Muslims and
southern Christians. According to Achebe (2012), “this calculation, the Biafrans insisted, was
predicated on a holy jihad proclaimed by mainly Islamic extremists in the Nigerian army and
supported by the policies of economic blockade that prevented shipments of humanitarian aid,
food, and supplies to the needy in Biafra” (p. 229). Due to ethno-religious division of Nigeria,
some writers of the Nigeria-Biafra War, for example Venter (2015), also explained the war from
this erroneous generalized dichotomy between the Muslim North and Christian South. Against
this erroneous hermeneutical approach to the war, it is important to note that the Nigerian troops
that waged war against Biafra were not northern Muslims alone. Many of them were Christians.
Soldiers from other ethnic groups other than Hausa-Fulani, for example, the Yorubas, also fought
on the Federal Nigerian side.
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Oyebade (2017) argued that “this religious delineation is not so clear-cut. The Yoruba,
who pitched their tent with the Federal Government (therefore with the Muslim Hausa/Fulani of
the north), are both Christians and Muslims. The head of the.. Federal Military Government,
General Yakubu Gowon, was a Christian” (p. 294). This is why Perham (1970) stated that “the
civil war was not one between northern ‘vandals’ and Igbo Christians, as the Igbo leadership
once suggested. The Federal army was a mixed one, with Hausa, Yoruba and Middle Belt
represented” (p. 244). However, and as noted by Doron (2014), the Biafran propaganda
“portrayed the Yoruba, who were fighting on the federal side, as suffering disproportionately
while their leadership was ‘treacherous and selfish and signed away the legacies of Oduduwa
land for mere office promotions and shining medals’” (p. 239). Biafran leaders therefore
maintained that “the Federal government was resolved upon a policy of extermination” (Perham,
1970, p. 240).
Doron (2014) analyzed “Biafran print and radio propaganda as well as internal Biafran
documents about the production, evaluation and monitoring of the movement’s propaganda
campaign to show how the secessionist message was constructed, delivered, refined and
adapted” (p. 227). According to Doron (2014), Biafran propaganda was designed to accomplish
two main objectives: arouse international community’s sympathy toward the Biafran cause and
galvanize unyielding support from the Biafran people who were convinced that they were under
a safety threat from the federal side.
While Doron’s (2014) article provides a deeper insight on how Biafran propaganda
influenced the war dynamics and outcome, it seems to me that the author took Biafra’s position
on “the war as the only possible response to a genocidal campaign against them” (p. 227) out of
context without historical precedents. In the order of things, and based on available historical
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evidence, Biafrans held that secession from Nigeria was the only way to secure the safety of
Eastern Nigerians since they felt they were no longer safe within the Nigerian federation as a
result of wide spread massacres against them in Northern and Western Nigeria. It was the federal
military government of Nigeria that declared war against Biafra after Biafran declaration of
independence. This prompted the Biafrans to prepare themselves for what they called a war of
survival. As Doron (2014) equally noted, “Biafran propaganda claimed that their war was strictly
for survival and that the Nigerian federal military government (FMG) was bent on the total
annihilation of Biafra” (p. 227).
These genocide allegations did not start during the Nigeria-Biafra War. In fact, they
started during the pogroms of the mid and late 1966 (Perham, 1970). As Perham (1970) stated,
“some of the first propaganda issued by the Eastern secessionists was the account of this
massacre, illustrated with horrifying photographs” (p. 233). The barbaric and unforgivable
killings in the name of war amplified genocide allegations and propaganda. Everyone at home
and abroad, including illiterate population, scholars, students, policymakers and
nongovernmental organizations, was moved by what they saw and heard - the massacres of the
Igbos and other minorities from Eastern Nigeria.
A day before the declaration of Biafra as an independent and sovereign state, an
international protest in front of the United Nations Headquarters in New York erupted. During
this protest which took place on May 29, 1967, Bruce Mayrock, a 20 year old Jewish
undergraduate student at Colombia University, set himself ablaze (on fire) as a way to draw
urgent international response to the massacres and sufferings of the Biafran people, especially
children, whom he and many others believed were being exterminated in Nigeria (Odeh, 2020,
May 30; Achebe, 2012).
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Melbourne (1973) summarized how news about the war and starving people of Biafra
was transmitted to international media outlets.
From public relations firms which had been hired by Biafra such as Markpress in Geneva
and Ruder & Finn in New York, came a flow of press releases which were picked up by
the media. The complex drama of the Nigerian situation began to attract numerous
correspondents who provided on-the-scene news broadcasts. In contrast to the suspicious,
restrictive attitude of the FMG toward journalists, Biafra was exceedingly cooperative.
Biafran radio carried extensive coverage of the fighting. Few reporters could get to the
action on the federal side, while action stories and pictures of war and famine came
pouring out of the East. These were such as to elicit the sympathies of the correspondents
themselves, which was reflected in their reporting. (Melbourne, 1973, p. 34)
Examples of such reporting include the May 12, 1968 London Sunday Times article,
“Gutted Hamlets, Rotting Corpses - This Is Genocide,” written by the British journalist,
Frederick Forsyth; the June 22, 1968 London Observer article, “Three Million People Starving to
Death in Biafra”; the June 30, 1968 New York Times article, “Blockaded Biafrans Are Facing
Mass Starvation”; and the July 12, 1968 Life magazine article, “Biafra: A War of Extinction and
Starvation;” or the August 23, 1968 Time Magazine article, “Hate, Hunger and the Will to
Survive.” Like in many other countries, these media reports were carefully examined and
discussed in the United States Congress which later contributed to the U.S. decision to offer
humanitarian assistance to Biafra (United States Congress, 1968, July 12).
In order to transmit its propaganda into the international mainstream media and public
opinion, the Biafran government contracted Markpress, a PR company in Geneva, Switzerland
from late 1967 to operate “as the Biafran overseas press division during the 30‐month civil war”
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(Hamilton, 1970, January 16, para. 8). Owned by William H. Bernhardt, Markpress, Doron
(2014) explained, “made extensive use of its knowledge of the international media system and
thus gave Biafra an effective avenue into global media” (p. 241). Doron (2014) stated that the
Nigerian federal military government immediately “hired the British advertising firm Galizine,
Grant & Russell” (p. 241) to counter Markpress’ savvy reporting at the international level.
As previously stated, in an effort to construct an appealing national identity and draw
international attention to their plight, Biafran leaders cleverly compared the state of Biafra, as
well as the killings and sufferings of the Biafran people with the Holocaust and the emergence of
the state of Israel (Parﬁtt, 2013; Bruder, 2012; Harnischfeger, 2012; Gerlach, 2010; Bruder,
2008). One of the highly revered Biafran emblem generally known as the Rising Golden Sun
with eleven stars or rays is symbolically associated with the eleven tribes of Israel (Onuoha,
2013b). According to Onuoha (2013b), “the Igbo regard themselves as one of the lost tribes [of
Israel] (the twelfth) missing somewhere in Africa” (p. 2194). Achebe (2012) contradicted this
interpretation of the Rising Golden Sun emblem and argued that the eleven rays or stars
represent “the eleven original provinces in the republic” (p. 151). Nonetheless, whatever this
emblem symbolizes, the truth is that the Biafrans likened their situation to that of the Jews.
Heerten and Moses (2014) argued that:
this analogy originated in ethnological genealogies that cast the Igbos as the ‘Jews of
Africa’, even as one of Israel’s ‘lost tribes’. The Biafran leadership drew on this
representation that many Eastern Nigerians had adopted as their self-perception. This
analogy, combined with the genocide charge, was used by the leadership to secure the
support of the Biafran population, and to build loyalty to Biafra by emphasizing the threat
from a common enemy. (pp. 178-179)
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Laying emphasis on a common enemy, no doubt, strengthened and reinforced Biafran
common identity. This is why Biafran leaders were more inclined to refer all Eastern Region
indigenes as Biafrans in their speeches. An example is Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who had argued in
his speech about the 1966 pogroms that “[o]ur kith and kin were slaughtered like cattle in an
abattoir, for no just cause other than that they were Biafrans” (Azikiwe, 1968, February 25, as
cited in Anthony, 2014, p. 212). That Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe referred to easterners who were killed
in the 1966 pogroms as Biafrans has been criticized by Anthony (2014). To Dr. Azikiwe’s
statement, Anthony (2014) responded: “In fact, by any contemporary measure they had not been
Biafrans in 1966, but rather, depending on one’s frame of reference, Igbos, Eastern Nigerians or
in most cases both. But by projecting Biafran identity backwards through time, Azikiwe revised
it to conform to the demands of the moment” (p. 12).
Anthony’s (2014) criticism of Nnamdi Azikiwe’s February 25, 1968 speech displays the
type of ignorance found in many texts written by foreign scholars, especially those without a
deeper understanding of Biafra as a historical territory that predated its short-lived independence
from Nigeria. What Anthony (2014) did not know is that even in 1966, people from Eastern
Nigeria were Biafrans. Azikiwe was in fact referring to the Biafran identity that predated the
1914 amalgamation of ethnic nationalities by the British into the artificial entity called Nigeria.
Biafra was not invented at the time of secession. Historically, Biafra referred to the territory
occupied by Eastern Nigerians. This is why it was easy for Eastern Nigerians to identify with
Biafran identity after their secession from Nigeria in 1967.
Another propaganda strategy utilized by the Biafran government to reinforce Biafran
identity against the Nigerian identity is the creation and publication of cartoons. According to
Doron (2014), “cartoons played an important role in the propaganda machine” (p. 231) and were
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often published in “The Leopard,” a newsletter of the Biafran military. These propaganda
cartoons reveal how the Biafran leaders shifted their messaging to the civilian population from a
show of might to a genocide campaign against them as the war dynamics changed in favor of the
Nigerians. Doron (2014) examined four cartoons to explain this shift: “She appears near, but she
ain’t;” “Wrestling Round 3;” “International observers HQ, Lagos;” and “Gowon’s harvest.”
Figure 3 portrays Biafra as a strong independent state prepared to defeat Nigeria
irrespective of the military and tactical support Nigeria received from the British and the Soviet
Union. According to Doron (2014), “the Biafrans portrayed themselves early on with an aura of
invincibility, which lasted largely until mid-1968, when the war sharply turned against Biafra”
(p. 232).
Figure 3
“She appears near, but she ain’t”

Note. The Leopard, 1968, January 26, as cited in Doron (2014, p. 232).
Figure 4 uses the metaphor of wrestling, which was a very important sport in Igbo
traditional society, to portray Ojukwu as triumphant over Gowon despite the help Nigeria
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received from the British and Soviet who are depicted in the cartoon as saying “we’re here to
assist you” (Doron, 2014, p. 233).
Figure 4
“Wrestling Round 3”

Note. The Leopard, 1968, February 16, as cited in Doron (2014, p. 233).
Figure 5 depicts the international observer team invited by the federal government of
Nigeria who are observing the war in Biafra from a boardroom in the Nigerian side. One
observer says “no blood mist,” the other replies “Then there’s no genocide” (Doron, 2014, p.
233).
Figure 5
“International Observers HQ, Lagos”

Note. The Leopard, 1968, November 22, as cited in Doron (2014, p. 233).
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Figure 6 depicts Gowon as a farmer who have sown the seeds of genocide, and
afterwards, sends his workers – the Nigerian soldiers – to harvest, gather and bring back to him
the skeletons of the dead Biafrans as the fruits of their labor.
Figure 6
“Gowon’s Harvest”

Note. The Leopard, 1968, November 22, as cited in Doron (2014, p. 234).
Moreover, since the difference between 1941-45 Holocaust and 1966-70 pogroms with
the Nigeria-Biafra War was not much, an analogy between the traumatic experiences of the Jews
and those of the Biafrans resonated with many international audience. This resonance with the
sympathy it generated was aided by the graphically disturbing images of starving children of
Biafra shown on international televisions and published in newspapers. Furthermore, “Biafran
refugee camps were described as ‘the camp of Belsen at its liberation’, ‘Mauthausens of famine’
or as a ‘Buchenwald for children’. Auschwitz, the most well-known site of mass annihilation,
was repeatedly referenced” (Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 179).
As discussed below, these helped galvanize humanitarian support for Biafra from
international religious groups and activists, including the Jewish communities and conservatives.
For instance, Bruce Mayrock, the 20 year old activist who set himself ablaze (afire) as a way to
draw urgent international response to the massacres and sufferings of the Biafran people, was
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Jewish (Odeh, 2020, May 30). Bernard Kouchner, who co-founded Comité de Lutte contre le
Génocide au Biafra during the Nigeria-Biafra War, a relief organization that later became
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) is also Jewish. In fact, Bernard Kouchner’s
“grandfather was killed in Auschwitz” (Heerten and Moses 2014, p. 179). Conservatives in the
United States were moved to action in support of the Biafran people. According to Melbourne
(1973), Fulton Lewis III and Congressman Lukens of Ohio visited Biafra “under the auspices of
church-run organizations” (p. 35).
From a foreign policy perspective, the Biafran propaganda also had serious impact on
foreign governments. British citizens and political leaders, as well as pro-Biafra journalists, for
example, Frederick Forsyth and Auberon Alexander Waugh, accused the British government “of
complicity in genocide” (Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 180). As a political columnist on The
Spectator, Auberon Alexander Waugh launched staunch criticisms against Prime Minister
Harold Wilson and his foreign secretary, Michael Stewart. Heerten and Moses (2014) noted that
Waugh made it clear that “the mass starvation to death of innocent civilians was the most
hideous crime against humanity in which England has ever been involved” (p. 180).
These criticisms prompted the British government to sponsor an international observer
team to Nigeria to verify whether the federal government was committing genocide against
Biafrans. Smith (2014) revealed that George Thomson, Secretary-General of Commonwealth,
informed Anthony Enahoro, Federal Commissioner for Information and Labor, that:
if the British government were to continue its present policy in the midst of a final
offensive by the FMG, then there needed to be ‘an invitation to outside observers to
accompany the troops and to testify that there were no massacres’. If the FMG did not
allow this, then the British government would not continue to support them. (p. 254)
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The federal military government of Nigeria accepted this condition and complied accordingly.
Members of the observer team who traveled to the Nigerian held territory from
September 1968 following an invitation from Nigeria included war and military experts from the
United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, Poland, the United Nations and representatives from the
OAU (Anthony, 2014; Smith, 2014; Melbourne, 1973; Mustafa, 1969). Anthony (2014) added
that the OAU was represented by “officers from Algeria and Ethiopia” (p. 219). These outside
observers were only mandated to “visit all war affected areas and newly liberated areas, on the
Federal-controlled side, to witness the conduct of Federal troops—re charges of genocide”
(Smith, 2014, p. 255). To this end, transportation and accommodation was provided to them by
the federal military government (Smith, 2014).
While in the Nigerian held territories, the observer team was prevented by the federal
government from entering Biafran held territories (Smith, 2014). Their observation was
conducted only from and within the Nigerian held territories. Some of the sites they visited
included prisons where Biafran prisoners of war were detained, refugee camps, and areas
liberated by the Nigerian forces (Smith, 2014). By implication, they were not able to see firsthand the devastating impacts of starvation, massacres, and bombings on Biafran civilians. This,
no doubt, restricted their movement and posed a challenge and limitation to objective
observations and findings.
Interdicting international observers from visiting Biafra was a norm for the federal
military government. Margery Perham, a British historian who flew to Nigeria in late August
1968 to observe the war on an official invitation by federal military government of Nigeria, just a
month before the international observer team started their work, stated that she was prohibited
from flying into Biafra (Perham, 1970). According to her, “I was given the maximum both of

226
help and of freedom of choice as to what and whom I should see. General Gowon lent me his
excellent executive jet plane to fly where I liked, except, of course, into Biafra” (Perham, 1970,
p. 238).
With these manipulations and restrictions, the observer team concluded in their several
reports that there was no evidence of genocide committed by the Nigerian forces against Biafra
(Heerten & Moses, 2014; Smith, 2014; Oguibe, 1998; Melbourne, 1973). In fact, their first report
issued on October 2, 1968, just few weeks after their arrival in Nigeria, stated: “[t]here is no
evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Igbo people or their property, and the
use of the term genocide is in no way justified” (Smith, 2014, p. 255).
The observer team’s conclusion that there was no evidence of genocide against Biafra
was ferociously rejected by Biafran leaders. The Biafran leadership argued that this conclusion
“was nothing but a shameless conspiracy, aimed at preventing the UN and the OAU from taking
a positive stand or positive action against the genocide being practiced” (Smith, 2014, p. 256).
This is because, according to the Biafrans, “the team did not get anywhere near the war fronts
nor did they come into Biafra. They were taken on a conducted tour. They ignored well
authenticated reports made by neutrals about the massacre of Biafran civilians near the war
fronts” (Anthony, 2014, p. 220).
The authors of “Nigerian pogrom: The organized massacre of Eastern Nigerians,” the
third volume of Eastern Region’s Crisis publication, had previously:
accused northern Nigerians of an ‘attempt to exterminate Easterners in the North and
other parts of Nigeria’. They argued that after a military decree eliminated Nigeria’s four
administrative regions in favor of a unitary state on 24 May, ‘[t]he so-called Muslim elite
of the North immediately conspired with their feudal rulers and, aided by the former

227
Northern politicians and administrators, a plan was hatched to massacre all the Easterners
in their midst’. (Eastern Nigeria Ministry of Information, Publicity Division, 1966, as
cited in Anthony, 2014, p. 210)
It is true that there were elements of propaganda in the Biafran genocide narrative during
the war, for example in Biafra Newsletter. However, it is a grave mistake on the part of Anthony
(2014) to argue that “while ‘Nigerian Pogrom’ was first and foremost propaganda calibrated to
shock readers, its descriptions accurately reflected the extent of the violence” (p. 210). Arguing
that the 1966 report, Nigerian Pogrom, “was first and foremost propaganda calibrated to shock
readers” (Anthony, 2014, p. 210) amounts to attacking the victims of the 1966 massacres twice
as well as suppressing the lived experiences of millions of easterners who survived the massacres
and returned to their ancestral home as refugees. Why should this 1966 report be both a
propaganda and an accurate depiction of what happened? What shocks readers is the
documentation itself as well as what the documentation represents – that is, what happened –
which was documented. Since the authors of the report, Nigerian Pogrom, “relied mostly on
witness and press accounts from Time, the Observer (London), the Daily Express (London) and
even the Kaduna-based New Nigerian” (Anthony, 2014, p. 210), it is evident that the events
documented in the report were not fabricated by Eastern Nigeria. The same events were reported
and documented by many other agencies.
Another important publication that Biafran ministry of information published was called
“The case for Biafra.” As Anthony (2014) noted, “The case for Biafra combined a treatment of
the 1966 violence with a critique of the war, first by assigning northern leaders collective
responsibility for the slaughter of 1966” (p. 211). The Biafrans argued that “wartime genocide
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was an extension of a longstanding anti-Igbo agenda among northern elites” (Biafra Newsletter,
1968, March 1, as cited in Anthony, 2014, p. 214).
In response to the one sided report of the International Observer Team that there was no
evidence of genocide, the Biafran government invited their own observer team named
International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes of Genocide (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1991, as cited
in Achebe, 2012). Heerten and Moses (2014) stated that the International Committee on the
Investigation of Crimes of Genocide was “an ad hoc group originating in Paris ‘under ofﬁcial
Jewish and Christian auspices’ and comprising jurists from various countries” (p. 186). This
committee was headed by a Ghanaian, Dr. Mensah, and arrived Biafra in December 1968
(Korieh, 2012).
Dr. Mensah’s International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes of Genocide report
determined “that previous and present actions of northerners against the Igbo clearly constituted
both ‘intent to destroy’ and ‘deliberate destruction’ of the Igbo” (Mensah, 1970, as cited in
Korieh, 2012, p. 7). According to the International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes of
Genocide report (1970, as cited in Korieh, 2012), “Nigerian authorities have admitted that there
is genocide going on in Biafra. They however disclaim responsibility for same and accuse
Biafrans with the perpetration of these crimes against humanity” (p. 7).
Unlike the British led International Observer Team that observed the war only in
territories controlled by the Nigerian troops, the International Committee on the Investigation of
Crimes of Genocide interviewed 1,082 people in total from both the Biafran and Nigerian sides,
including their foreign supporters (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1991, as cited in Achebe, 2012). On the Biafran
side, Dr. Mensah’s committee interviewed “refugees from Northern Nigeria who had fled during
the 1966 pogrom, refugees from Midwestern Nigeria, Biafran government officials, and private
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individuals” (Korieh, 2012, p. 7). On the Nigerian side, Dr. Mensah’s committee had a meeting
with “Nigerian officials in Lagos in March 1969 and conducted interviews with the Nigerian
Ministry of Defense, the International Red Cross, and the International Observer Team” (Korieh,
2012, p. 7).
For many Biafran sympathizers at home and abroad, the conclusion of the International
Observer Team was highly biased and skewed in favor of Nigeria. Many pro-Biafra analysts rely
rather on this contradictory report by the International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes
of Genocide published in 1969 which argued that there was “evidence of genocide and intent to
commit genocide… against the Igbo” (Korieh, 2013, p. 734).
A few analysts have insinuated that the war experts from Britain on the International
Observer Team used the observation as a means to gather “intelligence for the British
government, comment on the military performance of the FMG, consider what the FMG could
do better and assess FMG military needs” (Smith, 2014, p. 257). To some extent, this hypothesis
may be true since the MI6 was looking for intelligence from both Nigeria and Biafra. For
example, Frederick Forsyth, the highly revered pro-Biafra British journalist has confessed that
while reporting from within and in favor of Biafra he was also spying for the MI6, the Secret
Intelligence Service of the United Kingdom, specifically in the last year of the war (BBC News,
2015, August 30).
There were scholars who raised questions about the qualification of the members of the
observer team with regard to an inclusive understanding of the concept of genocide. Cronje
(1972) argued that the observer team lacked an objective framework or guideline for identifying
genocide in the context of Nigeria having intentionally omitted the 1966 pogroms of the Igbos.
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The question that needed to be answered was: are there other kinds of genocide in
addition to a total physical extermination of an ethnic, religious or national group? It is on this
point that Diamond (2007) posited that:
for these people [Biafrans], genocide meant both more and less than physical extinction.
It meant the collapse of their symbolic universe and living on sufferance in a state that
had used every conceivable means to reduce them to its own aspirations and pace, that is
to say, to the Nigerian common denominator as it had been determined by colonial
powers. (p. 359)
This made Diamond (2007) to infer that cultural genocide was committed against
Biafrans. Cultural genocide begets cultural trauma. According to Alexander (2004, as cited in
Oloyede, 2009), “cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been
subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness,
marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and
irrevocable ways” (p. 6).
The question of genocide against the Igbos, Korieh (2013) argued, should be answered by
understanding whether there was an “intent on the part of Nigeria to destroy the Igbo as a
nationality” (p. 728). Many will argue that it is difficult to know whether the Federal troops
harbored a genocidal intent given that millions of Igbos were not killed during the war.
Nevertheless, Korieh (2013), building on Achebe’s (2012) revelation and description of
premeditated killings of the Igbos, believes that the war was not isolated from the 1966 pogroms
against the Igbos in Northern and Western Nigeria. According to Korieh (2012 as cited in
Korieh, 2013), the war could be interpreted as “a final solution of what was perceived as an Igbo
problem” (p. 728), just as the Holocaust was for the Nazis a “final solution of the Jewish
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problem” (The International Committee on the Investigation of Crimes of Genocide, as cited in
Korieh, 2013, p. 728).
In addition, Aneke (2003) argued that “the three Division Commanders that Gowon
unleashed on Biafra were ruthless human beings with proven genocidal propensities: Col.
Mohammed Shuwa, Commander of the First Infantry Division; Col. Murtala Mohammed,
Commander of the 2nd Division; and Col. Benjamin Adekunle, Commander of the third Marine
Division” (para. 12). Citing a 1967 New York Times report, Aneke (2003) stated that Col.
Mohammed Shuwa and his deputy Commander, Col. Theophilus Danjuma, “mandated his troops
to exercise the utmost violence on the Biafrans” (para. 13).
According to Aneke (2003), “one needed to be in Enugu in the later part of 1967 to see
gouged-out eyes, amputated limbs, fractured skulls and horror stories of Nsukka refugees
pouring into Enugu and environs, to appreciate the violent propensity of Shuwa, Danjuma and
their men, in furtherance of Shuwa’s ruthlessness order” (para. 16). In characterizing the
atrocities Col. Benjamin Adekunle committed as genocidaire, Aneke (2003) relied on a 1968
New York Times article on Adekunle’s interview granted to the Economist and other news
sources which reported Adekunle saying:
I want to see no Red Cross, no Caritas, no World Council of Churches, no Pope, no
missionary and no U.N. delegation. I want to prevent even one Ibo having even one thing
to eat before their capitulation… we shoot at everything that moves … Then we shoot at
everything, even things that don’t move. (para. 18).
The extent to which Col. Benjamin Adekunle and his men carried out these horrific crimes in
Biafra remains a research question for historical analysis and scholarly discussion.
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Diamond (2007) argued that there were some instances of premeditated biological
genocide which involved the use of total economic blockade and starvation as major weapons of
war as well as massacres and pogroms. On the premeditated biological genocide, Diamond
(2007) opined that:
it was no doubt the policy of this or that field commander in localized areas, though it
was not officially sanctioned - a fact that does not relieve Lagos of the ultimate
responsibility for indiscriminate killing, however defined. But we can well understand
why many Biafrans felt that their destruction was planned. Certainly the massacres that
precipitated secession were, like all pogroms, organized from the top, igniting disaffected
elements at the bottom, while displacing attention from the genuine grievances of the
people at large. (Diamond, 2007, p. 360)
Korieh (2013) added that even though an explicit intent to destroy or exterminate the Igbos was
not officially declared by the federal military government of Nigeria, “the state had many willing
executioners with clear intent on exterminating the Igbo. The state did not do much to stop it nor
prosecute those who did the job” (p. 730).
Keil (1970) posited that based on “the Geneva Convention of 1948…, there can be no
doubt whatsoever that Biafra represents a crystal clear case of genocide...” (p. 1). To prove that
genocide was committed against Biafrans, Keil (1970) examined the intent of the killers during
the “the pogroms [he] witnessed in Makurdi, Nigeria (late Sept. 1966) [which] were
foreshadowed by months of intensive anti-Igbo and anti-Eastern conversations among Tiv,
Idoma, Hausa and other Northerners resident in Makurdi, and, fitting a pattern replicated in city
after city, the massacres were led by the Nigerian army” (pp. 1-2). On the genocidal intention of
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the killers, Keil (1970) recounted what dozens of Nigerian soldiers told him in Makurdi during
and after the pogroms against the Igbos.
After counting the disemboweled bodies along the Makurdi road I was escorted back to
the city by soldiers who apologized for the stench and explained politely that they were
doing me and the world a great favor by eliminating Igbos. ‘They eat dogs. They must die
like dogs’. ‘We find ‘em, we kill ‘em, and they do us the same, na be so?’ ‘They are born
with greed in their hearts’. ‘They are the only people spoiling Nigeria ever since - One
Nigeria without Igbo!’ ‘We make sure they will never worry us again’. (p. 2)
According to Keil (1970), the proof that a genocidal intention was harbored by a
significant part of the Nigerian military could be seen in “the pogroms in 1966 when 30,000
Easterners were killed” (p. 2), as well as in the massacres of innocent civilians in Asaba during
the first year of the war. Another key evidence for genocidal intention is drawn from “field
commander Col. Adekunle’s boasting that, ‘We shoot at everything that moves . . . even things
that don’t move’. ‘I want to prevent even one Igbo having even one piece to eat before their
capitulation’” (Keil, 1970, p. 2). In addition, Keil (1970) believed that Nigeria’s use of starvation
as a weapon of war against the Biafrans was aimed at killing as many Biafrans as possible until
they were completely exterminated or succumbed to submission. To prove this, Keil (1970) cited
a public statement made by “Chief Awolowo and supported by the then Army Chief of Staff
Katsina: ‘All is fair in war and starvation is one of the weapons of war. I don’t see why we
should feed our enemies fat, only to fight us harder’” (p. 2).
Similar genocide arguments by other pro-Biafra scholars have been summarized by
Anthony (2014). Uzoigwe (2011, as cited in Anthony, 2014) argued that “the violence of 1966
satisfies the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
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Genocide (CPPCG) criteria” (p. 206). Leo Kuper (1981, as cited in Anthony, 2014) referred to it
as a “‘genocidal massacre’, characterized by ‘the annihilation of a section of a group—men,
women, and children, as for example in the wiping out of whole villages’” (p. 206). Robert
Melson (2002, as cited in Anthony, 2014) argued that what occurred during the Nigeria-Biafra
War was “a genocide-in-part’ rather than a ‘genocide-in-whole’” (p. 206). According to him,
“despite their original intentions, which were not to exterminate a people in the manner of the
Nazis, the policies of the Nigerian military had led to a mass death” (Melson, 2002, as cited in
Anthony, 2014, p. 208). Emmanuel Okocha (2006, as cited in Anthony, 2014) strongly believed
that the “Nigerian forces committed genocide during the 1967 massacre of unarmed civilians at
Asaba” (p. 207). Others like Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe (2007, as cited in Anthony, 2014) are of the
view that “Nigeria’s use of starvation as a weapon of war constituted genocide” (p. 208).
Anthony’s (2014) research revealed that Biafran civilians gathered in different locations,
including hospitals, schools, markets, and relief centers were commonly targeted and attacked.
These and many other incidents along with the Asaba massacre constitute the basis for Biafran
claim of genocide against them.
According to Smith (2014), “the Senegalese and Tanzanian presidents (Leopold Senghor
and Julius Nyerere) also labelled the Nigerian policy as ‘genocide’” (p. 251). Influenced by the
reports of Catholic missionaries in Biafra, and probably the report of the Vatican’s emissary,
Monsignor Georges Rocheau, who visited Nigeria on a fact-finding mission and concluded that
genocide had taken place (Achebe, 2012), Pope Paul VI used the word ‘genocide’ in the closing
stages of the war, and had quickly to recant” (Perham, 1970, p. 240). Even some members of the
Canadian parliament stated that “there was an element of genocide in the war” (Smith, 2014, p.
257).
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A British historian, Margery Perham, who flew to Nigeria in late August 1968 to observe
the war on an official invitation by federal military government of Nigeria narrated an interesting
account of the pogrom that Brigadier Hassan Katsina told her. Having previously hosted
Brigadier Hassan Katsina’s father in her house in England, Brigadier Katsina confided in
Margery Perham “a full account of the massacres of the Igbo in the North, and especially of the
day, so terrible for a commander, when his life was in danger from his own men when they
mutinied against his officers and massacred Igbo on Kano aerodrome” (Perham, 1970, p. 238).
All these accounts of killings – whether genocidal or not – point to the fact that there was
destruction of life and property going on which resulted in a displacement of an ethnic or
religious group. In the words of Akçam (2007), “the important thing, however, is not the term
[i.e., genocide], but rather the moral position that recognizes the crime and condemns it.
However we define it, whatever word we use, we must acknowledge that this history involved
the deliberate destruction of a people” (p. 9).
However, many northern writers have put forward counter-arguments to the genocide
claims of the Biafrans. In an interview about his novel, City of Memories, Richard Ali
challenged the widely spread narrative about the Nigeria-Biafra War that places Northern
Nigeria as the perpetrators and the Biafrans as the victims (Ogundipe, 2016). According to
Richard Ali as cited in Ogundipe (2016), “the roots of that unfortunate conflict lie in selfish
politics patented by the southern Nigerian political elite playing on ethnic sentiments and, by the
same token, fostering ethnic stereotypes” (p. 177). Richard Ali said that “the North was a victim
of this desire to create an Other within Nigeria” (Ogundipe, 2016, p. 177). To justify his claim,
Richard Ali as noted in Ogundipe (2016) cited some examples of how the North was treated
badly by the South. According to him,
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in the early 1950s, House of Representatives members from the North were booed and
humiliated in Lagos because they did not agree that an early independence was in the
interest of the political bloc and the people they represented in that legislative chamber…
Then in January 1966, soldiers brought up on that same ruinous rhetoric of ‘Northern
domination’ and ‘corruption’ decided to wreak havoc on the then Northern Region. In
one swoop, [all the] architects of the Northern Region were murdered. These actions…
are rooted in stereotypes assiduously cultivated by Southern Nigerians. (Ogundipe, 2016,
pp. 177-178)
In addition to these claims, Richard Ali as explained in Ogundipe (2016) attributed a
justification for the pogrom of Eastern Nigerians who were living in the North in 1966 to the
reports of celebrations in Igbo communities after the January 15, 1966 coup in which many
northern leaders were murdered. According to him,
why did some people from the Eastern Region, living in Zaria in the North, who, as far as
anyone knows, had absolutely nothing to do with Nzeogwu and his coup, feel the impulse
to publicly celebrate the gruesome murder of the premier of the region in which they
lived?... And the answer, the only answer, is that the Southern Nigerians, generally, had
created an Other of us, the Northerners. (Ogundipe, 2016, p. 179)
Richard Ali as quoted in Ogundipe (2016) went further to state that:
the documented purpose of the 1966 counter-coup led by Northern Nigerian soldiers did
not topple General Ironsi’s government because they hated Southerners. Even months
after the killings of the leaders of the Northern Region in what, to even the most dull of
savants, was a politically premeditated coup, Northern Nigerians, on the night of July 29,
were not interested in seizing federal power. After the second coup, a forty-eight-hour

237
power vacuum ensued during which the British and other interested parties finally
prevailed on the putschists to assert their de facto power over the federation and not to
secede. (p. 179)
As I had argued before, one question still needs to be answered. Could it mean that the
fact that Northern Region was not able to secede after the counter coup of July 29, 1966 they
engaged in the pogroms of Eastern Nigerians in order to drive Eastern Nigerians away from the
federation? This question was not addressed by Richard Ali.
Some foreign scholars of the Nigeria-Biafra War and its genocide question have also
refuted some of the genocide claims of Biafra (Heerten & Moses, 2014). Heerten and Moses
(2014) critized Korieh (2013) and other scholars of Biafran origin and argued that:
to maintain consistency with the Holocaust dramaturgy as a non-political genocide,
Korieh and others emphasize Igbo innocence and lack of agency. They thus play down
Igbo ofﬁcers’ participation in the fateful military coup of 1966, and do not mention the
Biafran rejection of a supply corridor (for fear that the FMG would poison food) in 1968
and 1969, still less recall the obdurate continuation of the war against all odds despite the
catastrophic famine. (p. 186)
In addition, it has also been revealed that not all the federal soldiers and officers that entered
Asaba obeyed their commander’s order to kill the Igbos of Asaba (Bird & Ottanelli, 2014). Not
only that some of these federal soldiers and officers refused to kill, they also “stepped in to
prevent violence and to save and protect civilians [thereby stopping] even further bloodshed”
(Bird & Ottanelli, 2014, p. 394).
Although the extent and scale of the pogroms are troubling and have been acknowledged
by General Gowon (Gowon, 2015), Margery Perham concluded from her investigative research
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in Nigeria “that the Federal Government, admitting the wrongs committed against the Igbo, was
planning to treat them, after surrender or defeat, as probably no enemy” (Perham, 1970, p. 239).
Based on this assumption, she argued that the Biafrans were drawn into this bloody war on “a
wholly mistaken basis that the only alternative to independence was genocide” (Perham, 1970, p.
239). It is easy to pass a judgment and conclude that the decision of the Biafran leader to refuse
to surrender was a mistake. However, and as Bird and Ottanelli (2014) argued, one should not
ignore the fact that the massacre of the Igbo people of Asaba, who had pledged allegiance to the
federal government,
appeared to conﬁrm long-standing Biafran claims that the war was one of genocide… the
Biafrans were arguing that if federal troops would massacre so many of those who
remained loyal to Nigeria, simply because of their ethnicity, they would do far worse to
Igbos who had deﬁed the government and seceded. (Bird & Ottanelli, 2014, p. 392)
Achebe (2012) corroborated this view and confirmed that “in Biafra there was a widely
held belief that ‘a cease-fire would lead to genocide or retribution of equal magnitude, or at least
the relinquishing of self-determination and freedom’” (p. 124). Nonetheless, Perham’s (1970)
conclusion that Biafra’s persistence in war was a mistake corroborated the outcomes of the
surveys Biafran leaders conducted in the Biafran provinces. Unlike what many people think,
Biafrans did not just surrender to the Nigerians on January 15, 1970 without first and foremost
analyzing and understanding public opinion about the war within Biafra.
To do this, the Research Appraisal Committee within the Biafran Directorate of
Propaganda conducted surveys that sampled the opinion of about 902 participants drawn from
different locations in Biafra (Doron, 2014). Through these surveys, the Biafran government was
able to “ascertain how propaganda was received within Biafra” (Doron, 2014, p. 236). The
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results of these surveys were analyzed and presented in reports presumably written in 1969, one
of which is titled “What Biafrans know about the Nigeria/Biafra War” which revealed the morale
of Biafran citizens and their “perceptions of the war… by age groups, sex, education levels”
(Doron, 2014, p. 236).
Against the popular view that everyone in Biafra was in support of the so called war of
survival, the report, “What Biafrans know about the Nigeria/Biafra War,” as explained by Doron
(2014):
voiced a general concern of the effectiveness of the propaganda. While 50.9 per cent of
the respondents agreed that ‘Biafra is continuing to fight because we want to prevent
Nigeria from killing us off’, the report stated that number was extremely low ‘since
genocide has been Biafra’s propaganda trump card, and indeed the single greatest factor
that makes Biafrans to persist [sic] in the fight against all odds’. (p. 236)
Even the Land Army Scheme, a community based farming program “designed to
alleviate starvation in Biafra whereby communities would grow food, part of which would be
distributed among the community and another part would be handed over to the government for
redistribution” (Doron, 2014, p. 236), was supported by only “57.9 per cent, which, according to
the survey authors, ‘is too small a number” (Doron, 2014, p. 237).
As Biafra was struggling to cope with a humanitarian crisis of higher proportion and the
capture of some Igbo cities by the Nigerian troops, Biafran authorities sought to know public
opinion regarding how the war will end. Doron (2014) opined that “although the questions asked
how Biafrans thought both Nigeria and Biafra desired to end the war, the real motive behind the
questions was to gauge how the respondents saw Nigeria as a militaristic power that was bent on
either a military defeat of Biafra or on killing every Biafran, which polled 65.9 per cent and 24.2
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per cent, respectively” (p. 237). These numbers are significant because they reveal that the
Biafran people were disconnected from, and did not fully support, the Biafran propaganda that
the Nigerians were on a genocide mission against Biafra. Also, and as Doron (2014) has
illustrated, “although the depravations in Biafra were central to the accusations of genocide as a
global cause célèbre, many of the Igbo living in Nigerian-held territories were not suffering to
the extent that those in Biafran territory were” (p. 240).
Seen that the genocide propaganda was losing public support from home and abroad, the
Biafran propaganda machine shifted to racial injustice as the reason for Biafran fate. With
phrases like this, “We suffer because we are black” championed by Ojukwu at the Ahiara
Declaration also known as the declaration of the “Principles of the Biafran Revolution” (Ojukwu,
1969, June 1),
the Biafran government sought to garner public support for their secession by claiming
that their self-determination was part and parcel of the broad pan-Africanist movement.
By comparing Biafran secession to the various Balkan revolutions against the Ottoman
Empire, the program argued that racism informed the Western world’s support for Greek,
Yugoslavian and Romanian secession from the Ottomans, while at the same time
opposing Biafra’s separation from Nigeria. (Doron, 2014, p. 239)
This is why the Biafran leaders vehemently argued that “white neo-imperialists (represented by
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union – Nigeria’s primary military suppliers) feared the
appearance of a modern, self-reliant, and politically unfettered black state” (Anthony, 2010, p.
46).
Upset by the double standard of the so-called Super Powers toward Biafra, Keil (1970)
argued that the complicit policies of the British, Russians and also the American neutrality in the
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30-month Nigeria-Biafra War had serious implications for the future of human existence. As
Keil (1970) noted,
America, Britain and Russia are allies once again, but this time in a genocidal operation.
The realpolitik of this alliance is persuasive. In the case of Biafra, East-West
collaboration has proven more profitable than confrontation. Only the Biafrans lose. I
would suggest that we are entering a new disgusting age in which troublesome minorities
are routinely and publicly exterminated for economic gain. Biafra sets the precedent. (p.
3)
Humanitarian Disaster and Assistance
The botched observation of the International Observer Team along with its conclusion
that the federal troops did not commit genocide neither changed nor improved the humanitarian
disaster in Biafra. Before and after the report of the observer team, the humanitarian situation in
Biafra was a great concern to many interest groups and individuals abroad. Humanitarian crisis
was not only in Biafra. Melbourne (1973) noted that “war, as expected, brought severe hunger
and conditions of famine on both sides of the line as Biafra contracted” (p. 34). The situation
was, no doubt, worse in Biafran held territories. From the spring of 1968 the humanitarian
condition deteriorated in Biafra (Melbourne, 1973). At this time in 1968, it was estimated that
out of at least 300,000 affected by the kwashiorkor epidemic and about 3 million who were
starving to death with severe marasmus symptoms, “89 percent… were children under five years
of age. The remaining 11 percent were age five to fifteen” (Dr. Aaron Ifekwunigwe, 1968, as
cited in Achebe, 2012, p. 195).
It was extremely hard to turn away from the images of starving and dying Biafran
children shown on the television and newspapers. As Heerten and Moses (2014) explained, “the

242
Biafran crisis marks the onset of a new age of humanitarian catastrophe broadcast by modern
media” (p. 176). Others, like Michael Ignatieff (as cited in Heerten & Moses, 2014), believed
that “the ‘age of televised disaster’ began with the Biafran war” (p. 176). Even Achebe (2012)
corroborated this fact and affirmed that “it was the first time scenes and pictures – blood, guts,
severed limbs – from the war front flooded into homes around the world through television sets,
radios, newsprint, in real time” (p. 199).
The most striking description of these horrifying images streamed on television for the
first time was written by Perham (1970) who stated:
through the medium of television, for the first time the sufferings of a besieged people
have been carried into the homes of the great majority of our population. The Biafran
appeal to our emotions came from the repeated pictures, not only of dead or dying men
and women, but, even more penetrating, of small children with swollen stomachs and
stick-like limbs who sometimes appeared to look straight at the viewer with a last cry for
help. The charitable organizations reproduced such images in their appeals and offered
the public some alleviation to the anguish of pity by giving them the opportunity to assist
the courageous air-lift of supplies and devoted helpers. (p. 231)
These horrifying images moved individuals to organize and form committees in order to
offer humanitarian assistance to Biafra. Achebe (2012), however, argued that it was the
involvement of Carl Gustaf von Rosen, a Swedish nobleman and World War II veteran, who
came to Biafra’s assistance in 1968 as well as his public testimonies about the catastrophic
humanitarian situation on the ground that drew the attention of many foreigners to Biafra.
Existing international, non-governmental and religious organizations were moved to
mobilize funds and relief supplies to send to Biafra. Melbourne (1973) narrated how religious
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institutions in the United States conducted fundraising campaigns in support of Biafra. “One
example of such a campaign was led by a prominent matron of Topeka, Kansas, who organized
an inter-denominational week-long drive and induced the governor to proclaim Statewide Month
of Hope for Nigeria-Biafra” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 35). Another example is the January 1969
fundraising event hosted at St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York in support of Biafran relief
efforts which was attended by Mrs. Nixon, President Nixon’s wife, Cardinal Cooke, Senators
Goodell and Javits, and Mayor Lindsay (Melbourne, 1973). Mrs. Nixon’s participation in this
fundraising drive was “expressive of the President-elect’s attitude toward the war” (Melbourne,
1973, p. 38).
Heerten and Moses (2014) concluded that “the war was the ﬁrst postcolonial conﬂict to
engender a transnational wave of humanitarian concern” (p. 176). Many organizations offered
direct or on-the-ground humanitarian assistance to Biafra. The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) played a vital role in mobilizing donations and coordinating humanitarian
work in both Nigeria and Biafra. Field personnel working under ICRC coordination at the end of
December 1968 included 375 persons, of whom 257 were in Nigeria, 65 in the secessionist
province of Biafra, and 53 at Santa Isabel which is the present-day Malabo, capital of Equatorial
Guinea, located on the island of Bioko (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1969). These
field humanitarian workers were members of various humanitarian organizations from different
countries.
Organizations that participated under the ICRC coordination included Austrian Red
Cross, Danish Red Cross, Netherlands Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, French Red Cross, ICRC,
Irish Red Cross, Italian Red Cross, Nigerian Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, Swedish Red
Cross, Swiss Red Cross, American Red Cross, German Red Cross, Adventists, Catholic Relief
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Service, Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, Oxfam, Quakers, Roman Catholic Church Mission,
Save the Children Fund, IUCW/Retdda Barnen, UNICEF, World Council of Churches, and
others (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1969).
The ICRC coalition organizations whose relief workers were in the Biafran territory at
this time are the Swedish Red Cross (29 workers), the French Red Cross (13 workers), ICRC (12
workers), Adventists (5 workers), Oxfam (2 workers), World Council of Churches (2 workers),
and IUCW/Retdda Barnen (1 worker). The rest were either in the Nigerian held territories or in
Santa Isabel, Equatorial Guinea. The fact that a larger number of ICRC coalition workers, 257,
were in Nigeria and only 65 in Biafran held territories is an indication that their relief work in
Biafra was restricted by the federal government of Nigeria (Melbourne, 1973).
Food and medical supplies were distributed by the ICRC both in Nigerian and Biafran
territories. While it was possible to ship these to Calabar, Port Harcourt, Enugu and other
Nigerian locations by sea and train, airlift established by the ICRC on September 3, 1968 was
used to deliver relief and medical supplies at night to Biafran airfields, at Uli and Uturu from
Fernando Po, present-day Bioko in Equatorial Guinea (Melbourne, 1973; International
Committee of the Red Cross, 1969). These flights were made despite the opposition of the
federal military government of Nigeria (Melbourne, 1973).
“By the morning of December 20 [1968] the aircraft in ICRC service had performed 643
flights and carried 6,038 tons of relief and medical supplies” (International Committee of the
Red Cross, 1969, p. 3). With these supplies, about 850,000 people, most of them children, were
fed daily on the Biafran side while on the Nigerian side, 800,000 people received food daily
(International Committee of the Red Cross, 1969). To cover the cost of these medical and food
supplies, the ICRC’s budget from November 1968 to the end of February 1969 was about 132
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million Swiss francs (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1969). A list of organizations
and governments that donated to the ICRC for this cause is found in the ICRC’s (1969) Report
No. 94, International Review of the Red Cross.
Toward the end of 1968, however, the ICRC’s airlift from Fernando Po in Equatorial
Guinea was interrupted by Equatorial Guinean authorities. This made the ICRC coordinator to
initiate airlift operation from Libreville, Gabon (Desgrandchamps, 2012). According to
Desgrandchamps (2012), “this was totally unacceptable to the Nigerian government, given that
Gabon had recognized Biafra and that from its capital not only relief but above all arms made
their way to Biafra” (p. 1419). To resolve this issue, part of the airlift operations was moved to
Dahomey, present-day Benin Republic (Desgrandchamps, 2012).
The ICRC stopped its airlift operation in the summer of 1969 due to a loss of legitimacy
and a revoke of “its role as operations coordinator in Nigeria” (Desgrandchamps, 2012, p. 1420).
Other authors like Anthony (2014) argued that the suspension of ICRC relief airlift in 1969
happened “after Nigeria downed an ICRC plane over Biafra” (p. 216).
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Melbourne (1973) affirmed, “played a
minor role in the relief program, and by autumn it had contracted to use two helicopters to fly
supplies through federal areas” (p. 35). Other humanitarian organizations that intervened
primarily in Biafra include Caritas Internationalis represented by the Irish Fathers who were
instrumental in the founding of Joint Church Aid, Concern Worldwide, Comité de Lutte contre le
Génocide au Biafra, and so on. Some of these humanitarian organizations – for example,
Concern Worldwide, Joint Church Aid, and Comité de Lutte contre le Génocide au Biafra – were
created as a response to the increased sufferings of the Biafran people, especially at a time when
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the ICRC was perceived as being complicit due to its apolitical, neutral position on the atrocities
committed against Biafran civilians by the Nigerian forces.
Concern Worldwide was founded in 1968 by a group of Irish people in order to offer
humanitarian support to alleviate the effect of famine and starvation. These people “sparked a
grassroots movement that raised millions of dollars, and delivered thousands of tons of essential
food and relief supplies, circumventing a military blockade, and saving countless lives” (Concern
Worldwide US, n.d., para. 1).
Joint Church Aid (or “Jesus Christ Airline” as it was often called) was formed through
the collaborative efforts of many religious/faith-based groups from over thirty three countries. Its
principal initiator was an Irish priest from the Congregation of the Holy Spirit also known as
Holy Ghost Fathers, Fr. Tony Byrne CSSp who later authored “Airlift to Biafra: Breaching the
Blockade” (1997).
In the United States, Joint Church Aid was made up of faith groups such as Catholic
Relief Services, Protestant National Council of Churches, and the American Jewish Committee
(Melbourne, 1973). According to Melbourne (1973), Joint Church Aid was “the bulwark of the
American private relief drive” (p. 36). Joint Church Aid was known among other things for
successfully organizing series of independent night airlift of relief supplies, including food and
medicine, flying to the Uli airport in Biafra starting from the island of Sao Tome despite the
blockade imposed on Biafra and the opposition of the federal government of Nigeria
(Melbourne, 1973; Diamond, 2007). According to the Congregation of the Holy Spirit (2014,
May 7), Joint Church Aid “flew 5,314 extremely dangerous missions, carrying 60,000 tons of
humanitarian aid and saved millions of lives” (para. 1).
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The Comité de Lutte contre le Génocide au Biafra was founded by a group of young
French doctors led by Dr. Max Recamier and Dr. Bernard Kouchner who had volunteered with
the ICRC to work in Biafran hospitals. Due to the neutrality stance of the Red Cross even as
hospitals, healthcare workers, and civilians were constantly attacked and killed, and thousands of
children were dying daily as a result of enforced starvation policy against Biafra, these aggrieved
doctors saw the silence of the Red Cross over the atrocities committed by the Nigerian forces as
complicit with the Nigerian government. Melbourne (1973) also noted that “the Biafrans
resented the apolitical stance of the ICRC in its work” (p. 35).
Recamier and Kouchner believed the world needed to know about the events they were
witnessing: civilians being murdered and starved by blockading forces. They openly
criticized the Nigerian government and the Red Cross for their seemingly complicit
behavior. (Médecins Sans Frontières, n.d.)
In protest, the young doctors decided to quit the Red Cross and created the Comité de Lutte
contre le Génocide au Biafra, which in 1971 gave birth to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
known in English as Doctors Without Borders (Heerten and Moses 2014).
The French President, de Gaulle, was also moved by the indiscriminate bombings and
attacks on Biafran civilians. From May 1968, he committed to offering humanitarian support to
Biafra. According to Griffin (2015),
the Quai d’Orsay was instructed to release two million francs to buy medicines and fund
their delivery to Biafra, and de Gaulle added 30,000 francs from his own personal fund
on 8 May 1968. The only condition was that the medical aid had to go by way of the
French Red Cross, and not the International Red Cross, which de Gaulle said was
incompetent. (p. 124)
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Concerned about the sporadic bombings against civilians by the federal Nigerian troops, “the
French government made another concerted effort to raise public awareness and funds for
humanitarian efforts in March 1969, with a ‘Biafra Week’, from 11–17 March 1969” (Le Monde,
1969, March 11, as cited in Griffin, 2015, p. 127). Money raised from this week of fundraising
was donated to the French Red Cross to supply humanitarian aid to Biafra.
Israel also accompanied its limited military aid to Biafra with substantial amount of relief
supplies. “On 17 and 22 July 1968, the Knesset conducted lengthy debates on both the
government’s diplomatic stance and moral responsibility regarding the ‘prevention of genocide’”
(Levey, 2014, p. 270) in Biafra. The sympathy shown by parliamentarians toward Biafra as well
as the Israeli public support for Biafra resulted in sending humanitarian relief to Biafra. In
addition, Israel sent a team of medical experts who “worked in Biafra from September to
December 1968” (Levey, 2014, pp. 271-272). As noted above, “from July 1968 to January 1970
Israel provided aid in various forms worth $73,750,110 in addition to two transfers of $100,000,
to which Bar-On had made separate reference” (Levey, 2014, p. 275).
Similarly, many international committees were formed in different countries to help
galvanize and mobilize support for the Biafran people. According to G. W. S. (1968), “a very
powerful pro-Biafran political force developed in Canada. This… spilled over into the United
States, where a number of skillful organizers launched the North American Coalition for Biafran
Relief” (p. 2). Nigerian students who were studying in the United States universities in 1968,
about 1,790 most of whom were Igbos, played a pivotal role in enkindling pro-Biafra sympathy
and activism in the United States (Melbourne, 1973). Diamond (2007) noted that “the Igbo
accounted for more than two-thirds of the Nigerian students in this country [United States]. The
typical Igbo student was proudly financed by his local hamlet and considered a national
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resource” (p. 348). It is also possible that the Biafran delegation that visited the United States in
late 1968 which included Chinua Achebe, Cyprian Ekwensi, and Gabriel Okara “as part of an
extensive university tour to bring the story of Biafra” (Achebe, 2012, p. 167), played an
important role in generating support for Biafra. In addition, former Peace Corps service members
and Catholic missionaries, particularly Irish priests, who had worked in Eastern Nigeria, were
very instrumental in generating American support for the Biafran cause.
One of the most influential committees formed to mobilize support for Biafra is the
American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive. Initiated by three former Peace Corps volunteers
along with a British student, the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive was very
instrumental in sensitizing the American public through a city-wide demonstrations and
campaigns about the precarious situation in Biafra and also lobbied and put pressure on the U.S.
government to move beyond its neutrality stance to offering humanitarian assistance to the
Biafran people (Melbourne, 1973). Members of the committee “urged Congress to view Biafra
as ‘a test case for humanity’” (Levey, 2014, p. 273).
Melbourne (1973) examined how the relief drive for Biafra generated pressure that would
have resulted in a change in American policy of neutrality toward the war. The strong public
support for humanitarian aid to Biafra, Melbourne (1973) noted, was in part caused by the
intervention of many foreign powers in the conflict. In order to save the lives of the Biafran
civilians, the U.S. government decided to support “humanitarian efforts to bring relief to starving
civilians” (G. W. S., 1968, p. 1). Hansen and Aronson (1995) argued that pressures mounted by
the public such as those by the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive resulted in the U.S.
shift from its neutral position to a covert humanitarian support and latter to an open relief
assistance for Biafra.
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According to Melbourne (1973), “an Agency for International Development relief
program was authorized in March, and by June the Agency announced the shipment of $1.1
million in food aid and a $100,000 contribution through the American Red Cross” (p. 34).
Through their efforts, and with the support of the U.S. government, “the US share of
international relief to Biafra reached $112 million; 44.6 per cent of the total of $251 million. US
public resources provided $57.6 million; that was 34 per cent of international humanitarian
assistance during that war, most of the American aid provided beginning in late 1968” (Levey,
2014, p. 273). Based on Ogunbadejo’s (1976) assessment, the U.S. was “the largest contributor
to the relief efforts” (p. 19). These contributions were used to help “about 850,000 civilians in
the federal-held area and about 1,500,000 in Biafran territory” (Melbourne, 1973, p. 41).
Motivated by the sufferings of the Biafran people, Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) stated
that “these several agencies (Joint Church Aid, Caritas, Nordic Red Cross and others) accepted
Ojukwu’s every condition while refusing to abide by those set by the Lagos government, arguing
raison du guerre” (p. 3). It is true that the only way to send relief supplies to Biafra was by nighttime airlift since Gowon and Ojukwu were not able to reach a resolution over a safe corridor to
transport relief supplies and medicines to Biafran held territories and given that the Biafran
enclave was surrounded by the Nigerian forces. Nonetheless, and as Melbourne (1973) argued,
“relief was being flown in at night in violation of Nigerian sovereignty” (p. 34).
Although their ultimate goal was relief assistance to Biafra, it has been posited that some
of the relief organizations indirectly financed Biafran arms purchase as well as helped transport
them to Biafra (Melbourne, 1973; Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970). This was confirmed by Griffin’s
(2015) research who stated that “humanitarian aid provided a very effective cover for the secret
French arms shipments, which began to increase” (p. 125).
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Jim Townsend’s (2007) autobiography described how, from 1967, he and his colleagues
at Air Trans Africa, including Jack Mallock, flew many goods, currency and arms to Biafra from
Portugal, Ivory Coast, South Africa and Gabon. From January 17, 1968 until September 17,
1968, Jim Townsend and his Flight Engineer colleague, Bill Brown, were hired by Hank
Wharton, an American who operated clandestine, mercenary flights to Port Harcourt and Uli,
Ihiala in Biafra from Lisbon, Portugal through Guinea Bissau and São Tomé. In collaboration
with another flight engineer from South Africa, Captain Peitrie who also worked for Hank
Wharton, Jim Townsend was able to successfully deliver goods, arms, currency notes, and many
other supplies to Biafra until his colleague, Bill Brown from Rhodesia (a former region in South
Africa), was killed after his aircraft crashed in Ihiala where the Biafran secret airport was
located. Although Jim Townsend stopped flying for Hank Wharton on September 17, 1968, he
continued his mercenary flight operations in Biafra until the end of the war in 1970 with Jack
Mallock’s Air Trans Africa.
Melbourne (1973) opined that:
merely adding shipments such as those of the Catholic international relief agency,
Caritas, to the arms lift created a crucial, lasting Nigerian suspicion that food and
ammunition were aboard the same planes. Later, and with other carriers, a rigid
distinction was made, but the past was not easily dismissed by the Nigerians since arms
and relief flights were received at the same landing field. (p. 34)
Uphoff and Ottemoeller’s (1970) description of how relief organizations indirectly supported
Biafra financially and militarily is intriguing.
When space was available on food planes, Biafra was allowed to send uninspected
freight. Moreover these planes paid landing fees to the Biafran government for the
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privilege of flying in food. This went into Biafra’s Swiss bank accounts in hard currency
and financed the acquisition of war material. When relief agencies wanted to buy food
produced locally, they had to buy it from the Biafran government at prices much higher
than those paid in Biafran currency to Biafran producers by the government. (Uphoff &
Ottemoeller, 1970, pp. 3-4)
Relief supplies, although “tragically inadequate” (Diamond, 2007, p. 342), were
distributed to the Biafran people in different locations and camps up to the village level. During a
recent conversation I had with my older sister, Chioma B. Ugorji, who was six years old in 1970,
I came to learn that my father, Bernard W. Ugorji, was conscripted into the Biafran army and
later exempted from military service due to his other responsibilities as a school teacher. He was
also in-charge of a feeding station in his home town, Umuosi in Ntigha Uzo, in today’s Isiala
Ngwa South local government area of Abia state. Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) corroborated
this fact and opined that “dispersed feeding stations were set up… and where Igbos crossed over
into what had been Federally-held territory, they were able to get food in greater quantities” (p.
4). Some federal soldiers also collaborated with relief workers in feeding Igbo refugees who
crossed over to the federally held territories (Uphoff & Ottemoeller, 1970).
These were heroic actions by some of these federal soldiers given that starving Biafrans
to submission was a strategic policy the federal government of Nigeria adopted during the war.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Federal Minister of Finance, had announced in I968 that
“starvation is a legitimate weapon of war, and we have every intention to use it against the
rebels” (Oguibe, 1998, p. 95). This starvation policy was reechoed by Chief Anthony Enahoro,
Federal Commissioner of Information, in an official communiqué issued in July 1968 which
stated: “Some may say it [mass starvation] is a legitimate aspect of war” (Bartrop, 2012, as cited
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in Njoku, 2013, p. 719). Another source quoted Chief Enahoro saying that “there are various
ways of fighting a war. You might starve your enemy into submission, or you might kill him on
the battlefield” (Daily Mirror, 1968, June 13, as cited in Anthony, 2014, p. 217). Probably, these
statements prompted Nwachuku (1998) and many others to conclude that “the Nigerian military
government regarded starvation as a legitimate weapon of war and, therefore, frowned on any
measure by any country to abate starvation in Biafra” (p. 580).
As previously stated, there were millions of Biafran people, especially children and
women, who were not lucky to have constant access to relief supplies. About one million
children died as a result of the federal government’s starvation policy or what G. W. S. (1968)
called “a starve them into submission policy” (p. 2). According to this author, “the loss of life…
is not due so much to the fighting as to starvation” (G. W. S., 1968, p. 2).
Also, the prolongation of the war by Biafra emboldened by foreign relief aid and arms
supplies from France contributed to the deterioration of the grisly situation, leading to a higher
death toll and destruction (G. W. S., 1968). Oguibe (1998) stated that:
in October of I968, the International Red Cross reported a death toll of six thousand
Biafrans a day, most of them civilians. By December, the Red Cross counted ten
thousand deaths a day in unoccupied Biafra, and four thousand in Biafran territory under
Nigerian occupation, making a total of fourteen thousand deaths a day (p. 95).
These figures, although they are just estimates, need to be verified and more research
should be devoted to a statistical representation of daily death toll caused by starvation.
Nonetheless, other authors moderately estimated that “as many as 3,000 Igbos were dying daily
of starvation” (Mustafa, 1969, p.143). Among these dead people were Biafran soldiers. In a
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recent interview, Christopher Ejike Ago, a Biafran veteran, “remembers the overpowering
hunger that often forced Biafran soldiers to catch and eat mice” (Nwaubani, 2020, January 15).
In addition to the deaths of Biafran civilians, there were reports that planes carrying relief
supplies to Biafra were “inadvertently shot down by the federal air force which keeps a vigil over
the Uli airstrip to prevent the landing of aircraft carrying arms to Biafra” (Mustafa, 1969, p.143).
Smith (2014) also opined that relief planes and humanitarian workers were often targeted in
order to enforce a total blockade on Biafra. About four Red Cross workers were killed in the
process of delivering relief supplies and medicine to Biafra (Smith, 2014). Joint Church Aid, for
example, “lost 25 pilots and crew to the guns and bombs of the Nigerian forces intent on
enforcing the Biafran blockade… Thirteen of the amateur pilots — many of them priests — lost
their lives during a mission that was officially illegal, but had the blessings of the Pope”
(Congregation of the Holy Spirit, 2014, May 7, para. 3).
Jim Townsend’s (2007) autobiography revealed how dangerous it was to land and take
off from Biafran clandestine airways in Port Harcourt, Uli and Ihiala. Landing and taking off
were always done in the dark for fear of the Nigerian MIG fighters. Only pilots experienced in
mercenary or clandestine operations who are risktakers can fly in these situations. Even with all
the precautions they took and strict procedures they followed, some planes crashed resulting in
the death of some pilots and crew members.
There were also claims that the Nigerian fighters shot some planes down after takeoff. An
example is the one witnessed by Townsend (2007) involving “a Red Cross DC-7C [piloted by a
Swedish Captain] that got shot down just before the coast” (para. 50). Probably if the Nigerians
had known it was a Red Cross plane on a humanitarian mission, they would not have shot it
down. But being that everything happened in the night, and every plane flying into Biafra was
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suspected by the Nigerians, the only way to evade the Nigerian fighters was to follow the
clandestine procedures while landing and taking off.
Townsend (2007) presented his eyewitness account as follows:
I spoke to a Swedish Red Cross DC7 Captain in Uli and advised him of our procedures,
but it went against deaf ears. He would not believe that the Nigerian MIGs would shoot
down a Red Cross airplane. How he expected them to specifically identify a Red Cross
aircraft at night was obviously known to him but not the Nigerian pilots. I watched him
take off, and as expected, left all of his lights ON and kept on METO power which lights
up the night skies from the substantial exhaust flames. The airplane disappeared between
Uli and the Biafran coastline. We believe that a MIG got him. (paras. 51-52)
For the Biafrans, the town of Uli in the present day Anambra state symbolizes Igbo spirit
of ingenuity, what Yakubu Gowon later called “the inventiveness of the Igbo people from the
East” (Gowon, 2015, p. 1). As Gowon (2015) stated, “Uli was the hub of aviation activities in
war-time Eastern Nigeria” (p. 1). Uli not only served as a port of entry for relief supplies, it also
made the economic viability of the Biafran government possible.
Economic Change and Impact
Following the end of the Nigeria-Biafra War in 1970, Nafziger (1972) studied the
economic impact of the Nigeria-Biafra War and examined the correlation between the political
upheavals before and during the war and economic change. Nafziger’s (1972) research revealed
that “growth in real G.D.P. declined from 6.I percent per annum from the fiscal years (beginning
I April) 1958 to 1965, to 2.6 percent from 1965 to 1966, to – 4.8 percent in 1967 and – 0.2
percent in 1968” (p. 227).
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Many factors were responsible for this decline in economic growth. These include but not
limited to reduction in foreign and domestic investment as a result of political and security
instability; drop in oil production in the east; decline in domestic manufacturing; trading,
transportation and migration disruption; drastic reduction of human and financial capital; and so
on (Nafziger, 1972). Also, both the federal government and Biafra’s “financial policy was
directed towards the goals of raising sufficient funds for financing the war” (Nafziger, 1972, p.
229), while the other sectors saw a decrease in government spending.
It is true that the Nigeria-Biafra War affected many sectors of the Nigerian economy, but
its effects, according to Nafziger (1972), were largely felt in the following sectors: oil production
and export, manufacturing, transportation, domestic trade, and agriculture. The immediate and
long-term impact of these deficiencies were visible during and after the war. The cost of food
and other consumer commodities were exorbitant, especially in Biafran held territories and some
parts of the mid-west. Nafziger (1972) noted that even in federal territories, “food prices rose by
15 percent in 1969 and by 21 percent in I970” (Nafziger, 1972, p. 229). Unemployment was at
its peak during and after the war in Biafra while within the federation, jobs vacated by the Igbos
went to Nigerians from other ethnic groups.
Another factor that stymied Biafra’s ability to engage in free international trade during
the war was the federal government’s sudden policy change in foreign exchange. Nafziger
(1972) affirmed that “at the time of Biafran secession, Nigeria instituted a requirement that prior
official permission be received for all foreign payments - a measure that… hampered the
international use of Nigerian currency by the Biafrans” (p. 232). Because this policy was difficult
to enforce, the Nigerian authorities abruptly changed their currency banknotes in early 1968 and
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imposed stricter restrictions on foreign transactions and importations later that year (Nafziger,
1972).
The exact amount Biafra had in reserve before the change of currency notes is unknown.
Owen (2009) stated that the estimated amount Biafra had at this time was £37 million. Other
scholars like Nafziger (1972) had asserted that “Biafra had relatively substantial financial
reserves at the time of secession… Biafra was able to finance the purchase of armaments and
supplies to fight the initial campaign in what it expected to be a short war of independence” (p.
240).
With this change of currency, coupled with the federal government’s blockade on Biafra
as well as a complete drop in revenues from oil production, Biafrans were no longer able to
receive foreign currency in exchange for the Nigerian money they had in reserve. Owen (2009)
revealed that “a substantial amount of wealth was lost by citizens of the region under Biafran
rule simply through currency transactions - in the first instance, as the secessionary authorities
were forced to accept only around 60 per cent of the value of their original holdings of Nigerian
currency” (p. 577).
This motivated the Biafrans to create a currency of their own. It has been opined by
numismatologist Peter Symes (1997, as cited in Owen, 2009) that “the first series of Biafran
notes was printed in Portugal, while the second may have originated in Switzerland, both
locations where Biafran external affairs operations were based during the conflict” (p. 576). The
governor of the Central Bank of Biafra which was created after secession was an economist
named Dr. Sylvester Ugoh (Achebe, 2012). However, since the Biafran currency in circulation
was limited and was not accepted outside Biafra, it has been revealed by Achebe (2012) that the
Biafran government “used private bank accounts of wealthy Biafrans to perform transactions
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abroad” (p. 150). More research is needed to understand who these former Biafrans were and
under what terms their private bank accounts were used by Biafra in foreign transactions.
Nafziger (1972) affirmed that the federal military government monetary restrictions on
Biafra “together with the loss of import demand from the East, resulted in a decrease in imports
by 12 per cent in I967, and an additional 15 per cent in 1968 - a reduction concentrated primarily
in consumer goods” (p. 233). As previously noted, the outcome of these strict measures was food
scarcity and famine in Biafra which in turn resulted in starvation and the death of millions of
Biafrans, especially children and women.
To overcome this ugly situation and sustain Biafra war efforts, Biafran leaders resorted to
foreign aid, including arms supplied by France in the last quarter of 1968, assistance received
from relief and humanitarian organizations, and financial donations from Igbos and their
sympathizers in diaspora. Although the federal government of Nigeria “probably spent 5-10
times as much foreign exchange for direct defense expenditures in 1968 as Biafra” (Nafziger,
1972, p. 241), it took almost two more years for Biafra to surrender. This could be explained in
part by the unyielding resolve of Biafran soldiers to fight to the end, coupled with their ingenuity
and innovative techniques during combat.
The Nigeria-Biafra War was not only devastating, it was also costly in economic terms
for the federal government of Nigeria. Nafziger (1972) estimated that “the total military
expenditure by the Nigerian Government during the war was £N300 million from September
1967 until March 1969, a cost of £N270 million above the ‘normal peace- time’ level and equal
to more than one-tenth of the GDP for that period” (p. 242). Damages done to physical assets by
the end of 1968 amounted to £N250 million (Nafziger, 1972).

259
When combined with losses in export earnings, drop in government revenue, and the
economic impact of population decrease as a result of deaths and displacements, the cost of the
war becomes regrettably enormous (Nafziger, 1972). This is why at the end of the war in 1970,
the federal military government of Nigeria faced a gigantic challenge with its post-war
reconstruction programs.
Post-War Reconstruction Challenges: Irony of Gowon’s Policy of “No Victor, No
Vanquished”
At the end of the war Biafrans surrendered to the federal military government of Nigeria
at Dodan Barracks in Lagos, officially declared the end of Biafra, and pledged their commitment
and allegiance to One Nigeria. Although fighting ended on January 12, 1970, the war officially
ended on January 15, 1970 with the Biafran surrender. On this day, Major General Phillip
Effiong, who was the Chief of General Staff of Biafra before General Ojukwu fled to Ivory
Coast paving the way for him to become the acting Head of State from January 8, 1970 until
January 12, 1970, led a delegation of Biafran officers to Lagos to officially announce the
surrender and loyalty of Biafra to the federal military government of Nigeria. Achebe (2012)
revealed that Louis Mbanefo, M. T. Mbu, and Colonel David Ogunewe were also part of the
Biafran delegation to the Dodan Barracks in Lagos. Representing the Nigerian military
government during this official surrender of Biafra were:
General Yakubu Gowon; the deputy chairman of the Supreme Military Council, Obafemi
Awolowo; leaders of the various branches of the armed forces, including Brigadier
Hassan Katsina, chief of staff; H. E. A. Ejueyitchie, the secretary to the federal military
government; Anthony Enahoro, the commissioner for information; Taslim Elias, the
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attorney general; and the twelve military governors of the federation. (Achebe, 2012, p.
227)
Mr. Ntieyong Udo Akpan, who served as the Chief Secretary of the Government and
Head of the Civil Service of Eastern Nigeria, stated that since he was unwilling to pay the final
price with his life as the Biafran secessionist leader, “Ojukwu’s final departure just before the
war ended, albeit self-seeking, ultimately served for the good of war-weary Biafrans” (Akpan,
2013, as cited in Effiong, 2017, para. 31). After his acceptance of the instrument of surrender
from the Biafran leadership, the Nigerian military head of state, General Yakubu Gowon,
announced to the world his postwar policies which were encapsulated in “The Dawn of National
Reconciliation,” his victory radio broadcast to the nation marking the official end of the 30month long Nigeria-Biafra War (Gowon, 1970, as cited in Kirk-Greene, 1971).
Reflecting on his postwar reconstruction policies after the surrender of Biafra on January
15, 1970, Gowon (2015) stated: “I was mindful that my place in history would be determined by
how well or badly we tackled the immediate challenges of a young nation that had just emerged
from the ravages of war” (Gowon, 2015, p. 6). The greatest challenge that the Gowon
administration faced was how to reintegrate former Biafrans into Nigeria without punishment or
reprisals and at the same time repair war-time damages (Nafziger, 1972).
Driven by what seemed to be a spirit of magnanimity at the time, General Gowon refused
to claim victory. He declared that there was “no victor, no vanquished.” Translating his “no
victor, no vanquished” philosophy into practice, Gowon initiated a set of projects popularly
known as the 3Rs: reconciliation, (reintegration) rehabilitation and reconstruction. By these
postwar policies, the federal military government “guaranteed the personal safety and security of
the Igbo and their properties; the right to reside and work anywhere in Nigeria; the reabsorption
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of public civil servants of Igbo ethnic extraction into the civil service and the military; and the
granting of general amnesty to the Igbo” (Onuoha, 2013b, p. 2188).
In his reflection on these postwar reconciliation projects, Gowon (2015) asserted:
rather than bask in the euphoria of perceived victory, we chose to travel down a road
never before traveled by any nation in the history of wars in the world. We decided that
there was no gain in accumulating the spoils of war. Instead, we chose to face our most
challenging task of achieving reconciliation, national reintegration within the shortest
possible time. That worldview made it possible for us to quickly and deliberately
administer healing balm to take care of hurts and wounds. It underscored our philosophy
of No Victor, No Vanquished which I pronounced in my speech to the nation after we
silenced the guns and rolled up our sleeves as we set our hands on the plough to rebuild
Nigeria. Our search for solutions to the problems of the aftermath of war and destruction
made it imperative that we established a set of guiding principles as anchors for our
determined forward march. This was the basis of our introduction of the 3Rs....Reconciliation, (Reintegration) Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, which we must
understand did not just try to rapidly address issues of immediate socio-economic and
infrastructural concerns but vividly underpinned my vision of the future; a vision of a
greater, united Nigeria in which anyone, from the East, West, North and South could
aspire to succeed in any field of human endeavor. (p. 6)
In addition to the 3Rs: reconciliation, (reintegration) rehabilitation and reconstruction, the
Gowon administration created the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) on July 2, 1973
(Maiangwa, 2016; Gowon, 2015). Recent graduates were mandated to serve their nation for a
period of one year in any institution located outside their home state. This program served as a
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vehicle for promoting patriotism, unity in diversity, intercultural education, interethnic
understanding, and national integration and cohesion with the aim of fostering and deepening
national reconciliation (Gowon, 2015) and reducing out-group hostility and prejudice
(Maiangwa, 2016). The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) is still going on in Nigeria.
Another important postwar reconciliation event that took place was the in-person meeting
of the two leaders, General Gowon and General Ojukwu, in the late 1970s in London (Gowon,
2015). This meeting took place when Gowon was in exile in the UK after he was overthrown in a
military coup on July 29, 1975 in which Brigadier Murtala Muhammad emerged as the new head
of state. Prior to this meeting with Ojukwu in London, it should be noted that Gowon had made
an official reconciliatory visit in early 1971 to the East Central State, the heartland of the Igbos
(Herskovits, 1973).
The highlights of this reconciliatory meeting was narrated by Gowon (2015) who stated:
let me begin by quickly dousing speculations that my late brother and friend, the Ikemba
of Nnewi and I probably continued our ‘fight’ until his death in the UK on November 26,
2011. We achieved reconciliation several decades, about four (4) decades ago when we
had our first post-Civil War physical meeting in the late 1970s in his room at the Mont
Calm Hotel, Marble Arch in London. Before then, he had reached out to me through his
friend, Frederick Forsyth, who rang the house and spoke to my wife, for him. He then
spoke to her and she later informed me at Warwick University where I was pursuing my
graduate/postgraduate degree program at the time. When I was back home at the
weekend, I called him and arranged to meet. We eventually met at the Mont Calm Hotel,
Mable Arch, London. I recall our first meeting was a spontaneous first name call by both
of us - Emeka! Jack! Nice meeting you again. We shook hands and embraced each other
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warmly and engaged in heart to heart discussion, reminiscing on the past and expressing
hope that we could soon return and join forces with our compatriots back home to build a
better Nigeria. He soon did, joining the political foray, and I followed later after
completing my studies. (Gowon, 2015, p. 1)
At the age of 80 years old, Gowon revealed in 2015 his only regret about his postwar
reconciliation with Ojukwu. Gowon stated:
the only regret I have is that I did not make an effort to draft Emeka into our Nigeria
Prays ministry to join me and many others in praying for Nigeria. Who knows whether
with his experience of the horrors of the civil war and the powers of prayer we would not
have sooner been saved the scourge of the violence, bombing, kidnappings and mayhem
being lately experienced in the nation. (Gowon, 2015, p. 8)
It is heartbreaking and disappointing that even at the age of 80 years old the only regret
Gowon has shown is his failure to include Ojukwu in his Nigeria Prays ministry. It is true that
reconstruction and reconciliation efforts were made immediately after the war, as Gowon himself
pointed out that “communities across the nation can only complain of not getting enough, not of
having been abandoned” (Gowon, 2015, p. 6). However, in addition to the poorly implemented
reconstruction projects, the core philosophy or principle of ‘no victor, no vanquished’ on which
the 3Rs were based has been identified by many scholars and analysts as the root cause of the
failure of the postwar national reconciliation (Onuoha, 2013b).
As discussed in the next section on repression and the establishment of a dominant
narrative, the ‘no victor, no vanquished’ policy officially committed all the war-time atrocities to
oblivion, indirectly or directly exonerated the perpetrators from their barbaric crimes, denied the
survivors and victims access to the truth about what happened, and prevented justice, reparation,
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healing and closure from taking place. It was an official code of silence against the survivors of
the 1966 pogroms as well as the victims and survivors of the 30-month war-time atrocities and
massacres. In short, it was an institutionalized silence that coerced both the returning Biafrans
and Nigerians to behave as if nothing had happened - as if everything that happened from 1966
to 1970 was only a nightmare that needed not to be remembered, discussed and addressed. As
many Nigerians and former Biafrans pointed out after the war, Gowon’s government was “a
military government, and so we have to keep quiet” (Herskovits, 1973, p. 405).
In this official silence, it was practically impossible for many returning Biafrans,
especially the Igbos who had abandoned their jobs and fled to Eastern Nigeria before the war, to
regain those jobs either within the government or in the private sector. After the war, the Igbos,
Uphoff and Ottemoeller (1970) stated, were “more dispensable as well as less desirable; the rest
of Nigeria’s people have developed new skills during the absence of Igbo personnel” (p. 3).
According to Nafziger (1973), “the Yorubas and other communities who remained loyal to the
Federation were able to move into some of the positions vacated by Igbos” (p. 529).
There were, however, some Igbos who were able to regain their jobs in Nigeria both in
the private sector and government offices (Herskovits, 1973). An example is Dan Ibekwe who
was appointed a Supreme Court Justice. Herskovits (1973) wrote about states that hired
experienced Igbo professionals. According to the author,
many state governments rushed to hire Igbo, more and more frequently on permanent
appointments, not short contracts. The Mid-West was the first to reach out to the EastCentral State after the war, but all six states of the old North have joined in, with NorthWest now employing over 300 Igbo, and all are asking for more… Even Lagos State
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government, with its own highly trained Yoruba resources, has hired some Igbo.
(Herskovits, 1973, pp. 398-399)
It has been revealed that some Igbos remained in federal held territories during the war
(Anthony, 2014; Perham, 1970). Some of these Igbos who remained in the federal held
territories, for example Lagos, disguised themselves for fear of being identified as Biafrans. But
there were Igbos who openly supported the federal government of Nigeria and “presented
themselves as Nigerian Igbos. The most visible example—and one of the Federal side’s most
useful weapons in confronting allegations of genocide—was the administrator of the East Central
State, Dr. Ukpabi Asika…from a prominent Onitsha family” (Nikolai Jeffs, 2012, as cited in
Anthony, 2014, p. 221). As Anthony (2014) noted, “Asika was a frequent target in Biafran
rhetoric, which lambasted him as a puppet or traitor” (p. 221).
Perham (1970) noted that some of the Igbos who remained in the federal side, especially
in Lagos, were imprisoned. The author also stated that majority of the Igbos who remained
“continued with their work, from that of house-servants to that of permanent secretaries. An Igbo
academic, Dr. Asika, was in charge of the department set up to prepare for the rehabilitation of
his people” (Perham, 1970, p. 239). That some Igbos remained in Lagos during the war was also
corroborated by Diamond (2007) who affirmed that “during the war the 35,000 Igbo in Lagos
were registered, and reports about their treatment vary. The least that can be said is that they held
very few significant posts in education, industry, etc.” (p. 362).
Nonetheless, Nafziger (1972) emphatically revealed that “autarkic policies limited the
return of Igbo traders and workers to areas outside of Igboland, especially to the neighboring
Rivers State… A military decree of August 1970 gives the Federal and State Governments the
power to dismiss civil servants who participated in the Biafran rebellion” (p. 244). This is
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contrary to Gowon’s (2015) assertion that “there were no reprisals against any group or
individuals just as soldiers quickly dropped their guns to render helping hands to the civilian
populace” (p. 6). This bewildering or labyrinthine claim of Gowon will be revisited later.
Meanwhile, it has become evident that many Biafrans were punished and marginalized
after the war, and the severity of their punishment was based on the role(s) they played during
the war. Biafran civil servants, 55 years old and above, were forced to retire. While some of
them were retired with pension, others were not (Herskovits, 1973). Professional soldiers who
fought on the Biafran side were reintegrated on a case by case basis. Also, about 65 officers were
reabsorbed into the Nigerian army, 32 discharged with full benefits, and 16 discharged without
any benefits (Herskovits, 1973). In addition, the Nigerian military discharged “officers involved
in the January 1966 coup and those central to the invasion of the Mid-West State (approximately
30 men, who were in detention)” (Herskovits, 1973, p. 398).
Meagher (2009) argued that:
while the government policy of ‘no victor, no vanquished’ facilitated relations of ethnic
accommodation for returning Igbo migrants, the lack of state assistance in the process of
reconstruction, combined with disadvantageous policies governing the economic
reintegration of Biafra, crippled Igbo participation within the formal economy,
intensifying their focus on informal systems of economic organization. (p. 37)
One of such economic policies taken by the Nigerian government through its Finance
Minister, Obafemi Awolowo, was to invalidate the Biafran pounds, that is, the Biafran currency
(Onuoha, 2011). The implication of this was that “people found it impossible to buy anything
including food, since the dealers would no longer accept Biafran money” (Udo, 1970, p. 12). In
addition, having frozen the bank accounts belonging to former Biafrans, the federal government
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collected Biafran pounds in circulation (Udo, 1970). In exchange, the federal government began
in June 1970 “to pay only £20 each to those who surrendered their Biafran money” (Udo, 1970,
p. 12). This means that irrespective of one’s savings – billions, millions, hundreds of thousand,
tens of thousands, or less than hundred pounds - each Biafran received only £20 in exchange.
Even with this punitive policy, some Biafrans did not receive the £20 payment. Maiangwa
(2016) stated that “the twenty pound compensation to Igbo was haphazardly done, and very few
Igbos were compensated” (p. 49).
This is how Owen (2009) described this punitive financial policy,
At the end of the war those holding Biafran pounds lost their remaining fortunes almost
overnight, when, in one of the most shameful episodes carried out by one of Nigeria’s
otherwise much-lauded founding fathers, then Finance Minister Obafemi Awolowo
undercut the official war-end Federal policy of ‘no victor, no vanquished’ by refusing to
redeem all Biafran currency holdings for Nigerian pounds as at first indicated, and
instead made a flat disbursement of £20 (Nigerian Pound) to all former Biafrans, no
matter the value of their previous cash holdings and deposits. (p. 577)
This policy was in contradiction to the suggestion made by the United Nations.
According to Dent (1970), there was a “suggestion made by the U.N. observer team for some
limited conversion of rebel currency into Nigerian currency, or alternatively for an issue of an
‘iron ration’ of Nigerian currency to each household in the most depressed areas” (p. 106). There
is no way £20 per former Biafran signifies “an iron ration of the Nigerian currency.”
All these policies resulted in extreme poverty and higher unemployment in the postwar
era, especially among the Igbos. This is because, and as Owen (2009) noted, “the war’s end was
perhaps the time when Biafran currency was in the most widely available supply, with large
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personal and institutional holdings of now-worthless notes in the region (estimates range from
115 to 140 million Biafra pounds), as well as a huge stock of undelivered paper currency
remaining overseas” (p. 577).
Unemployment and sometimes discrimination against the Igbos were worsened by the
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972 known by most Nigerians as Indigenization
Decree (Onuoha, 2011; Herskovits, 1973). The Indigenization Decree, Herskovits (1973) stated:
reserves for Nigerians 22 kinds of business, from advertising through bread-baking,
hairdressing, newspaper publishing and printing, and retail trade (‘except by or within the
departmental stores and supermarkets’) to tire retreading. It restricts participation of
aliens in 33 others, including beer-brewing, construction, some manufacturing, running
travel agencies and wholesale distributing. (Herskovits, 1973, p. 406)
Onuoha (2011) opined that the Indigenization Decree “compelled foreign companies to sell part
of their shares to Nigerians at a time when the Igbo ethnic group had barely recovered from the
effects of the war and were still economically emasculated” (p. 408).
By promulgating the Indigenization Decree in 1972, barely two years after the war when
the Igbos were still economically bankrupt, the Gowon administration inflicted another injury on
the Igbos with long term negative impact on their way to recovery. The timing of the
indigenization of the Nigerian economy was, no doubt, meant to benefit citizens from those
regions that were not impacted by the war – the north and west. Onuoha (2011) also argued that
“the implementation of these policies shifted the balance of power quickly in favor of the two
other dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria” (p. 409) – the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba. These nonIgbos were in a position to raise enough investment capital to take over those businesses from
Europeans, Americans, Asians, people from the Soviet Union, and so on. It was impossible for
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the Igbos whose bank accounts where frozen immediately after the war by the federal military
government of Nigeria (Herskovits, 1973) to compete for the indigenization program with the
Yorubas, Hausa-Fulanis, and other ethnic groups within the federation who enjoyed continuous
economic growth in their regions.
These priviledged groups at the time also benefited more from the Second All African
Games hosted in 1973 and the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture
hosted in 1977 by Nigeria (Onuoha, 2013b). These events, particularly the Festival of Arts and
Culture led to a gigantic infrastructure project with the creation and development of a brand new
city called Festac Town in Lagos. As a teenager in the mid-1990s, I lived in one of the Festac
Town apartment buildings in Lagos originally constructed to host the participants of the Festival
of Arts and Culture.
The only hope some Igbos - those who were living in other regions of the federation
before the war - had was their abandoned property. Igbos who abandoned their property in other
regions of the federation as a result of the war were quick to return to those states to claim their
property. According to Herskovits (1973), some states such as Benue-Plateau and Mid-West
created a commission known as abandoned property authority during the prewar exodus to
document and manage those property abandoned by Eastern Nigerians. In some cases, for
example, in the Mid-West state, rents collected were given back to the Igbo owners of those
property (Herskovits, 1973).
Udo (1970) also posited that:
rents saved up by the local authorities of Kano and other states on the property
abandoned by Igbos in 1966 are now being paid to the owners of these properties and
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many people have noted that northerners are showing a great interest in re-establishing
good relations with southern immigrants including Igbos. (p. 10)
Margery Perham, a British scholar and historian who visited Nigeria in late August 1968 to
observe the war also confirmed that during her meeting with the military governors in Kano and
Jos the abandoned property authority was already in place (Perham, 1970). Perham (1970)
stated: “I saw something of the plans to register all abandoned Igbo housing and to accumulate
the rents paid by the new tenants in the interests of the Igbo owners when they should return”
(Perham, 1970, p. 238).
Due to the bitterness and animosity engendered by the war, since much of the fighting
took place in minority held areas of former Eastern Region, reclaiming abandoned property in
cities such as Port Harcourt was very challenging. For the most part, it was impossible for the
Igbos to reclaim their abandoned property in Port Harcourt, Rivers state capital, although “over
95 percent of the individually owned property belonged to Igbo” (Herskovits, 1973, pp. 399400). Udo (1970) also revealed that Port Harcourt “had a predominantly Igbo population up to
1967. Its economy was controlled by the Igbos who also provided most of the labor force and
owned most of the residential houses in the city (p. 10).
In order to aid the rehabilitation of traumatized Igbo families, Igbos who owned
abandoned property in Port Harcourt needed the rent desperately. Unfortunately, they were
denied access to the city of Port Harcourt and to their property (Udo, 1970). However, and as
Herskovits (1973) noted, only “a very small percentage of houses [were released] to their
owners” (p. 400). Probably, large percentage of abandoned Igbo property were sold by the
“FMG-instituted Abandoned Properties Implementation Committee (APIC)… at ridiculously
low prices to indigenes” (Nwabueze, 2010 as cited in Onuoha, 2011, p. 408). Justifying Igbo

271
property seizure and takeover by the Rivers people, an official from the state was quoted to have
said that “our government cannot be a tenant, nor can we abdicate; we must control our own land
for our own people” (Herskovits, 1973, p. 400).
Unlike in Port Harcourt where extreme postwar tension occurred between the Igbos and
Rivers state indigenes as a result of the abandoned property seizure, reconciliation was relatively
smooth in some parts of South-East State despite “fierce divisions over secession, and severe war
damage” (Herskovits, 1973, p. 401). An explanation to this hospitable and cordial relationship
between the Igbos and South-East State indigenes could be due to the fact that former Biafrans
from this state were “appointed to a range of government positions, even on the level of
commissioners and senior civil servants” (Herskovits, 1973, p. 401).
Herskovits’ (1973) observation that the Igbos quickly normalized relationship with the
indigenes of the South-East State cannot be said to have occurred everywhere immediately after
the war. Udo (1970) examined “the problems of reconstruction with particular reference to the
Igbo-Ibibio borderlands, an area which suffered the greatest physical destruction during the 30month civil war ending in January 1970” (p. 9). According to Udo (1970), there were growing
anti-Igbo feelings in this territory even though most of the civil service and teaching jobs prior to
the war were occupied by the Igbos. Also, majority of the traders and plantation workers in this
minority territory prior to the war were Igbo. Udo (1970) posited that over 700 thousand Igbos
were living in the former Eastern Region minority areas before the war.
It is time to revisit a pending question that warrants clarification. How accurate is
Gowon’s (2015) assertion that “soldiers quickly dropped their guns to render helping hands to
the civilian populace” (p. 6)? In Herskovits’ (1973) article, “One Nigeria,” an answer to this
question is discernable. Two propositions from the author’s text are relevant here. The one is that
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“in January 1970 the challenge in the East-Central State was most immediate: there was an army
of occupation, and an administrator faced a demoralized, malnourished, defeated people, who
expected the disaster their radios had predicted” (Herskovits, 1973, p. 396). The other is that “the
presence of federal soldiers, after rape and looting of the kind that accompany war’s end
everywhere had stopped, came to be seen as a boost to the economy” (Herskovits, 1973, p. 396).
From these two propositions one can deduce that many women were raped by the federal
soldiers not only during the war, but in the days and weeks following the end of the war in
January 1970. This unfortunate situation was confirmed by Tabori (1971, as cited in Achebe,
2012). According to the author, “the federal troops soon arrived in Okporo and broke our idyllic
village existence. With their arrival came the horrendous stories of nurses and local women
being raped and violated in unthinkable ways” (Achebe, 2012, p. 200). Also, some federal
soldiers were involved in looting and retributive killings. These happened to Biafran civilians
even though the East Central State administrator, Dr. Ukpabi Asika, had informed Gowon, the
head of state, that the Igbos were suffering from “a somnambulist reaction, a kind of vegetable
state, in reaction to sudden defeat” (Herskovits, 1973, p. 396). This somnambulist reaction was
the subject of Oloyede’s (2009) research who concluded that “in the wake of the loss of Biafra,
the assumptive world of the Igbo was shattered” (p. 2).
These unacceptable behaviors described by Dent (1970) as “the indiscipline of the
ordinary soldier, who thinks that victory and the continuance of military government put him
above the law in the newly occupied secessionist areas” (p. 104), can never be characterized as
rendering “helping hands to the civilian populace” as Gowon (2015) asserted. They are heinous
crimes against humanity for which the perpetrators ought to have been prosecuted and punished
if not for Gowon’s code of silence in the guise of his institutionalized general amnesty and his
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policy of “no victor, no vanquished.” Probably, it was due to the barbaric killings perpetrated
against Biafran civilians and the need to commit information about them to oblivion that made
Gowon decide not to give “any sort of war medal or decoration for individual gallantry in the
civil war” (Dent, 1970, p. 103).
Had it not been for the federal government imposed code of silence, policy makers would
have leveraged on the Biafran war-time ingenuity to build an economically prosperous Nigeria.
As Diamond (2007) testified, “Biafrans made their own matches, refined their own oil,
experimented in separating protein from grass, grew new crops, and developed new forms of
communal land tenure” (p. 362). With little or no help, Biafrans manufactured arms and other
military equipment, and built two airports in Uli and Nnokwa. While Nnokwa “was used for
military missions” (Achebe, 2012, p. 192), Uli which was the hub of international relief supplies
became “one of the busiest airports in Africa, with more than 50 flights a night” (Achebe, 2012,
p. 155). According to Diamond (2007), “the airstrip at Uli, for example, was initiated,
maintained, and operated by Biafrans, one of the most extraordinary ground operations in the
history of aviation” (p. 345).
In fact, the Biafrans were outstandingly innovative and inventive during the war. This is
how Diamond (2007) described the Biafran wartime ingenuity.
Approximately half of Biafran arms were manufactured in Biafra by Biafrans, although
this figure varied considerably during the course of the war. In the beginning of the war,
apart from Nigerian army stocks on hand, almost all arms were locally made. There were
no European experts on the scene, and the traditional smiths of Awka proved equal to the
task. Toward the end of the war, the displacement of men and the loss of materials made
the manufacture of arms virtually impossible. Biafra had on hand mines, armor plate,
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short-range mortars, ammunition for an idiosyncratic arsenal, and explosives. Scrap iron
was the major local resource. They manufactured explosives from local stores of
dynamite, supplemented by ingredients purchased in Europe, and built gun-boats for
patrol of the Niger and the Niger basin. They secretly purchased electronic components
from commercial companies in Europe and the United States, copied them wherever
possible, and assembled them locally. (Diamond, 2007, p. 343)
One of the explosives Diamond (2007) referred to was called Ogbunigwe, a Biafran
invented bomb. Achebe (2012) revealed that Ogbunigwe was first developed by a group of
Biafran engineers and technicians, Gordian Ezekwe, Benjamin Chukwuka Nwosu and Willy
Achukwe, and was later adopted by the Biafran Research and Production unit (RAP).
Even General Gowon acknowledged the ingenuity of the Igbos during the war.
According to Gowon (2015),
one needed to step foot on the town that symbolized the inventiveness of our brothers and
sisters, the Igbo people, from the East. Uli was the hub of aviation activities in war-time
Eastern Nigeria and one could only wonder what the horizon would have been had
successive governments after my regime followed our blueprint for the development of
Nigeria, as encapsulated in the abandoned Third National Development Plan 1975 –
1980. (p. 1)
Again, Gowon exonerated himself from the failure of the development projects. Since his
administration had forbidden the use of the Uli airstrip, how could those military dictators that
succeeded him have reinstated its use and developed it? As Diamond (2007) put it, the use of Uli
airstrip was forbidden “perhaps because it is situated in the most devastated area and could serve
as the channel for large-scale, rapid relief where it is most needed” (p. 342). In addition, if, after
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the war, the Gowon administration had not banned aid from countries that sympathized with
Biafra, such as France, Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, as well as those partisan relief
organizations that came to the rescue of Biafra, for example, “Joint Church Aid, the efficient and
humanitarian organization that did its best to supply Biafra with protein food and medicine
during the war” (Diamond, 2007, p. 342), Uli airstrip would have been developed into an
international airport with the Igbo inventiveness and ingenuity, leading to other infrastructural
and technological cum scientific advancements and innovations.
It should be acknowledged that contrary to the fear of being totally isolated, dehumanized
and annihilated, returning Igbos were to a larger extent integrated in the north and west, thanks to
Gowon’s integration policies. To ordinary citizens, normalizing economic or trading relations
was more important and beneficial than political hostilities toward the Igbos. This was because
all the regions depended on one another for their economic survival. Uphoff and Ottemoeller
(1970) observed that:
Igbo traders were going into the North at Oturkpo without incident in 1969. After the
surrender, while front pages of newspapers were full of alarm, business pages reported
that Hausa cattlemen had their herds near the battlelines in readiness to move in once
fighting stopped. They had suffered great losses during the previous three years while the
Igbo market was closed to them. (p. 3)
Dent (1970) who was a colonial administrator in the old Middle Belt Tiv division
narrated his experience when he revisited the area in 1968. According to Dent (1970), “people
complained bitterly to me of unsold surpluses of food crops, and there are now many traders
from these areas only too willing to take food down in their lorries to the East Central state if
they can find a market for it” (p. 105).
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The same was true for Igbo traders and entrepreneurs who returned “in large numbers to
towns in the northern states where the much publicized massacres of 1966 took place” (Udo,
1970, p. 10). It was this mutual dependence that led Meagher (2009) to argue that “Igbo
involvement in the informal economy, which has been intensified by their postwar
marginalization from political and economic power” (p. 34) has contributed in building crosscultural and interethnic linkages from below between the Igbos and other ethnic groups in
Nigeria.
Nonetheless, there were many underprivileged Igbos, especially “the ordinary villager
with no friend to help him” (Dent, 1970, p. 104). No doubt, these were excluded from the
postwar reconstruction projects. As Onuoha (2013b) noted, “the policy of reconciliation turned
out to be unpopular at the grassroots level due to the obvious failures of implementation” (p.
2188). Dent (1970) stated that the poor people at the grassroots level “did not have the means to
buy food, [and] were subject to acute hunger and in danger of dying from starvation” (p. 105).
The exception was that some Igbo farmers who remained in East Central State were
provided with seeds through the help of relief agencies to resume their agricultural work (Udo,
1970). The distribution of these seeds to farmers were however hampered by inadequate
transportation as all bridges were destroyed during the war and many roads were damaged. In
addition, even farmers who eventually began to cultivate their land faced a “risk of death from
mines laid by retreating rebel troops. By the end of March 1970, that is just over two months
after the war, 28 farmers were reported killed or wounded by mines while preparing their land
for cultivation” (Udo, 1970, p. 12). Achebe (2012) also affirmed that in addition to farmlands,
“roads and the rural areas were littered with landmines that continued to maim and kill
unsuspecting pedestrians well after the hostilities ended” (p. 227).
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Another group of Biafrans who did not benefit from the reconstruction projects were
those suffering from mental illness as a result of the war. Caused by their traumatic experiences
of the war, Achebe (2012) revealed the nature of this mental illness epidemic during and after the
war. According to this eyewitness account, many Biafrans suffered “major depression,
psychosis, schizophrenia, manic-depression, personality disorders, grief response, post-traumatic
stress disorder, anxiety disorders, etc.- on a scale none of us [the Biafrans] had ever witnessed”
(Achebe, 2012, p. 195). These mental illness cases were even worse among the veterans on the
Biafran side. No doubt, some veterans of the war from the Nigerian side also had similar forms
of mental illness (Alabi-Isama, 2013). Unfortunately, these mentally ill civilians and war
veterans were neither cared for nor given treatment during or after the war. They were
abandoned to their fate. Achebe (2012) described this ugly situation this way:
One of the saddest images of the war was not just the dead and the physically wounded
but also the mentally scarred, the so-called mad men and women who had been
psychologically devastated by the anguish and myriad pressures of war. They could often
be seen walking seemingly aimlessly on the roads in tattered clothes, in conversation with
themselves. (p. 195)
Faced with these postwar situations, most of the Igbos were driven by their spirit of
resilience and determined to channel their energy and resources to the informal economy as
entrepreneurs. This approach was motivated by the motto: “Happy Survival” – inscribed “on
public buildings and private portals, testifying to the inimitable strength of a people and the
indefatigable resilience of the human spirit” (Oguibe, 1998, p. 97). Although they survived the
30-month brutal and bloody war as well as the mutinies and pogroms that preceded it, both the
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Biafrans and Nigerians were robbed of an opportunity to tell their stories by the repressive code
of silence encrypted in the “no victor, no vanquished” policy of General Gowon.
Repression and the Establishment of a Dominant Narrative
In “The Dawn of National Reconciliation,” Gowon’s speech to the nation at the end of
the war which he delivered on January 15, 1970 (Gowon, 1970, as cited in Kirk-Greene, 1971),
one can easily identify five early indicators of repression and the establishment of a dominant
narrative. These five indicators are critically analyzed and summarized below.
The first is that a ban on the use of the name, Biafra, was imposed, while replacing it with
East Central State. As Anthony (2010) confirmed, former Biafrans were “sometimes called
former rebels and almost never Biafrans” (p. 61). According to Heerten and Moses (2014),
“integrating Eastern Nigerians into the state with the policy of ‘no victor, no vanquished’ meant
smashing Biafra through ‘lawfare’” (p. 189). Onuoha (2016) made it clear that after the war the
name Biafra was obliterated “from state documents and discourse… The southern stretch of
Nigeria’s Atlantic coast, formerly known as the Bight of Biafra, was renamed the Bight of
Bonny, and the oil pumped from this region, formerly known as Biafra Light, is now called
Bonny Light (Bight of Bonny Act 1975, 1990)” (p. 11).
The second is that the promotion of a national reconciliation guided by the “no victor, no
vanquished” philosophy was devoid of transitional justice. This is why none of the perpetrators
of the 1966 mutinies and pogroms as well as the 30-month war-time massacres was held
accountable. According to Oloyede (2009), “the silence that followed was to deny the Igbo and
indeed the country as a whole the opportunity to express the suffering brought about by the war...
This would have eased, arguably, to a considerable degree, the present anxieties among the Igbo
and their perceived marginalization would possibly have been dampened” (p. 4).
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Okonta and Meagher (2009) stated that “new institutional arrangements that emerged in
response to the war tended to mask the problems of Nigerian statecraft rather than solve them…,
failing to address smouldering grievances among the Igbo and the southern minorities of the
Niger Delta” (p. 2). The consequence of not creating a transitional justice after the war was well
described by Onuoha (2013b). According to this author, “people harboured the memory of hurt
and injury, but did not express them, and these memories were gradually eased out of the public
space and increasingly became a property of private memory” (Onuoha, 2013b, p. 2188).
The third is that a declaration of a general amnesty prevented public or legal discussions
on prewar mutinies, pogroms and war-time atrocities and massacres. A general amnesty in this
respect without implementing some variants of retributive or restorative justice as it was done in
Rwanda after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis created a pathway for an institutionalized
amnesia and denial. Onuoha (2013b) made it clear that “for both victims and perpetrators, there
were no apologies or reparations, and no one was held accountable for any wrongdoing” (p.
2188). As Njoku (2013) noted, it is probably Gowon’s general amnesty that prevented the
international community from applying international criminal justice to two important cases in
Nigerian history. The one is the 1966 massacres of the Igbos in northern Nigeria popularly
known as the pogroms. The other is the massacres and other gross human rights violations and
crimes that were committed during the Nigeria-Biafra War. According to Njoku (2013), this
neglect by the international justice system is in part due to “the politics of no victor, no
vanquished” (p. 715) implemented by Gowon at the end of the war.
This is why “the killings at Asaba, as well as smaller events at other towns in the MidWest, remained little known outside Igbo communities for many years, largely because they
went unreported in the press… and subsequently received scant attention in histories of Civil
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War” (Bird & Ottanelli, 2011, p. 2). Also, and as Bakare-Yusuf (2012) asserted, “over a million
Biafrans died of strategic starvation, disease, fighting, etc. We Nigerians scarcely talk of it.
There is an active forgetting at work” (p. 245). According to Korieh (2013), this active forgetting
is made worse by the continuous attempts by public and private officials to silence the events,
thereby discouraging serious studies on and adequate attention to the reported genocide against
the Igbos prior and during the Nigeria-Biafra War.
The fourth is that the erroneous ruling and declaration that the federal armed forces
strictly observed the code of conduct issued to them at the start of the war and maintained high
standards suppressed information about intentional massacres and other atrocities committed by
the same federal forces during the war. No doubt, many scholars and analysts as well as Gowon
and his cabinet members must have drawn their judgement and conclusion from the report of the
International Observer Team. However, while the final report prepared by international
observers categorically concluded that no genocide was committed against Biafrans
(Organization of African Unity, 1968; Anthony, 2010), some scholars argue that the observation
and report of the observer team were skewed to favor the federal government thereby
contributing to the suppression of the truth.
As Njoku (2013) noted, all the items in Gowon’s code of conduct were not respected by a
significant number of federal troops and military officers. If they were respected, the massacres
that occurred in Benin, Asaba, Warri, Ogwasi-Ukwu, Calabar, Sapele, Owerri, and Ameke-Item,
for example, would not have happened. According to Njoku (2013), it is very unfortunate that
“No record has been found of any Nigerian soldier who was officially punished for violating the
code of conduct. This neglect challenges the veracity of the intent of the law-giver and thus
indicts the effectiveness of the criminal justice” (p. 722). Bird and Ottanelli (2011) believed that
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Gowon’s declaration that the federal armed forces strictly observed the code of conduct “created
a climate that discouraged the revisiting of wartime atrocities. Murtala Muhammed, commander
of the division that took Asaba, became of president of Nigeria after toppling Gowon in a 1975
coup, making such revisiting even more unlikely” (p. 14).
The fifth is that there was a faulty generalization and adjudication made by Gowon
without evidence and consensus that the war victory was a victory for all, for national unity, for
hopes of Africans and black people everywhere. On this, Diamond (2007) totally disagreed. “The
defeat of Biafra,” Diamond (2007) contended, “is not a victory for the Nigerian people but for
the neo-colonialists, whether Soviet or North-Atlantic” (p. 341). Diamond (2007) submitted that:
like every other bloody exercise in political scapegoating, the aggressor’s sense of unity
is always false. It is the victim who learns the real name of the game. Gowon himself is a
man in a quandary. Torn between Russia and England on the one hand, regionally based
politicians on the other, and faced, moreover, with a rising military class, his political
moment is probably ending. (p. 360)
In fact, as Diamond (2007) predicted, General Gowon was overthrown in a military coup in
1975, only five years after the end of the Nigeria-Biafra War.
Intended or unintended, the repressive policies of the Gowon administration as well as
successive military regimes prohibited and prevented eye witnesses and participants in the 30month bloody war from narrating their stories and making their lived experiences public. In their
rigorous and extensive research on the Asaba massacre of October 1967, a massacre orchestrated
by the Nigerian troops few months into the Nigeria-Biafra War, Bird and Ottanelli (2014) found
that “news of the atrocities was suppressed by the federal government and, consequently,
subsequent histories of the war barely mention the massacre” (p. 379). Survivors “rarely spoke of

282
the massacres outside their families, because they would not be believed” (Bird & Ottanelli,
2014, p. 390). This, no doubt, resulted in the internalization of trauma and outburst of
intergenerational anger.
Although buried in the unconscious and often secretly transmitted from one generation to
another through oral history, those who tried to initiate a local memorial in honor of the victims
and survivors of the massacres were prohibited from doing so by the federal government. Bishop
Emmanuel Chukwuma (as cited in Bird & Ottanelli, 2011), a witness of the Asaba massacre,
“held an annual commemoration for a few years, until ordered to stop by federal authorities” (p.
14).
Even courageous survivors of the massacres and activists who attempted to expose the
war crimes committed by the federal troops were arrested, imprisoned, or threatened. Bird and
Ottanelli (2014) stated that one of their Asaba interviewees named Sylvester Okocha who was a
senior civil servant in Benin during the war was imprisoned by the federal military government
of Nigeria for sending a letter about the massacres to the International Committee of the Red
Cross. According to Bird and Ottanelli (2014),
after his letter was intercepted by the military, he was arrested, tortured and incarcerated
in Lagos. Indeed, the Nigerian government kept tight control of all information from the
war zone, making it illegal for anyone, including international news sources, to divulge
information deemed detrimental to federal authorities. (p. 391)
Another example is Wole Soyinka, a Nigerian playwright, novelist and poet of Yoruba
origin who was later awarded a Nobel Prize in Literature in 1986. During the Nigeria-Biafra
War, Wole Soyinka was one of the prominent Nigerian activists who protested against the
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massacres of the Igbos and other Eastern Nigerians. As a result, he was arrested in 1967 by the
federal military government of Nigeria and imprisoned.
Although the federal troops committed many massacres in other towns and villages
throughout the war similar to what they did in Asaba, reports about these massacres were all
suppressed by the Nigerian government to prevent people both in Nigeria and outside from
knowing what happened (Bird & Ottanelli, 2011).
One of the reasons cited for the initial suppression of the atrocities and crimes committed
during the war is lack of communication between the field commanders and the federal
government led by General Gowon. Philip Asiodu (2009, October 8, as cited in Bird & Ottanelli,
2011), a former member of General Gowon’s war cabinet, said in his testimony: “when the
things happened in Asaba, there we were in Lagos. We didn’t really get proper reports. The
people who perpetrated it knew what they did was criminal … They must have done their best to
suppress reports coming out” (p. 18).
However, even when the reports of the massacres reached the federal government in
Lagos, they were confiscated, concealed and silenced. One reason for this, according to Bird and
Ottanelli (2011) is because of “the Nigerian government’s tight reign over all reporting and
information from the war zone, which made it illegal for anyone, including international news
sources, to divulge information deemed detrimental to federal authorities” (p. 18).
Heerten and Moses (2014) were of the opinion that although there were scholarly
publications on the Nigeria-Biafra War by international scholars in early 1970s, “it was largely
forgotten by the end of the decade, overtaken by the grotesque events in Cambodia and
elsewhere” (p. 170). Granted that a few Nigerians and former Biafrans have written their own
accounts of the war, Bakare-Yusuf (2012) argued that:
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the story is yet untold… there is deafening silence from women on the other side, the
Nigerian side. There is an almost complete absence of first-hand accounts from ordinary
survivors. Accounts not just of horror and carnage, but also of moments of laughter and
humor, of birth and marriage amidst the most indelible devastation known to Nigeria’s
modern history. There is much work to be done as memory recedes fast. (pp. 245-246)
An area of importance that Gowon’s code of silence sent into oblivion is the lived
experiences of ordinary civilians both on the Nigerian and Biafran sides. On this, Bakare-Yusuf
(2012) made a case for the reconstruction of “life stories… from the survivors and their children”
(p. 246).
Another reason for institutionalized amnesia and denial could be that Gowon wanted to
avoid residual consequences that may come from prosecuting the perpetrators of both the
January 15 and July 29, 1966 bloody coups, the 1966 mutinies and pogroms, as well as the wartime barbaric massacres. This is because not only was he a direct beneficiary of the July 29, 1966
bloody coup as the one who emerged as the head of state, the very architects and executors of
this coup as well as the mutinies and pogroms that ensued played major roles that helped defeat
Biafra in the 30-month bloody war. In addition, subsequent military heads of state until the
return of democracy in 1999 - General Murtala Muhammed (in office from 1975-1976); General
Muhammadu Buhari (in office from 1983-1985 and 2015 - present); General Ibrahim Babangida
(in office from 1985-1993); and General Sani Abacha (in office from 1993-1998) - were all
leading participants in both the coup of July 29, 1966 and the Nigeria-Biafra War.
Among the Nigerian military dictators, the only person who did not participate in the July
29, 1966 bloody coup and mutinies is General Olusegun Obasanjo (in office from 1976-1979 and
1999 – 2007). He is a Yoruba from Western Nigeria. However, as the commander of 3 Marine
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Commando Division he played a leading role that coerced Biafran forces to surrender, ending the
30-month bloody war on January 12, 1970 (Obasanjo, 1980).
Following the footsteps of General Gowon, Nigerians were divided into more new states
from 1976 by these military dictators (Maiangwa, 2016). Overall, a total of thirty-six states has
been created in Nigeria.
Implicated in either the July 29, 1966 coup, the mutinies and pogroms, or the war, these
military dictators codified and implemented Gowon’s institutionalized amnesia and denial
throughout the era of military dictatorship. This culture of impunity is the root cause of the
breadown of law and order that characterized both military and democratic governance in
postwar Nigeria. As Dent (1970) noted, “in 1966 it was absence of such punishment both to the
murderers of January and to those of May, July, and September which spread the fatal doctrine
that there was somehow a ‘holiday’ from the law and a license to kill” (p. 104). In other words,
“the nation’s averted eyes in the face of another’s suffering mark the origin of contemporary
acquiescence to militarized impunity” (Bakare-Yusuf, 2012, p. 247).
Nevertheless, I find Dent’s (1970) justification for exonorating those Biafrans who led or
supported secession from facing the law troubling and repressive. According to the author,
since no one was punished for the large-scale massacres of Igbos in that year and since it
would now be impossible to dig into the past to seek to find the culprits (many of whom
have in any case subsequently made up for their misdeeds by showing great gallantry
fighting on the Federal side in the civil war), the sense of symmetry which is so essential
a part of the concept of justice demands that the holiday from the penalty of the law
should also be extended to those guilty of the offence of supporting secession in 1967.
(Dent, 1970, p. 107)
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First, if the former Nazis who participated in the Holocaust are still being brought to
justice even in 2021, an argument that it was impossible to find and bring the perpetrators of the
pogroms that occurred in 1966, only four years before the end of the Nigeria-Biafra War, is both
fallacious and illogical. “Crime once committed runs forever until justice is met” (Njoku, 2013,
p. 724).
Second, the fact that many of these perpetrators fought on the federal side during the war
against the same people they massacred during the pogroms that preceded the war should not in
itself exonorate them from the legal consequences of killing unarmed civilians. Njoku (2013)
argued that because the Federal troops were aware of Gowon’s operational code of conduct for
Nigeria Armed Forces which explicitly adopted the Geneva Convention, the troops who
committed crimes against humanity and similar crimes against Biafran civilians during the war
should be held accountable under international criminal justice laws.
That no one should be held accountable for their heinous and barbaric killings in the
name of a general amnesty was in itself both the terminus a quo and terminus ad quem of an
institutionalized amnesia and denial in Nigeria. General Gowon, although praised for his postwar
reconstruction and reintegration efforts, is to be blamed for the consequences of his
institutionalized amnesia through his general amnesty enshrined in the “no victor, no
vanguished” policy. As Njoku (2013) affirmed, “the political constructions of no ‘victor no
vanquished’ and the concepts of three Rs—Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation—
were projected to displace and dislocate the framework of justice” (Njoku, 2013, p. 722). Bird
and Ottanelli (2014) observed that due to “the failure of postwar Nigeria to acknowledge the
atrocity..., the combination of ofﬁcial concealment and the local selective narrative of the event
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as an act of genocide has worked to keep ethnic tensions alive and stood in the way of
meaningful reconciliation” (p. 394).
Gowon’s institutionalized amnesia or code of silence also coerced foreign actors into
silence. One example among many is the decision by the Joint Church Aid members to bury their
experiences until after thirty years before they can unearth and make them public. In
corroboration, the Congregation of the Holy Spirit (2014, May 7) revealed that “after the war it
was decided that due to political sensitivity, members of Joint Church Aid would wait 25-30
years before telling their unique story” (para. 5). Those foreign actors who decided to break the
silence did it in favor of the federal military government of Nigeria while depicting Biafra as the
aggressor and cause of the war. On this point, Diamond (2007) stated:
statements emanating from the Great Powers would have us believe that the Biafrans
were the aggressors against a liberal and well-intentioned Nigerian regime…, that it was
a creature of the oil companies, that the war was a conspiracy by a clique of adventurers
led by Ojukwu. These variations on a theme run from Moscow through Whitehall to the
State Department and the editorial pages of The New York Times, and they echo in the
pronouncements of General Gowon. (p. 341)
In misrepresenting the facts and tilting the war history in favor of Nigeria, the Nigerian
military governments and their foreign allies have done “everything in their power to
underestimate the past suffering and the present condition of the Biafran people” (Diamond,
2007, p. 341). While the elites on both sides of the conflict were and are still busy blaming each
other for the starvation and death of millions, Diamond’s (2007) submission still holds. The fact
of the matter is that “a generation of children has either been starved to death or deprived of the
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protein necessary for normal mental and physical growth. A generation of young adults, among
them the most talented and skilled in black Africa, has been stifled” (Diamond, 2007, p. 341).
In fact, the postwar generation of Biafrans, those who were born during and after the war,
are currently stifled as a result of the harmful effect of the war and postwar institutionalized
amnesia and denial. Bakare-Yusuf (2012) argued that “it can make forgiveness difficult because
a renewed anger is reborn by each new generation demanding explanation and resolution” (p.
244). As I stated above, these repressive policies indirectly or directly exonerated the
perpetrators from their barbaric crimes, denied the survivors and victims access to the truth about
what happened, and prevented justice, reparation, healing and closure from taking place.
At the domestic level, Dr. Ukpabi Asika, the first administrator of East Central State, also
implemented institutional reforms aimed at repressing the memories of the Nigeria-Biafra War.
According to Herskovits (1973), Asika,
abolished the existing provinces and created divisions tied directly to his state capital at
Enugu. He abolished customary courts, reconstructed the judiciary and, most
controversial of all, ordered a state takeover of all schools the first in Nigeria. By these
moves, he says, we could arouse people and we could defuse the debate, the possible
recriminations, about the war. Now energies and debate could go into the new policies,
justified, of course, in themselves. (p. 396)
With the takeover of schools by the states under a repressive military controlled federal
government, the Nigeria-Biafra War was ignored in school history curricula (Bird & Ottanelli,
2014). Ejiogu (2013) revealed how a “military decree—which is still held on Nigeria’s statute
books—came into effect in the 1970s [and] prohibited the adoption of any book(s) on the Biafra
war as a school textbook” (p. 742). The ban of the Nigeria-Biafra War history in school curricula
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and classrooms continued throughout the military dictatorship era and the history of the war has
not yet been fully included in history textbooks and curricula (Bakare-Yusuf, 2012).
Onuoha (2016) presented a detailed description of this issue:
a major outcome of the tendency to forget or remember is that the war is not officially
listed in the national curriculum in Nigerian universities, supervised by the Nigerian
Universities Commission. Courses in the political history of Nigeria in the twentieth
century do exist, but course design and coverage of major political developments during
the period are left to individual lecturers, who either omit or include themes on the war.
When issues related to the war arise in senior secondary-school curricula, it is the official
and institutionalized interpretation of the war that is presented… Though these textbooks
referred to the war, the references were kept to the barest minimum or written in highly
biased language, thus confirming the whitewashing of history textbooks to conform to a
dominant and hegemonic agenda. (p. 10)
This further helped to officially commit the stories about the war “below the threshold of
consciousness, resting under many thousands of tongues. The stories also, of course, lay buried
underground. Traumas turning to earth, which only the trees can now remember” (Bakare-Yusuf,
2012, p. 246).
Having established a framework for repressing the truth about what happened before and
during the war, and having created a dominant narrative sponsored by the Nigerian state, it was
no longer possible for the vulnerable Biafran returnees and survivors on the Nigerian side to
reject Gowon’s postwar reconstruction framework. The primary goal of former Biafrans was to
utilize every opportunity given to them to reintegrate into Nigeria in order to rebuild their lives
and families. Overwhelmed by their traumatic experiences during the war and the fear of the
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unknown, Biafran survivors raised their children in the guise of Gowon’s code of silence to
believe in the unity of Nigeria and that they are not second class citizens.
Some second generation of Biafra, or what I call postwar generation, have narrated their
experience growing up in Nigeria in the postwar era. Oguibe’s (1998) story is worth noting.
I was raised under the blanket of silence that Nigeria draped over Biafra at her defeat. I
grew up inside that silence, and I believed in the idea of Nigeria. For thirteen years I
worked tirelessly toward that idea, laboring in the vineyard of the Nigerian prodemocracy movement, surviving years of police detention and constant anxiety and grief
for friends killed or jailed or lost. Over time, however, I found within the ranks of my
fellow ‘nationalists’ that same deep-seated sectarianism that long ago destroyed the
illusion that was Nigeria. While I pursued the same nationalist vision for which many an
easterner fought and died, it became increasingly apparent that I was surrounded by
people who were not my own, people who would, at a moment’s notice, trade the idea of
unity for personal or sectarian gain. The realization shook me to the marrow. For one
moment, I felt the depth and the weight of that betrayal that my father’s generation had
suffered at the hands of their countrymen and women thirty years earlier. Apparently, not
even the blood of two and a half million could buy salvation for an accursed nation. I
became increasingly disillusioned with the country that had once renounced my kin, and
to which I had blindly devoted nearly half of my young life. It was a profoundly troubling
moment for me, one filled with resentment and hurt. Where passion and patriotism once
had reigned supreme, now I felt resignation and cynicism. (Oguibe, 1998, p. 98)
Another important point that Oguibe (1998) made is that Gowon’s “no victor, no
vanquished” with the repressive policies it inspired prevented both the former Biafrans and
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Nigerians to engage in memory work, trauma healing, truth finding, and restorative justice. As
Oloyede (2009) noted, this is why “the concept of trauma does not occupy a key position in the
discussion about Biafra” (p. 22). Also, retired Brigadier-General Godwin Alabi-Isama, who was
the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Marine Commando during the war, had stated in an interview:
If it were in a good country, there would have been an inquiry. General Patton of the
United States Army slapped a soldier and he was demoted… There should have been an
inquiry to know how they died so that the troops of today will not make the same
mistake. If there are punishments for crimes, there will be deterrence. (Alabi-Isama,
2019, October 29)
A transitional justice aimed at making things right would have promoted memory work
(or the work of memory), trauma healing, inclusion, loyalty, and patriotism. In the absence of a
transitional justice and trauma healing, Biafra with what it represents to those who experienced
the war (prewar generation) and their descendants (postwar generation) has been relegated to
“the psyche of a people and whose loss, in the sense of not being brought to existence, is one of a
‘shattered assumption’” (Oloyede, 2009, p. 2). As Oguibe (1998) affirmed, “it is an irony of
history that his [Gowon’s] words would be borne out many years later in ways unbeknownst to
him at the time. For in conquering Biafra, Nigeria has raised a generation with uncertain loyalty
and a legacy of hurt and betrayal, a generation without nation, my generation: Biafra’s children”
(p. 98).
A generation without nation because, “born in massacre and bred in starvation” (Perham,
1970, p. 234), Biafra died after its surrender to Nigeria on January 15, 1970. It was then buried in
oblivion until the dawn of democracy and freedom of speech in 1999. From this time, Biafra was
resurrected by the postwar generation. The return of democracy in Nigeria in 1999 with the
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freedom of speech it bestowed on the citizens as an inalienable right acted as a catalyst bringing
“the words of the ordinary men and women who experienced Biafra… out of the archive of
silence” (Bakare-Yusuf, 2012, p. 247).
The Return of the Repressed to Consciousness
In my introduction of this literature review, I adopted as a structure, in addition to the
precursors of the war, Henry Rousso’s (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004) four stages of chronological
ordering of memory and recollection. These are: 1) the phase of collective mourning (or
unfinished mourning) as a result of traumatic affliction; 2) phase of repression and the
establishment of a dominant myth; 3) phase of the return of the repressed to consciousness; and
finally, 4) phase of obsession with the past. Based on a careful examination of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history and recent developments surrounding it, coupled with ongoing recollection efforts
and circulation or dissemination of information about the war aided by social media, social
movements, the archives and the arts, I submit that Nigeria is currently in-between the third and
fourth phases – those of the return of the repressed to public consciousness and obsession with
the past. The reasons for this assertion are presented in this section on the return of the repressed
to consciousness and in the section that follows which is entitled obsession with the past.
Since the traumatic memories of the Nigeria-Biafra War were repressed and an official
narrative was created and sanctioned by successive authoritarian military regimes beginning
from the Gowon administration, it was anticipated that the return of democracy in Nigeria in
1999 with the freedom of speech it bestows on citizens was to serve as a catalyst for the
reawakening of the past. This is exactly what happened. Adebanwi (2004) and Agbu (2004) as
cited in (Onuoha, 2013a) argued that “Nigeria’s return to civil rule and the opening up of the
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public space… unleashed a host of hitherto suppressed and dormant forces in the country… after
decades of prolonged military rule” (p. 429).
Oloyede (2009) stated that Biafra is “a past unsettled; one that political discourse of the
present brings alive in the collective and individual memory” (p. 2). Onuoha (2013b) went
further to assert that “issues related to Biafra and Igbo war memory have been forcefully brought
back to the public space in Nigeria’s democratic dispensation… [because] the Igbo ethnic group
still harbors perceptions of marginalization and exclusion that are rooted in Biafra” (p. 2191).
Also, Smith (2005, as cited in Oloyede, 2009) affirmed that “collective memories about Biafra
are being revitalized, reinscribed, and surely, to some degree, reinvented” (p. 3).
It must be acknowledged that there were many Nigerian writers and activists whose
writings and activism heralded the return of repressed war memories. The works of these early
writers have been carefully and critically classified in bibliographical checklists by Amuta
(1982) and McLuckie (1987). Okonta and Meagher (2009) with other scholars published a
collection of scholarly articles that address “the challenge of assessing the Biafran legacy, with a
view to addressing silences and grappling with the underlying challenges” (p. 3). For many
former Biafrans and their descendants, the publication of Achebe’s (2012) “There Was a
Country: A Personal History of Biafra” symbolizes the epiphany of Biafra (Ejiogu, 2013).
Critical analyses of the contributions of these early writers and most importantly recent
writers, both of fiction and nonfiction works, to the return of the Nigeria-Biafra War memories
have been done by a group of scholars in a volume edited by Falola and Ezekwem (2016). In
addition to providing a guideline on how to understand the Nigeria-Biafra War, the contributors
in Falola and Ezekwem (2016) critically addressed core issues and emerging themes about the
war. These include but not limited to an appraisal of existing scholarly literature, the background
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and history of the war, critical debates in Nigeria engendered by the war, assessment of fictional,
biographical and artistic works about the war, and explanation of gender roles. In addition,
Uchendu’s (2007) research had revealed the silenced memories, lived experiences and
disregarded or forgotten roles of women during the Nigeria-Biafra War. Also, without forgetting
the importance and instrumentality of war songs, Vambe (2012) and before this author, Agu
(1991), conducted research that analyzed how war songs became a powerful instrument used by
Biafran officials to recruit soldiers, forge collective consciousness, and motivate troops to fight
to the end.
Moreso, a collection of documented accounts of civilian survivors (Okafor, 2002) and
war soldiers (Momoh, 2000) from both the Nigeria and Biafra camps who witnessed or
participated in the war had earlier been published. Bird and Ottanelli’s (2011; 2014)
reconstruction of the Asaba massacre of October 1967 during the Nigeria-Biafra War fills a
significant gap in the history of the war, while revealing the hidden, suppressed and silenced
traumatic memories and narratives about the massacre of unarmed civilians by the Nigerian
troops through the testimonies of the survivors and other archival materials.
It was only in the late 1990s that the suppressed memories of the Asaba massacre began
to return to public consciousness through witnesses’ testimonies and accounts. The first account
written from the survivors’ perspective is documented in “Blood on the Niger,” a book published
in 1994 and written by Emmanuel Okocha whose father was killed during the Asaba massacre of
October 1967. In Bird and Ottanelli’s (2011) view, “Okocha’s work has been crucial to keeping
memory of the event alive” (p. 15).
Nevertheless, Ejiogu (2013) expressed concerns and worry that the passage of time and
death of key actors and eyewitnesses may retard the full return of the repressed memories of the
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Nigeria-Biafra War to public consciousness. This is why Ejiogu (2013) made an emotional plea
to the survivors of the Nigeria-Biafra War to write their lived experiences.
Why has the world not read from those kwashiorkor-stricken Biafran children who
survived that sadistic ordeal? How about their counterparts and others who were eyewitnesses to the horrors of the pogroms in the north of Nigeria? Until the world reads
from them the way it reads from those Jewish children, in books by Elie Wiesel, Anne
Frank of The Diary of a Young Girl, and many others who lived through and escaped
Auschwitz and other Nazi concentration camps, Nigeria and its apologists will not be
held accountable for the atrocities they perpetrated against the Igbo in particular and
Biafrans in general. (Ejiogu, 2013, p. 746)
Having acknowledged the works of Nigerian writers as cited above and the limitations
faced in this era of the return, this part of literature review focuses on three indispensable
avenues that paved the way for a full return of the repressed memories of the war to public
consciousness. The first is the work of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission
(HRVIC), a national truth and reconciliation program also known as Oputa Panel which was
created on June 14, 1999 “to break the silence of the past … to map out or indicate pathways to
… redress the injustices of the past; [and] to prevent and forestall future violations…” (Oputa,
2002, p. 3-4). The second is the parallel creation and activism of the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The third is a conglomeration of
breakaway factions from MASSOB under the umbrella of a more radical pro-Biafra
independence social movement named Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). These three avenues
or pathways for the full return of the repressed memories into Nigeria’s public consciousness are
carefully examined below.
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First Avenue: Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission
Created on June 14, 1999 by the government administration of former President
Olusegun Obasanjo, the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC) or Oputa
Panel was initially mandated to review and investigate the human rights violations that were
committed during the four military government regimes between 1984 and the dawn of
democracy on May 29, 1999. However, new revelations about the past led to the extension of the
investigation back to January 15, 1966, when the first post-independence military coup d’état
occurred, which is also known as the precursor of, and catalyst for, the Nigeria-Biafra War.
Oputa Panel was “named after the chairman of the Commission, the late Justice Chukwudifu
Oputa, an Igbo Jurist” (Maiangwa, 2016, p. 50).
As the official report of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission
(HRVIC) states, it was only before this Commission that the Igbos, through Ohaneze Ndigbo - a
pan-Igbo cultural organization - could make their first official and open demand for “reparations
for damages done to the Igbos during the civil war” (Oputa, 2002, p. 84). The documented
testimonies collected by this Commission include the Ohaneze Petition which describes in details
the human rights violations committed against the Igbos from the time of the military coup in
1966 to the time of the Nigeria-Biafra War and after the war. Emmanuel Okocha, the author of
“Blood on the Niger” (1994), a collection of testimonies from the Asaba massacre survivors,
“brought the Asaba events to the attention of the Nigerian Human Rights Violations
Investigation Commission (HRVIC, or Oputa Panel)… and included 1969 depositions made by
Asaba survivors and testimony from witnesses” (Bird & Ottanelli, 2014, p. 391).
Most of the Commission’s sessions were broadcast live on television and millions of
Nigerians watched them. As Bird and Ottanelli (2011) put it, “since testimonies were broadcast
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on television and widely discussed in the press, the Oputa Panel brought visibility to civil war
(and other) atrocities, and set the stage for more survivors to speak publicly” (p. 15).
Granted that the six-man-commission was not able to listen to all the petitions that were
brought forward for public hearings and special sessions due to a lack of resources at its disposal
– both financial and human –, and challenged by federal court rulings against convening some
high-level case hearings because of the personal safety of the persons involved, as well as the
numerous criticisms and accusations that the Commission was “re-opening old wounds” (Oputa,
2002, p. 6), it is generally agreed that the Commission played a pioneering role in breaking the
silence of the past. The Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission, no doubt, was a
catalyst for the return of the repressed memory to public consciousness. As Bird and Ottanelli
(2011) concluded, “the veil of secrecy [was] lifted at the Oputa Panel” (p. 20).
However, the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission did not succeed in
laying “to rest the ghost of this dark and painful period” (Oputa, 2002, p. 3) in Nigerian history
as it had hoped to accomplish. The government administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo
failed to implement the recommendations in the official report – a nine-volume report with
summary, conclusions, and recommendations – that the Commission submitted to him in May
2002. By failing to implement the Commission’s recommendations, and by deciding not to
officially release the report to the public, the Obasanjo administration attempted to reinforce the
old tradition and practice of the politics of oblivion by which his predecessors – the military
dictators – ruled Nigeria. Nevertheless, the Commission’s report was unofficially released online
through anonymous sources. In addition to televised hearings, the public’s unrestricted access to
the Commission’s report online helped in returning the repressed memories of the war to public
consciousness.
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Another symbolic outcome of the Commission’s hearings and work was General Yakubu
Gowon’s December 9, 2002 personal apology to the Igbos for the Asaba massacre of October
1967, although he claimed that he was not informed about the massacre at that time (Ogwuda,
2002). In his public apology, Gowon stated:
It came to me as a shock when I came to know about the unfortunate happenings that
happened to the sons and daughters of this state especially of this (Asaba) domain. I felt
very touched and honestly I referred to it (the killings) and ask for forgiveness being the
one who was in charge that time. Certainly, it is not something that I would have
approved of in whatsoever. I was made ignorant of it, I think until it appeared in the
papers. A young man wrote a book at that time. It just happened seven hours ago when I
was visiting the state for our nation prayers, I took the opportunity of being with his
Royal Majesty (Asagba of Asaba) to make this public apology on behalf of myself and
government of Nigeria at that time and to ask for forgiveness as we have to look at the
future. I feel very touched when we came this time to hear his majesty refer to it again.
(as cited in Ogwuda, 2002, para. 2)
Gowon’s apology has been ferociously criticized for his denial of “knowledge and
responsibility for these atrocities” (Njoku, 2013, p. 722). Some authors of Igbo descent have
described Gowon’s public apology as lacking sincerity (Aneke, 2003). Nnaemeka Luke Aneke’s
(2003) newspaper article, “Gowon’s Apology to the Igbos Lacks Sincerity,” fervently debunked
Gowon’s claim of ignorance about the Asaba massacre. According to Aneke (2003),
Gowon tried to change the facts of history by claiming that he was unaware of General
Murtala Mohammed’s genocidal instincts and the actual genocidal campaigns he carried
out west of the Niger, between Asaba and Agbor. That denial of knowledge, in the face
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of abundant and contrary facts, undercut Gowon’s apology and denied it of sincerity and
genuineness. (para. 2)
A reliable source of evidence that Aneke (2003) cited is Chief Anthony Enahoro who was
Gowon’s Federal Commissioner of Information during the war and who was quoted to have
stated the following while responding to a question posed to him in a meeting in New Jersey by
the then leader of United Committee to Save Nigeria, Jumoke Ogunkeyede:
Do you really know anything about what happened during that war? I was the one that
stopped late Gen. Murtala Mohammed from further massacre of innocent children and
mothers. At a point when Britain refused to sell further arms to Nigeria because they had
ample evidence from the Red Cross of the federal forces killing innocent civilians, I
confronted Gowon with the fact and that the only way I can get Britain through my
contact with their High Commissioner to resume a supply of weapon to Nigeria was that
Murtala had to leave that war sector. Either Murtala leaves or I will have to leave his
cabinet. Gowon told me that he is willing to call a meeting and on the condition I will be
the one to confront Murtala. If there was anybody that Gowon feared so much it was
Murtala Mohammed. At the meeting of the Federal Executive Council, I confronted
Mohammed with elaborate evidence complete with photographs. He was livid. He could
not refute them so he resorted to calling me all sorts of names prompting me to observe
before the council that if he was a fine officer as he claims to be, he should not be acting
the way he was acting. Needless to say that I was instrumental to his withdrawal from
that sector and subsequent appointment as a minister. (The Nigerian and Africa
magazine, March 1998, as cited in Aneke, 2003, para. 6)
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Major General Ibrahim Bata Malgwi Haruna who later succeeded General Murtala
Muhammed as the General Officer Commanding the Second Division and who commanded the
Federal troops that executed the Asaba massacre was quoted to have said during the Oputa Panel
hearing that:
As the commanding officer and leader of the troops that massacred 500 hundred men in
Asaba, I have no apology for those massacred in Asaba, Owerri, and Ameke-Item. I acted
as a soldier maintaining the peace and unity of Nigeria…If General Yakubu Gowon
apologized, he did it in his own capacity. As for me I have no apology. (Achebe, 2012, p.
135)
Nevertheless, even though this was not an official government admission of guilt for the
Asaba massacre, Gowon’s public apology to the Igbo people of Asaba not only encouraged
many survivors to freely share their experiences, but most importantly, it created a pathway for a
public memorialization of the massacre to begin with the goal of making this memorial part of
Nigeria’s official heritage (Bird & Ottanelli, 2014). As part of the Asaba massacre memorial,
Asabans and many Nigerians gather on October 7 every year at Ogbe-Osowa to reenact the
Ogbe-Osowa parade, a dance parade of the Asaba people that ended in a massacre orchestrated
by the federal troops (Onuoha, 2016; Bird & Ottanelli, 2014).
In addition to the Asaba massacre memorial project, Bianca Odumegwu Ojukwu, the
wife of the former Biafran leader, Chukwumeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, announced on May 29,
2020 the start of a Project Mayrock, a Biafran war memorial in honor of Bruce Mayrock, the 20
year old Jewish activist who set himself ablaze (afire) in front of the United Nations
Headquarters in New York on May 29, 1967 as a way to draw urgent international response to
the massacres and sufferings of the Biafran people (Odeh, 2020, May 30).
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With Gowon’s personal apology to the Igbos for the Asaba massacre dominating public
discussions, many critics have wondered why the Obasanjo administration chose not to release
the Commission’s report to the public or implement its recommendations. A careful examination
of the policies of the past administrations, including the Obasanjo’s, regarding the revelation of
painful historical events may lead to a conclusion that their preference for a total oblivion of past
injustices and human rights violations over their public revelation and reparations is motivated
by these leaders’ limited understanding of peace, an understanding that is centered on the idea of
a negative peace and a policy designed to blindfold the citizens, suppress their quest for the truth,
hinder serious questioning about the past, and prevent ardent demand for justice and restitution.
However, credit should be given to former President Olusegun Obasanjo for taking a bold step to
initiate an investigation of human and group rights violations committed prior to, during and
after the Nigeria-Biafra War to which he was an active, leading participant.
As the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission stressed in their official
report (Oputa, 2002):
we must be prepared to confront this history, if we are to forge ahead. We need to
understand it, even if it means asking unpleasant questions and offering blunt answers.
Where did we make the wrong turn? Who was responsible for what? What opportunities
did we miss and why? What are the major lessons to be learnt? What do we now need to
do to put the past behind us and to look to the future with renewed hope and patriotic
zeal? What are the basic conditions for us to effect national catharsis? (p. 3).
Because the Obasanjo administration and his successors failed to leverage on the
opportunity provided by the impartial, patriotic, restorative and transitional justice-based work of
the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission to confront this painful history and heal
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the bleeding and open wounds caused by the Nigeria-Biafra War and associated massacres and
past injustices; and with the advent of democracy and freedom of speech in 1999, new forms of
activism and currents of agitation inspired by past injustices and injuries have emerged in
different parts of Nigeria. These militant activists have brought back the fundamental, old and
uncomfortable questions about the basis of the Nigerian federation, dating back to “the 1914
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Regions of Nigeria by the British colonial
government” (Ugorji, 2017a, p. 2). Prominent among these activists is the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB).
Second Avenue: Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) was
founded on September 13, 1999 by Chief Ralph Uwazuruike, a lawyer who studied in India
(Ugorji, 2017; Duruji, 2012; Onuoha, 2011; Obianyo, 2007). While it may be true in some cases
that “the global economic crisis of the 1980s was very significant in creating the conditions for
the new form of ethno-nationalism that arose in the 1990s in Nigeria” (Duruji, 2012, p. 537), the
timing of, and events surrounding, the founding of MASSOB as well as the stated goals of this
organization point to other factors such as the end of authoritarian military regimes, return of
democracy with its promise of freedom of expression, and the need to address unresolved
conflicts and suppressed memories. Onuoha (2011; 2013a) argued that the emergence of
MASSOB “was a direct response to the failure of the Nigerian state and successive governments
to address the Igbo predicament since the end of the civil war in 1970” (p. 403; p. 429).
According to Maiangwa (2016), “the renewed push—since the return to democratic rule in
Nigeria in 1999—for the creation of Biafra owes to the marginalization and transgenerational

303
trauma of the people belonging to the Igbo ethnic group as a result of the Nigeria-Biafra War of
1967-70” (p. 39).
By proclaiming itself a nonviolent movement in the spirit of Mahatma Gandhi, and
driven by perceived or real marginalization of the Igbos, MASSOB, as its name suggests, is
passionately engaged in revitalizing the old agitation for self-determination and independence of
Biafra from Nigeria. The ultimate goal of MASSOB is the realization of self-determination for
the Igbo through nonviolent means (Onuoha, 2011; Oyebade, 2017). Obianyo (2007) explained
that the five specific objectives of MASSOB are:
to actualize the independent nation of Biafra; to use peaceful means only; to support all
entities using peaceful means to bring about Biafra; to encourage sincere and honest
dialogue with all nations in Nigeria aimed at peaceful separation of Biafra (and other
nations, if they so desire); to inform the rest of the world about Biafra actualization
(Biafra Nation). (Obianyo, 2007, pp. 5-6)
During their inaugural event held on May 22, 2000 which included a hoisting of Biafran
flag at Ariaria International Market in Aba, Abia state (Duruji, 2012), MASSOB’s founder,
Ralph Uwazuruike stated in a speech titled, “Declaration of Our Demand for a Sovereign State of
New Biafra from the People and Government of Nigeria”:
MASSOB has therefore packaged about 25 stages for the actualization of the sovereignty
of the new Biafra State through non-violence and non exodus... It also admits of non cooperation and passive resistance to oppressive and obnoxious laws of the authorities.
Having hoisted the flag of our new Biafra today, we wish to declare our resolve to
demand and pursue the realization of our sovereignty from the Federal Republic of
Nigeria. (Biafraland, 2004, as cited in Onuoha, 2013a, p. 429)
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This inaugural event with the declaration has been labeled the Aba Declaration of May 22, 2000
(Omeje, 2005). The announcement of “the birth of a new Biafra” by Uwazurike (2000, as cited
in Omeje, 2005, p. 631) drew the attention of both domestic and international media toward the
unresolved Biafran issues.
These two – marginalization of the Igbos or injustice since the end of the Nigeria-Biafra
War and unresolved trauma as a result of repressive policies – created the condiction for a
renewed agitation for Biafran secession. These two factors are a synthesis of my 2017 diagnosis
of the problem in which I posited that the “failure of the postwar transitional justice,
transgenerational trauma, removal of history education from the school curricula in Nigeria
through the policies of oblivion have created the conditions for the reawakening and
revitalization of the old agitation for the independence of Biafra” (Ugorji, 2017b, para. 11).
Because of the failure of Gowon’s “no victor, no vanquished” policies, including the
“3Rs” (Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation), neither the core issues that led to the
war nor the crimes committed during the war as well as postwar injustices against the Igbos were
addressed. These therefore became the foundation on which MASSOB’s agenda to revitalize the
agitation for Biafran independence and self-determination is anchored. Maiangwa (2016) argued
that “although officially repressed, the memory of the Nigeria-Biafra War and the attendant
trauma may partly be responsible for the resurgence of Igbo nationalism by groups like IPOB
and MASSOB” (p. 54). This assertion was hinted at by Owen (2009) who stated that
“MASSOB’s agenda draws upon a rich vein of memories of suffering, as well as the resonant
rhetoric of post war marginalization” (p. 575). Other scholars have also argued that “the
injustices and conditions that made Biafra possible are still very much present in the Nigerian
state” (Duruji 2009; Ikpeze 2000; Ojukwu 2009, as cited in Onuoha, 2013a, p. 435).
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Obianyo (2007) argued that “it is in recognition of this fact that the new generation of the
Igbos suffering these exclusionist policies have either become members of MASSOB or given
their unalloyed support to its struggle” (p. 7). These in turn have not only “led to the construction
of Igbo identity and consciousness” (Obianyo, 2007, p. 7), but most importantly, leveraging on
them for the attainment of its goal, MASSOB laid the groundwork for breaking the silence about
unresolved issues that led to the Nigeria-Biafra War as well as the silenced atrocities committed
during the war, and the postwar injustices against the Igbos. Onuoha (2013b) cleverly articulated
MASSOB’s approach to memory work this way.
Most members of MASSOB did not experience the war, but the movement persuasively
evokes a sense of collective memory of Igbo genocide (before and during the war) and
perceptions of postwar persecution, deprivation and marginalization, which have all
become dominant Igbo narratives since the end of the civil war in 1970. (Onuoha, 2013b,
p. 2184)
By revitalizing Biafran secession agitation, MASSOB has championed the return of
repressed war memories to public consciousness. Contrary to Obianyo’s (2007) view that “the
activities and tactics of MASSOB as separatist movement… creates an identity dilemma for the
Igbo nation whose interests it claims to protect” (p. 2), this study argues that the coincidence of
MASSOB’s founding with the return of democracy in Nigeria that signaled freedom of
expression and the protection of human and group rights created a pathway for the return of
repressed memories of the Nigeria-Biafra War to public consciousness. Onuoha (2013a) also
asserted that “the ghost of Biafra was publicly resuscitated with the founding of MASSOB” (p.
429). Heerten and Moses (2014) agreed by stating that “MASSOB broke the taboo to refer to
Biafra in Nigerian political discourse” (p. 192).
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Awakened by the activities of MASSOB and the public discussions they engendered
beginning from 1999, Haynes (2006, as cited in Okonta & Meagher, 2009) confirmed that
although it is “still a highly sensitive subject (prompting government intervention in the title of
one of the films), Nollywood films have begun to explore the issue of Biafra and its legacies” (p.
6). In addition, Nigerian writers of fiction and non-fiction works have been prompted to devote
their resources to the Nigeria-Biafra War memories (Falola & Ezekwem, 2016). Omeje (2005)
affirmed that MASSOB actions inspired “the convening of the first international conference of
Biafra in Greenbelt, Maryland (US) on 18 October 2003” (p. 632). A similar conference on the
Nigeria-Biafra War was also held at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria in 2002, a year before the
Maryland conference (Onuoha, 2016). The outcome of the Maryland conference on Biafra was
that “the conditions that led to the Biafra-Nigeria War are still present and worse…” (Biafra
Foundation, 2003, as cited in Omeje, 2005, p. 632).
The revitalization, revival or reimagining of Biafra is characterized by a generational
shift, from the prewar generation to the postwar generation. As Onuoha (2011) affirmed,
“MASSOB represents a post-civil war second generation nationalist movement that contests the
marginalization of the Igbo since the end of the civil war in 1970” (p. 408). Onuoha (2013b)
carefully examined “the impact of the Nigerian-Biafran War memories on Igbo youths, most
notably those born after the war and who connect with the memories of the war to forge a
specific narrative linking the present and the past in the struggle for Igbo self-determination in
Nigeria” (p. 2183).
Ukiwo and Nwajiaku (2009, as cited in Okonta & Meagher, 2009) stated that “while
Biafra was very much a product of elite politics in the 1960s, it has been reappropriated since the
1990s as a symbol of subaltern politics” (p. 5). Championed by Igbo youths, similar to former
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Biafran leaders and soldiers who were in their 20s and 30s during the war, and with enormous
support from Igbo communities in the diaspora (Onu, 2001, as cited in Duruji, 2012; Omeje,
2005), Biafran revivalists such as MASSOB leaders and militants are “disillusioned with the
corruption and cliental pacts of their elites, and impatient with the failures of military rule,
democracy and neo-liberal reforms to deliver inclusive forms of citizenship” (Okonta &
Meagher, 2009, p. 5).
As will be examined in the next section, on the obsession with the past, Igbo elites since
the end of the war, particularly the prewar generation, desisted from employing radical
approaches to communicate their concerns and disappointments with the federal government.
Rather, they adopted a conciliatory approach. Onuoha’s (2013a) research revealed that none of
these Igbo elite social cultural organizations such as “Ohanaeze Ndi Igbo, Aka Ikenga, Mkpoko
Igbo, Eastern Mandate Union (EMU), Odenigbo Forum, South East Movement (SEM), Igbo
National Assembly (INA), Ndi Igbo Liberation Forum, Igbo Salvation Front (ISF), Igbo
Redemption Council (IRC), Igbo Peoples Congress (IPC) and the Igbo Question Movement
(IQM)… espoused a radical or confrontational tendency” (p. 429). However, MASSOB’s
strategy and activities symbolize a break from the prewar generation’s somnambulist tradition
and attitude with regard to unresolved issues from the Nigeria-Biafra War. As Omeje (2005)
opined, “MASSOB in a large sense crystallizes the broad ideological discourses of the neoBiafra movement into a practical plan” (p. 631).
The activities of the Igbo youths (postwar generation) under the umbrella of MASSOB
and similar neo-Biafran movements have gained national attention, especially through media
reporting, due to the sensitive nature of Biafran secession and the security threats it poses to the
Nigerian state. Among many strategies used by MASSOB to achieve the reawakening of Biafran
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memories are: re-declaration of the State of Biafra and the hoisting of Biafran flag in strategic
locations in the southeast and abroad; stay-at-home strikes, boycotts of elections and census,
protests or rallies, civil disobedience or riots, reintroduction and circulation of Biafran pound
notes among Igbo traders, collection of taxes from Igbo traders, creation of Biafran Security
Agency (BSA) in the southeastern states, wearing Biafran shirts and face caps during rallies and
protests, celebration of the anniversary of Biafran secession every May 30th known as annual
Biafra Day, singing the Biafran anthem during events, creation and distribution of Biafran
passport, opening of a Biafra House in Washington, DC and Senegal, creation of online radios,
TV, newspapers and forums, establishment of a Biafran Government in Exile (BGIE), and so on
(Onuoha, 2013a; Onuoha, 2013b; Duruji, 2012; Onuoha, 2011; Owen, 2009; Obianyo, 2007;
Omeje, 2005).
By engaging in these activities, and arguing that they are not Nigerians but Biafrans,
MASSOB succeeded in resurrecting suppressed memories of Biafran resilience and loss (or
trauma) into the Nigerian public sphere. As Onuoha (2013a) argued, the use of Biafran
commemorations, anniversaries, symbols or repertoires of the Nigeria-Biafra War memory as
“vehicles for entrenching their claim to self-determination [highlight] the salience of their quest
for political disengagement” (pp. 430-431).
In addition to their separatist agenda, MASSOB’s activism and militancy have helped in
generating competing narratives about the Nigeria-Biafra War memory. This is why Onuoha
(2013a) affirmed that:
while the Nigerian state is intent on shaping the official history, memories and narratives
of the war to suit its own vision, interests and politics, the neo-Biafran movement
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connects to the war as a war of Igbo national liberation and rejects the official views as
the sole and legitimate framework for remembering and interpreting the war. (p. 436)
Having initiated the commemoration of the May 30, 1967 Biafran independence every May 30
as an annual Biafra Day, MASSOB rejects officially sanctioned war commemorations, including
the Armed Forces Remembrance Day observed as a public holiday in Nigeria every January 15
to honor war veterans (Maiangwa, 2016; Onuoha, 2013a; Onuoha, 2013b).
Honoring war veterans from the Nigerian military on January 15, the day that the
Nigeria-Biafra War officially ended in favor of one Nigeria, and exhibiting memory objects
representing the federal forces only in the National War Museum commissioned on
September14, 1989 (Onuoha, 2016), are examples of a repressive policy created by the Nigerian
federal military government to commit the memories of the war from the Biafran side into
oblivion. This commemoration continuous to silence Biafran war veterans, while conditioning
and relegating them to a state of defeat despite Gowon’s “no victor no vanguished” declaration.
In order to resurrect Biafran memories of the war, MASSOB declared “the annual Biafra Day a
public holiday for its fans and sympathizers in Nigeria, an event that increasingly paralyses
commercial activities in some major cities where Igbo traders enjoy preponderant control of
open market business activities” (Onuoha, 2013a, pp. 632-633).
With its members drawn from both Nigeria and abroad, MASSOB’s administrative
structure is equivalent to that of a nation-state. “At the apex of the movement is the leader,
followed by the national coordinators (equivalent of ministers), provincial administrators
(equivalent of governors for the 24 provinces” (Obasi 2002, as cited in Obianyo, 2007, p. 6).
Uwazurike, MASSOB’s leader, used the perceived and real economic and sociopolitical
marginalization of the Igbos after the war to attract and recruit members into MASSOB. The
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large membership of MASSOB during its early beginning – about 6 million members (Adekson,
2004, as cited in Onuoha, 2011) – posed a significant threat to the law enforcement.
There have been multiple clashes between the law enforcement and MASSOB members,
leading to arrests and, in some cases, deaths. Due to inadequate documentation, it is difficult to
know how many MASSOB members have been killed by the law enforcement. Nevertheless, it
is estimated that over 2,000 were killed between 2000 and 2008 (Ugwoke, 2008, as cited in
Onuoha, 2011). According to the Human Rights Watch (2005, as cited in Owen, 2009), “the
MASSOB movement has been the subject of intense surveillance, censure and detention by state
security services” (p. 572). Onuoha (2011) stated that the law enforcement crackdown on
MASSOB increased
in March 2000, when Uwazuruike was detained by the State Security Service (SSS)
primarily based on his quest for secession from the main federation. In 2006, Uwazuruike
and five others were arrested and arraigned by the federal government for treasonable
charges and were only granted temporary bail towards the end of 2007. (p. 413)
According to a report on the UK government country policy and information notes on Biafran
secessionist groups (2021), former President Goodluck Jonathan had in May 2013 designated
MASSOB as an extremist group threatening Nigerian national security. What these
confrontations with the law enforcement show is that “memories of persecution, suffering and
marginalization can sustain group identities, and even after festering for years or decades can
translate into a basis for future violence” (Onuoha, 2013b, p. 2182).
These punitive measures by the Nigerian government resulted in a change of tone and
strategy on the part of the leader of MASSOB. In November 2007, one month after he was
released from detention, the leader of MASSOB, Chief Ralph Uwazuruike, issued a statement in
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which he said: “I am not levying war against Nigeria. I am not conspiring with anyone to levy
war. What I am saying is not secession, but self-determination, the right an individual has to say
I want to be on my own. What I advocate is self-determination by non-violent means” (Vanguard
Newspaper, 2007, November 5, as cited in Owen, 2009, p. 575).
This change of strategy and tone by Uwazuruike after his release from prison coupled
with a conflict that had erupted among his members over the leadership of the movement while
he was in prison in 2006 resulted in the fragmentation of MASSOB and the emergence of
breakaway factions or splinter groups (Duruji, 2009, as cited in Onuoha, 2011; Duruji, 2012).
This is exactly what Omeje (2005) predicted will happen. Omeje (2005) had argued that “even
though MASSOB and its Diaspora allies advocate non-violence struggle, a large and growing
proportion of the group’s followers tend to favor militancy and chances are high that these
zealots could take the struggle much farther than presently envisaged” (p. 634). This actually
happened.
Uwazurike’s leadership style caused the breakaway of the Coalition of Biafra Liberation
Groups (COBLIG) and the Biafra Must Be Society (BIAMUBS) (Okonkwo, 2008, as cited in
Duruji, 2012). In addition, there were accusations of mismanagement of fund levied against
Uwazurike. Duruji (2012) noted that Uwazurike was accused “of high-handedness and misuse of
the organization’s resources for personal gratification, including the building of the massive
edifice called the Freedom House in his hometown of Okwe, Imo state” (p. 544). Another factor
that needs to be considered which in fact hampered their morale is that MASSOB’s activities did
not receive enough “attention from the international media and community” (Ugorji, 2017b,
para. 12).
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The challenges and limitations faced by MASSOB in leading the way for the realization
of the Biafran independence have given birth to new pro-Biafra independence activists with
unyielding position, radical and innovative strategies. Like MASSOB members, members of
these radical splinter groups were born during and after the Nigeria-Biafra War (1967-1970), and
have never experienced or witnessed war. As Omeje (2005) argued, “nostalgic reflections,
sophisticated propaganda, effusion of sentiments and pro-Ghandian alternatives would hardly
achieve statehood in a neo-patrimonial postcolonial setting where high stakes like oil (the lifeblood of the state) are involved” (p. 634).
As will be discussed in the next section, the breakaway factions from MASSOB worried
that their Biafran independence dream will not be achieved through MASSOB under the
leadership of Ralph Uwazuruike (Ugorji, 2017b). The most famous and highly celebrated among
these radical pro-Biafra independence activists of our time is Nnamdi Kanu, a Nigerian-British,
London-based director of Radio Biafra, generally referred to by the media and his followers as
the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).
Third Avenue: Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a conglomeration of some radical splinter groups
from MASSOB, emerged between 2012 and 2014 from a London based online Radio Biafra
broadcast headed by a Nigerian-British pro-Biafra independence activist, Nnamdi Kanu, a
former member of MASSOB (Ugorji, 2017b). According to BBC News (2021, February 4), the
leader of IPOB, “Nnamdi Kanu came to fame in 2009 when he started Radio Biafra and
broadcast to Nigeria from London, using the platform to call for Biafran independence and
urging his followers to take up arms against the Nigerian state” (para. 15). Being a young man at
the time who was born during the Nigeria-Biafra War, he “decided to use the emerging mode of
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communication, social media, and online radio to drive millions of pro-Biafra independence
activists, supporters and sympathizers to his Biafran cause” (Ugorji, 2017b, para. 12).
In my case study presentation on the Biafra conflict (Ugorji, 2015, November 17), I
summarized the main arguments of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) as well as the
responses of the federal government of Nigeria. These are presented in table 6 below.
Table 6
Arguments of the Indigenous People of Biafra and Government Response










Indigenous People of Biafra
Biafra was an existing autonomous nation
before the arrival of the British in Africa
The 1914 amalgamation that united the
North and South and created the new
country called Nigeria is illegal because it
was decided without the consent of
indigenous peoples (it was a forced
amalgamation)
And the 100 years terms of the
amalgamation experiment expired in 2014
which automatically dissolved the Union
Economic and political marginalization
within Nigeria
Lack of developmental projects in
Biafraland
Security problems: killings of the Biafrans
in Nigeria
Fear of total extinction








Federal Government of Nigeria
All the other regions that form part of
Nigeria also existed as autonomous
nations before the arrival of the British
Other regions were also forced into the
union, however, the founding fathers of
Nigeria unanimously agreed to continue
with the union after independence in 1960
At the end of the 100 years of the
amalgamation, the past administration
convened a National Dialogue and all the
ethnic groups in Nigeria discussed the
issues concerning the union, including the
preservation of the union
Any expressed intention or attempt to
overthrow the federal or state
governments is considered a treason or
treasonable felony

Nnamdi Kanu was quoted to believe that “it is impossible to achieve independence
without war and violence” (Government of IPOB, 2014, p. 15) on the grounds that relying on the
Nigerian judicial system and process to decide the self-determination and independence of Biafra
is only a myth that will never be realized. Therefore, Mr. Kanu’s Radio Biafra and IPOB
followers have resolved to use all means within their power to achieve the independence of
Biafra even if it ends in the use force, violence and war.
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This radical approach and the reason for it was addressed by Maiangwa (2016) who
argued that “the unaddressed transgenerational memories and trauma of the past can easily
nurture the condition for the families of victims of injustice to seek redress—through violent or
non-violent means—for the wrongdoing committed against them or their forbears” (Maiangwa,
2016, p. 44). For IPOB members, peace and justice are not simply the absence of violence or
war. It is mostly the action of changing the status quo until the system and policies of oppression
are overthrown, and freedom is restored to the oppressed (Ugorji, 2015). This approach may be
analyzed, interpreted and understood from the theoretical perspective of a “positive peace”
which is beyond the scope of this study.
Comprised of educated as well as non-educated young people with a mastery of the 21st
century technologies, sophisticated in their commitment to reveal the hidden and painful
historical events in Nigeria by telling and discussing the untold stories about the past, and savvy
in their use of social media (such as Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, WhatsApp, message boards) as
well as online radio and television, the IPOB movement has succeeded in zooming the light and
redirecting the attention of millions of people worldwide to the untold stories about the NigeriaBiafra War and its devastating impact on the former Biafran people and their descendants
(Ugorji. 2017b). They have also leveraged on the strong sentiments and sympathy their stories
have generated to mobilize millions of Biafran sympathizers both in Nigeria and abroad to join
their fight for self-determination and independence of Biafra as members of IPOB, while
appealing especially to young people who are seeing for the first time the revealed images,
videos and audios of the Nigeria-Biafra War on the internet and other social media and
communication platforms.
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In my November 2015 presentation on the Biafra conflict (Ugorji, 2015), which I
delivered at the Nova Southeastern University’s Department of Conflict Resolution Studies in
Florida, I stated that:
The pro-Biafra movement led by Radio Biafra London and its Director, Nnamdi
Kanu, is most likely to resort to violence and war as these have been part of their
rhetoric and ideology. Through their online broadcast, this group has mobilized
millions of Biafrans and their sympathizers both in Nigeria and abroad, and it is
reported that they have called on Biafrans all over the world to donate millions of
dollars and pounds to them to procure arms and ammunition to wage a war
against Nigeria, especially the Northern Muslims [if the federal government of
Nigeria does not grant their request for independence]. Based on their assessment
of the struggle, they believe that it may be impossible to achieve independence
without violence or war. And this time, they think they will win Nigeria in the
war if eventually they will have to go to war to achieve their independence and be
free. These are mostly young people who did not witness or experience the civil
war of 1967-1970.
A month before this presentation on Biafra, that is, on October 14, 2015 to be
exact, Nnamdi Kanu, the director of Radio Biafra and the self-proclaimed leader of the
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) was arrested by the State Security Service (SSS)
upon his return to Nigeria (Ugorji, 2017b; Maiangwa, 2016). His arrest stirred up massive
protests both in Nigeria and abroad. Hundreds of IPOB members have been killed by the
Nigerian security agents, others have been seriously injured or arrested during protests
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and confrontations with the law enforcement (UK Government Country policy and
information notes, 2021).
According to BBC News (2021, February 4), Nnamdi Kanu “spent more than a
year-and-a-half in jail without trial on treason charges” (para. 16). He was later released
in April 2017 on bail after which he fled from Nigeria to an undisclosed location first,
and later to the UK from where he continued to broadcast on Radio Biafra to his
followers in Nigeria and abroad (UK Government Country policy and information notes,
2021). Unfortunately for him and his followers, Nnamdi Kanu was apprehended on June
27, 2021 supposedly on his visit to Kenya and brought back to Nigeria by the Nigerian
security operatives to face court trials on charges of treason, terrorism and so on (Busari
& Princewill, 2021, June 29; Reuters, 2021, July 20). After my assessment of his initial
arrest in October 2015, I concluded that “President Buhari’s decision to order the arrest
of Mr. Kanu and the protests that followed the arrest resulted in a rapid spread of the proBiafra independence movement” (Ugorji, 2017b, para 14).
Maiangwa (2016) described an incident that occurred in Aba, Abia State, between
IPOB members and the law enforcement. According to the author, “in February 2016, a
video footage of Nigerian security forces shooting unarmed protesters in the southeastern
city of Aba—Abia state—went viral. Thirteen of the protesters died on the spot as a result
of gunshot wounds” (Maiangwa, 2016, p. 39). The government administration of
President Muhammadu Buhari declared IPOB a terrorist organization in September 2017
(UK Government Country policy and information notes, 2021). The fact that IPOB was
labeled a terrorist organization and proscribed in 2017 by the Nigerian government did
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not prevent its leader and members from continuing their pro-Biafra independence
activism.
In the guise of acting in self-defense against perceived or real attack from Fulani
herdsmen whose activities have posed security threats in many Nigerian states, IPOB
created a militia or vigilante group named Eastern Security Network (ESN) in December
2020. In fact, IPOB had in the past established the Biafran National Guard (BNG).
Images and videos of the training and activities of IPOB’s Eastern Security Network
(ESN) coupled with the radical rhetoric of the leader of IPOB posted on social media
platforms prompted the Nigerian security forces to invade ESN’s operational base in Orlu
local government of Imo state in January 2021 using land and air military style operations
(Saharareporters, 2021, January 25). This resulted in violent confrontations between the
Nigerian forces and the ESN. Many people were killed and property destroyed (UK
Government Country policy and information notes, 2021; Saharareporters, 2021, January
25).
With the ongoing high tension, some people are afraid it could lead to a second
Nigeria-Biafra War. As will be explained in the next section, not only do the members of
the Indigenous People of Biafra with their leader, Nnamdi Kanu, want to achieve Biafran
independence by all means, they are also nostalgically obsessed with the past.
Obsession with the Past
That the repressed memories of the Nigeria-Biafra War have returned to public
consciousness can no longer be disputed. The bone of contention in this era of the return of the
repressed is twofold: 1) how to handle and reconcile conflicting or competing memories that are
being remembered; and 2) how to manage the unresolved core issues they invoke or represent.
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The first bone of contention – reconciling competing narratives about the war – which is
examined in chapter 4, Teaching the Nigeria-Biafra War History, is situated at the heart and soul
of this study. The second bone of contention – conflict resolution styles utilized by Nigerian
citizens of Biafran origin born before and after the Nigeria-Biafra War to resolve the ongoing
agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra – has been chosen as a dependent
variable for this research and is examined in this section on obsession with the past.
As hypothesized in the introduction and methodology chapters, there seems to be a
correlation between transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and conflict
resolution styles. What this means in a layman’s language is that if we learn the history of the
Nigeria-Biafra War transformatively, we will know how to manage unresolved issues about the
war. Most importantly, it is believed that due to the generational gap in the knowledge of the
Nigeria-Biafra War history, the prewar generation are most likely to demonstrate a higher level
of transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and the use of the collaborative style
of conflict resolution in their efforts to manage the ongoing agitation for self-determination and
independence of Biafra than the postwar generation.
It is true as Heerten and Moses (2014) revealed in their research that some “academic
proponents of the Biafran cause today advance arguments strikingly similar to the Biafran
propaganda campaign of the late 1960s… [And that] these scholars were either participants in
the conﬂict or are children of participants” (p. 185). As will be explained and illustrated in the
subsequent paragraphs, this repetition of the past is more predominant among the postwar
generation Biafra independence activists, especially with regard to their strategy.
Onuoha (2013b) defined the postwar generation as:

319
a second-generation Igbo separatists… most of whom were born after the Nigeria-Biafra
War in 1970... Most Igbo youths who make up the movement did not suffer the brutalities
of the war; some did as children but could hardly give a vivid account of their
experiences, except for the fact that most were raised in a difficult and unique postwar
Nigerian context that they perceived as offering little or no opportunity for selfactualization. (p. 2191)
Represented by MASSOB and IPOB members, the postwar generation in this research are
descendants of Biafran survivors who did not experience the Nigeria-Biafra War of 1967-1970
(Omeje, 2005). To understand these neo-Biafran groups, scholars have developed analytical
categories (Onuoha, 2013a). One of these analytical categories is their militancy which is “based
on their expression of certain radical features, use of inflammatory rhetoric, quest to disengage
from the Nigerian state project, and inevitable clash with State Security Services” (Adekson
2004, as cited in Onuoha, 2013a, p. 430).
On the other hand, the prewar generation refers to those Igbo elders and elites who
witnessed, participated in, or were direct victims of, the Nigeria-Biafra War of 1967-1970. They
are Biafran survivors who were not completely consumed in the Nigeria-Biafra War of 19671970 (Government of IPOB, 2014). According to Onuoha (2013a), the prewar generation “refers
to those who experienced the horrors of the war… [And as a result] are not favorably disposed to
the idea of another war or a secessionist attempt” (p. 443). While referring to the prewar
generation as “the Igbo establishment,” Omeje (2005) stated that they “comprise many war
veterans and much older adults that have bitter memories of the pain and agony of the war” (p.
634).
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Understanding the generational gap in the knowledge of the Nigeria-Biafra War history is
indispensable (Omeje, 2005). Although both the prewar generation and postwar generation seek
to accomplish one goal – management of the unrolved core issues the returned war memories
evoke –, their strategies or means to attain this goal are incompatible and “are increasingly at
loggerheads” (Omeje, 2005, p. 634). It is in their ongoing struggle to attain the goal of selfdetermination or independence either through a nonviolent, rule of law based strategy or by all
means, including violent resistance, that obsession with the past comes in handy for the parties –
the prewar generation and postwar generation.
Obsession with the past in this context should be understood in two ways: as an old idea
or as a repetition. On the one hand, it signifies an old idea or a paracosm – a detailed imaginary
world – that never stops to preoccupy or intrude one’s mind. For the Igbos, that old idea or
imaginary world presents itself in the form of a restructured Nigeria in which Southeastern
Nigeria will enjoy increased autonomy over the affairs of their current occupied territory (similar
to the agreement reached by Ojukwu and Gowon in Aburi, Ghana) or irredentism, that is, a
return to the idea of the Land of the Rising Sun, their short-lived Biafran state.
On the other hand, obsession with the past could be understood as repetition. This means
the repetition of the same arguments and propaganda campaigns made by the leaders of the
former Eastern Region government, particularly by General Ojukwu, and the federal military
government of Nigeria led by General Gowon before and during the 30-month bloody war, as
well as the repetition of the decisions and actions that resulted in the war. Given that the policies
and actions of the current Nigerian government on the Biafran issue are predictable, and having
observed a generational divide among the Igbos on how to manage their conflict with the federal
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government of Nigeria, this discussion on obsession with the past is limited to a comparison
between the strategies of the prewar generation and postwar generation of the Igbo ethnic group.
Now is the time to explain how the postwar generation represented by MASSOB and
IPOB engage in the obsession with or repetition of the past. “Although the actors, the political
climate, and the reasons may be different, the goal and propaganda are still the same. The Igbos
claim that they are the victims of an unfair relationship and treatment at the center. Therefore, a
complete independence from Nigeria is the ideal solution” (Ugorji, 2017b, para. 11). In addition
to all the strategies of MASSOB and IPOB that were reviewed in the preceding sections of this
study, the one that uniquely brought these postwar generation movements “to the center stage of
national public debate and the front pages of major newspapers” (Ugorji, 2017b, para.17) is their
skillful work on emotions.
In my 2017 article, “Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB): A Revitalized Social
Movement in Nigeria,” I analyzed how IPOB has used emotion work to mobilize support for
their Biafran independence cause.
Because the experience of the Nigeria-Biafra War helped in shaping the collective history
and memory of the Igbo ethnic group, it is easy to see how emotion has contributed to the
spread of the pro-Biafra independence movement. Upon discovering and watching the
videos of the horrific massacre and death of the Igbos during the war, Nigerians of Igbo
descent born after the Nigeria-Biafra War will absolutely be angry, sad, shocked, and will
develop hatred toward the Hausa-Fulani of the north. The leaders of the Indigenous
People of Biafra know it. That is why they include such horrific images and videos of the
Nigeria-Biafra War in their messages and propaganda as reasons why they are seeking
independence. (Ugorji, 2017b, para. 17)
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This is exactly what happened after the 1966 pogroms of Eastern Nigerians in the north
as well as during the 30-month bloody war that ensued. Eastern Region under Ojukwu’s
leadership as its military governor used the images of the victims and survivors of the pogroms
and war-time massacres or starvation to galvanize majority of Eastern Nigerians into supporting
the secession of Biafra from Nigeria. They also used images and videos of war victims to
mobilize support for the war from the Biafran people as well as generate sympathy and support
from foreigners.
When strong emotions and sentiments are stirred up, and feelings of revenge are incited
through inflammatory, hate-filled, demonizing and stereotypical rhetoric of the movement
leader, it becomes impossible for a rational public discussion on the Biafran conflict to take
place. Arguments that are based on emotion or affective state only, and not on reason, can easily
escalate the conflict from a manifest conflict stage to an aggressive conflict stage as the so-called
perpetrators will be driven to a counter-action. Omeje (2005) observed that:
relations between the Igbo and their two larger Nigerian rival groups have never been
worse since the end of the Biafran war and, as opposed to dousing the tension, the
adversarial rhetoric of the neo-Biafra activists and their allegations of conspiracy,
subjugation and domination by the ‘Hausa/Fulani/Yoruba oligarchs’ clearly places the
campaigners’ brand of ethnic nationalism on a strategic danger of reciprocal bigotry and
hate. (p. 634)
This is exactly what happened in 2017 in the north and has also happened in Yorubaland
of Western Nigeria. On June 6, 2017, a coalition of northern youth groups under the umbrella of
Arewa Youth Consultative Forum gave an
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eviction notice to the Igbos who were living in Northern Nigeria. The eviction notice
enjoined all Igbos residing in all the northern states of Nigeria to move out within three
months and asked that all Hausa-Fulani in the eastern states of Nigeria should return to
the north. This group openly stated that they will engage in acts of violence against the
Igbos who refuse to obey the eviction notice and relocate by October 1, 2017. (Ugorji,
2017b, para. 18)
The action and counter-action between these postwar youth-led militant movements –
Indigenous People of Biafra (of the Igbo) and Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (of the HausaFulani) – is just another example of a repetition of the 1966 rhetoric and actions.
In addition, MASSOB’s founding was based on obsession with the past. To buttress this
point, Duruji (2012) affirmed that MASSOB’s founder, Ralph Uwazurike, had argued that:
the nonchalant attitude of both federal and state authorities to bring to justice perpetrators
of the Sharia riot of 2000 in Kaduna and the Miss World riot of 2002 in Kano, was an
assault on the psyche of the Igbo people who were the most seriously affected victims of
the riots. This and other sentiments expressing the alienation and marginalization of Igbo
people in Nigeria constituted the bedrock upon which MASSOB was formed and
sustained. (p. 542)
This is a repetition of the same argument put forward by Ojukwu, the military governor of
former Eastern Region after the 1966 pogroms of the Igbos and other Eastern Nigerians in the
north. As discussed previously, Ojukwu and other former Biafran leaders argued that since the
federal government was not able to protect the lives and property of Eastern Nigerians in the
north or bring to justice those Northern Nigerians who were responsible for the pogroms of
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Eastern Nigerians, secession from Nigeria was the only way to guarantee the safety and security
of all Eastern Nigerians.
Emotion work in this era of the return of the repressed war memories to public
consciousness and obsession with the past, just as it was before and during the Nigeria-Biafra
War, cannot achieve its goal without passing through various modes of communication. Before
and during the Nigeria-Biafra War, four modes of communication were often used. They
included verbal (speeches, Radio Biafra), non-verbal expressions and actions, written (reports,
newspapers and newsletters) and visual (photo images, catoons and other artistic drawings and
works).
The postwar generation Biafra independence activists also utilize these modes of
communication but in their optimized forms, thanks to the advancement in communication
technologies. Despite the advancement in communication technology that has given birth to new
modes of communication with a wider, global audience such as social media and online news
media which have replaced print media and old frequency-based radio stations, the postwar
generation Biafra independence activists are still obsessed with the past both in the content and
style of their communication.
Four examples could suffice in explaining this phenomenon. The first is the revitalization
of Ojukwu’s defunct Radio Biafra in 2009 by Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of IPOB. This is how I
described Nnamdi Kanu’s Radio Biafra in 2017 arguing that the revitalization of Radio Biafra:
was a smart move because the name, Radio Biafra is very symbolic. Radio Biafra was the
name of the national radio station of the defunct Biafran state, and it operated from 1967
to 1970. At a time, it was used to promote the Igbo nationalist narrative to the world and
to mold the Igbo consciousness within the region. From 2009, the new Radio Biafra aired
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online from London, and has drawn millions of Igbo listeners to its nationalist and
secessionist propaganda. To draw the attention of the Nigerian government, the director
of Radio Biafra and self-proclaimed leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra, Mr.
Nnamdi Kanu, decided to use provocative rhetoric and expressions, some of which are
considered to be hate speech and incitement to violence and war. He continuously aired
broadcasts that portrayed Nigeria as a zoo and Nigerians as animals without rationality.
The banner of his radio’s Facebook page and website read: ‘The zoo called Nigeria’. He
called for the supply of arms and ammunitions to wage war against the northern HausaFulani people if they oppose the independence of Biafra, stating that this time, Biafra will
defeat Nigeria in war. (Ugorji, 2017b, para. 13)
In fact, according to the UK Government Country policy and information notes (2021), Nnamdi
Kanu’s Facebook page was banned by Facebook in February 2021 “for violating its rules on
harm and hate speech” (p. 44).
The inflammatory rhetoric and deceptive propaganda of Nnamdi Kanu and his fellow
IPOB leaders in this era of the return of the repressed war memories to public consciousness is
nothing but a repetition of prewar propaganda of former Eastern Nigerian leaders, especially
after the pogroms and during the war. Uwechue (2004) stated that prior to the war Ojukwu, the
then military governor of Eastern Region, assured Eastern Nigerians that “he was well prepared
for any eventuality and that he was militarily strong enough to offer the required protection to his
people in the event of an armed conflict” (p. 19). In reality, and as discussed in detail in the
previous sections, Ojukwu had no arms and military equipment ready to prosecute such a bloody
war against the heavily armed federal military government of Nigeria (Achebe, 2012). “He had
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made no true preparations for war even after his forces had repelled the initial police action”
(Richard Ali, as cited in Ogundipe, 2016, p. 180).
Boasting and propaganda alone were insufficient to engage the federal military
government of Nigeria in war. Richard Ali, as cited in Ogundipe (2016), stated that Ojukwu’s
“fatal miscalculation seemed to be the belief that bluster alone could avoid a military attempt to
dissuade the East from their secession” (p. 180). Also, disregarding the advice and views of
important and experienced political leaders of Igbo origin, such as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Michael
Okpara and others like them was the beginning of the downfall of Biafra (Ikejiani, 2005, as cited
in Achebe, 2012). Dr. Okechukwu Ikejiani revealed this fact on March 6, 2005:
when a leader of a nation wants to go to war, he should consult people… I told Ojukwu
[to] invite these people [and inform them]. He told me they would compromise. That’s
what he said. He didn’t invite them, never asked them questions. That’s not how to lead.
That’s what led us into trouble. There are many areas we would have compromised.
Ojukwu did not compromise. That’s one of the mistakes we made in the war…. (Achebe,
2012, p. 216)
In fact, after the death of millions of Biafrans and seeing that the heavily armed Nigerian
forces were closing in on Biafra in early January 1970, Ojukwu fled to Ivory Coast with his
family and part of his inner circle, leaving behind miserable and helpless Biafran civilians and
military. If Ojukwu were truly the hero he is associated with, he would have stayed in Biafra
with his people until the end of the war as he had advocated – to fight on till the end.
Nevertheless, Achebe’s (2012) conclusion on why Ojukwu fled to Ivory Coast should not be
neglected. According to him, “by taking himself out of the equation, so to speak, Ojukwu robbed
his old nemesis Gowon of the war booty he sought the most – his head. Therefore, the protracted
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internal rivalry between the two men… had no resolution, and he had robbed Gowon of closure
and complete satisfaction in victory” (Achebe, 2012, p. 224). Uwechue (2004), on the other
hand, argued that “by positively encouraging through intensive propaganda its own supporters to
the baneful notion of ‘mass suicide if need be’, Lt. Col. Ojukwu’s government has not put itself
in a stronger moral position than that of Lagos” (pp. 19-20).
It is therefore of vital importance in this era of the return of the repressed to public
consciousness that the postwar generation Biafra independence activists learn from the past in
order not to make the same mistakes that resulted in the death of millions of Biafrans caused by
the 30-month bloody war. Unfortunately, what happened when the Nigerian military Operation
Python Dance troops arrived in Afaraukwu, Umuahia in Abia state, the home town of Nnamdi
Kanu, the leader of IPOB, is an epitome and glimpse of a repetition of the past. On September
14, 2017 Nnamdi Kanu escaped to undisclosed locations before making his way to Israel and
finally to the UK where his family lives (Eze, 2019, November 3). This ordeal is a repetition of
the same old pattern of incitement, resistance, escalation and escape or flight to the detriment of
vulnerable Igbo population.
The second repetitive content has to do with the use of slogans by the IPOB leaders and
members. One example of such slogans is “Biafra or death.” By this it means “give us Biafra or
let us die for Biafra.” IPOB leaders encourage their members to be ready to sacrifice their lives
for the Biafran independence struggle if need be. A similar slogan was used by former Biafran
leaders prior and during the Nigeria-Biafra War. As stated before, Biafran propaganda
encouraged Biafrans to fight the war or face total extermination (genocide) by the Nigerian
forces (Perham, 1970). Another slogan used by former Biafran leaders was “sovereignty or mass
suicide” (Uwechue, 2004). However, and as was previously examined, Biafrans were not
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exterminated after the surrender of the Biafran military to the federal forces on January 12, 1970.
They were welcomed back and reintegrated into Nigeria.
The third is the association or analogy of the Holocaust with the pogroms of the Igbos in
Northern Nigeria which is a common feature of both the former Biafran propaganda and the
postwar generation propaganda. According to Onuoha (2013a),
the most striking and exploited aspect of the neo-Biafran struggle for self-determination
is the Igbo identification with the Jews, who are perceived to have suffered the same fate
as the Igbo nation in the face of genocide. The neo-Biafran movement emphasizes
narratives that link the Igbo to oriental traditions of origin. These narratives stem from
Nri, popularly described as the cradle of Igbo culture and home to the famous kingdom of
Eri. The myth of Eri describes him as the founding father of the Igbo civilization, the fifth
son of Gad, one of the original 12 sons of Jacob, and the lost tribe of Israel. (p. 440)
Due to this genealogical association with the Jews, many postwar generation Biafra
independence activists have converted to Judaism from Christianity, and the construction of
Temples is on the rise in the southeastern states of Nigeria.
The fourth is related to the issue of former minorities within the old Eastern Region. With
the defeat of Biafra and creation of thirty-six states in Nigeria which have been divided into six
geopolitical zones, former minority areas within the old Eastern Region now called the South
South Region are separated from the core Igbo areas now known as South East Region.
Obsession with the past in this context has to do with the fact that the postwar generation Biafra
independence activists like IPOB have included the six South South Regional states of Akwa
Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers as part of their imagined independent
republic of Biafra.
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Just like in 1966 and 1967, most of the postwar generation Biafra independence activists
are Igbo from the South East Regional states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo. It is
true that links are currently being forged between some militant groups in the Niger Delta (South
South Region) and the postwar generation Biafra independence militant groups (NwajiakuDahou, 2009). An example is Alhaji Mujahid Asari-Dokubo’s March 13, 2021 declaration of
Biafra De Facto Customary Government which included Niger Delta territories under his
proposed Biafran government (Alechenu, et al., 2021, March 15; Onuigbo, 2021, March 16).
Although Asari-Dokubo was the president of the Ijaw Youth Council, some Niger Delta based
militant groups such as his own Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and Movement for the Survival of
Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in Niger Delta (MOSIEND) quickly rejected his move to include their
region in Biafra De Facto Customary Government and suspended him from their militant
organizations (Saharareporters, 2021, March 21). The postwar generation Biafra independence
activists’ propaganda that the whole of South South Region is in support of Biafran
independence from Nigeria is nothing but a repetition of the past – exactly what Ojukwu did in
1967, including his invasion of the Mid-West Region which backfired. As was previously
revealed, coopting the minorities from the present-day South South Region into the Biafran
secessionist agenda by force or by ruse was the beginning of the fall of Biafra.
In sharp contrast with the ideology and methodology of the postwar generation Biafra
independence activists represented by MASSOB and the IPOB movement, but united in the same
goal of achieving self-determination for Biafra, the elders in Biafraland who witnessed,
participated in, or were direct victims of, the Nigeria-Biafra War of 1967-1970 strongly advocate
for a peaceful process of achieving self-determination and, if possible, independence through
nonviolence and based on the rule of law. Onuoha (2013b) revealed in his research that “while
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the older generation… relates to the emancipation of the Igbo not necessarily as an immediate
project, but as a long-term project, the younger generation sees Igbo emancipation as an
immediate project” (p. 2191).
Prominent among the prewar Biafran elders are war veterans who fought on the Biafran
side and key civilian actors during the war, most of whom are members of the Ohanaeze Ndigbo
(a pan-cultural association), the Igbo Leaders of Thought, or the Supreme Council of Elders of
Indigenous People of Biafra (SCE), as well as the governors of the five southeastern states.
Omeje (2005) who referred to these Igbo elders and elites as the “Igbo establishment” affirmed
that they have “distanced themselves from the activities of the neo-Biafra movement and have
also occasionally denounced the agenda of the organisations” (p. 633). Akinyele (2001, as cited
in Onuoha, 2011) also revealed that:
prominent elite Igbo groups like Ohanaeze Ndi-Igbo and Aka Ikenga both agree on the
need to address the Igbo Question and the place of the Igbo in the post-civil war Nigerian
project, but their opposition to MASSOB is predicated largely on disagreements on the
best strategy for pursuing this collective Igbo agenda. The uneasy relationship between
MASSOB and the Ohanaeze Ndi-Igbo is captured in the outright rejection of the former’s
separatist alternative by the latter. While MASSOB perceives Ohanaeze NdiIgbo as
basically moderate or conservative, or even complicit in subverting the Igbo agenda, it
has assumed a radical and critical stance, by rejecting the leadership of the organization
and describing them as a group of ‘elderly cowards’ who have aided the marginalization
of the Igbo. (p. 416)
Onuoha (2013a) further stated that “these opposing views have sometimes led to open threats of
attack on prominent Igbo elites by the neo-Biafran movement, and with the tacit and open
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support of these political elites in the south-east there have been several raids on the hideouts of
the neo-Biafran movement across the region” (pp. 436-437).
Ambassador Raph Uwechue, a well-known diplomat and scholar who represented Biafra
in France as an envoy until 1968 (Achebe, 2012) and later became the President General of
Ohanaeze Ndigbo (2009-2013), cautioned against slogans such as “sovereignty or mass suicide”
and “Biafra or death” in his memoir, “Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future”
(Uwechue, 2004). According to him:
if the objective in view is to alleviate the effect of this tragedy rather than to worsen it,
then it is the duty of responsible leadership to coax and guide a justly embittered people
towards the most salutary and beneficial objectives. Without neglecting its obligations to
the memory of the dead, Biafran leadership has a more positive and definite
responsibility to the living – to see that as many of them as possible go on living. This is
– or was – the purpose of the entire struggle. Viewed otherwise it is meaningless.
Sovereignty or mass suicide is an irresponsible slogan unworthy of the sanction or
encouragement of any serious and sensible leadership. (Uwechue, 2004, p. 20)
Also, given that the Nigerian constitution recognizes the use of customary law and sharia
law in settling disputes in Nigeria, and in order to provide a constitutional and legal argument for
the self-determination of Biafra, the Supreme Council of Elders (SCE) decided to revitalize the
Customary Law Government of Indigenous People of Biafra (Government of IPOB, 2014).
These elders claim that their arguments for self-determination of Biafra are based on the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) and the Laws of the Federation
of Nigeria (1990) that guarantee the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, while
stating that:
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1. All peoples shall have right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political
status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy
they have freely chosen.
2. Colonized or oppressed people shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds
of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community.
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States Parties to the present
Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political,
economic or cultural. (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, Cap. 10: African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 20(1)(2)(3))
The elders in Biafraland (or as used in this study, the prewar generation) have
categorically taken an anti-war and anti-violence position on the issue of self-determination and
independence of Biafra. As I also noted in my November 2015 presentation on the Biafra
conflict at the Nova Southeastern University’s Department of Conflict Resolution Studies in
Florida (Ugorji, 2015), the Supreme Council of Elders of Indigenous People of Biafra (SCE)
argued that:
from the Nigerian-Biafran experience, war is an ill-wind that blows no good to anyone.
‘Both Nigeria as a whole and the remnants of Biafra who were not consumed in this war
are still suffering from the effects of the war. Having experienced, and fought during, the
war, the Supreme Council of Elders of Indigenous People of Biafra does not accept the
ideology and methodology of war and violence in the Biafran struggle for independence’
(Government of IPOB, 2014, p. 15). Having lost the war of 1967-1970, the Supreme
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Council of Elders of Indigenous People of Biafra believes that the legal process is the
only method by which Biafra could achieve its independence. (Ugorji, 2015)
The incompatible positions taken by the prewar generation and postwar generation on the
issue of self-determination and independence of Biafra on the one hand, and the observed
contradictory conflict styles with which these two groups try to achieve their mutual goal of selfdetermination and independence on the other hand, highlight the importance and role of history
and memory in conflict and conflict resolution. Based on their direct (immediate) experience of
the Nigeria-Biafra War, and influenced by both the traumatic memory of what happened to them
during the war and the lessons learned, the prewar generation, exemplified by the Supreme
Council of Elders, categorically and strongly oppose those actions and behaviors that will result
in another violence and war as a means to achieve self-determination and independence. But they
openly welcome opportunities for negotiation, mediation, dialogue, and the legal process.
However, since the postwar generation exemplified by the leader of IPOB with his followers
were born during and after the Nigeria-Biafra War (1967-1970), they do not have direct
(immediate) experience of the Nigeria-Biafra War, and probably have never had direct
experience of war in other countries. Lack of immediate experience of war within the Nigerian
context just as it was for the then young military governor of former Eastern Nigeria, Lieutenant
Colonel Ojukwu, is probably why the postwar generation Biafra independence activists are
unconsciously or consciously obsessed with the past.
As I noted in 2017, “the continuous agitation for the independence of Biafra could be
described as a coin with two sides. On one side is labeled the price that the Igbo ethnic group has
paid or will pay for the Biafra independence agitation. On the other side is engraved the benefits
for bringing the Biafran issues to the public for a national discussion” (Ugorji, 2017b, para. 20).
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In the preceding sections I analyzed the price former Biafrans paid for the declaration of
independence. These devastating consequences, as I summarized them in Ugorji (2017b), include
but not limited to:
the death of millions of Biafrans and other Nigerians before, during and after the NigeriaBiafra War of 1967-1970; destruction of property and other infrastructures; famine and
kwashiorkor outbreak (a terrible disease caused by starvation); political exclusion of the
Igbos at the federal executive branch of government; unemployment and poverty;
interruption of the education system; forced migration leading to brain drain in the
region; underdevelopment; healthcare crisis; transgenerational trauma, and so on. (para.
21)
I also noted in the same 2017 article on “Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB): A
Revitalized Social Movement in Nigeria” (Ugorji, 2017b) that:
the present-day agitation for Biafra independence comes with many consequences for the
Igbo ethnic group. These are but not limited to intra-ethnic division within the Igbo
ethnic group between the pro-Biafra independence group and the anti-Biafra
independence group; disruption of the education system due to youth involvement in
protests; threats to peace and security within the region which will prevent external or
foreign investors from coming to invest in the southeastern states as well as preventing
tourists from traveling to the southeastern states; economic downturn; emergence of
criminal networks that may hijack the non-violent movement for criminal activities;
confrontations with the law enforcement that could result in the death of protesters as it
happened in late 2015 and in 2016; reduction of Hausa-Fulani or Yoruba confidence in a
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potential Igbo candidate for presidential election in Nigeria which will make the election
of an Igbo president of Nigeria more difficult than ever before. (para. 22)
On this note, Omeje (2005) had predicted that “the comeback and upsurge of the enyimba enyi
spirit [i.e., Biafran war song that encouraged Biafrans to go to war] remains potentially
detrimental to the Igbo as the human and material consequences of turning Igboland into a
battleground for a major conflagration or for the more probable scenario of intensified
crackdown of insurgencies would be most colossal” (p. 634).
On the flip side of the coin, the ongoing national discussions on the unresolved issues of
the Nigeria-Biafra War which the return of the repressed war memories to public consciousness
has evoked present many benefits to the Nigerian people as a whole. One of such benefits is to
engage in a respectful, meaningful, and policy based public discussion on the best way to
restructure Nigeria for the good of all citizens and federating units.
The second benefit could be to engage in a public policy discussion on reparation for all
the injustices committed against both the former Biafrans and other Nigerians prior, during and
after the Nigeria-Biafra War (Maiangwa, 2016).
In addition to reparation, the third is the proposal put forward by Maiangwa (2016) which
is “an acknowledgement of and apology for past wrongdoing, memorialization, and mediation
forums for inclusive dialogues” (pp. 51-52). As was discussed in the preceding section, the
military head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, has already offered a public apology to the Igbos
of Asaba for the Asaba massacre. Although this apology was not an official apology of the
federal government, it created a pathway for memorialization projects to begin in Asaba and
elsewhere. Nevertheless, I agree with Maiangwa (2016) that “memorialization could translate
into a national day of commemoration for the victims on all sides” (p. 55).
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The fourth benefit that the return of the repressed war memories offers to Nigerians,
which is the primary goal of this research, is to initiate a transformative teaching and learning of
the Nigeria-Biafra War history in schools in order to deepen if not complete national
reconciliation. This meets Maiangwa’s (2016) need for mediation dialogue forums in which
“participants will understand that not everyone has contributed to atrocities, that many people on
all sides have suffered or committed some form of atrocities against the other, and that only by
working through the legacies of their history together can the ‘vicious cycle of repetition be
disrupted’” (p. 58). Since “social movements have played vital roles in making structural and
policy changes in countries around the world” (Ugorji. 2017b, para. 16), a transformative
teaching and learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history in schools is the most important policy
change this research proposes. As I had previously argued, “what is required now is not a
destructive argument or conversation with respect to who the enemy is or who is right or wrong;
rather what is needed is a constructive conversation on how to build a more inclusive, respectful,
equitable and just Nigerian state” (Ugorji, 2017b, para. 23).
Despite the persistent and rapid return of the repressed war memories to public
consciousness, and irrespective of “the growth of public and scholarly interest, however sound
and comprehensive” (Heerten & Moses, 2014, p. 192), it is alarming to observe that both the
proponents of Biafra and the federal government are still locked in the repetition of the same
arguments made by each conflict party before, during and after the war without an openness to
critically examine each other’s claims and by so doing move beyond rigid positions to exploring
and understanding each other’s interests and needs. This is one of the tasks accomplished by the
proposed transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history.
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An important task before us in this era of the return of repressed memories of the NigeriaBiafra War and its obsession is how to move from obsession with the past to the transformative
learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history in order for the phrase never again to actually mean
never again. To move beyond obsession with the past in this context means to go beyond simple
repetition of the same conflict style(s) and narrative(s) that led to the Nigeria-Biafra War in order
to explore, design and engage in a transformative learning of the history of the war. This task is
situated in the heart and soul of this research.
Before I delve into a discussion on the transformative learning theory and practice, I
propose to examine four theories that are indispensable to this research: theories of knowledge,
memory, forgetting, and history.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework
This research draws on theories of knowledge (Steup & Neta, 2020), as well as memory,
forgetting and history (Ricoeur, 2004) to explore the implications and effects of revealing,
teaching and learning the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War after decades-long politics of
oblivion in Nigeria.
On the Theory of Knowledge
One of the fundamental goals of history is to provide an opportunity for people to know
what happened in the past. Knowledge is therefore inseparably tied to history. For this reason,
this study is justified in its examination of the theory of knowledge.
Serious scholarly writings on the theory of knowledge have their origin in a branch of
philosophy known as epistemology. Whether in the traditions of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas
Aquinas, John Locke, Emmanuel Kant, Bertrand Russell, or positivism and post-positivism,
epistemology, the study (episteme) of knowledge (logos), is primarily concerned with the
understanding of different types of cognitive success or failure (Steup & Neta, 2020). Without
downplaying the importance of a philosophical controversy over what constitutes different types
of cognitive success or cognitive failure, the questions that this research seeks to answer could
rather be understood through an explanation of what knowledge is, how it is justified and how it
is acquired. In other words, what exactly can we know? How can we justify that which we claim
to know? What are the various sources of the knowledge we claim to have?
The concept of “knowledge” has been defined in different ways and by many scholars.
However, the definition of knowledge in the Merriam-Webster dictionary (n.d.) puts forward two
important ideas: the fact or condition of knowing something with familiarity gained through
experience or association; and the sum of what is known: the body of truth, information, and
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principles acquired by humankind. In these two ideas are summarized three ways by which
humans can know. Human beings have the capacity of knowing individual persons or things,
how things are or are done, and the facts about people, things or behaviors.
According to Steup and Neta (2020), the knowledge of individuals, whether individual
persons or things, is based on acquaintance and perceptual relation to those individuals. The
extent to which this acquaintance or perception justifies knowledge is debatable. Gilbert Ryle (as
cited in Steup & Neta, 2020) believes that a fundamental difference exists between knowing how
to do something and knowing facts about doing that thing. For example, somebody may have a
doctoral degree in music without knowing how to sing well. Alternatively, a great musician may
not know as many facts associated with music as a person with a doctoral degree in music. To
know something for a fact requires three conditions: belief, truth and justification (Steup & Neta,
2020). For Steup and Neta (2020), “the three conditions—truth, belief, and justification—are
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge of facts” (para. 28). Knowledge,
according to this proposition, is therefore a justified true belief.
How then can we justify that which we hold or believe as true? Epistemologists have
over the years identified various ways by which the propositions we hold or believe to be true
can be justified. Two kinds of justification are worth discussing here. The first is deontological
justification (DJ) and the second is non-deontological justification also known as sufficient
likelihood justification (SLJ) (Steup & Neta, 2020).
To understand what deontological justification is, it is important to explain what makes a
proposition or belief deontological. When a belief is deontological, the one holding such a belief
has no obligation to abandon the belief. According to the proponents of deontological
justification, it means that S (where S is the knowing subject) is justified in believing that P
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(where P is the believed true proposition) if and only if S is not obliged to refrain from believing
that P (Steup & Neta, 2020).
For evidentialist epistemologists, “it’s possible for a belief to be deontologically justified
without being sufficiently likely to be true” (Steup & Neta, 2020, para. 43). According to the
proponents of sufficient likelihood justification (SLJ), S (where S is the knowing subject) is
justified in believing that P (where P is the believed true proposition) if and only if S believes
that P in a way that makes it sufficiently likely that her belief is true (Steup & Neta, 2020). For
one’s belief to be true and justified, one must possess some forms of evidence. By evidence it
means to have an experience that demonstrates that one’s belief or proposition is true and not
false. Evidence, by implication, experience, can be in different forms, including experiences
acquired through perception, introspection, memory, and intuition (Steup & Neta, 2020). These
sources of evidence stem from one’s internal conditions or factors and are highly influenced by
one’s mental states.
On the contrary, reliabilist epistemologists argue that having an evidence alone is not
enough to justify the belief or proposition we hold as true. According to the proponents of
reliabilism, our beliefs or the propositions we hold as true can only be justified if and only if they
are derived from a reliable source (Steup & Neta, 2020). To be reliable therefore means that the
sources of our beliefs must be objectively proven to be dependable and trustworthy. According
to Steup and Neta (2020), “for true beliefs to count as knowledge, it is necessary that they
originate in sources we have good reason to consider reliable” (para. 97). Reliabilism in this
sense highlights the need to critically examine the sources of our justified true belief – that is, the
sources of the knowledge we claim to have.
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What then are the various reliable sources of the knowledge we claim to possess? The
most commonly cited reliable sources of knowledge in epistemological texts are perception,
introspection, reason, memory, and testimony (Steup & Neta, 2020). Knowledge – that is, our
justified true belief – could be acquired or gained through any of these reliable sources (see
Figure 7) following some cognitive mechanisms which are briefly described below.
Figure 7
Reliable Sources of Knowledge
Reliable
Sources of
Knowledge

Perception

Introspection

Reason

Memory

Testimony

Perception
As an aptitude for becoming aware of something, perception is a cognitive mechanism by
which reliable knowledge is acquired or gained through our five senses of sight, touch, hearing,
smelling, and tasting. This means that perception is a “mental process by which we discern an
external object by way of the senses” (Sully, 1892, p. 207). “In perception,” affirmed Sully
(1892), “we not only attend to the sensation (or sensations) discriminating and identifying it, but
pass from the impression to the object which it indicates or makes known” (p. 207).
Because of the fallibility of our perceptual experience, Steup and Neta (2020)
distinguished between perceptual seemings – that is, hallucinations or things that appear to our
perceptual experience without being factual – and perceptual reality – things that appear to our
perceptual experience which have been verified to be as they appeared to us. For example, it is
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one thing for a house owner to hear a knock on his front door; it is another thing to see a mail
carrier when s/he opens the front door. Sometimes, it may seem that somebody knocked on the
door when in reality nobody knocked. This is perceptual seemings. When perceptual seemings
coincides with reality or actuality, for example, when the house owner opened the door and saw
the mail carrier, reliable knowledge through perceptual experience is acquired.
The question one may ask is: how then can we acquire perceptual knowledge?
Epistemological views on how perceptual knowledge of external objects is gained can be
classified into two kinds: direct realism and indirect realism (Steup & Neta, 2020; Sully, 1892).
By direct realism it means that we can directly perceive and acquire knowledge of external
objects as they appear to be. For example, when a war veteran sees a bullet, what the veteran
perceives is the bullet itself which becomes the foundation of the veteran’s knowledge. By
indirect realism, however, we do not have direct knowledge of external objects, rather what we
see and know as a bullet is nothing but a bullet-like sense-datum or our mental construct or
sensation representing a bullet. This means that we gain knowledge of external objects through
our “knowledge of sense data” (Steup & Neta, 2020, para. 100). Whether perceptual knowledge
of external objects is acquired directly or indirectly, we can prove its reliability by appeal to our
memory – that is, “through remembering whether they served us well in the past” (Steup & Neta,
2020, para. 101).
Introspection
Introspection is a faculty, capacity or process by which we inwardly self-examine or
observe both our emotional and mental states. In doing so, we come to know the contents of our
mental state, thought or feeling (Steup & Neta, 2020). For example, when we are upset, we know
by introspection our present mental state of being upset. We are in the best position to know how
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it feels to be upset. Most epistemologists agree that introspection has “a special kind of immunity
to error” (Steup & Neta, 2020, para. 102).
This immunity to error stems from the core attributes of introspection. In an introspective
experience, perceptual seemings or appearances are one and the same with their corresponding
reality. Also, introspective knowledge is acquired from a primary and authentic source – that is,
from and by the one who had an introspective experience of the phenomenon. This fact
eliminates any doubts, makes the knowledge gained through introspection certain, incorrigible
and foundational (Steup & Neta, 2020).
Reason
Perceptual experience and introspective experience as described above are necessary but
not enough for all kinds of knowledge acquisition or justification. Some forms of knowledge are
acquired through a process of reasoning or rational deduction. Epistemologists call these forms
of knowledge a priori as opposed to a posteriori which denotes knowledge gained through an
empirical observation of phenomenon (Steup & Neta, 2020).
The forms of knowledge acquired a priori “are conceptual truths (such as ‘All bachelors
are unmarried’), and truths of mathematics, geometry and logic” (Steup & Neta, 2020, para.
110). To this example, one can add: war is a fatal incident. Through a process of reasoning, we
can deduce that every bachelor is unmarried and every war results in fatality. This means that a
rational analysis of the concept of bachelor implies the state of being unmarried. In the same
way, we can know a priori that the concept of war suggests a fatal incident. We do not need to
empirically observe individual occurrences of war as it is the case with synthetic, a posteriori
knowledge before we know a priori that war implies intentional and unintentional destruction
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with devastating consequences for both the victims and perpetrators as well as the future
generations.
Memory
Memory as a source of knowledge could be of the past, present or future. For example,
we remember traumatic experiences of war that occurred in the past. We also remember the
name and phone number of a friend we want to call in the present, or the date and time of a
scheduled meeting with a colleague. Nevertheless, memory in the context of this research is
defined as “the capacity to retain knowledge acquired in the past” (Steup & Neta, 2020, para.
105) and the ability to remember them in the present.
The challenge associated with memory as a reliable source of knowledge is that not
everything we remember about the past corresponds to the truth of what happened. Those
outliers in remembering are known by epistemologists as memorial seemings (Steup & Neta,
2020). From these memorial seemings, nonetheless, it is possible to gather some clues about the
past and eventually arrive at a reliable knowledge of what happened. One way of accomplishing
this is by listening to and examining what others remember about the past through the stories
they share. This means that knowledge could be acquired from both individual memory and
collective memory.
Testimony
Testimony as a source of knowledge involves a process of remembering, narrating, or
sharing stories about what happened in the past or what we know as true. The knowledge of
something acquired through the stories of another person or multiple people is known as
testimony. Testimonies are usually available in various forms, including stories or narratives,
oral history, works of arts, sites of memory, “utterances in daily life, postings by bloggers on
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their blogs, articles by journalists, delivery of information on television, radio, tapes, books, and
other media” (Steup & Neta, 2020, para. 115).
The main issue associated with testimony is reliability. Are testimonies reliable? How
can we know if they are reliable? To answer this question, externalist epistemologists argue that
testimonies could count as reliable if and only if they are collected from reliable sources (Steup
& Neta, 2020). What then makes the source of a testimony reliable? Some epistemologists argue
that the credibility of the source is needed to determine its reliability. Thomas Reid (as cited in
Steup & Neta, 2020) “suggested that, by our very nature, we accept testimonial sources as
reliable and tend to attribute credibility to them unless we encounter special contrary reasons”
(para. 116). The yardstick for determining whether testimonial sources are credible or not
credible is explored through an inclusive theory of memory, forgetting and history.
Theories of Memory, Forgetting, and History
At the heart and soul of this research are difficult questions about memory, forgetting and
history. To be able to answer these questions, a theoretical examination of these three concepts
are done under the tutelage of Paul Ricoeur. In his classic philosophical work on “Memory,
History, Forgetting,” Ricoeur (2004) meticulously broached and analyzed the central problematic
undergirding the theory of historical memory tagged “the problematic of the representation of the
past” (p. xvi). Through this critical analysis, Ricoeur (2004) thoroughly explored the question:
“what is there to say of the enigma of an image, of an eikōn – to speak Greek with Plato and
Aristotle – that offers itself as the presence of an absent thing stamped with the seal of the
anterior?” (p. xvi).
In an effort to answer this important question about historical memory, Ricoeur (2004)
engaged in an exploration of the phenomenology of memory, epistemology of history, and
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hermeneutics of the historical condition of human beings through a critical reflection on the
concept of forgetting. In the context of this study, these concepts have been reorganized for
examination in this order: phenomenology of memory, forgetting, and the status and role of
history in the work of memory.
On the Theory of Memory
In line with the phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl, two important issues are
addressed by Ricoeur (2004) in order to explore the phenomenology of memory. To understand
the concept of memory, it is important to answer two fundamental questions: “Of what are there
memories? Whose memory is it?” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 3). To answer these two questions, Ricoeur
(2004) first debunked “the philosophical tradition that tends to favor the egological side of
mnemonic experience” (p. 3). René Descartes’ popular maxim inscribed in his canonical
“Discourse on Method” (1956) which says in Latin: cogito ergo sum or in French: je pense, donc
je suis, meaning I think therefore I am, is an example of a theory that prioritizes the “I” or
individual consciousness in mnemonic experience. Descartes’ cogito does not consider the
importance of the collective, in this case, collective memory.
Also, since “all consciousness is consciousness of something” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 3), it is
most appropriate to first understand the what – that is, what to remember or the object of
memory. Once the question about the mnemonic phenomenon is answered, then the question of
how to remember or recall it is explored followed by the question of whose memory should be
remembered. The meaning embedded in the three stages of memory – the what, how, and who –
are well illuminated by the two sides of memory (see Figures 8 and 9), namely the cognitive side
(memory as appearing into mind) and pragmatic side (memory as an object of a search) (Ricoeur,
2004).
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Figure 8
Two Sides of Memory

Figure 9
Three Stages of Memory

The what of memory. The what of memory is the thing we remember or wish to
remember. In other words, it is the object of memory or mnemonic phenomena or mneme.
Memory – or representation of the past – appears to us as an image. “We say interchangeably
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that we represent a past event to ourselves or that we have an image of it, an image that can be
either quasi visual or auditory” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 5).
The question that needs to be addressed is: Is there an “eidetic difference” between
imagination and memory? By situating the origin of this problematic within the Greco-Roman
philosophy, Ricoeur (2004) developed “a typology of mnemonic phenomena… [aimed] at
determining the original experience of temporal distance… paired with a parallel revision of the
thematic of the imaginary” (p. 6).
The Greco-Roman Notions of Memory
Platonic philosophy of memory. Plato’s characterization of memory as “the present
representation of an absent thing” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 7) stems from the overall framework of
Socrates’ dialogues on sophistry titled Theaetetus and Sophist. The sophists were skeptical of
everything, including memory and image. As a countercurrent to the skepticism of the sophists,
Socrates used his dialogues to make manifest the true meaning of things. As Ricoeur (2004)
explaind: “the problematic of the eikōn is, in addition, from the outset associated with the
imprint, the tupos, through the metaphor of the slab of wax, error being assimilated either to an
erasing of marks, semeia, or to a mistake akin to that of someone placing his feet in the wrong
footprints” (p. 8). From this problematic of the eikōn (or image) emerges the problematic of
memory by way of forgetting as illustrated through “the effacement of traces and a defect in the
adjustment of the present image to the imprint left as if by a seal in wax” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 8).
Socrates used the metaphor of “a block of wax” to explain the operation of memory (in
Greek Mnemosyne), how we remember and how we forget. Describing the function of memory,
Socrates (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004) stated:
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We make impressions upon this of everything we wish to remember [mnemoneusai]
among the things we have seen or heard or thought of ourselves; we hold the wax under
our perceptions and thoughts and take a stamp from them, in the way in which we take
the imprints [marks, semeia] of signet rings. Whatever is impressed upon the wax we
remember and know so long as the image [eidolon] remains in the wax; whatever is
obliterated or cannot be impressed, we forget [epilelesthai] and do not know. (p. 9)
Socrates’ teaching on memory, Ricoeur (2004) posited, shows that “the problem of
memory is indirectly concerned by what could be considered a phenomenology of mistakes not
only at the moment of capture but also with respect to the state of possession” (p. 10).
Mistakes in memory are often encountered in the process of recollection or remembering
and representation. Plato (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004) “distinguished veracity from trickery” (p.
11) in the process of recollection and representation. This means that our recollection and
representation of the past could either be accurate, a true image [eikōn] of the past - that is,
conforming to facts - or a deceptive appearance [phantasma] of what exactly happened in the
past. Plato’s distinction between veracity and trickery shows the limits of representation
[mimesis] of memory. According to Ricoeur (2004), “there can be a truthful or deceitful mimetic
because there is between the eikōn and the imprint a dialectic of accommodation, harmonization,
or adjustment that can succeed or fail” (p. 13). In mimesis, that is, representation of memory,
historical traces are presented in different forms, including written materials and the arts. In
Socrates’ view, “a painter [zographos]… provides illustrations [graphei]” (as cited in Ricoeur,
2004, p. 14) to written historical experience [pathema]. The challenge of memory is therefore to
discern truth and falsehood, or in Plato’s words, veracity and trickery, from mimesis.
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Aristotelian philosophy of memory. Aristotle’s theoretical reflection on memory and
recollection is articulated and presented in his collection of work entitled Parva naturalia with
the Greek title, Peri mnemes kai anamneseos translated into Latin as De memoria et
reminiscentia (Of Memory and Recollection). Memory, in Aristotle’s view, is characterized by
the notion of “affection [pathos], which distinguishes it precisely from recollection” (Ricoeur,
2004, p. 15). Affection in the sense used by Aristotle is affection produced in the soul and mind
through perceiving something in the past. Based on this, Aristotle (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004)
argued that “memory is of the past” (p. 15). The phrase “of the past” highlights the notion of
temporal distance – that is, between the time when something happened in the past and the time
when that thing is remembered (see Table 7).
Table 7
Memory is of the Past

The central question that Aristotle addressed is “how, when the affection is present but
the thing is absent, what is not present is ever remembered” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 16). Aristotle’s
answer to this question is that the affection produced by perception is like a picture
[zographema] which is often called memory. An important question follows: if this affection is
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like an image, “what is it that we remember? Is it the affection or the thing that produced it? In
other words, while perceiving an image, how can we remember something distinct from it?”
(Ricoeur, 2004, pp. 16-17). Aristotle used the metaphor of “otherness” to explain how a drawing
or inscription of something is itself perceived and at the same time serves as a “representation of
something else [allou phantasma]” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 17). By appearing as itself and
representing something else, a drawing or an inscription causes what Ricoeur (2004) called “a
double intentionality” (p. 17) in the mind of the person who is remembering. This means that an
external object, for example, a drawing, stimulates in the mind of the one remembering a series
of images that resemble the thing(s) in the past that is being remembered.
For every process of recollection, there is a starting point and ending point. In-between
these two points is situated an active search to remember. In this process named methodical
remembering by Ricoeur (2004), “the starting point remains under the command of the explorer
of the past…[and] several paths remain open leading from this same starting point” (p. 18). This,
and coupled with lapse of time, could expose the explorer – the one remembering – to error.
Since recollection involves “a sort of reasoning [sullogismos]” (Aristotle, as cited in Ricoeur,
2004, p. 18), the minimization of error in the process of remembering is possible. In Aristotle’s
philosophy, the difference between memory and recollection, that is, between “simple evocation
and effort to recall” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 19), is made more apparent (see Figure 10).

352
Figure 10
Distinction between Memory and Recollection

Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenological sketch of memory. According to Ricoeur (2004),
mnemonic phenomena should be understood “from the standpoint of the capacities” (p. 21) and
not from the deficiency of memory in terms of forgetting. This is because, as Ricoeur (2004)
points out, “we have no other resource, concerning our reference to the past, except memory
itself” (p. 21). Although memory can be abused and testimonies serving as a bridge between
memory and history can be manipulated, deceptive or officially sanctioned, Ricoeur (2004)
believed that “we have nothing better than memory to signify that something has taken place, has
occurred, has happened before we declare that we remember it” (p. 21).
What then is memory in Ricoeur’s phenomenological analysis of memory? To
understand memory, Ricoeur (2004) semantically distinguished between two typologies of
memory based on what we remember, that is, based on the object of memory (see Figures 11 and
12). The first is memory (la mémoire) as intention. The second is memories (les souvenirs) as the
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things intended. As Ricoeur’s typology of memory shows, memory as intention highlights a
capacity, habit or knowing-how which is spontaneously evoked and its evocation results in selfawareness without any explicit form of recognition of the absent past. On the other side, memory
as the things intended or as recollection is acquired by searching for the absent past through a
process of remembering connected to the situation and place in the world in which one
remembers. Recollection in this sense becomes successful when the past thing or event that is
being remembered is recognized.
Figure 11
Typology of Memory in Relation to Time
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Figure 12
A Rule-Governed Typology of Memory

Habit/memory . The two poles, habit/memory, presuppose the presence of an experience
acquired in the past. The difference between habit and memory lies in the fact that “in the case of
habit what is acquired is incorporated into the living present… In the other case, a reference is
made to the anteriority of the prior acquisition” (Ricoeur, 2004, pp. 24-25). While the former
explains how we spontaneously act out in the present the things we learned in the past, for
example, reciting a poem or the days of the week, the latter highlights the importance of
temporal distance in understanding memory, for example, a particular event that occurred in the
past whose memory could be represented in the present and preserved for the future. This means
that memory as representation depicts something that occurred in the absent past. This is why
Bergson (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004) recommended that “to call up the past in the form of an
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image, we must be able to withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have the
power to value the useless, we must have the will to dream. Man alone is capable of such an
effort” (p. 25).
Evocation/search. By evocation we gain the present memory of “the absent that was
earlier perceived, experienced, learned” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 27). By Search or anamnesis Ricoeur
(2004) referred to “the anteriority of the “thing” remembered in relation to its present evocation”
(p. 27) through searching [zetesis] and “returning to, retaking, recovering what had earlier been
seen, experienced, or learned” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 27) but had been forgotten. Forgetting therefore
is inseparably tied to remembering.
The connection between forgetting and remembering poses an unavoidable challenge
about the nature of forgetting. Do we forget because the traces of past events have been erased,
wiped out? Or do we forget because we experience a temporal obstacle that impedes our
recollection of the past event we are trying to remember? To answer these questions, Ricoeur
(2004) used a recollection technique that operates “from quasi-mechanical association to the
work of reconstruction” (p. 28) similar to Aristotle’s idea of argumentation (sullogismos) to
address how we forget and remember.
While mechanical association and reconstruction efforts could be likened to Bergson’s
distinction between “spontaneous recollection and laborious recollection” (as cited in Ricoeur,
2004, p. 28), the latter shows that efforts are needed in memory work, that is, in the process of
remembering and reproduction, as well as “production and invention” (Bergson, as cited in
Ricoeur, 2004, p. 28) of memory. This recollection effort, according to Bergson (as cited in
Ricoeur, 2004) “consists in converting a schematic idea, whose elements interpenetrate, into an
imaged idea, the parts of which are juxtaposed” (p. 29). This means that the affection (pathos) of
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the known retained in our mind intersects with the searching (zetesis) for and reconstruction of
the forgotten. Reconstructed memory in this sense becomes secondary memory.
In what ways does the effort to recall the past relate to forgetting? Ricoeur (2004),
incorporating the idea of St. Augustine, inferred that “searching for a memory indeed attests to
one of the major finalities of the act of remembering, namely, struggling against forgetting,
wresting a few scraps of memory from the “rapacity” of time, from “sinking” into oblivion
(oubli)” (p. 30). This means that “the duty of memory consists essentially in a duty not to forget”
(Ricoeur, 2004, p. 30), but in a duty to remember the past.
Reflexivity/worldliness. Reflexivity refers to the process of remembering oneself doing
something. Remembering oneself doing something makes the one who is remembering the
primary source of memory. As Ricoeur (2004) affirmed, “reflexivity is an undeniable feature of
memory in its declarative phase: someone says ‘in his heart’ that he formerly saw, experienced,
learned. In this regard,…memory belongs to the sphere of interiority” (p. 36). On the other pole
of the spectrum of memory, worldliness refers to the recollection of “the situations in the world”
(Ricoeur, 2004, p. 36) in which something happened in the past. Worldliness therefore is
important in interpreting and understanding the declaration of reflexivity. In this sense,
worldliness is connected to collective memory.
In-between reflexivity and worldliness lies three “mnemonic modes” identified by
Edward Casey (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004) which are “reminding, reminiscing, recognizing” (37).
Reminding, according to Ricoeur (2004) “stands for clues that guard against forgetting,” for
example, “photographs, postcards, diaries, receipts, memento” (p. 38). Similar to collective
memory, reminiscing “consists in making the past live again by evoking it together with others,
each helping the other to remember shared events or knowledge, the memories of one person
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serving as a reminder for the memories of the other” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 38). Inseparable from
recollection, recognition seeks “to coat with presence the otherness of that which is over and
gone” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 39).
The question we must ask is: when did what happened happen? Where did it happen? To
be gone presupposes the notion of time, especially that of date, and place. This shows the
importance of memories of dates and places in mnemonic experience. Commemorations and
memorials are held at particular sites of memory and on specific date(s) of memory. In
commemoration and memorialization, “pure memory” becomes visualized or materialized into
“memory-image” (Ricoeur, 2004).
Uses and abuses of memory. Memory could be used positively or negatively. While the
positive use of memory correlates with memory’s aim to be truthful and faithful to the past, one
way of using memory negatively is to abuse it. The use and abuse of memory fall within the
pragmatic aspect of memory. According to Ricoeur (2004), “remembering is not only
welcoming, receiving an image of the past, it is also searching for it, ‘doing’ something” (p. 56).
Based on this, Ricoeur (2004) employed the term “remembering” (remémoration) to designate
the superposition of both the cognitive and pragmatic aspects of memory as well as the
“operation of anamnesis, of recollection, of recall” (p. 56). When memory (i.e., natural memory,
not artificial memory) is abused or blocked, and remembering is manipulated, “memory’s aim of
truthfulness is seriously threatened” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 57). From this perspective, Ricoeur
(2004) mapped out a typology of the abuses of natural memory, namely blocked memory,
manipulated memory, and obligated or controlled memory (see Table 8).
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Table 8
Typology of the Abuses of Natural Memory

Blocked memory. The understanding of the term “blocked memory” is inspired by the
very notion and nature of collective memory of the past. While linking blocked memory to the
pathological and therapeutic level of memory work, Ricoeur (2004) argued that “there exists no
historical community that has not been born out of a relation that can, without hesitation, best be
likened to war… In this way, symbolic wounds calling for healing are stored in the archives of
the collective memory” (p. 79). Because of the traumatic and painful nature of these repressed
memories, the survivors and their descendants find it difficult to talk about them. As Ricoeur
(2004) noted, affected communities “undergo the ordeal of the difficult work of remembering”
(p. 79) their wounded memory. This explains how traumatic memories of the past get blocked in
the collective psyche of a victimized, surviving community.
Manipulated memory. Based on John Locke’s theory of memory as “the criterion of
identity,” Ricoeur (2004) illustrated how collective memory and forgetting are abused and
manipulated by those in power. When memory is manipulated, it becomes an instrument in the
hands of the manipulator(s) for the realization of their ulterior motives. Connected to this motive
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is the manipulation and reshaping of collective identity. Often times this is accomplished by
those in power either by suppressing vital elements of historical memory or by promoting an
officially sanctioned narrative about what happened in the past. As Ricoeur (2004) observed,
“we recognize some disturbing symptoms: too much memory, in a certain region of the world,
hence an abuse of memory; not enough memory elsewhere, hence an abuse of forgetting” (p. 81).
The reason for the abuse of memory by the powerful, specifically the suppression and
manipulation of some elements of historical memory, could be as a result of perceived fragility
of the union that binds the identities of both the powerful (superordinate) groups and nonpowerful (subordinate) groups together. In the confrontation that erupts in this union, “others”
are perceived to be a threat. Ricoeur’s (2004) rhetorical question and clarification are therefore
inescapable here.
Is our identity so fragile that we are unable to bear, unable to endure the fact that others
have different ways than our own of leading their lives, of understanding themselves, of
inscribing their own identity in the web of living together? This is so. There are indeed
humiliations, real or imagined attacks on self-esteem, under the blows of poorly tolerated
otherness, that turn a welcome into rejection, into exclusion—this is the relation that the
same maintains with the other. (pp. 81-82)
One of the tools of memory manipulation used by the powerful to alleviate the effects of
fragility of the union is ideology. The phenomenon of ideology, Ricoeur (2004) opined, engages
itself in the “distortions of reality, the legitimation of the system of power, and the integration of
the common world by means of symbolic systems immanent in action” (p. 82). Ideology, serving
the purposes of memory distortion, legitimation and integration, is incorporated into an official
narrative sanctioned to be learned within the education system.

360
In some cases and in different countries, manipulated memory and abusively sanctioned
memory are promoted, preserved and transmitted through school classroom learning and public
discourse. Ricoeur (2004) defined learning as consisting “in the acquisition by a living being of
new behaviors that are not part of inherited, genetically programmed repertoires of abilities or
know-how, nor do they stem from cortical epigenesis” (p. 59). As Ricoeur (2004) stated: “it is
through the narrative function that memory is incorporated into the formation of identity” (pp.
84-85), that is, the so-called national or common identity. The question that arises is: who
controls the learning process? Who directs the manipulation of what is learned? According to
Ricoeur (2004), it is the one who has the power to “determine the task, define the criteria of
success, organize punishments and rewards, and, in this way, ‘condition’ the learning” (p. 59).
The underlying assumption of the powerful is that whatever is included in the official
narrative will be remembered; and whatever is excluded from the official narrative will be
forgotten. This assumption is of course due to “the selective function of the narrative that opens
to manipulation the opportunity and the means of a clever strategy, consisting from the outset in
a strategy of forgetting as much as in a strategy of remembering” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 85). The
final goal of manipulation of memory or abuse of memory through the learning of officially
imposed or sanctioned narrative is to keep a section of the population under the perpetual
domination of the powerful. Through this process of memory manipulation, what is taught
becomes what is learned; what is learned becomes what is remembered; and what is remembered
becomes what is celebrated, commemorated and memorialized; until such a time when what
could be called a memory rebellion occurs, challenging, modifying or replacing this version of
historical memory through an act of activism and justice.
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Obligated or controlled memory. To understand how memory can be obligated or
controlled, it is important to first explore the connection between the use of memory and the
notion of justice. As “the womb of history” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 87), and as the guardian of the
representation of the past in the present, and the representation of the present for the future, what
then is the main duty of memory in the context of its use and abuse? Put differently, why do we
remember?
The spontaneous answer to this question is discernable from the popular phrase used time
and time again: “Never again!” But as history has repeatedly taught us, simply saying or
shouting “Never again!” alone has never prevented a horrible or traumatic event from happening
again. More practical action is needed - a justice oriented action - if “never again” should
become never again (see Figures 13 and 14). “Extracting the exemplary value from traumatic
memories,” Ricoeur (2004) affirmed: “it is justice that turns memory into a project; and it is this
same project of justice that gives the form of the future and of the imperative to the duty of
memory” (p. 89).
Figure 13
Duty of Memory as a Point of Convergence
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Figure 14
United Force of Justice as the Duty of Memory

This means that in the notion of justice is embedded the various elements of the duty of
memory. As Ricoeur (2004) emphatically noted, “the duty of memory is the duty to do justice,
through memories, to an ‘other’ than the self” (p. 89). The “otherness” in this context implies
those who have gone before us and to whom we are indebted by virtue of our heritage. Most
importantly, we are obligated from an ethical perspective not only to remember the victims of
past traumatic events, for example, victims of the 1966 pogroms of Eastern Nigerians and the
Nigeria-Biafra War that ensued, but also to make things right by way of justice. “Among those
others to whom we are indebted, the moral priority belongs to the victims” (Ricoeur, 2004, p.
89).
The inescapable question is: if the duty of memory is the duty to do justice as discussed
above, from where comes the abuse of memory? In other words, what explains the transition
from the use of memory as a tool for justice to its abuse? The answer to this question is not
imperceptible. From Ricoeur’s (2004) perspective, abuse of memory “can occur only through the
manner in which the idea of justice is handled” (p. 89). One of the ways this occurs is by
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controlling a commemoration of past traumatic events while disingenuously speaking in the
name of the victims.
From personal memory to collective memory. A theory of historical memory will not
be complete without addressing the connection between personal memory and collective
memory. From this premise, it suffices to ask: in what ways is personal memory related to
collective memory? Put differently in Ricoeur’s (2004) words, since “the memories of one
person cannot be transferred into the memory of another” (p. 96), at what point do individual,
personal memories become the memory of the collective?
From a philosophical perspective, the answer to this question could be explained first and
foremost with Husserl’s phenomenological analysis, especially his views in the “Fifth Cartesian
Meditation” that underscores a passage “from the solitary ego to the ‘other’ capable of
becoming, in turn, an ‘us’ [situated] at the crossroads of the theory of transcendental
consciousness and the theory of intersubjectivity” (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004, p. 117). Becoming
an “us” – that is, “intersubjective communities” – is a result of shared heritage and life, as well as
the socialization inspired by this shared heritage. “Sphere of ownness, pairing, and
communalization thus form an unbroken conceptual chain” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 118) that could be
used to describe the connection between personal memory and collective memory.
This linkage between personal memory and collective memory should be understood in
the sense of an analogy. As Ricoeur (2004) stressed, it is,
in relation to individual consciousness and its memory, that collective memory is held to
be a collection of traces left by the events that have affected the course of history of the
groups concerned, and that it is accorded the power to place on stage these common
memories, on the occasion of holidays, rites, and public celebrations. (p. 119)
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In addition to Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity, Maurice Halbwachs’ (1992)
attribution of memory to collective entities like groups, societies, families, religions, ethnicities,
etc., is even more relevant here. The basic premise in Halbwachs’ original book, The Collective
Memory, is that “to remember, we need others” (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004, p. 121). The need for
others refers to the testimonies emanating from others’ experiences of what happened in the past.
The recognition of what happened in the past is not only derived from the recollection of one
person, but most symbolically from the collective recollection of the past through the testimonies
of others. This means that collective memory is formed from shared memories and the
testimonies narrated or told from common experiences of the past. In collective memory,
therefore, coherent narrative about the past is sought for. “We must turn to the side of collective
memory to account for the logics of coherence presiding over the perception of the world”
(Ricoeur, 2004, p. 123).
But in-between personal memory and collective memory, there are memory agents whose
efforts or roles are needed to preserve what were initially personal memories and pass them onto
the domain of the collective, of collective memory. According to Ricoeur (2004), these middle
agents are our “close relations” (p. 31). In addition to our close relatives to whom oral history is
transmitted, archival materials play a mediation role in preserving shared memories. Most
importantly, history offers “schemata for mediating between the opposite poles of individual
memory and collective memory” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 131).
Collective memory of past traumatic experiences represented in the form of history (oral
or written) and in other forms of memory preservation and representation serves as a warning
sign to not only forget the past, but most importantly to learn from the past in order to
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successfully deal with a similar situation in the present and prevent this ugly past from repeating
itself in the future.
On the Theory of Forgetting
If memory is “a struggle against forgetting” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 413) and the threats it
poses, and remembering is the pillar on which the work of memory is anchored, as thoroughly
discussed above, what then is forgetting? Why are significant aspects of the past lost in oblivion,
some scarcely represented in collective memory, and many rarely remembered in the public
arena? To understand forgetting and why some crucial elements of the past are buried in
oblivion, Ricoeur’s (2004) distinction between two types of profound forgetting – “forgetting
through the erasing of traces and a backup forgetting, a sort of forgetting kept in reserve (oubli
de réserve)” (p. 414) that makes traces to persist - is very relevant.
When traces of the past are erased either by people or through the passage of time, it is
very difficult to remember what happened in the past. The understanding of how traces are
erased requires an understanding of different types of traces (see Table 9). Three types of traces
are identified by Ricoeur (2004): written or documentary trace; psychical trace or impression;
and cerebral or cortical trace. “Like every material trace,” Ricoeur (2004) was of the view that
both the documentary trace and cortical trace “can be physically altered, effaced, destroyed” (p.
415). The psychical trace, on the other hand, is confronted with an inaccessibility challenge with
the passage of time causing a sort of memory loss. This means that although psychical traces
persist, they are difficult to remember.
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Table 9
Typology of Traces

Through an experience of recognition, these inaccessible traces initially formed as
impressions or affections in our minds could be recalled. As Ricoeur (2004) believed, their
recollection through recognition can “draw support from a material basis, from a figured
presentation such as a portrait or photograph, the representation inducing an identification with
the thing depicted in its absence” (p. 429). From this, it follows that recognition is indebted to
and aided by the persistence or survival of the image of the absent past. “What we have once
seen, heard, experienced, or learned is not definitively lost, but survives since we can recall it
and recognize it” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 434).
While remembering through recognition, according to a neuroscientist, could be called
“reactivating traces,” for a phenomenologist-hermeneutician like Ricoeur (2004), recollection
attests to “a persistence of the original impression” (p. 416). Based on this, and given that
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amnesia designates a total or partial loss of memory traces, it is possible to conclude that
forgetting can be definitive while some aspects of forgetting can be reversible. Definitive
forgetting, according to Ricoeur (2004), is explained by “the erasing of traces” and reversible
forgetting could be described as “the reserve of forgetting” (p. 417), that is, an aspect of
forgetting that persists waiting to be recalled (see Figure 15). It is therefore Ricoeur’s (2004)
contention that:
it is a primordial attribute of affections to survive, to persist, to remain, to endure, while
keeping the mark of absence and of distance, the principle of which was sought in vain
on the level of cortical traces. In this sense, these inscription-affections would contain the
secret of the enigma of the mnemonic trace: they would be the depository of the most
hidden but most original meaning of the verb to remain, synonym of to endure. (p. 427)
Figure 15
Conceptual Chain of the Psychical Trace
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In addition to forgetting as effacement of traces, survival or persistence of traces not yet
remembered equates forgetting in the sense that the existence of the presence of the thing(s) that
has/have been remains unconscious to the mind. This means that traces that persist are removed
from “the vigilance of consciousness” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 441). Until the human mind becomes
conscious of their existence and remember them as they are, they will continue to elude our
minds and remain forgotten. In Bergson’s (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004) view, “the pure memory is
powerless only with respect to a consciousness that is preoccupied with practical utility” (446).
To recall persistent traces therefore requires arduous and vigorous efforts. This is why Ricoeur
(2004) argued that “the effort of recollection possesses different degrees on a scale of
arduousness” (p. 444).
From a pragmatic perspective, and following the presuppositions enunciated by the
various uses and abuses of memory, Ricoeur (2004) posited another type of forgetting, manifest
forgetting, which is “the manifestations of the exercise of forgetting” (p. 418). Through the
typology of manifest forgetting (see Figure 16) as illustrated in forgetting and blocked memory,
forgetting and manipulated memory, and commanded forgetting (or amnesty), Ricoeur (2004)
explained the various “uses and abuses of forgetting” (p. 418).
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Figure 16
Typology of Manifest Forgetting

Forgetting and blocked memory. Sometimes our efforts to recall the absent past remain
a futile endeavor as a result of an experience of blocked memory. From a psychopathological
perspective, by blocked memory it means that the traces of the absent past endure or persist but
our minds are hindered by an inaccessibility obstacle when attempting to recall them. According
to Ricoeur (2004), these “impediments blocking access to the treasures buried in memory” are
found between “the instantaneousness of the image’s return and its grasp” (p. 444). What then
prevents the human mind from grasping or having access to these memory treasures? Three
important lessons from psychoanalysis could be leveraged on to explain this phenomenon of
blocked memory that results in forgetting.
First, after a traumatic experience that happened in the past, psychoanalysts believe that
our lived experiences of trauma, for example, the traumatic experiences of the Nigeria-Biafra
War, will continue to persist and exist. Some of the elements or contents of the trauma we
suffered, although inaccessible to us at the moment, endure. In the place of these traumatic
experiences “arise phenomena of substitution, symptoms, which mask the return of the repressed
under the various guises” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 445).
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Second, the fact that past traumatic experiences repressed into the arena of the
unconscious are inaccessible to our minds at the moment does not mean that they cannot be
remembered one day. Based on his “thesis of the unforgettable,” Freud (as cited in Ricoeur,
2004) strongly argued that “the past once experienced is indestructible” (p. 445). Repressed
memories or traces of the absent past committed to the unconscious by the force of repression are
believed to have the potency of reemergence to the conscious following the principle of
“instinctual drives” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 445) or energy release through action.
Third, one way that instinctual drives or energy manifest into action is by mourning our
losses. When memories of the past are consigned to the unconscious through repression, it is not
unusual to speak of lost memories, where memories are memories of something or somebody
previously existing in the past but are no longer accessible to us. To find these lost memories,
one engages in an action of searching, of recollection, which in itself leads to mourning while
yearning for its return to the conscious. According to Ricoeur (2004), “this integration of loss
through the experience of remembering is of considerable significance… [because] it is no
longer possible to think in terms of drives without also thinking in terms of lost objects” (p. 446)
and their active searching through recollection.
Forgetting and manipulated memory. Ordinarily, searching for lost memories is an
arduous task as shown above. But the already extremely difficult search is even compounded and
made complex when a loss of memory is caused by manipulation. When memory is abused, and
available narrative is manipulatively selective, forgetting the excluded and manipulated memory
is inevitable. In light of this, memory manipulation or configuration is a strategy whose goal is
forgetting. “The prime danger,” according to Ricoeur (2004), “lies in the handling of authorized,
imposed, celebrated, commemorated history— of official history” (p. 448). The imposition of
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official history, of official historical narrative, is of a dubious character. Its ultimate goal that
leads to forgetting part, if not essential aspects, of the past is to strip “the social actors of their
original power to recount their actions themselves” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 448).
Faced with the might of the status quo - the great manipulator of memory and the
powerful guardian of official narrative -, how can social actors - individuals and communities engage in the work of memory, remember the forgotten, represent the excluded, and fight for the
rewriting of history? An important way to accomplish this gigantic task of memory, Ricoeur
(2004) argued, is to draw inspiration from the motto of the Enlightenment: sapere aude! move
out of the state of tutelage! Ricoeur (2004) suggested that this motto could be rewritten as “dare
to give an account yourself!” (p. 449). By this it means that those whose memories have been
manipulated and whose narratives are excluded should start to tell their own stories – their
account of what happened in the past. It is also a call to document the testimonies of living
witnesses as well as testimonies left behind by witnesses who have died. This way, manipulated
memories will be corrected and made right, and excluded narratives will be included.
Repetition of memory in the form of commemoration of officially imposed historical
narrative should therefore be replaced with the work of memory or working-through memory
(see Figure 17). The work of memory is important in unraveling and including in our collective
memory “the things left unsaid, the slips of the tongue, and especially the return of the
repressed” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 450). Even after repressed, manipulated or excluded traumatic
memories of the past have been made right and returned to the public consciousness, it is most
likely that the returned memories will be denied by the powerful who dubiously consigned them
to oblivion through manipulation and exclusion. The motto: “dare to give an account yourself!”
is a source of inspiration to help confront denial through unrelenting, unyielding storytelling.
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Figure 17
Working-Through Memory

As earlier discussed, working-through memory or the work of memory is a very
strenuous endeavor. It takes the memory worker back in time to the past traumatic events as they
were occurring. It passes through Henry Rousso’s (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004) four stages of
chronological ordering in terms of memory and recollection, from the phase of collective
mourning (or unfinished mourning) as a result of traumatic affliction; phase of repression in the
establishment of a dominant myth; phase of the return of the repressed to consciousness; on to
the phase of obsession (see Figure 18).
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Figure 18
Four Stages of Memory and Recollection

These four stages are applicable to the historical memory of the Nigeria-Biafra War. A
careful examination of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and the current events and developments
surrounding it, coupled with the collection, circulation or dissemination of information about the
war aided by social media, the archives and the arts, attest to the fact that Nigeria is in-between
the third and fourth phases – those of the return of the repressed to public consciousness and
obsession with the past. An important task before us in this era of the return of repressed
memories of the Nigeria-Biafra War and its obsession is how to move from obsession with the
past to the transformative teaching and learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history as an integral
aspect of the work of memory or working-through memory in order for the phrase never again to
actually mean never again. To move beyond obsession with the past in this context means to go
beyond simple repetition of the same conflict style(s) and narrative(s) that led to the Nigeria-
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Biafra War in order to explore, design and engage in a transformative learning of the history of
the war. This task is situated in the heart and soul of this research.
As Ricoeur (2004) reminded us, “obsession is selective… Seeing one thing is not seeing
another. Recounting one drama is forgetting another” (p. 452). The teaching and learning of
history, especially the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War, in school classrooms was completely
abandoned and then forgotten since after the end of the war in 1970. As explained below under
the typology of commanded forgetting, this forgetting was indeed a commanded forgetting based
on the government’s post-war politics of oblivion. In this era of the return of the repressed, not
only should forgotten memories be brought back to public consciousness, most importantly the
teaching and learning of history education, especially the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War,
should be fully returned to and integrated into the Nigerian school curricula.
According to Ricoeur (2004), “the historian of the present day… cannot escape the major
question regarding the transmission of the past: Must one speak of it? How should one speak of
it?” (p. 452). To the first question, yes, one must not only transmit the past, but also teach and
learn from the past because knowledge is power. We learn from the past in order not to repeat
the mistakes of the past in the present and in the future. To the second question, this research
proposes the use of the transformative learning process to not only transform the conflict at the
heart of this history, but also to transform the relationship and people involved in this historical
conflict.
Commanded forgetting. As an abuse of forgetting or an example of imposed
institutional forgetting, commanded forgetting is orchestrated by an institutionalized amnesty.
This type of forgetting is based on the authoritative order not to remember the past that often
accompanies an amnesty proclaimed by a head of state.
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Why should a head of state grant amnesty to their so-called enemies of the state or enemy
citizens? As Ricoeur (2004) pointed out, amnesty “brings to conclusion serious political
disorders affecting civil peace—civil wars, revolutionary periods, violent changes of political
regimes—violence that the amnesty is supposed to interrupt” (p. 453). After a civil war, for
example, leaders usually create an official narrative aimed at ending civil unrest by
reconstructing national identity and promoting national unity. An example is the official
declaration by the former head of state of Nigeria, General Yakubu Gowon, at the end of the
Nigeria-Biafra War in 1970: “no victor, no vanquished but victory for common sense and the
unity of Nigeria.” This declaration was followed by an amnesty program and the reintegration of
former Biafran secessionist soldiers into the Nigerian military. This example could be well
understood within the context of Ricoeur’s (2004) description of the steps in granting amnesty.
The war is over, it is solemnly proclaimed: the present combats, of which tragedy speaks,
become the past not to be recalled. The prose of the political now takes over. A civic
imaginary is established in which friendship and even the tie between brothers are
promoted to the rank of foundation, despite the murders within families. (p. 454)
Reconstructing an urgent national unity through the gesture of amnesty after a prolonged
brutal and bloody civil war involving different ethnic groups and serious crimes against
humanity has a long lasting effect on memory. Amnesty, in this context and situation, leads to
institutional forgetting. Amnesty, by its nature, intent and design, eliminates the possibility of
holding official judicial hearings and trials capable of opening the door to interrogating and
reexamining the past. Since “stopping the trials amounts to extinguishing memory in its
testimonial expression and to saying that nothing has occurred” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 455), the
motivation of the head of state granting amnesty needs to be carefully examined. Amnesty also
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takes the focus away from “the very roots of the political, and through it, the most profound and
most deeply concealed relation to a past that is placed under an interdict” (Ricoeur, 2004, p.
453). Placing a traumatic past, for example the memory of the Nigeria-Biafra War, under an
interdict through amnesty with the reintegration and reconciliation programs that accompany it
serves as a direct link to amnesia.
The long-term costs of amnesty outweigh the momentary gains. One of the long-term
consequences is that “it erases from the official memory the examples of crimes likely to protect
the future from the errors of the past” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 455). In the case of Nigeria, by
proclaiming “no victor, no vanquished but victory for common sense and the unity of Nigeria”
after a three-year bloody war that sent about three million people to their graves and wiped out
entire communities from the planet earth, individual or group responsibilities for the crimes
committed are implicitly denied and exonerated. This shows that “the proximity… between
amnesty and amnesia signals the existence of a secret pact with the denial of memory” (Ricouer,
2004, p. 453).
In lieu of officially silencing evil or decreeing a commanded amnesia through amnesty,
the work of memory – that is, gradually working-through those traumatic memories - may be
more beneficial in the long-term. The starting point for the work of memory lies in a careful and
critical re-examination of the history of the traumatic past.
On the Theory of History
To aid the work of memory, history lends its methodological operation in three different
but interconnected forms. The first begins with the testimonies of eyewitnesses and all the
archival materials transmitted from the past. The second focuses on the meaning of these
testimonies and archival materials – meaning generated through the process of explanation and
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understanding. The third serves to coherently and faithfully connect the memories of the absent
past to what actually happened through history writing and other literary works. Ricoeur (2004)
named the first the documentary phase of history that provides a proof of what happened in the
past through archival research; the second is the explanation/understanding phase; and the third
is the representative or literary or writing phase. In these three historiographical operations, the
ultimate intention of the historian is made apparent - that of “a true reconstruction of the past”
(Ricoeur, 2004, p. 137).
The link between the documentary phase and the representative phase lies in the ability of
the historian to interpret, understand, explain and represent as accurately as possible archival
materials in a literary form for the reader’s use. As Ricoeur (2004) illustrated:
history is writing from one end to another. And in this regard, archives constitute the first
writing that confronts history, before it completes itself in the literary mode of
‘scripturality.’ Explanation/understanding thus finds itself encased, upstream and
downstream, by two writings. It gathers energy from the former and anticipates the
energy of the latter. (p. 138)
The former writing here from where explanation/understanding gathers energy refers to the
archives and the latter is the written history.
Written history, although quintessential in understanding the absent past, is confronted
with a problematic - that of memorization - that often limits the reader’s own use of memory
while relying on the account of a professional historian. The reader in this context understands
the world through the lenses of the historian. What if the written history is selective, and
committed important aspects of the absent past into oblivion? Does it not lead to a loss of those
memories [mnemes]? The myth about the origin of history writing [graphes] contained in Plato’s
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work called Phaedrus could be helpful in clarifying this problematic. At the primary level,
written history is not “for remembering, but for reminding [hupomneseos]” (Ricoeur, 2004, p.
142). By reminding it means “being capable of remembering” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 142). In other
words, readers who have prior memories or knowledge of this history are capable of
remembering what is represented in the written history. It is through this function of reminding
that written history becomes a living memory.
But what about those other readers without prior knowledge of this history? In what ways
are they capable of remembering or being reminded of this past? The answer to this question lies
in the secondary level of the problematic of written history. The memory of the past can become
alive in the minds of the readers “through the interminable work of contextualization and recontextualization” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 143). What this means is that the “educated memory”
contained in the written history of a well-informed historian overlaps with other “scholarly
history” works about the same traumatic past. The process of contextualization and recontextualization helps in reviving the memory of the past which in turn results in what
Collingwood (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004) called “reactualizating, reliving the past” (p. 145).
Whether in the case of reminding us of the past or putting into context the written account of the
historian, archives are indisputably indispensable.
Archived memory. Memories of the absent past deposited in the archives are in
themselves memories of lived experiences in specific places and at particular times. This means
that time and place or space are inseparable from the notion of archived memory. A place is an
inhabited space, that is, where the event took place. This place is usually transformed into a site
of memory. During war or other forms of violent conflict, many people if not the entire
population are uprooted from their communities, from their place in life and place in time,
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through tragic means such as killings, displacement, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and so on. The
survivors of these atrocities always yearn to return to their proper place in life as well as the sites
of memory.
As Ricoeur (2004) attested, “the feeling of uneasiness—Unheimlichkeit—joined to the
feeling of not being in one’s place, of not feeling at home, haunts us and this would be the realm
of emptiness” (p. 149). The archives, not only serving as a place but also as living testimonies,
help to fill this emptiness with a feeling of hope. Without the archives, survivors of war and
similar violent conflicts and their descendants will become like “that passerby, that wanderer,
that flâneur, that vagabond, stray dog that our fragmented contemporary culture both sets in
motion and paralyzes” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 149).
The situation is even worsened when the memory of the traumatic past is blocked, erased
or manipulated and its forgetting commanded. In this situation, Ricoeur’s (2004) prophecy is
most likely to come true and be seen in action. The “traumatic experiences of uprooting and
desolation…, returns in force with the dark moods of uprooted city dwellers that the countryside
and its landscapes no longer comfort” (p. 151). This is exactly the case in Biafraland, especially
in the southeastern region of Nigeria. The national anxieties caused by the revitalization of the
agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra by the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and later taken to its apex by the
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), is an unavoidable case in point.
One way of mitigating and managing these anxieties caused by blocked, manipulated
historical memory and commanded forgetting is by constructing, reconstructing and naming sites
of memory. This is important to fill the emptiness or bridge the gap left by many decades of the
ban on history education and the work of memory in Nigeria. According to Joyce (as cited in
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Ricoeur, 2004), “places remember events” (p. 151). Constructed or reconstructed and named
sites of memory serving as sites of commemoration and memorialization become sites of the
archives - the living testimonies of the absent past. The historian whose duty is to reconstruct the
memory of the absent past as deposited in the archives will then have to commute from the site
of memory through the historical time to discovering the convincing and trustworthy testimony:
“I was there [which] is added the affirmation this happened ‘before,’ ‘during,’ ‘after,’ ‘since,’
‘during so much time” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 154).
Testimonies and the archive. The importance and relevance of the archives lie not just in
the constructed, reconstructed and named sites of memory but in the testimonies that inhabit
therein which bring to life the absent past. In the archives are found different types of testimonies
that refer to the same events that occurred in the past and given by different witnesses who had
firsthand knowledge or information about what happened (see Figure 19). Testimonies therefore
remain the primary source of information or historical proof about the past, albeit in its original,
raw form. “With testimony opens an epistemological process that departs from declared memory,
passes through the archive and documents, and finds its fulfillment in documentary proof”
(Ricoeur, 2004, p. 161).
To testify presupposes that the past event is important to the one testifying. Since
testimonies can only be given in a narrative form backed by the tools of language in the form of
a discourse, and given that testimonies are personal accounts, they sometimes provoke suspicion
as to the authenticity of the witness and trustworthiness of the narrative. Even with this
faithfulness issue about the past, testimonies still serve as an unavoidable and indispensable
historical proof. According to Ricoeur (2004), “we have nothing better than testimony, in the
final analysis, to assure ourselves that something did happen in the past, which someone attests

381
having witnessed in person, and that the principal, and at times our only, recourse, when we lack
other types of documentation, remains the confrontation among testimonies” (p. 147).
Figure 19
Dialogical Structure of Testimony

The important question about trustworthiness of testimonies needs not remain
unaddressed. To address this question requires an examination of six core components of a
testimony identified by Ricoeur (2004).
1. Testimonies denote an “assertion of the factual reality” and its “certification or
authentication” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 163).
2. The witness is inseparable from his or her testimony. This means that the witness
self-designates himself or herself in the past at the very place and time of the
occurrence of the event in the expression: “I was there.” This self-designation makes
apparent the use of life-history or personal history in telling the stories about the
absent past. As Ricoeur (2004) posited, this “is why the affective imprint of an event
capable of striking the witness like a blow does not necessarily coincide with the
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importance his audience may attach to his testimony” (p. 164). Testimony is therefore
personal and deeply rooted in the lived experience of the witness.
3. Although testimonies are personal and based on the witnesses’ lived experiences, they
cannot be given in a vacuum or a place of nothingness. For a testimony to achieve its
goal, there is need for an audience to whom the witness testifies and from whom the
witness also seeks validation. The audience either validates or refutes, accepts or
rejects, approves or disapproves the testimony given by the witness. The interplay
between testimony, audience and validation introduces a dialogical dimension to
testimonies. According to Ricoeur (2004), “this dialogical structure immediately
makes clear the dimension of trust involved: the witness asks to be believed. He does
not limit himself to saying ‘I was there,’ he adds ‘believe me.’ Certification of the
testimony then is not complete except through the echo response of the one who
receives the testimony and accepts it. Then the testimony is not just certified, it is
accredited” (p. 165). It is also possible that the testimony will be viewed with
suspicion.
4. When a testimony is viewed with suspicion and the credibility of the witness is
questioned, the stage of corroboration of testimonies opens up within the public
space. This means that to the self-designation of the witness – I was there – and the
witness’ quest for validation – believe me –, a third request is introduced: “If you
don’t believe me, ask someone else, said almost like a challenge” (Ricoeur, 2004, pp.
164-165).
5. The stage of corroboration is followed by the stage of consistency whereby the
witness is tested for consistence and steadfastness to know if he/she exhibits what
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Ricoeur (2004) called ipseity or sameness of character. This brings to light the moral
aspect of testimony whereby the witness is tested for steadfastness and consistency.
As is often done, historians or similar researchers usually interview living witnesses
of a past traumatic event in order to hear directly from them about what they had
previously said about that very traumatic event. “The witness,” argued Ricoeur
(2004), “must be capable of answering for what he says before whoever asks him to
do so” (p. 165).
6. Finally, it is in this way that a collection of testimonies deemed trustworthy
metamorphoses into a natural institution. By an institution of a testimony, Ricoeur
(2004) refers to “the stability of testimony ready to be reiterated, and next the
contribution of the trustworthiness of each testimony to the security of the social bond
inasmuch as this rests on confidence in what other people say” (p. 165). However,
this institution of testimonies risks being manipulated by those in power in order to
maintain the status quo whatever that may be, thereby raising the question of
manipulated memory. When this occurs, the confidence and trustworthiness exhibited
by this natural institution of testimonies are brought to question. Nevertheless, within
the repository of archived testimonies are found elements of dissensus and consensus,
that is, “the critique of potentially divergent testimonies” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 166) on
the commonly accepted narrative.
The archive and the birth of written history. Although testimonies are by their very
nature oral at the time of their declaration, they are for the most part documented in a written
form and deposited into the archives so that the professional historian can critically study them.
This critical approach to history is important because the archives also contain manipulated
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memory, deceitful testimonies, and testimonies based on “the role of propaganda, censorship,
and the pernicious effects of rumor” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 172). These documented materials,
however, stand as an indispensable historical trace. As Ricoeur (2004) opined, “the archive…
presents itself as a physical place that shelters the destiny of the documentary trace” (p. 167).
The process of archiving, that is, preserving and classifying the documentary trace “inaugurates
the act of doing history” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 168).
There are two types of testimonies deposited in the archives. These are written
testimonies and unwritten testimonies. Obviously, not all the materials in the archives are written
testimonies. Those unwritten archival materials or vestiges, Ricoeur (2004) named “unwritten
testimonies” (p. 170). These unwritten testimonies in the archives or “vestiges play a
nonnegligible role in the corroboration of testimonies, as police work confirms, but as also does
the interpretation of oral or written testimony” (p. 173). They provide important clues or
additional evidence to testimonies for the historian’s work. This means that written history of the
professional historian is “made up of clues and testimonies, whose final amplitude rejoins the
initial one of the trace” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 175). Based on this, Carlo Ginzburg (as cited in
Ricoeur, 2004) argued that “historical knowledge is indirect, presumptive, conjectural” (p. 174).
It is possible that some important information about the traumatic experiences of the past
have not yet been deposited into the archives. An example is the testimonies of some survivors
of past traumatic experiences. These are untold stories and undocumented testimonies. They are
untold and undocumented because these survivors are so traumatized that they are either afraid
or ashamed to open up and tell their stories. This situation is what Ricoeur (2004) referred to as
“the impossibility of communicating and about the unbearable imperative to testify” (p. 176).
For a written history that addresses this traumatic past to be close to being accurate, the
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testimonies of these survivors need to be collected, documented, deposited in the archive, and
carefully and critically studied by the historian for history writing.
The archive - the home of historical proof. The written and unwritten testimonies
available in the archives serve an important purpose – that of a proof of the absent past. The
concept of proof presupposes the idea of a search for answers about the past, that is, answers to
the question(s) with which the historian enters the archives. As Ricoeur (2004) argued, “If a
proof role can be attached to the consulted documents, it is because the historian comes to the
archives with questions…” (p. 177). Ricoeur (2004) went on to say that “the historian undertakes
research in the archives armed with questions” (p. 177).
What kinds of question does the historian go to the archive with? To this I extend
Ricoeur’s phrase and argue that the historian is armed with unanswered questions or unproven
hypotheses. It is to these unanswered questions or unproven hypotheses that the historian is
seeking answers or a proof. This is why Antoine Prost (as cited in Ricoeur, 2004) remarkably
argued that there is “no observation without hypotheses, no facts without questions” (p. 177).
These questions and hypotheses as well as the methodology through which they are researched
are the things that let loose the facts or traces or proofs from the archives and suddenly manifest
themselves as well as appear to the amazement and awe of the historian. “The documents do not
speak unless someone asks them to verify, that is, to make true, some hypothesis” (Ricoeur,
2004, p. 177).
Historical proof: From explanation to understanding. The role of the historian who
enters the archives with some unanswered questions or unproven hypotheses is not only to
answer these questions and prove the hypotheses, but most importantly to explain historical facts
in order to help uncover their meaning. According to Ricoeur (2004), “it is in relation to
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explanation that the document is proof” (p. 183). Through the process of explanation, “the modes
of interconnectedness of the documented facts” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 183) are laid bare in the
history text for the reader. These modes of explanation enshrined in the relationship between
cause and effect – for example, if..then or the reasons for… – are understood from the point of
view of social change that characterizes the absent past. As Ricoeur (2004) opined, it is the
historian’s intention to explore the “correlation among three factors: the specific nature of the
change considered— economic, institutional, political, cultural, or whatever; the scale with
which it is apprehended, described, and explained; and, finally, the temporal rhythm appropriate
to that scale” (p. 184).
What kind of explanation should the historian engage in and with which scale? The
historian is confronted with many choices of which two are worth mentioning: macro-historical
approach and micro-historical approach. With respect to the former, the historian may decide to
start from the top to the bottom – or from the dominant to the subordinate - to explain macro
elements about the absent past, for example, political, social, economic, religious, educational
institutions, foreign relations, humanitarian assistance, and so on. For the latter, the historian may
decide to start from the bottom to the top - that is, from the subordinate to the dominant - while
focusing instead on micro historical elements such as social agents themselves and their
interactions within the subunits of the society to which they belong.
While the macro historical elements of the Nigeria-Biafra War are important and have
been carefully examined and analyzed in the literature review chapter of this study, I recommend
that it is equally important to consider the use of the micro historical approach to analyze micro
historical elements in the archives and the interactions that occurred within the subunits of the
Nigerian society, especially within, between and among ethnic groups and communities in
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Nigeria. Seeking to understand the cause of the gap in the knowledge of the Nigeria-Biafra War
between the prewar generation and postwar generation of the Igbos as well as the resultant
differences in the ways by which each generation is managing the current Biafran conflict, as this
study has equally done, is another example of a micro historical approach.
One analytical model that could be useful for this kind of analysis is Michel Foucault’s
(1972) archeology of knowledge. This model proposes an archeological description of historical
discourses starting from the original and the regular, through an analysis of contradictions and
comparison of facts, to the emergence of transformative change (Foucault, 1972). Foucault’s
archeology model is important because the historian who enters the archive with unanswered
questions and unproven hypotheses seeking answers and proofs will be confronted with
contradictions and differences available in the archives. For some historians these differences
and contradictions stand as obstacles to explanation and understanding. “Archeology, on the
other hand, takes as the object of its description what is usually regarded as an obstacle: its aim is
not to overcome differences but to analyze them, to say what exactly they consist of, to
differentiate them” (Foucault, as cited in Ricoeur, 2004, p. 202 ). As later discussed, Foucault’s
archeology of knowledge, especially the phase of transformative change, will reach its apex and
achieve its purpose within the domain of history education, that is, the teaching and learning of
the Nigeria-Biafra War history through Jack Mezirow’s (2009) transformative learning theory
and practice.
Meanwhile, it is in the transformation of contradictory testimonies in the archives – those
of consensus and dissensus – that “the archive, as the register of discursive formations, and
archeology, as the description of interdiscursive transformations” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 202) meet
each other. In this way, the archive stands for the formation of testimonies; while archeology
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engages in the transformation of the differences in testimonies. The historian, adopting this
model of explanation, moves from the archives as a place of testimonies to archeology as a
model of explanation. Put it differently, the historian in this sense moves from the place of
archived representations to the arena of historiographical operation or literary practice.
Standing for - history’s capacity for representing the past. The knowledge of history
acquired through the outcome of the historiographical operation, according to Ricoeur (2004), is
enshrined in a transition from the “documentary proof” as contained in the archives to “literary
emplotment” through “the causal and teleological explanation” (p. 250) carried out by a
professional historian. Literary emplotement or historiography entails writing about an absent
past event. This means that history is of something – that is, history stands for something that
happened in the past. History in this sense is a representation of a past event. The ultimate goal
of history is therefore to stand for the absent past that the historian intends to represent in
historical discourse, either in a history book, article or other forms of historical writing.
According to Ricoeur (2004), by “standing for” is implied “the historian’s intention or
intentionality. It indicates the expectation attached to the historical knowledge of constructions
constituting reconstructions of the course of past events” (pp. 274-275).
The skeptic may doubt the accuracy of the historian’s representation and the
trustworthiness of his intention. Against this skepticism, Ricoeur (2004) argued that “the truth
claim of historical discourse” could be traced from the phase of history writing through the
explanatory phase to the documentary proof in the archive. This means that the historian’s work
is only dependent on the documentary proof – in other words, on the archived testimonies – and
his or her critical explanation of these testimonies. As Ricoeur (2004) argued, just as “we have
nothing better than our memory to assure ourselves of the reality of our memories—we have
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nothing better than testimony and criticism of testimony to accredit the historian’s representation
of the past” (p. 278). Therefore, written history is like a living image through which we can see
that which previously or formerly existed/happened but no longer exists/happens except in the
history books, the archives and the sites of memory (see Figure 20).
Figure 20
Enigma of the Historian’s Representation

Written history as standing for or representing the absent past can only play the role of a
living image if and only if the historian’s work is read, taught and learned. This highlights the
importance of history education in post-war, transitional societies such as Nigeria, especially if
knowing the past and learning from it will inform the choices we make in the present and our
vision for the future.
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Chapter 4: Teaching the Nigeria-Biafra War History
To prepare the ground for a discussion on the transformative learning of the NigeriaBiafra War history which is partly reserved in the last chapter after the analysis and presentation
of survey results, it is imperative that I reiterate the fact that the Nigeria-Biafra War history, of
which its teaching and learning I hereby propose, is a controversial issue. As I underscored it in
the preceding chapters, the memories of the Nigeria-Biafra War remain “highly divisive and
deeply contested” (Onuoha, 2016, p. 3) even in this era of the return of the repressed to public
consciousness. This is probably why the Nigerian leaders placed a ban on history education,
specifically on the history of the war. Nevertheless, Achebe’s (2012) rhetorical questions remind
us of the preponderant nature of this history education. “Why has the war not been discussed, or
taught to the young, over forty years after its end? Are we perpetually doomed to repeat the
mistakes of the past because we are too stubborn to learn from them?” (p. 228).
Based on this problematic, three questions need to be scrutinized. 1) Why should the
history of the Nigeria-Biafra War, although controversial, be taught and learned in schools? 2)
What is the nature or breadth and depth of this controversy within the education system? 3) How
can these controversial memories of the Nigeria-Biafra War be taught or learned in schools?
The first question, referring to the goal of history education in postwar societies, is
explored in the first section of this chapter under history education and national reconciliation.
The second question which calls our attention to the content of controversial history education is
addressed in the second section of this chapter under teaching the Nigeria-Biafra War history as
a controversial issue. While an analysis of the third question which introduces my proposed
method of teaching the Nigeria-Biafra War history is accomplished in the third section of this
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chapter under transformative learning theory and practice, its application within the Nigerian
school system is recommended in the last chapter of this study.
History Education and National Reconciliation
After a long and thorough discussion on the Nigeria-Biafra War, its traumatic memories,
repression, return of the repressed to consciousness, and obsession with the past, it is time to
create a pathway and lay the groundwork for teaching the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War in
school classrooms. By this, I seek to answer the question: why should the history of the NigeriaBiafra War, although controversial, be taught and learned in schools? In answering this question,
the goal of history education in postwar societies is laid bare.
I propose to do this by examining a theory of history education discernable from the
fundamental arguments and propositions put forward by Elizabeth Cole’s (2007) edited volume:
Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and Reconciliation. The title of the first part of this
book, “As generations pass: The challenges of long-term reconciliation in history textbooks,”
offers a quick preview of the central idea undergirding Cole’s (2007) theory of history education.
History education brings to completion the work of [national] reconciliation.
The relationship between history education and reconciliation is important to understand
how different countries, particularly Nigeria, in the aftermath of war and gross violations of
human and group rights can overcome the temptation of plunging into a revengeful war, hear one
another’s stories, deal with traumatic and painful past, coexist with some level of tolerance,
mutual respect and understanding, make reparations for wrongful deeds, rebuild trust, foster
unity in diversity, and create a new national identity. According to Cole (2007), “during a violent
conflict or period of gross human rights violations, the first priority in peacemaking and human
rights protection is a cessation of violence. However, it is clear that attention cannot be limited to
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the ceasefire itself but from the outset must include planning at least for a period of political
transition and social reconstruction…” (p. 1).
On the one hand, the period of political transition after war or violence which is also
known as a transitional justice period could be best achieved through the components and
elements of a national reconciliation program. On the other hand, social reconstruction after war
and violence sees hope in history education, including its content and methodology.
Reconciliation as it is explained in this book seeks to answer the question of “how to deal
with the past .., especially when the past involves memories of death, suffering, and destruction
so widespread that a high percentage of the population is affected” (p. 1). By bringing
perpetrators and victims as well as community actors and political leadership together for
reconciliatory programs, highly polarized and transitional societies could develop effective
mechanism and processes for respectful and sustainable mutual coexistence. According to Cole
(2007), “several concepts are … closely linked to reconciliation: justice, apology, forgiveness,
individual healing, commemoration, and the reform of education” (p. 1).
History education with its reform extends the process and outcome of national
reconciliation to the citizens themselves through a democratic teaching and learning of
controversial issues in the classrooms. Arguments on history education as revealed by Cole
(2007) seek to uncover:
how its content must be changed to include information and interpretations that have
been repressed or manipulated under dictatorial regimes, as well as new representations
of former enemies, and how its methodology must change to promote tolerance,
inclusiveness, an ability to deal with conflict nonviolently, and the capacity to think
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critically and question assumptions that could again be manipulated to instigate conflict.
(pp. 1-2)
The author also noted that although scholars and researchers have studied the role of history
education in post conflict reconstruction such as the one that took place after WWII, “the
relationship of secondary school history education to reconciliation has not been extensively
conceptualized, nor have there been many comparative studies investigating efforts to reform
history education after different types of widespread violence in a variety of cultures” (Cole,
2007, p. 2).
In light of the foregoing, Cole (2007) set out to accomplish three foundational levels of
objectives. The first is to explore contemporary “understandings of sociopolitical reconciliation
and suggest where history education seems to fit into the sequencing and major components of
reconciliation understood as a long-term, multilayered, and multigenerational process” (p. 2).
The second is to examine and analyze “problems with the linkage of reconciliation and history
education” (p. 2). The third is to identify and specify “ways in which history education can
contribute to reconciliation” (p. 3). In the subsequent sub-sections, each of these objectives is
critically examined and analyzed while making reference to some postwar transitional societies
where issues of historical memory and conflict resolution are of national importance.
Socio-Political Reconciliation
In postwar countries or countries emerging from violent conflict, two concepts are often
used to describe post-conflict reconstruction processes. The one is transition, and the other is
reconciliation. Although the two concepts are equally important, Cole (2007) did not explain in
detail the connection between transitional justice and reconciliation – whether from a sociopolitical or national reconciliation perspectives. A discussion on the nature and process of
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national reconciliation in postwar transitional societies should begin with an overview of the
concept of transitional justice, including its theory and practice of which reconciliation is an
essential component. Perhaps, as a matter of convenience or due to a lack of expertise in
questions of transitional justice, the author devotes substantial resources – intellectual and time –
to the issues of reconciliation.
In strict obedience to the focus of this research which is the relationship between history
education and conflict styles with respect to the revitalization of the agitation for the
independence of Biafra, I decided to thoroughly examine transitional justice in the preceding
chapter within the context of Gowon’s postwar reconstruction policies and the Oputa Panel.
Nevertheless, exploring how history education extends, if not completes, the work of
reconciliation in the aftermath of a civil war is indispensable.
Cole’s (2007) understanding of reconciliation is informed by various examples of
reconciliatory projects as were implemented by former postwar countries such as Germany (after
WWII), Spain (after their civil war), and so on. Based on these cases, the author revealed
inherent complexities in the concept of reconciliation. Reconciliation, Cole (2007) argued,
involves “a painful national transformation akin to death and rebirth” (p. 4). Although
reconciliation is often practiced between different individuals, the author defined reconciliation
“as a process involving political communities, not individuals with one another” (p. 4). Based on
this socio-politico-national focus of reconciliation, the author re-examined the existing definition
of reconciliation from various sources. Existing definitions of reconciliation could be categorized
under two important themes: thin reconciliation and thick reconciliation (two terms used by
David Crocker and cited in Cole, 2007, p. 4). While thin reconciliation is defined in terms of
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tolerance and accommodation, thick reconciliation involves the practice of apology and
forgiveness or relationship-building.
One challenge needs to be addressed. How could reconciliation agents and practitioners
implement and realize thick reconciliation after gross human / group rights abuses, mass murder,
war, genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, torture, and many other atrocities? Under what conditions
could a perpetrator ask for pardon, make reparations for wrongful deeds committed, be forgiven
by a victim or survivor, and work together to rebuild their relationship in order to co-exist in
peace and harmony? To explain this challenge, the author argued that “a more in-depth definition
of reconciliation is most necessary, but both the thicker and thinner types of reconciliation need
to be accompanied by specific examples of policies and case studies to illuminate the range of
meanings reconciliation can have” (Cole, 2007, p. 5).
This is why Cole’s (2007) edited volume on Teaching the Violent Past: History
Education and Reconciliation included nine case studies covering Germany, Japan, Canada,
Northern Ireland, Spain, Guatemala, Russia, Korea (North and South), India and Pakistan, each
with practical examples on socio-politico-national reconciliation. It is true that these case studies
provide in-depth insight on, and understanding of, the concept of reconciliation, examining cases
of national reconciliation from some African countries like South Africa, Rwanda, or Nigeria
(even with its failure) would have further enriched the author’s understanding of the subject
matter. To bridge this gap, I devoted many pages to Gowon’s postwar reintegration and
reconciliation programs in the preceding chapter.
Nevertheless, two important definitions of reconciliation as analyzed by Cole (2007)
could apply transnationally and cross-culturally. The one is by Hannah Arendt (as cited in Cole
2007). Reconciliation “seeks not to restore an imagined moral order that has been violated but to
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initiate new relations between members of a polity” (Cole 2007, p. 5). The other is a definition
by Burkhard Schaefer (as cited in Cole 2007) which posits that “reconciliation is a symmetrical
relation. I can be reconciled with you only if you are reconciled with me. Therefore, it requires as
a minimum condition, if not an equivalence in power, then at least the survival of both sides in
the process of reconciliation” (p. 5). For the author, this symmetrical “relationship is not
necessary for other processes that [are] commonly related to reconciliation, mercy, forgiveness,
or empathy, which in principle could be initiated from one side in the absence of any gesture or
overture from the other” (Cole 2007, p. 5).
By implication, reconciliation involves a balance of power which is necessary for an
honest and sincere review of the past. Predicated on the principle of restorative justice,
reconciliation does not mean an exoneration from accountability or responsibility for one’s
actions in the past. Rather, reconciliatory processes help in the revelation of suppressed and
silenced painful, traumatic events buried in oblivion. In short, reconciliation begins with a
serious work on forced amnesia.
Based on previous research on reconciliation, Cole (2007) identified nine components of
reconciliation: 1) official acknowledgement of harm done; 2) official apology and other official
gestures; 3) the promotion of public fact-finding or truth-telling fora (such as truth or historical
commissions), including a platform for victims; 4) the payment of reparations or the making of
restitution; 5) justice in the form of trials or lustration; 6) establishment of rule of law; 7) public
gestures of commemoration through the creation of monuments, memorials and holidays, and
other educational and cultural activities; 8) institutional reform and long-term development; and
9) public deliberation.
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A careful review of these integral components of reconciliation shows that recognition
and acknowledgement - two fundamental principles of narrative mediation (Winslade and Monk,
2000) – are at the heart of reconciliation. For reconciliation to be successful, there is need to
recognize and acknowledge/validate the narratives of “the victim group, most often a group that
has continued to be vulnerable and marginalized, and a validation of their collective memories of
suffering” (Cole, 2007, p. 7).
Although many victims of violence still carry unhealed psychological and physical
wounds/injuries even after a long passage of time, and their descendants may be suffering
transgenerational trauma as a result, recognition and acknowledgement or validation of their
painful past during reconciliatory programs may soothe their wounds and create a platform for
restitution or reparation by the perpetrators. As Cole (2007) explained, reconciliatory programs
anchored on the principle of recognition and acknowledgment,
can foster mutual understanding by placing present generations on the moral foundation
of coming to terms with historical injustices. It can promote the creation of a shared past
in which both perpetrators and victims, being mindful of their past and present roles as
well as the relationship between them, establish a new reality. (p. 7)
Substantial and tangible reparations that follow the precepts of recognition and
acknowledgement are the prerequisite for trust-building and a symbolic gesture that “the
perpetrating group will not repeat the acts that led to a need for reconciliation in the first place”
(Cole, 2007, p. 8).
It is not enough to make reparation. There is need for its implementation, oversight and
enforcement. This is why Cole (2007) argued that the role of political leadership in achieving
reconciliation cannot be overemphasized. According to Cole (2007),
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The importance of political leadership can be explained by the fact that heads of state and
other high officials represent the body politic, and their actions convey the message that
the state acknowledges past wrongs, that it has disassociated itself from the actions of its
predecessor, and that henceforth it will be committed to justice. Without these top-level
assurances, as numerous cases around the world attest, reconciliatory gestures and
projects from nongovernmental and less highly placed officials will be viewed with
suspicion. (p. 9)
In my opinion, the idea that socio-political reconciliation cannot be successful unless it is
initiated and executed by political leadership is not true in all societies and cultures. A review of
some cases of national reconciliation in many countries will show that a large number of
reconciliatory projects initiated and executed by the governments failed completely. In 1999 at
the dawn of a democratic transition in Nigeria after decades of military rule and dictatorship, the
newly elected government of President Olusegun Obasanjo initiated a national reconciliation,
truth and justice commission to deal with the painful, traumatic and suppressed memories of
human/group rights violations and violence against some populations of the country committed
during military dictatorship and the Nigeria-Biafra War of 1967-1970. After many years of
reconciliatory activities, the recommendations by this commission and the proposed
reparations/restitutions and revision of history education were not implemented. It was seen as a
waste of time and resources. Nevertheless, it played a vital role in returning the repressed
memories of the war to public consciousness. This shows the failure of government-led
reconciliatory projects.
On the contrary, a reconciliatory project initiated by women of faith in Liberia led by
Nobel Peace Laureate Leymah Gbowee not only helped in ending the second Liberian Civil War,
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but most importantly it was instrumental in national healing and reconciliation as well as in
restoring peace and stability in Liberia (Maru, 2019). However, one area that governments have
a lot of influence and power is the education sector through history education. Unless the
powerful whose narratives are being transmitted and learned agree to the revision of history
education in order to include the narratives of the victims and powerless, the long-term goals of
reconciliation will not be achieved.
Linking Reconciliation to History Education: Problems and Challenges
National reconciliation is linked to the teaching and learning of history education in
school classrooms. The relationship between reconciliation and history education is evident in
Cole’s (2007) assertion:
If the representation of a group’s past is now recognized as an integral part of identity,
and identity includes not only how one views one’s own group but also how one views
groups seen as ‘Other,’ which would include especially former enemies, then
understandings of history are crucial to a society’s ability to reckon with the past for the
sake of a more peaceful future. (p. 13)
Reckoning with the past does not only end with political reforms and truth and justice
commissions. The challenge of reconciliation is how to move beyond the changes in political
leadership and truth commissions toward a citizen-oriented program within the education sector.
Two propositions from Cole (2007) could be utilized to explain the importance of history
education in achieving long-term national reconciliation.
1.

While justice and legal processes and macro-institutional reform processes (at the
level of the state, including the legislature, judiciary, military, and security organs)
are a necessary part of enduring reconciliation, at some point reconciliatory processes
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must reach beyond the level of the elite and become part of people’s lives, and also
part of the midlevel and grassroots institutions, such as schools, whose workings
relate more closely to the lives of average citizens. (Cole, 2007, pp. 13-14)
2. Where social memories of widespread violence are present …, only democratization
would both allow for continued work on the past, to prevent it from continuing to
exist in subterranean forms that could reappear and poison the present and provide the
crucial structures that lower the likelihood of violence reoccurring by allowing deep
moral disagreement to occur in a civil way. (Cole, 2007, p. 16)
The two propositions stated above show that schools are laboratories of democracy and
citizen engagement. For the outcomes of national reconciliation programs to be adopted and
implemented by citizens, it is important that teachers and students are empowered to teach, learn
and discuss controversial issues based on democratic principles. However, certain criteria need to
be met and some challenges in teaching controversial and painful history need to be addressed.
Cole (2007) identified two types of challenges facing history education in different
countries. The first is that the revision of history textbooks and the teaching of controversial
historical issues should depend on the success of national reconciliatory programs. In Cole’s
(2007) view:
history education potentially can promote reconciliation, but a certain stage of
reconciliation needs to be reached before textbooks can be revised, the public can accept
these revisions, which challenge narratives held dear by certain sectors of the population,
and teachers can challenge discredited narratives and stereotypes and risk controversy in
the classroom. (p. 18)
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The second challenge is that history education should be based on a balance between the
promulgation of patriotic national identity and a revision of historical injustices in order to
include the narratives of historically marginalized populations. Although national identity and
patriotism are crucial aspects of history education in school classrooms, educators also “need to
provide a critical history, which may include a very large number of negative and unflattering
events” (Cole, 2007, p. 19). Deepening the role of reconciliation through the revision of school
textbooks and the actual teaching of these painful histories highlights the important role of
history education in achieving national reconciliation.
The Roles of History Education in Achieving National Reconciliation
The teaching and learning of history in school classrooms can extend the promise of
national reconciliation to the wider citizenry. For Laura Hein and Mark Selden (as cited in Cole,
2007), the goal of history education is “to transmit ideas of citizenship and both the idealized
past and the promised future of the community” (p. 13). History education provides an
opportunity for students to engage in a democratic dialogue on controversial and painful past in
other to identify ways to live together in peace and harmony. Cole (2007) summarized the main
roles of history education as follows:
Secondary-school history education revision would seem to fit into, complement, or
deepen certain reconciliatory processes and stages identified above, including
acknowledgement and truth-telling. Changes in history textbooks and curricula would
function as a kind of secondary phase, which reflect and embody the state’s commitment
to institutionalizing earlier processes such as truth and historical commissions and official
gestures and processes of acknowledgement, apology, and repair. (p. 15)
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This means that if national reconciliation is not extended to revisions in school textbooks and if
these revised textbooks are not taught in school classrooms, the various aspects and promises of
reconciliation as previously discussed will have minimal effect in the society.
Another major role that history education plays in furthering the goal of national
reconciliation is the correction of past injustices throughout the history of the country. In
addition to its corrective role, history education also provides the opportunity and platform for
the inclusion of multiple, if not contradictory, narratives. Through history education, “former
enemies or excluded groups who might have been largely omitted from official histories can be
brought back into the national narrative as agents who made positive contributions to the life of
the nation; those who were portrayed in limited, simplistic, and negative ways can be rehumanized” (Cole, 2007, p. 20).
While discovering multiple narratives about controversial and painful issues that
happened in the past, students are prepared to engage in a critical dialogue with respect and
empathy. The skills acquired from history education will help students to become better citizens
who are able to have honest and respectful discussions on issues of national concern without
instigating hate, demonizing those who hold contradictory views, or resorting to violence.
As the Nigerian society struggles with competing narratives about painful historical
memories, especially the memory of the Nigeria-Biafra War, it is important that a new
understanding on how to reconcile and teach these narratives is constructed. This is what Cole’s
(2007) Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and Reconciliation has done. In reviewing
this book, I found that socio-politico-national reconciliation lays the groundwork for history
education – what to teach, how to teach it and for what purpose it should be taught. It is not
enough to create reconciliatory projects such as truth commissions, and so on. There is need to
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extend the changes reconciliation heralds to the education sector in order not to repeat the
mistakes of the past. By teaching and learning controversial and painful history in school
classrooms the promise that national reconciliation holds is extended to the wider citizenry.
The question that comes to mind is: how could painful histories be taught and learned in
school classrooms? Cole (2007) invited history educators to promote “students’ ability to
approach the past with scholarly detachment, with moral judgements suspended, and then to use
their knowledge to contribute to an enhanced moral understanding of present dilemmas and their
own future obligations” (p. 22). This means that understanding our ugly past is important to
avoid making the same mistakes again in the present and future.
In addition, an important takeaway from Cole (2007) is that:
teaching that presents students to history as an academic discipline with widely accepted
standards and methodologies rather than as a political tool or expression of nationalism
can help make the study of history ‘at its best… not simply a collection of facts, not a
politically sanctioned listing of indisputable ‘truths,’ but an ongoing means of collective
self-discovery about the nature of our society. (p. 21)
While socio-political reconciliation focuses on restorative justice – perpetrators taking
responsibility for their action and making sincere reparations for their wrongdoing -, history
education seeks to answer three fundamental questions: 1) “what is it we are obliged to
remember from the past? 2) how can or should we judge the actions of people in the past? 3)
what can we learn from the conflict of the past for the ethical issues that face us today?” (Cole,
2007, p. 22).
Because we remember differently, there is need to not only include multiple narratives in
our history textbooks to reflect our diverse and multicultural society, but most importantly,
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educators should not shy away from teaching and allowing students to participate in discussions
on controversial issues about the past. In the case of Nigeria, those controversial issues and
difficult questions about the Nigeria-Biafra War should be learned and discussed.
The challenge, however, rests not only on what to teach but on how to teach it. On the
question of “how to teach” the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War in school classrooms, the theory
of transformative learning (Mezirow, 2009) is examined. Before that, it is important to briefly
review the nature of the controversial issues in the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War which
addresses the question of what to teach, that is, the content of this history education.
Teaching the Nigeria-Biafra War History as a Controversial Issue
Now is the time to answer the question: what is the nature or breadth and depth of this
controversy within the education system? As discussed below, this question reveals the delicacy
and problematic embedded in the content of a postwar history education such as the NigeriaBiafra War history. To thoroughly address this salient question from the Nigerian perspective, I
decided to call on Onuoha’s (2016) “Shared Histories, Divided Memories: Mediating and
Navigating the Tensions in Nigeria–Biafra War Discourses.” Onuoha’s (2016) article
“interrogates the contending and opposing narratives generated by the Nigeria–Biafra War” (p.
4).
In this era of the return of the repressed memories of the Nigeria-Biafra War to public
consciousness, three key areas of narrative contention with regard to its breadth are discernible.
The first is a contention between the hegemonic narrative of the federal government and the
multiple narratives of various ethnic groups in Nigeria. The second is a contention among the
major ethnic groups that had a preponderant influence and role before and during the war. These
ethnic groups are Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. The third is a contention between minority
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ethnic groups or communities and the dominant ethnic groups, for example between minority
ethnic groups or communities in the former Eastern Region and the Igbos.
The bone of contention here has to do with the purpose of or reason for the NigeriaBiafra War. Why did we fight such a bloody war that resulted in the death of more than two
million people? In the previous chapter under the sub-section, precursors of the war, I provided a
thorough analysis of possible answers to this question. Nevertheless, the succinct answers
provided by Onuoha (2016) recapitulate the various arguments I had already enunciated.
According to Onuoha (2016), “the official and hegemonic historical narratives advanced
by the state posit that the war was a ‘war of national unity’” (p. 4). This official position of the
federal government has been fervently rejected by some ethnic groups in Nigeria on the ground
that it should not be accepted as “the sole legitimate framework for remembering and
interpreting the war” (Onuoha, 2016, p. 4).
As has been previously explained, the major ethnic group within the secessionist camp
that led the prosecution of the war against the federal military government of Nigeria is the Igbo
ethnic group. The Igbos argue that the war was “a war of Igbo national liberation” (Onuoha,
2016). In fact, if we include those former Eastern Region minorities that supported Biafran
secession or fought on the Biafran side, then it will be accurate and just to say that former
Eastern Nigerians perceived the war as a war of liberation of Eastern Nigerians or as some of
them may argue, it was a war of self-defense.
Nonetheless, many minorities reject both the broader Eastern Nigerian narrative and the
federal narrative. As Onuoha (2016) opined, “some ethnic groups relate to it in terms of the
massacres and atrocities committed by the federal troops and the secessionist republic in their
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communities, and continue to claim that their accounts have not been accommodated in official
narratives” (p. 4).
The second aspect of the bone of contention is the depth of the controversy within the
education system. While the breadth of the controversy as discussed in the preceding paragraphs
relates to the agents of the controversy (or agents of competing memory), that is, the various
ethnic groups, minority communities and the federal government, its depth refers to the specific
elements or issues of the controversy.
These controversial issues include but not limited to the 1914 amalgamaation of the north
and south; the role and influence of the British; the reason for the January 15, 1966 coup;
General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s Unification Decree; the July 29, 1966 counter coup; the north’s decision
to abandon northern secession after the counter coup; the pogroms of eastern Nigerians that
ensued; the failure of the negotiations and peace agreements, particularly the Aburi Accord; the
question of self-determination; creation of twelve states on May 27, 1967; declaration of Biafran
independence on May 30, 1967 and the secession question; shift from police action to a fullblown war; the invasion of the Midwest Region; role of the Yorubas during the war; the Asaba
massacre and massacres in other locations; the death penalty and execution of Lieutenant
Colonel Victor Banjo, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Major Phillip Alale and Major Samuel
Agbamuche by General Ojukwu; reason for total blockade of Biafra; responsibility for the death
of millions of civilians caused by starvation; the fate and role of minority ethnic groups in the
former Eastern Region; the roles of foreign powers and international organizations such as
Britain, Russia, France, United States, China, OAU and its member states, United Nations,
humanitarian organizations, and other involved countries; Biafran surrender; postwar 3Rs and
the no victor, no vanquished policies including abandoned property policy, twenty pound policy,
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and indigenization decree; the name to be given to the war, for example, Nigerian Civil War,
Biafran War, Nigeria-Biafra War, the War of National Unity, the War of National Liberation, the
War of Self-Defense, the War of Genocide; and finally, the question of genocide.
It must be emphasized that controversial narratives (breadth of the contention) and
controversial issues (depth of the contention) alarmingly exist in each ethnic group or tribe. This
is evident in the firsthand accounts of key individuals who participated in the war in various
capacities. A good example is the disagreement between two Yoruba leaders, former President
Olusegun Obasanjo’s account of the war which he narrated in “My Command: An Account of
the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970” (Obasanjo, 1980) and Alabi-Isama’s (2013) “The Tragedy
of Victory: On-the-Spot Account of the Nigeria-Biafra War in the Atlantic Theatre.”
Given the breadth and depth of the controversy about what happened during the NigeriaBiafra War, Heerten and Moses (2014) strongly advocated for the inclusion of the history of this
war in genocide studies. For the authors, this is even important and urgent “since its implications
challenge some of the field’s founding assumptions and promises” (p. 169). Heerten and Moses
(2014) identified four ways by which the Nigeria-Biafra War could be studied as a war of
genocide.
The first has two components: the obvious intentional massacres of Igbo civilians
supported by the Nigerian military in the north and west that caused the exodus of millions of
Igbos in different regions back to their Igbo homeland; and the intentional use of starvation as a
weapon of war and total annihilation of a population through the embargo placed on Biafra by
the Nigerian military government headed by General Yakubu Gowon that resulted in the spread
of a kwashiorkor pandemic that killed millions of people in Biafra. The second is the uniqueness
of the genocide of Igbos which is at the center of the Nigeria-Biafra War distinguishing it from

408
other genocides of the twentieth century. The third is the convincing testimonies of the survivors
of the war previously silenced or suppressed but have now been brought back to public
consciousness through the work of some genocide scholars and other academics and independent
researchers. The fourth is the evolving expansion of the field of genocide studies to include
previously neglected cases both during and after colonization of which the Nigeria-Biafra War is
an example.
Despite the merits or demerits of the opposing narratives of the agents of controversy, or
put differently, agents of competing memory (with regard to the breadth) as well as the
controversial issues in their narratives (as it relates to the depth), Onuoha (2016) argued that “the
plurality of perspectives on the Nigeria–Biafra War must be harnessed for education, dialogue,
and reconciliation by policymakers and practitioners” (p. 4). This is important if we want to
avoid a dual or even triadic approach to education which Akinola (2014) labeled “the greatest
legacy of disunity bequeathed to Nigeria by the British administration” (p. 7). By this it means
that there was not a uniform or standardized education system and curricula. Also, the
southerners embraced Western education earlier than the northerners due to differential colonial
policies.
In the case of the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War, teaching different narratives about
the war in different regions or states may jeopardize ongoing efforts made for national
reconciliation and unity just as it happened after the 1914 amalgamation. “Education, being a
supreme force of socialization and integration,” Akinola (2014) argued, “would appear to have
been deliberately ignored as a tool for unifying the intermixture of cultures loosely compounded
under amalgamation” (p. 7).
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Having ignored the importance of education in carving out an inclusive national identity
and completing national integration after the 1914 amalgamation no matter how controversial its
contents were, it is imperitive not to make the same mistake again in this era of the return of the
repressed memories of the Nigeria-Biafra War to public consciousness. This is why Onuoha
(2016) strongly argued that:
rethinking the writing and teaching of the war can contribute to national dialogue and
reconciliation, so that lessons deducible from the nation’s most tragic experience, and
arguably its single most important event, will not elude future citizens. The domain of
education can be harnessed to create a more balanced, shared, collective, and impartial
national narrative, based on a democratic and critical reading of historical sources and
multiple points of view, which do not shy away from contested and controversial issues
in the search for a project of national reconciliation. (p. 4)
Teaching multiple points of view or controversial issues has been thoroughly studied by
many scholars as is evident in enormous research literature available within the field of history
education. To highlight the importance of this study and the scholarly cum policy contributions it
is designed to make, it is imperitive that a thorough review of literature on teaching and learning
controversial public issues is done. I have therefore devoted the remaining pages of this subsection to this analytical review.
Hess (2002) defined controversial public issues (CPI) as unresolved questions of public
policy that spark significant disagreement. Malikow’s (2006) paper provides secondary teachers
with guidance for considering and conducting discussions of controversial issues with their
students. The author argued that a controversy exists when both a strong intellectual argument
can be made for two or more conflicting positions, and the issue in dispute involves two or more
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parties with equal and competing interests. Before engaging students in controversial issues
discussion, the author stressed the importance of determining whether the topic is truly
controversial.
For Malikow (2006), a truly controversial issue is likely to involve competing interests or
values. Having determined a controversial issue to be discussed, the author suggested that
teachers should ask themselves if this topic is a part of the course’s curriculum and if the
discussion of this topic will contribute to this course’s stated objectives for the students. In
addition to these questions, teachers, the author argued, should anticipate the probability of
community reprisal or concerns when weighing the inclusion of a controversial topic.
Authenticity and integrity are identified by the author as the core virtues of pedagogy for
controversial issues. This means that teachers should be bold to share their positions on the
controversial issue being discussed, and the strongest possible representation of all sides of an
issue should be encouraged.
Binnenkade (2015) posited that the teaching and learning of controversial history involve
a memory practice which is anchored on the idea of discursive node. Viewed as hermeneutical
metaphors that give meaning to, and facilitate the understanding of, historical facts from
different perspectives, discursive node could be understood from two perspectives: the micro and
the macro levels. Within the micro level, the teacher and the students carry within them different
sources of historical narratives and knowledge that have shaped and continue to influence their
worldviews. At the macro level, discursive node shows that the content of history education and
how it is taught in school classrooms are determined by many actors and institutions, although
the goal is to influence the behaviors of the students in the society and public opinion about the
past.
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Using the Japanese American internment as a case study, Camicia (2008) explored the
challenge often faced by stakeholders in deciding which curriculum topic is controversial and
which is not. The author revealed that while some consider a historical interpretation in the
curriculum to be well-established and non-controversial, others challenge this interpretation and
view it as controversial. The categorization of an issue as controversial, the author argued, is
influenced by power relations. In the author’s view, hegemony makes it difficult for a dominant
ideology to acknowledge ideologies that challenge the “taken-for-granted,” and this influences
what is and what is not categorized as controversial. The author also revealed that one of the
ways to determine whether an historical issue should be classified and taught as controversial or
not is by understanding how that issue is framed by different stakeholders. Political, cultural,
economic, and ideological differences lead to different interpretations or framings of issues and
events. In the last analysis, the author opined that disagreements over what aspect of the
curriculum is controversial or not reveal the presence of deep polarization in the community and
deeper conflicts related to historical and contemporary contexts.
In the view of Zembylas and Bekerman (2008), efforts by the hegemonic group or the
powerful to determine, define and promote the type of historical memory that should be included
in school curricula eliminate the possibility of considering and learning about other narratives
susceptible of creating the conditions for national healing and reconciliation. These silenced
memories of past trauma are conceptualized by the authors as dangerous memories. They are
called dangerous because they reveal different accounts about what happened in the past.
Including dangerous memories in school curricula and critically discussing and learning about
them will help forge a sense of solidarity that recognizes and acknowledges the past and looks
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toward the future. For this reason, the authors advocate for a pedagogy of dangerous memories in
school classrooms.
Oteíza et al. (2015) explored how historical memory of gross human rights violations
could be taught to younger generation through classroom history education. Although the
teachers and students are guided by the course curriculum and textbooks, their views are highly
influenced by their subjective experiences of the traumatic memories of the past either as a
collective or as an individual. Irrespective of what their views are regarding the official
narratives or counternarratives about what happened in the past, history education classes
provide an opportunity for critical reflection, dialogue and meaning making between the teacher
and the students as well as among the students. In history classes, both the students and the
teachers are confronted with different narratives, memories, and interpretations of the same past
in order to engage in critical discussion and dialogue. The outcome of critical reflection and
dialogue on traumatic historical past, the authors believe, is the emergence of shared meaning
and understanding needed to ensure that what happened in the past will not happen again in the
future.
Teeger (2015) held that schools are key institutions of socialization where individuals
should be taught, among other histories, the effects of histories of legislated racism on the
present. By this the author implies that history education is important for understanding how
young people learn about the connections between histories of racial oppression and the
contemporary racial order, for example, the legacies of apartheid and the inequality between the
privileged and unprivileged groups. However, race-neutral discourses deny the existence of both
present-day racism and the contemporary effects of histories of racial oppression. By raceneutral discourses, the author means that teachers teach “both sides of the story,” and tell their
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students that not all whites were perpetrators and not all blacks were victims. In the author’s
view, the dissociation of victims from perpetrators, and the teachers’ silence over which group
benefited from racial discrimination hinder students’ abilities to make connections to the present
and to articulate the effects of racism on their everyday lives.
Washington and Humphries’ (2011) study examined how controversial public issues are
taught and learned in school classrooms. Focusing on the teaching and learning of race related
issues in rural American school classroom, the authors sought to understand how teachers are
equipped by their training and socially acquired skills, if any, to teach and deal with
controversial issues in their classrooms. Through their findings, the authors revealed that
educational background and personal teaching philosophy, perhaps more than the school
environment, may influence a teacher’s disclosure decisions, that is, the disclosure of personal
viewpoints on controversial issues surrounding race in school classroom. According to the
authors, it is important that preservice teachers be taught effective, engaging methods for
controversial issues discussion while also openly discussing their fears, being mindful of the
school communities in which their preservice teachers may be working, and helping them
reconcile the information they may be getting from educational research findings, advice from
mentor teachers, and anecdotes about school administrators and parents.
Controversial issues for Washington and Humphries (2011) are therefore those issues that
are not “settled” and, accordingly, still appropriate for public debate. The authors argued that the
success of controversial issues discussions, particularly those surrounding race, depended upon
the implementation of “preventive measures” in terms of building relationships and community,
or, more simply, planning for discussion. For this reason, the authors recommended that taking
the time to build positive teacher-student relationships helps to protect the teacher from those
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“community backlashes” that teachers often fear. They also posited that taking the time to plan
out and visualize the future discussion can help to both prevent inappropriate student comments
and prepare the teacher to respond in the event that such comments do emerge.
Duckworth (2015) called for an evaluation of our current peace education programs and
proposed the implementation of critical peace education. Critical peace education draws from the
literature on historical or collective memory. Through the use of oral histories and “futures
visioning” methodologies, the author argued that teachers should be equipped to interrupt
transgenerational and historical cycles of violent conﬂict. This is possible according to the author
if the survivors of historical trauma and violence are given the opportunity to share their
experiences on the painful past, stories that are contrary to the state sanctioned narratives taught
in history classes. By this, it is implied that history educators should be trained to facilitate
critical awareness of previously silenced narratives and create spaces for student-to-student and
student-to-teacher dialogues. This, the author believes, will result in narrative transformation
within the community. Narrative transformation, however, will not be achieved without a careful
examination of how textbooks tell stories of painful historical past. The classrooms therefore are
seen by the author as spaces for critical dialogue. The outcome of critical dialogue and narrative
transformation are in two folds: 1) replacement of previously held destructive narratives with
new ones that recognize the experiences and rights of all parties; and 2) (re)building of
relationships.
Fournier et al. (2012) posited that the state promoted collective memory such as
Remembrance Day in Canada are included in school curricula and taught to students as if that is
the only version about what happened in the past. Government official narratives highlight the
importance afforded to militaristic and nationalistic sentiments that place war narratives at the
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heart of national collective memory and justify war as a means of achieving freedom. However,
the authors argued that official accounts of governments do not include a discussion of how war
influenced policy and the treatment of those at home, including the exclusion of immigrants and
‘alien’ enemies, and labor camps, for example. According to the authors, remembering is a
dynamic and complex process that draws on a multitude of discourses. The authors therefore
caution educators to be mindful of the ways in which curriculum, government resources, and
non-governmental resources work to essentialize and complicate national identity.
Macgilchrist et al. (2015) explored the meanings of memory and history education as
they have been used in recent research literature. Memory, according to the authors, is a site of
political contestation, subject formation, power struggle, knowledge production, and communitybuilding. Because historical memory is taught in school classrooms, the authors explained that
history education is a site where teachers and pupils as members of distinct generations engage
with textbooks and other materials as specific forms of memory texts that guide what should be
passed on to the younger generation. The authors therefore argued that it is important to
investigate how what counts as worth remembering in a given context is reproduced, negotiated
and/or interrupted in classrooms and other educational practices.
Chhabra (2015) investigated memory practice or the doing of collective memory between
conflicting groups in formal and informal education platforms. Inspired by the case of collective
remembering of the historical event of the 1947 British India Partition, the author explored how
members from conflicting groups engage with memories of a violent past, what memory
practices or personal and collective ways of remembering they choose and what they discard
when transmitting knowledge of the event to the next generation, how these practices influence
the next generation’s understanding of the event and of the perceived “other”, and how collective
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memory practices that perpetuate a hegemonic remembering can be interrupted. While exploring
these questions, the author examined the intention, the tone that shapes the collective memory or
the content of what gets remembered and what gets suppressed or forgotten. Most importantly,
the message that older generations in a community want to convey to the young about how to
think about the event and, more importantly, how to think about the other, is also examined by
the author. More so, the author believes that it is important to evaluate how teachers are teaching
narratives of historical memory of violence or war, in addition to pupils’ understandings, and the
contents of history textbooks. Understanding these, the author opined, will help offer
perspectives on possibilities of transforming memory practices that perpetuate collective
memories of unchallenged feelings of hate and animosity between and among conflicting groups,
and on practices that can open the way for a spirited and meaningful engagement with the other.
Ahlrichs et al.’s (2015) paper explored how “collective” memory is enacted in history
education today. Drawing on ongoing research projects, the authors described three vignettes,
teasing apart different ways of “doing memory” in history classrooms in Germany. History
teaching according to the authors is seen as a cultural practice through which particular social
orderings and categorizations come to be seen as acceptable and reasonable and others as
controversial or unreasonable. Leveraging on the concept of memory practice, the authors sought
to understand how people are engaging with memory objects, how they are selecting “things” to
engage with, what they are doing with these things, where conflicting interpretations become
noticeable to the participants of an exchange and where they are not. Furthermore, by describing
how pupils and teachers engage with media in history classrooms, the authors illustrated how
memory is enacted and contested in everyday, apparently banal, media practices that are all but
benign in their implications. This illustration is done through the help of three vignettes
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identified by the authors to explain three different kinds of memory practices. In the first, a
commonsense social ordering is reproduced in the classroom. In the second, teacher and pupils
co-create a political position which contests mainstream views, but they do not expressly discuss
this contestation. In the third, a pupil’s media selection interrupts the conventional perspective on
that past, and the class discusses that interruption. Critical discussions such as these, the authors
argued, generate vibrant conversations that consider multiple voices from divergent perspectives
in the historical power matrix.
In Wang’s (2008) view, it is collective memory of the past that binds a group of people
together. The powerful link between collective memory and history, the author held, is
particularly salient in the education system. This means that schools are the primary social
institutions that transmit national narratives about the past. The author argued that during the
period of political transitions, nation-states place great emphasis on teaching their national
history with the aim of consolidating the bond between the individual citizen and the homeland.
To achieve this, the author recommended that nation states engage in, among other practices, the
rewriting of school history textbooks. The author therefore argued that it is important to examine
the implications of the uses and abuses of national history for political purposes as has been done
by Chinese Communist Party’s nationwide education campaign, the ‘‘Patriotic Education
Campaign.
Torsti (2008) posited that societies emerging from violent conflict or civil wars face
enormous challenges with respect to the teaching and learning of history. This challenge, the
author believed, is more complicated when these societies are divided along ethno-national lines.
Through a normative approach, the author discused three areas of consideration when
implementing history education in a post-conflict or conflict context. The first is on a need to re-
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examine the basic aims of history education. For the author, history education should be seen as
long-term development and security issue that deserves careful planning, implementation,
coordination and evaluation. With this long-term vision in mind, the goal of history education,
the author argued, should not be unity in homogeneity, but unity in diversity - a unity that
develops organically, and not the one that is legislated. Second, the author showed that the
achievement of this unity in diversity in a multicultural and post-conflict situation is dependent
on the agents of history practice which include textbooks, teachers or historians. Third, inspired
by Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy, the author illustrated how deliberative
communication could serve as a helpful tool for teaching and learning history in post-conflict
and multicultural societies. Deliberative communication, the author affirmed, provides an
opportunity for open encounters with the “others” as opposed to forced integration.
Torsti (2009) focused on two problematic issues often encountered in societies emerging
from violent conflict, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The one is the overall national
segregation that divides children into separate groups. The other is the teaching of national
subjects, in particular history, which fosters enemy images and stereotypes of the other national
groups. The author found that the use of “us-them” terminology in textbooks, in which hostile
stereotypes about other national groups of the country, was typical. The author also stressed that
historical consciousness developed among people of different nationalities, influencing peoples’
perceptions and interpretations of the past, present and future. It is important, the author
suggested, for international actors who intervene in postwar countries to recognize the
importance of history education and help involved policymakers determine what to teach, how to
teach it and expected outcomes of history education. These, according to the author, are integral
to the overall goal of nation-building, identity construction, national recovery and reconstruction.

419
Alayan’s (2016) paper investigated why the Holocaust as a traumatic historical event is
included in Jewish history curricula and excluded in Palestinian history curricula. In addition, the
author explored how this history is taught within the state of Israel and the traumatic historical
event that is taught in Palestine. The Holocaust, the author revealed, is studied extensively in
Israeli schools as the most tragic event in Jewish history and has become one of the most
signiﬁcant factors in shaping Jewish identity, Israeli national consciousness, and Jewish
remembrance. On the other hand, the author opined that the Nakba which is the Palestinian
suffering during and after the events of 1948 is taught in Palestinian schools. However, the
Palestinian Ministry of Education chooses not to teach the Holocaust because teaching it, they
believe, would mean acknowledging the Jewish suffering during the Holocaust, which is
hypothesized by some as legitimizing the Israeli/Zionist agenda and especially the establishment
of the State of Israel—something they are not prepared to do at this moment in time. By not
teaching and learning the Holocaust in Palestinian schools, and by not teaching and learning the
Nakba in the Israeli schools, both groups deny the importance of those traumatic events. For the
author, negating the national or political “other’s” historical narrative is perhaps common but
harmful to intergroup relations and learning more about that narrative can be a step toward
understanding the society in which one lives (in the case of Palestinian-Israeli students) and
toward reconciliation (in the case of students in the Palestinian Authority). Through teaching
historic events, the author concluded, education systems can assist students on both sides of the
fence to better understand the Arab-Israeli conﬂict as well as current relationships between Jews
and Arabs.
Toledo et al. (2011) affirmed that inclusion of painful historical memory in the
curriculum of countries that have experienced war, genocide, ethnic conflict or military
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dictatorships imposes new demands on teachers. For the authors, the complexity of teaching
history increases when the history being taught involves violations of human rights. To teach in
this situation, the authors argued that teachers must take a stand in the classroom to promote
critical thinking. Critical thinking in history class according to the authors helps students to
understand the conflict experienced and its impact on them and their families. For the authors,
history education in transitional societies should focus on peaceful conflict resolution, social
justice, recognition of social and cultural diversity, non-violence, collaborative work,
multiculturalism, and environmental care. Leveraging on the principles of restorative justice, the
authors suggested that the goals of history teaching-learning should include, among other things,
healing of trauma and national reconciliation. These, the authors argued, will be possible only if
teachers utilize discourse and transformative practices that will help students take ownership of
the concept of peace, enrich it and mould it to their own existence.
Hogervorst (2015) explored how the process of pedagogization of memory derived from
authentic locations and objects instead of from personal memories from eyewitnesses could be
useful in facilitating communication about the past between the different generations. Using the
German bombardment of the mediaeval city center of Rotterdam on May 14, 1940 as a case
study, Hogervorst explained that memory transmission to the younger generation through
pedagogization of memory is necessitated by the growing distance from the past, and the
decreasing number of people who have personal memories of the bombardment. For the
transmission of this painful memory to be successful, the author highlighted the importance of
memorials, sites of memory, oral history, and history education in both the primary and
secondary schools. Focusing on the moral lessons drawn from the past in the present and the
virtual representation of lessons learned from memory sites, objects and practices, the author
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showed how the transmission of war memories and associated moral values to younger
generations could serve as a crucial way of giving meaning to the past, and thereby creating and
sustaining identities.
Krieg (2015) explored the ways in which teachers and students balance emotions and
facts while teaching and learning the history of the Holocaust in German school classrooms. The
author argued that although preserving the memory of the Holocaust is a central pillar of the
German government, educators in Germany increasingly have problems reaching young people
with moral messages, and more often than not these messages are angrily rejected by the
learners. The author observed that developing good teacher-student relationship in history class
helps create a safe and trusting space for learning the traumatic events of the Holocaust. The
author therefore recommended that teachers should try to distinguish between emotions that
induce apathy and those that induce empathy. Developing a sense of empathy in history class is
helpful in reconciling the contradiction between emotions and facts.
Oulton et al.’s (2004) research which focused on the UK’s policy on citizenship
education indicate that the inclusion of controversial issues in the curriculum will help to prepare
future citizens for participating in their resolution. How well-prepared teachers are to teach about
controversial issues in school classroom, the authors argued, will determine how well students
are introduced to multiple perspectives about a controversial issue. In addition to this, the authors
held that controversial issues cannot always be resolved by recourse to reason, logic or
experiment as they involve a degree of emotion; controversial issues may be resolved, as more
information becomes available. Because controversial issues are emotion laden, the authors
suggested that students should be taught how to be aware of bias in controversial materials and
given the skills and abilities to identify bias for themselves. By using a teaching strategy that
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could result in open-mindedness, the authors affirmed that students are most likely to change
their mind in the light of convincing evidence, argument or experience, while recognizing,
respecting and valuing the notion that a person’s stance on an issue will be affected by their
worldview.
According to Asimeng‐Boahene (2007), teaching controversial issues has been widely
viewed as preparing students for effective citizenship. In Africa, the author contended that
teaching controversial issues in school classrooms is even more important because of past and
ongoing violent conflicts and traumatic events that have severely polarized people along ethnic
and religious lines. However, the author posited that controversial issues are most often
neglected in African school classrooms because of the following reasons: resistance from
students; lack of trained and experienced teachers; teaching methodology; instructional materials
availability; fear on the part of teachers of governmental interference; and societal views.
Nevertheless, the author proposed various strategies that teachers could use when teaching
controversial issues in school classrooms. If declaring own stance regarding the controversial
issue, a logical explanation supported by evidence is necessary; and letting the students know
that own position is not definitive but is open for discussion and challenge. By setting a positive
example, the author highlighted that skillful teachers act as excellent models of good democratic
practice. The author’s overall argument is that an education that encourages and nourishes
exposition of different views in classrooms should be the norm in African school classrooms,
because such curricula would prepare the African students of the 21st century to deal with the
local and global crises that humans will face.
Avery et al. (2013) shared their findings on their evaluative research on the Deliberating
in a Democracy (DID) Project, a project aimed at teaching teachers and students how to
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deliberate about controversial public issues in their classrooms. According to the authors, DID
has been quite successful in enhancing students’ ability to formulate and state their opinions,
listen to opposing viewpoints, and take multiple perspectives. The content, process and strategy
utilized by DID, the authors illustrated, are based on the very principles of deliberation.
Deliberation, they argued, is not a debate, rather the goal is to arrive at the best possible solution
to an issue through the thoughtful consideration of alternatives. In deliberation, they emphasized,
the group seeks to uncover the best possible rationales for alternative positions, ferret out their
weaknesses, and consider the possible short- and long-term consequences associated with
positions.
In a deliberative forum, Avery et al. (2013) affirmed, citizens study an issue, consider
alternative solutions and potential consequences, and develop some consensus on ways to
address the issue. For the authors, this deliberation leads to enhanced belief in core democratic
tenets—fairness, equality, tolerance, and cooperation. Students who participate in issues
discussions in open and supportive classrooms are more likely to demonstrate qualities
associated with enlightened and engaged citizenship. Structured academic controversy (SAC),
the authors demonstrated, is one method for engaging students in deliberation about
controversial public issues. Advantages of SAC according to the authors include: it is student led
but facilitated by the teacher; involves all students; and acknowledges and respects all
perspectives. The authors stressed the need for teachers to be professionally equipped to facilitate
discussions about controversial public issues. This will help teachers ensure that each young
person who participates in SAC leaves the classroom feeling respected.
Payne and Gainey’s (2000) article focused on how controversial issues could be taught in
criminal justice classes. However, their findings and suggestions are applicable to other fields of

424
learning, including history education. According to the authors, educators can be seen as
fulfilling one of at least three roles: mentor, facilitator, and arbiter. As a mentor, the educator
develops the issue and directs the students through a consideration of the different ways the issue
can be approached. As a facilitator, the educator guides the students through a discussion of the
issues by allowing students to develop and answer the central questions associated with the issue.
As an arbiter, the educator ensures that various sides of an issue are given equal attention and, at
the same time, protects those who make points that may, at times, upset other students in the
course. Based on these fundamental roles of an educator, the authors identified five approaches
that instructors might borrow from to help them teach controversial issues in their classrooms.
These include: 1) Due Process Approach in which the educator provides a fair process to discuss
issues with equal attention given to both sides and the goal is fairness; 2) Peacemaking Approach
in which the process of discussing issues is non-confrontational and the goal is peace; 3)
Academic Controversy Approach in which the process of discussing issues is by questioning
beliefs and the goal is conflict resolution; 4) Devil’s Advocate which is a process of presenting
arguments opposing beliefs of majority students and it is used to introduce new ideas to students;
and 5) Avoidance which is a process of ignoring emerging controversial issues and avoiding
their discussion.
As tools for addressing controversial issues in the classroom, Payne and Gainey (2000)
argued, none of these approaches are necessarily better than any of the others. How then could an
educator encourage the active and full participation of all the students and move them away from
silent or monopolized discussions? The authors offered strategies that can be used to prevent the
discussions from getting too heated, or to recover once the discussion has become too heated.
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These include norm development (or setting the ground rules), norm enforcement, humor,
cooling out, free writes, and supplemental readings.
Hand et al. (2012) justified discussion to be the most appropriate method of teaching
controversial issues in school classrooms. For the authors, discussions involve multiple points of
view, and discussants must also be receptive or responsive to opinions other than their own,
meaning that discussion requires that people are genuinely willing to listen to and learn from one
another, and to change or modify their views in light of what they hear. The authors also argued
that discussion helps both students and teachers to develop knowledge, understanding and/or
judgment on the matter under discussion.
This means that the goal of discussion is to get to the truth of a matter, to get something
right. Two basic reasons are identified by the authors. First, discussion is peculiarly conducive to
appreciative understanding of the different positions in a controversy and to empathy with those
who hold them. Second, discussing controversial issues afford the most promising opportunities
for engaging students in discussion. Discussing controversial issues helps students develop civic
virtues such as reasonableness, peaceableness and orderliness, truthfulness, freedom, equality
and respect for persons.
According to Hand et al. (2012), to teach something as controversial is to teach it as
unsettled, to present it as a matter on which contrary views are or could be held. By this, the
authors mean that controversial issues are matters on which teachers are not authorities.
Teachers, they argued, will often have opinions on them, hopefully informed and considered
ones, but their opinions do not have the status of knowledge. They know that equally reasonable
and well-informed people hold contrary opinions and that through discussion the available
evidence and argument can be construed in more ways than one. Regardless of how ﬁrmly
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people may be wedded to their opinions, discussion, the authors illustrated, help them recognize
that these matters are unsettled and there is scope for further intellectual work on them. The
authors believed that controversial issues are the one area of the curriculum in which teachers
can engage students in genuine discussion, can join them in a collaborative, mutually attentive
and responsive exploration of questions to which none of them knows the answer. In this
instance, teachers and students are full and equal participants in the communal discursive quest
for understanding.
According to Hess (2002), by learning how to discuss divisive public topics, young
people are prepared for democratic citizenship. However, teachers, the author argued, face many
challenges in teaching controversial public issues in school classrooms, including lack of time,
how to deal with intense emotions associated with controversial issues, inadequate skills set, and
fear of community reprisal. Based on her research on best practices and lessons learned, the
author proposed the following theoretical framework by which controversial public issues could
be successfully taught in schools through discussion. 1) Discussion is both a desired outcome
and a method of teaching students critical thinking skills, controversial issues content,
interpersonal skills and developing the belief that many perspectives are necessary to fully
understand a CPI. 2) Teachers work to make the discussions the students’ forum. 3) Teachers
select a discussion model and a facilitator style that is congruent with their reasons for using
discussion and their definition of what constitutes effective discussion. 4) Decisions about
whether and how to assess students’ participation in CPI discussions pose a set of persistent
dilemmas for teachers, the most significant of which is a tension between authenticity and
accountability. 5) Teachers’ personal views on CPI topics do not play a substantial, visible role
in classroom discussion itself. However, teachers’ views strongly influence the definition and
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choice of CPI for discussion. 6) Teachers’ CPI discussion teaching is aligned with, not in
opposition to, what is expected in the school. In the author’s view, students and teachers who
prepare well for CPI discussions tend to have greater success. Preparation for discussion, the
author stressed, enhances the equality and quality of the discussions.
Ezzedeen (2008) showed how teachers can teach controversial public issues in their
classrooms. For the author, the physical environment is critical to the conversational learning
effort. The author stated that a seating arrangement – for instance, U-shaped – that facilitates a
sense of equality and community invites the kind of trust necessary for conversational learning.
In addition, the author argued that class size is a big factor and so, breaking down the class into
smaller discussion groups might be helpful. It is also recommended by the author that educators
should recognize and strive to overcome initial student resistance. Other recommendations put
forward by the author include: educators must strike a balance between motivating conversation
through the grading system and encouraging students to enjoy it intrinsically and willingly
engage in it; recognizing student differences; adopting a modularized approach to course
organization; choosing relevant, interesting conversational topics; adopting current and
accessible reading materials; finding creative and provocative ways of launching conversations;
recognizing that successful conversations can be unpredictable and emotionally charged
experiences; and carefully balancing the roles of teacher and conversational participants.
Stoddard (2012) examined how ﬁlms act as a thoughtful medium for teaching historical
controversial issues in school classrooms. Through the author’s research in two high-school US
history classes, it is found that films could serve as a source for engaging students in higher order
activities in history classes ranging from concept development to deliberation. The author
affirmed that in addition to helping students develop conceptual knowledge, films could help
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engage students in aspects of perspective recognition and caring that is part of historical empathy
as well as to engage in deliberations of historical issues and controversial events.
Marcus (2005) proposed the inclusion of films in history education as pedagogical tools.
Examination of films, according to the author, is important because of their prevalence outside
the classroom. The author held that students are consuming large volumes of feature films
outside the classroom, many of which contain historical themes or are based in history. The
author therefore argued that we cannot ignore the pervasiveness of electronic mass media in our
societies. By including films in our history curricula, the author noted, students are given an
opportunity to develop their historical understanding, including, but not limited to, interpretation
of evidence, increased historical empathy, exploration of historical perspective, and connecting
the past to the present and to one’s own life.
Most importantly, Marcus (2005) explored more deeply what it means to interpret
inevitably inaccurate film portrayals in a way that promotes, rather than diminishes, historical
understanding. The author therefore affirmed that films should be considered as evidence of
history and a tool to develop and explore issues of historical empathy, historical perspective, and
historical significance. When analyzed alongside other historical sources, a film presents one
piece of the historical puzzle, challenging the students’ and the teacher’s notions of the
trustworthiness of all historical sources, including film. In addition, the author argued that every
film has a perspective or point of view, although that may not be obvious to students. Therefore,
examining perspective is critical to understanding film and equally important in studying history.
In the author’s own assessment, students’ engagement with film can expand discussion and may
support the development of historical empathy. By analysing the content of films in history
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classroom, historical elements become significant and students will see our relationship to the
past.
Misco’s (2010) research focused on the implementation of a Holocaust curriculum
designed for Latvian schools. In response to perceived historical silences on the Holocaust within
Latvian schools and society, the author showed how the Latvian stakeholders supported by the
international experts produced a new Holocaust education curriculum within the Teaching the
Holocaust in Latvian Schools Project (THLSP). The author also showed the ways in which
teachers enacted, modified, or ignored the new curriculum. In this study, the author argued that
the particular problem of silenced and controversial issues in curriculum implementation, such as
the Holocaust in Latvia, naturally entails the problem of changing teaching behavior. It is found
by the author that students lacked the knowledge of the Holocaust and that this lack of
knowledge leads to stereotypical attitudes. The author therefore suggested that the opportunity
for students to learn about controversial issues is a democratic imperative, as is the need for
citizens to be able to critically examine the history of their country.
Oulton et al. (2004) explored the nature of controversial issues and how these issues are
taught in school classrooms. By controversial the authors mean that significant numbers of
people argue about controversial issues without reaching a conclusion. Because different people
view, interpret and understand controversial issues differently, the authors argued that
controversial issues cannot always be resolved by recourse to reason, logic or experiment.
Rather, controversial issues may be resolved as more information becomes available. According
to the authors, these issues are controversial because attitudes to the issues will be based on value
judgements, which in turn may be based on moral codes or related ethical principles held by the
individual.
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In school classrooms, Oulton et al. (2004) opined that students need to explore how it is
that individuals can apparently arrive at different perspectives on an issue. Introducing students
to multiple perspectives, the authors held, is therefore an essential part of the methods of
teaching about controversial issues. The authors also argued that teachers should make their
position explicit at the start of the exercise so that pupils are aware of potential bias in the way
the teacher has arranged the experience and in what they say and do.
Having taken the pain to review the above indispensable literature on controversial public
issues, one lesson remains obvious. By deepening, if not completing, national reconciliation, the
teaching and learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history as a controversial public issue hold the
promise of reconciling both the opposing narratives of the agents of controversy and the specific
controversial issues embedded in their narratives. As Okonta and Meagher (2009) affirmed,
“what is clear is that… Biafra still has a lot to say about the struggles of citizenship and
statehood in Africa. As a cautionary tale, as a symbol of democratic longing, as a rallying point
for the disaffected, or a justification for foreign intervention, Biafra stands as a reminder of
failure and resilience, of lessons learned and unlearned” (p. 7).
Given the reconciliatory power of history education, Bird and Ottanelli (2014)
recommended that the Nigeria-Biafra War with its controversial narratives and issues be taught
in school classrooms in Nigeria. However, it is not enough to know why this controversial
history should be taught or what its contents should be. Knowing how the Nigeria-Biafra War
history should be taught will help in maximizing its benefits. The question of how to teach the
Nigeria-Biafra War history as a controversial public issue is explored using the transformative
learning theory.
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Transformative Learning Theory and Practice
The fundamental question explored in this section is: how can the controversial narratives
and issues embedded in the Nigeria-Biafra War history be learned? I propose to tackle this
important question by invoking the transformative learning theory and practice. To do this, I first
present the original definition of transformative learning as enunciated by Jack Mezirow (1978a;
1978b; 1991) which has become known as the cognitive/rational perspective. Then, I briefly
examine the evolution of transformative learning while highlighting its diverse understandings.
Lastly, I emphasize that this research is anchored on the inclusive understanding of
transformative learning which unifies its diverse perspectives – cognitive, extrarational and
social critique – and develops common outcomes (Stuckey et al., 2013). This means that when
transformative learning occurs in other contexts and settings outside the formal school classroom
through a variety of processes, its outcomes remain the same (Stuckey et al., 2013).
Jack Mezirow’s Notion of Transformative Learning
A holistic understanding of transformative learning cannot be acquired without its
foundational theory and general principles established by the founder of the transformative
learning school of thought, research and practice, Jack Mezirow (2012, 2009, 2000, 1995, 1991,
1990, 1978a, 1978b). This foundational theory of transformative learning has been named by
later scholars as a cognitive/rational perspective of transformative learning (Stuckey et al., 2013).
The fundamental question addressed is: what is transformative learning according to Jack
Mezirow? Transformative learning as a theory has its origin in the 1978 pioneering research
conducted by Mezirow in a community setting on how perspective transformation occurred in
female adults, who, after a break in their education, decided to return to college. This
groundbreaking research culminated in two publications in 1978: “Education for perspective
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transformation: Women’s re-entry programs in community colleges” (Mezirow, 1978a) and
“Perspective transformation” (Mezirow, 1978b). While the former is a book, the latter is a peerreviewed article published in Adult Education Quarterly. In this article, the author urged fellow
scholars and educators to recognize and adopt his newly formulated theory on a “critical
dimension of learning in adulthood that enables us to recognize, reassess, and modify the
structures of assumptions and expectations that frame our tacit points of view and inﬂuence our
thinking, beliefs, attitudes, and actions” (Mezirow, 2009, p. 18).
The structural change that occurs in our thinking and worldview through critical
reflection is akin to transformation. The resultant transformation in turn leads to “more inclusive,
discriminating and integrative” (Mezirow, 1978b) perspectives and a change in behavior. Based
on this, Mezirow (2009) defined transformative learning as “learning that transforms problematic
frames of reference to make them more inclusive, discriminating, reﬂective, open, and
emotionally able to change” (p. 22).
As a philosophical quotation attributed to Aristotle states: “Quid quid movetur ab alio
movetur,” meaning “whatever moves is moved by another,” the early beginning of Mezirow’s
(1978a, 1978b) transformative learning theory was influenced by a number of theories and
scholars before him. These include “Paulo Freire’s concept of conscientization, consciousness
raising in the women’s movement, the theory of transformation of psychiatrist Roger Gould, the
writings of Jürgen Habermas and Harvey Siegal” (Mezirow, 2009, p. 19). It is in Habermas’
(1991) theory of communicative action that he found an interesting distinction between
instrumental learning – a scientific research method involving the manipulation or intervention
of a group to condition an outcome or result, scientifically known as “learning through deductive
reasoning and hypothesis testing” (Baumgartner, 2012, p. 103) – and communicative learning –
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that is, the kind of learning that occurs in discursive exchange or interaction. Intrigued by this
distinction, the concept of communicative learning became the moment of the epiphany or
turning point for the theory of transformative learning.
According to (Mezirow, 2009), participating in learning through a “discourse involves
dialectical and critically reﬂective thinking leading to a best tentative judgment” (p. 20). It is in
dialogue with others that discursive exchange occurs. These “others,” that is, other people with
whom we engage in a dialogue or discourse must be those “we believe to be informed, objective,
and rational, to assess reasons that justify problematic beliefs” (Mezirow, 2009, p. 20).
For transformation to occur, assessing our epistemic assumptions is indispensable. These
epistemic assumptions refer to those “assumptions about the role of evidence, authority, and
interpretation in the formation of solutions to problems” (Mezirow, 2009, p. 21). People speak
from their already acquired worldviews and assumptions about themselves, others, and the topic
or subject of inquiry. Based on these assumptions, they construct a view or an expectation about
the outcome of a discursive interaction. To identify and assess these assumptions, the following
ten questions could be asked:
1. What assumptions support the frame of reference?
2. Where does the knowledge it represents come from?
3. What epistemic assumptions have been taken for granted in deﬁning the problem?
4. How is this knowledge expressed, formulated, and communicated?
5. Has the person deﬁning the problems focused on certain dimensions rather than
others to perceive and construe a situation?
6. Has he or she chosen the ﬁrst useful option that emerged, at the expense of others?
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7. Has the object been segregated from its situation or context-related entities or from
the observer?
8. Has an earlier framing of the object or situation become obsolete?
9. What was the inﬂuence of an authority ﬁgure or role model?
10. How has this learning been signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by anxiety, emotion, conation,
intuition, bias, habit, or self-concept? (Mezirow, 2009, p. 21)
Working on our assumptions makes us more open to new perspectives which in turn lead
to perspective transformation. How then does transformation occur in practice? Here, I use
Figure 21 to demonstrate transformative learning stages. This demonstration applies to a
transformative learning process both inside and outside a formal school classroom. It is also
important to note that there are other processes of transformative learning (Stuckey et al., 2013).
However, this demonstration is based on the critical reflection (including critical self-reflection)
and critical discourse approach to transformative learning (Mezirow, 1991; Mezirow, 2003).
Figure 21
A Transformative Learning Process
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A transformative learning process begins with participant’s voluntariness to learn
something or learn from something. This participant’s initial understanding is highly influenced
by his or her epistemic assumptions or frames of reference. Frames of reference “are structures
of assumptions and expectations on which our thoughts, feelings, and habits are based”
(Mezirow, 2009, p. 22). It is through these frames of reference that the participant sees,
understands, and interprets the world around him or her. This means that the participant’s
attitude, behavior or way of life is conditioned by his or her frames of reference. A predisposition
or conditioning of this sort is known as a frame. According to Mezirow (2009), “frames ﬁlter
sense perceptions, selectively shaping and delimiting perceptions, cognition, and feelings by
predisposing our intentions, purposes, and expectations” (p. 22).
Two questions immediately come to mind. The first is: how can a participant’s frames of
reference be transformed? The second is: in what ways are transformative learning different from
normal school learning? It is in differentiating transformative learning from normal school
learning that the question of how transformative learning occurs becomes relevant. To do this, an
appeal to Mezirow’s (2009) distinction between learning and transformative learning is made.
Learning may be understood as the process of using a prior interpretation to construe a
new or revised interpretation of the meaning of one’s experience to guide future action.
Transformative learning may be deﬁned as learning that transforms problematic frames
of reference to make them more inclusive, discriminating, reﬂective, open, and
emotionally able to change. (Mezirow, 2009, p. 22)
As these definitions show, transformative learning operates on a different level than a
normal school learning. In a normal learning, the revised or new interpretation of the student’s
experience is based on his or her prior understanding, an understanding that is influenced by his
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or her frames of reference. What this means is that in a normal learning, “existing meaning
schemes” are revised or “new meaning schemes” are acquired. However, when a student or nonstudent participant engages in transformative learning, not only are these frames of reference
transformed, “meaning schemes” and “meaning perspectives” are equally transformed, helping
the participants to engage in new meaning-making and a change in perspective.
This change, turning point, or moment of the epiphany, is the moment of transformation
which, according to Mezirow (2009), could be “epochal (involving dramatic or major changes)
or incremental” (p. 23). The transformation of meaning schemes and meaning perspectives could
be a painful process (Mezirow, 1985) for it involves a change in perspectives, beliefs, and long
held assumptions through critical self-reflection. In the context of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history, research participants engaged in objective critical reflection on their assumptions and
presuppositions about the war and existing narratives and actions, as well as a critical selfreflection on the very premise upon which the problem has been defined (Mezirow, 1998).
Whether in its epochal or incremental forms, transformative learning leads to “an
informed and reﬂective decision to act or not” (Mezirow, 2009, p. 22) and to behave in a certain
way. All these distinctions and explanations put together make transformative learning an
“epistemology of how adults learn to reason for themselves—advance and assess reasons for
making a judgment—rather than act on the assimilated beliefs, values, feelings, and judgments of
others” (Mezirow, 2009, p. 23).
Evolution of Transformative Learning
Research on transformative learning has been extended to the understanding of other
human and social conditions in a variety of settings and contexts (Cranton, 2006), marking a
shift from a narrow understanding of transformative learning as perspective transformation to its
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broader, more encompassing conceptualization which Hoggan (2016) called a metatheory. As
Stuckey et al. (2013) noted, “transformative learning theory has been investigated extensively in
a variety of settings, significant life experiences, and across a range of populations” (p. 212).
Although transformative learning research has been largely conducted in educational
settings, including higher education, using qualitative research methods, a small number of
researchers have developed transformative learning assessment instruments for quantitative
research studies in diverse settings and contexts (Cox, 2021; Stuckey et al., 2013; King, 2009).
To validate these quantitative measures, more and more researchers are beginning to explore
how and the extent to which transformation occurs in diverse settings and contexts with different
populations, for example, in the workplace (Kwon et al., 2021). Varied perspectives that
highlight the continuous evolution of transformative learning have been studied and presented in
Mezirow and Taylor (2009), Taylor and Cranton (2012), and Cranton (2016). From this trend, it
is easy to pinpoint the relevance of transformative learning to historical and collective memory,
and the assessment of conflict behaviors that emerge from controversial issues about the past in
post-war, transitional countries and in the context of highly divided societies.
Taylor (2001), Dirkx (2001), Boyd and Myers (1988), for example, have studied the role
of implicit memory, symbols, images, emotions and soul-work in transformative learning, and
found that the recollection of overlooked memories of the past from the unconscious content
could engender habits, attitudes and preferences, and these are susceptible to influence present
behaviors. In the works of similar researchers one finds the importance and role of
transformative learning in achieving social transformation through the rectification of past
injustices (Brookfield, 2012; Freire, 1970). These examples show that connecting transformative
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learning to transitional justice, historical and collective memory, and controversial public issues
in highly divided societies is possible.
Because of its multifaceted nature, transformative learning has been defined in various
ways based on the different conceptions that have developed over time. As noted before,
Mezirow (1981) described transformative learning in terms of perspective transformation which
is defined as:
the emancipatory process of becoming critically aware of how and why the structure of
psycho-cultural assumptions has come to constrain the way we see ourselves and our
relationships, reconstituting this structure to permit a more inclusive and discriminating
integration of experience and acting upon these new understandings. (p. 6)
Other scholars have proposed a definition of transformative learning that goes beyond
cognition and considers the importance of memory and social change in the process of
transformation. O’Sullivan, Morrell, and O’Connor (2002) defined transformative learning as
involving an experience of “deep, structural shift in the basic premises of thought, feelings and
actions. It is a shift of consciousness that dramatically and permanently alters our ways of being
in the world” (p. xvii, as cited in Hoggan, 2016). Transformative learning as a metatheory is
defined by Hoggan (2016) to “refer to processes that result in significant and irreversible changes
in the way a person experiences, conceptualizes, and interacts with the world” (p. 71). In other
words, transformative learning is “a process whereby previously uncritically assimilated habits
of mind are called into question and revised so as to be more open, permeable, and better
justified” (Mezirow, 2000, as cited in Wang and Cranton, 2011). These definitions implicitly
highlight two important aspects of transformative learning. The two aspects are the processes and
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outcomes of transformative learning. A comprehensive consideration of these aspects provides
an inclusive understanding of transformative learning.
Inclusive Understanding of Transformative Learning
Although there are divergent perspectives on the approaches or processes of
transformative learning (Cranton, 2006; Taylor, 1998, 2007; Taylor & Snyder, 2012; Stuckey et
al., 2013; Hoggan, 2016), there is a consensus that these diverse processes lead to similar
outcomes (Stuckey et al., 2013). As previously stated, no matter the context, setting, and people
involved, transformative learning helps participants develop “a more inclusive, discriminating,
and permeable worldview” (Mezirow, 1991, as cited in Stuckey et al., 2013, p. 213).
Stuckey et al. (2013), following Cranton (2006), discussed three major points of view on
the processes of transformative learning – cognitive/rational, beyond rational/extrarational, and
social critique perspectives. Inspired by the need for a holistic understanding of transformative
learning (Cranton & Taylor, 2012), an inclusive assessment tool was developed by Stuckey et al.
(2013) to assess these divergent transformative learning processes and the related outcomes they
produce. The authors named this assessment tool Transformative Learning Survey. A description
of this instrument and how it was used to collect data for this research are provided in the
methodology chapter.
Meanwhile, a brief definition of each of the three processes of transformative learning
used in developing the Transformative Learning Survey items should suffice here. As previously
noted, the cognitive or rational conception of transformative learning is derived from Mezirow’s
(1991) understanding of transformative learning. This perspective holds that transformation
could be experienced through critical reflection (or critical self-reflection) and reflective
dialogue. As Stuckey et al. (2013) put it, it is “a process of constructing and appropriating new or
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revised interpretations of the meaning of one’s experience with a goal of greater personal
autonomy and independence” (p. 213).
Some transformative learning scholars have argued that people can experience
transformation through other processes that go beyond simple rationality or cognition (Dirkx,
1998; Tisdell, 2000; Dirkx 2001; Lawrence, 2012). They hold that emotion, images, symbols,
spirituality, and arts are significant instruments for transformative learning. This view is known
as the beyond rational or extrarational conception of transformative learning (Stuckey et al.,
2013).
Other scholars strongly believe that the idea of social justice and emancipation is
inseparable from transformative learning (Brookfield, 2012; Freire, 1970). Known as the social
critique perspective, this view of transformative learning places emphasis on “ideological
critique, unveiling oppression, and social action” (Stuckey et al., 2013, p. 213). In this line of
thought, transformative learning could be understood as a process of critically identifying, and
liberating oneself from, self-imposed restrictions and the oppressive restrictions imposed by
others. Its ultimate purpose is to transform the world and make it “a more equitable place for all
to live” (Stuckey et al., 2013, p. 213).
With this holistic understanding of transformative learning and the inclusive
transformative learning assessment instrument developed by Stuckey et al. (2013), this study
measured the levels of transformative learning experience derived from the Nigeria-Biafra War
by the prewar and postwar generations of Igbos in Nigeria. The Nigeria-Biafra War history is
charged with specific life-changing events from where transformative learning experience could
be drawn. While focusing on the various sources of life-changing experiences – traumatic
memories, repressive policies, emancipatory processes, emotions, images and spiritual practices
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– through outside-the-school-classroom critical reflection (and critical self-reflection), and with
the help of open-ended questions and personal journaling, an experience of transformative
learning becomes unquestionably possible. This is supported by Cox’s (2021) research as well as
the study conducted by Fetherston and Kelly (2007), all emphasizing the importance of critical
reflection in transformative learning.
The contribution of this study to the theory of transformative learning is therefore
enshrined in its application to the context of a war history, particularly the history of the NigeriaBiafra War. Within this context, and using the southeastern states of Nigeria (known as the
Igboland) as well as the ongoing agitation for Biafran secession as the setting, this study
explored the correlation between transformative learning and conflict styles.
It is important to emphasize that the study was not conceived to identify particular
processes or factors that have more impact on a person’s or group’s level of transformation.
Rather, the study was designed to determine: 1) whether there is a correlation between a
transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War and conflict styles; 2) whether transformative
learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War is a significant predictor of one or more components of
conflict style; and 3) the difference in the levels of transformative learning and use of conflict
style between the prewar generation and postwar generation.
Conflict style in this study is defined as the conflict-handling strategies that Nigerian
citizens of Biafran origin born before and after the Nigeria-Biafra War use to manage the
ongoing Biafran conflict. These conflict styles are competing (or forcing), collaborating (or
integrating/problem solving), compromising (or sharing), avoiding (or withdrawing), and
accommodating (or smoothing). Although a few qualitative research studies have explored how
transformative education could reduce violent tendencies (Harris, 2009), quantitative research
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studies on the relationship between transformative learning and conflict styles are nonexistent.
Here lies the strength of this study and the gap it bridges. As Kwon et al. (2021) stated, the
results of a quantitative study of this nature “can be utilized to improve the design of educational
interventions, enabling transformative learning to be more actively practiced” (p. 2).
Conclusion
After a thorough review of available research literature on the history and memory of the
Nigeria-Biafra War as well as its learning, it is both disappointing and an opportunity to discover
that existing research on this war has not yet raised and answered the fundamental question of
why the Nigeria-Biafra War should be taught in Nigerian classrooms in the first place. Also,
none of the available research has examined the type of change that will occur in interethnic and
interreligious relationships in Nigeria through the teaching and learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War. And finally, there is no diagnosis or framing of the problem associated with a sudden and
unprepared discovery of what I call shocking, embedded and evolving truth about what happened
during the Nigeria-Biafra War through other means other than the school history education, for
example, through social media, archives or museums in foreign countries, and university
research databases outside Nigeria.
These observations and gaps were also noticed by Onuoha (2016) who stated that there is
only “a dearth of literature [that] still links memories of the war to education in a manner that
would enhance national dialogue and reconciliation in contemporary Nigeria” (p. 4).
The intent of this study is therefore to fill these gaps in the current research literature:
1. A gap between the need to teach the Nigeria-Biafra War history in Nigerian school
classrooms and the moral obligation to discern and determine which narratives about
the Nigeria-Biafra War should be included in the school curricula;
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2. A gap between the proposed methods by which the Nigeria-Biafra War history could
be taught in Nigerian classrooms and the expected effects this history education could
have on the Nigerian students and society.
By addressing these gaps in the current research literature, this research explores the
relationship between a transformative learning of controversial narratives or issues about the
Nigeria-Biafra War and conflict styles utilized by Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin born before
and after the Nigeria-Biafra War to resolve the ongoing agitation for self-determination and
independence of Biafra. A research study of this kind will help in determining whether
transformative history education, particularly transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history, would have the potential to create the conditions for deepening, if not completing,
national reconciliation, tolerance, and peace.
This research is intended to make unique and timely contribution to the existing body of
literature on the Nigeria-Biafra War, the theories of teaching controversial public issues and
transformative learning, and the role of history and memory in conflict and conflict resolution in
postwar countries. The research will also be the first study to shed light on the relationship
between transformative learning and conflict styles, while providing the human and social
sciences as well as policy makers with an original understanding of the role of transformative
history education in creating the conditions for national reconciliation, tolerance and peace in
postwar countries.
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Chapter 5: Methodology
Overview
The methodology of this research logically follows from the discussion on the
relationship between transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and conflict
styles. Included in this methodology is a description of the research population and setting,
research design, study sample and sampling procedures, instrumentation and operationalization
of constructs, data collection methods, procedures for recruitment, pilot study, and data analysis.
Research Population and Setting
From a general perspective, this research was conceived to study the indigenes and
descendants of the former secessionist Republic of Biafra in Nigeria. Precisely, the population
(N) that this research studied is Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin born before and after the
Nigeria-Biafra War. However, the large number of people, ethnicities, and tribes within this
population, the dispersion of this population across Nigeria and around the world, and the social,
political, economic, and cultural factors as well as other variables make the data collection from
the entire population practically impossible.
Scope and Delimitations of the Study
Based on this difficulty, the boundaries or parameters of this research were determined by
delimiting the setting from which the study sample was drawn. This research therefore focused
on the Igbo ethnic group in southeastern Nigeria. A sample of the Igbo ethnic group was drawn
from institutions and a local government in Abia state. Also, only those participants who met the
inclusion criteria below were randomly selected for this research.
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Inclusion Criteria
•

Must be an Igbo indigene born before the start of the Nigeria-Biafra War (i.e., born
before July 6, 1967) or born after the end of the Nigeria-Biafra War (i.e., born after
January 15, 1970).

•

Must be 18 years old or over.

•

Must read and understand English.

•

Must be a resident of any of the five southeastern states of Nigeria, namely Abia,
Imo, Anambra, Enugu, and Ebonyi.

By selecting participants from these strata, a simple random sample of Nigerian citizens
of Biafran origin born before and after the Nigeria-Biafra War was drawn from the same region.
Not only did the selected strata make data collection easier, most importantly, the stratified
sample is in accordance with the goal of this research. With this sample, it was possible to
statistically compare the conflict styles of the indigenes of Biafra born before the Nigeria-Biafra
War (prewar generation) and the conflict styles of the descendants of Biafra born after the war
(postwar generation). Most importantly, the views of participants from these strata about the
Nigeria-Biafra War experiences are important in understanding the perception of the prewar
generation and postwar generation toward the ongoing Biafran independence conflict. Their
responses to the survey questions were necessary for determining how the prewar generation and
postwar generation are most likely to react or behave in conflict situations.
Research Design
To study the extent to which transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War may
possibly affect the conflict styles utilized by Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin born before and
after the Nigeria-Biafra War to resolve the ongoing agitation for self-determination and
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independence of Biafra, this quantitative research employed ex post facto research design
(Kerlinger and Lee, 1999; Cohen, et al., 2000). As these authors posit, ex post facto research
design is a nonexperimental design used to study or investigate whether there is a causal
relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable. For this research, the
independent variable is transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history. The dependent
variable is conflict styles.
In addition, this research design seeks to verify if the resulting differences in groups of
subjects are due to pre-existing conditions in one of the groups with respect to the independent
variable of transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history. The two groups in this
proposed study are the indigenes of Biafra born before the Nigeria-Biafra War (prewar
generation) and the descendants of Biafra born after the war (postwar generation).
As noted earlier in the introduction, Biafran indigenes who were born before the war (i.e.,
before July 6, 1967) acquired the knowledge of the Nigeria-Biafra War not only from the state of
their mind (introspection), or the narratives or stories (testimonies) developed and told by others,
or the a priori definition of war as a fatal incident (reason), but primarily their knowledge draws
on what they directly perceived before and during the war with their five senses of sight, touch,
hearing, smelling, and tasting (perception), as well as the memories of the war they retained and
now remember (memory). Therefore, the Biafran elders’ direct (immediate) experience of the
Nigeria-Biafra War and the traumatic memory of what happened to them during the war which
they now remember as well as the lessons learned constitute the pre-existing conditions that will
be verified using ex post facto research design. These pre-existing conditions are not applicable
to the Biafrans born after the Nigeria-Biafra War (i.e., after January 15, 1970). The postwar
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generation relies only on reason, testimonies, and introspection as the main sources of their
knowledge of the Nigeria-Biafra War.
Unlike the experimental research designs that focus on both the treatment and control
groups assigned by the researcher, the selected ex post facto research design is intended to guide
data collection about transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and conflict
styles among the two groups: prewar generation and postwar generation within the Igbo ethnic
group in the southeastern part of Nigeria. These variables will not be manipulated by the
researcher.
As Kerlinger (1973) stresses: “ex post facto research is systematic empirical inquiry in
which the scientist does not have direct control of variables. Inferences about relationships
among variables are made from any determined variations between the studied variables” (p.
344). Based on this, any observed variations in this research came only from the differences
resulting from the measurement of the stated study variables: transformative learning of the
Nigeria-Biafra War history, conflict styles, age, gender, education level and occupation.
Study Sample and Sampling Procedures
Study Sample
As noted above, the population (N) for this study is the Igbo ethnic group located within
the five southeastern states of Nigeria. These states are Abia, Imo, Anambra, Enugu, and Ebonyi.
The estimated total population of the Igbos in Nigeria is about 32 million (Nigeria Fact Sheet,
n.d.).
However, since it is difficult to sample all the Igbos in Nigeria for this research study,
some strata of the population were identified from where a stratified random sample was drawn.
The sample of the indigenes of Biafra born before the Nigeria-Biafra War (prewar generation)
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and the descendants of Biafra born after the war (postwar generation) was drawn from some
institutions and a local government area in Abia State.
The total number of sample for the study is 320 Igbos, representing a total of 160 Biafran
indigenes born before the war (prewar generation) and 160 Biafrans born after the war (postwar
generation). Recruiting 320 participants to complete both the transformative learning survey and
conflict styles survey was necessary for a cross-sectional analysis of the other variables - age,
gender, education level and occupation. Also, this sample is important to understand the
statistical relationship between transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and
conflict styles among the two study groups: prewar generation and postwar generation.
Sampling Procedures
Through a stratified random sampling procedure, survey participants were selected from
a table of random numbers provided by the administrators of the institutions. The institutions
from where the sample was drawn have well-defined organizational structures with known
leaders and administration.
To gain access to the research sample, therefore, contact was first initiated with the
leaders (gatekeepers) of these institutions while taking necessary precautions to minimize bias. A
request to participate in this research study with a detailed description of the study and
participant recruitment protocol were sent to the administrators of the institutions. After
answering all their questions and satisfying their internal policies and regulations on conducting
research within their facilities, the leaders accepted to participate in the research and returned a
signed site approval letter that states their commitment to providing access for this research
project.
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To ensure that the sample is randomized, the volunteers designated to help with this
research were trained on the simple random sampling procedure. For each research group (i.e.,
prewar generation and postwar generation), the names of participants who met the inclusion
criteria for this research as stated in the recruitment protocol were compiled. From this list, a
table of random numbers (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.), each number representing the name of a
participant, was created. Two tables of random numbers (without names) were sent to the
researcher (me, Basil Ugorji). One table of random numbers was prepared for the prewar
generation group and another table was prepared for the postwar generation group. From each
table, I randomly selected 160 numbers, totaling 320 numbers for both research groups. The 320
numbers I selected were matched with the corresponding names on the list of qualified
participants prepared by the research volunteers. Finally, the selected 320 participants were
contacted with an informed consent letter, the Transformative Learning Survey (TLS) and
Conflict Styles Survey. Selected participants were asked to read the informed consent letter first
before completing the two surveys online or onsite.
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
Having identified and discussed the population and setting of this study, and in
accordance with the selected research design and sampling procedures, two instruments were
chosen to measure the independent and dependent variables. While measuring these two
variables, information about the participants’ demography was collected to serve as the
moderator variables for this study.
Independent Variable: Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War History
The independent variable, transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history, was
measured by the Transformative Learning Survey (TLS) instrument developed by Stuckey,
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Taylor, and Cranton (2013). This instrument was used to measure transformative learning
processes and outcomes among the selected sample of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin born
before and after the Nigeria-Biafra War (prewar generation and postwar generation groups).
As Stuckey et al. (2013) noted, the Transformative Learning Survey is a 92-item selfreport survey of which 90 comprise a 4-point Likert-type scale (mostly disagree = 1 to mostly
agree = 4), in addition to two open-ended questions on specific life-changing events from where
transformative learning experience could be drawn. This survey also contains six questions on
demography, including age, gender, education status, etc.
Data collection using the Transformative Learning Survey was divided into two phases:
transformative learning experience and measurement. The phase of transformative learning
experience consisted of a critical reflection (and critical self-reflection) on specific life-changing
events connected to the Nigeria-Biafra War through open-ended questions and personal
journaling. This was done by asking participants to reflect on two open-ended questions on the
specific life-changing events associated with the Nigeria-Biafra War from where transformative
learning experience could be drawn. Almost all the participants spent days working on this
reflective exercise and documented the outcome of their reflections in writing. Participants were
asked to critically reflect on the following two open-ended questions:
1. Identify a specific life changing experience(s) (or cumulative smaller experiences)
from the Nigeria-Biafra War which changed your perspective about how you make
sense of the world and your relationship with others. This should be an event(s)
which altered your perspective in a fundamental way. Describe the experience or
experiences. What were the circumstances of this life-changing experience of the
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Nigeria-Biafra War? What happened? When did it happen? Where did it happen?
Who was involved? How were you feeling?
2. In what way did this experience(s) change your perspective, if at all, about yourself
and the way you relate to others? Describe the new perspective.
According to Stuckey et al. (2013), “the purpose of these questions was to focus people on a
specific life-changing event (transformative learning experience) that they could consider as they
rated each of the statements” (p. 218). Since this is not a mixed methods research design,
qualitative data which I collected from the phase of transformative learning experience were not
included in the analysis. Only the quantitative data collected from the measurement of
participants’ levels of transformative learning experience were analyzed and presented.
The measurement phase consisted of survey statements that participants rated after
reflecting on their transformative learning experience(s) (see Appendix A). The purpose of the
survey items was to measure participants’ levels of transformative learning. The Transformative
Learning Survey assesses two main areas of engaging in transformative learning in the context of
a life-changing experience: 1) processes and 2) outcomes.
Processes of transformative learning. The assessment of the processes of
transformative learning is subdivided into three main aspects:
A. Cognitive, rational process: This process is represented by five subscales namely
critical reflection, action, experience, disorienting dilemma, and discourse.
B. Extrarational process: This process consists of six subscales, namely arts-based
learning, dialogue with others, emotional reactions, imaginal learning, spiritual
learning, and soul work.
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C. Social critique: The social critique process has four subscales, namely ideology
critique, unveiling oppression, empowerment, and social action.
Outcomes of transformative learning. The assessment of the outcomes of
transformative learning focuses on four scales, namely acting differently, having a deeper selfawareness, having more open perspectives, and experiencing a deep shift in worldview.
In sum, the Transformative Learning Survey has four subscales with which the outcomes
of transformative learning are assessed, and fifteen subscales for assessing how transformative
learning occurs (process). The combination of the outcomes and processes of transformative
learning makes the Transformative Learning Survey an instrument with 19 subscales. For this
study, the following two subscales, imaginal learning and soul work were merged into
imaginal/soulwork. This reduced the subscales to 18. The average time to complete the
Transformative Learning Survey online is 15-20 minutes.
Stuckey et al. (2013) made it clear that “… in terms of research, an educator or researcher
who wants to assess the extent to which transformative learning occurs can use the survey alone
or in conjunction with other data collection techniques such as interviews or storytelling. The
survey includes open-ended questions, but these could easily be elaborated on in a mixedmethods research design where participants tell the story of their transformative experience” (p.
225). For this research, I used the instrument to measure levels of transformative learning that
resulted from participants’ reflective activities on their transformative learning experiences about
the Nigeria-Biafra War.
To prove the reliability of the Transformative Learning Survey instrument, Stuckey et al.
(2013) carried out a reliability analysis (or test of internal consistency) and reported a
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .75 for the entire scales which is satisfactory. The authors also
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established content validity by implementing the reviews made on the survey instrument by ten
renowned experts with diverse perspectives in transformative learning, as well as by a focus
group at their university which helped in clarifying understanding of the survey questions. In
addition to the expert reviews and focus group, the authors conducted a pilot study with 136
college educated adults from the United States and Canada, comprising 21 men, 95 women, and
20 whose gender is unknown, coming from a diverse demography that includes White, Black,
Latino, Asian, and mixed race, the majority of whom were between the ages of 24 and 65. The
authors reported a descriptive statistics of survey items with means greater than 3.0 on a 4-point
scale and standard deviations less than 1.
The age range in Stuckey et al.’s (2013) research is similar to the age range in my sample
which includes 160 older adults between the ages of 55 and over 74 (known in this study as the
prewar generation) and young adults between the ages of 18 and 54 (known in this study as the
postwar generation). What this means is that older adults can also experience transformative
learning and their levels of transformative learning experience could be measured using the
survey items.
To use the Transformative Learning Survey instrument for this study, contact was
initiated with Stuckey, Taylor, and Cranton (2013). Dr. Edward W. Taylor, Professor Emeritus
of Lifelong Learning of Adult Education at Penn State University – Harrisburg, provided me
with a consent that includes an authorization to use the instrument for this study. Before the data
collection started, Dr. Edward W. Taylor helped to set up an online group survey with the name:
Nigeria-Biafra War, specifically for the research participants of this study. At the end of the data
collection, survey data was downloaded to an excel file and the data was given to me for
analysis.
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Although the Transformative Learning Survey instrument was piloted in the United
States and Canada and with college educated students of diverse backgrounds and ethnicities.
Using it to study a transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history in the southeastern
states of Nigeria offers a unique opportunity to expand the utility of the instrument into other
cultures, contexts, and settings.
Dependent Variable: Conflict Styles
The dependent variable in this study is conflict styles. Through the Thomas-Kilmann
Conflict Mode Instrument developed by Thomas and Kilmann (1974), this research measured
and analyzed five conflict styles (or conflict-handling modes) that Nigerian citizens of Biafran
origin born before and after the Nigeria-Biafra War use to manage the ongoing Biafra
independence conflict. These conflict styles are competing (or forcing), collaborating (or
integrating/problem solving), compromising (or sharing), avoiding (or withdrawing), and
accommodating (or smoothing).
The Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument is based on a refinement of Blake and
Mouton’s (1964) two-dimensional conflict management model. The two dimensions of conflicthandling behavior are 1) assertiveness, the extent to which the individual attempts to satisfy his
or her own concerns (concern for self), and 2) cooperativeness, the extent to which the individual
attempts to satisfy the other person’s concerns (concern for others) (Thomas, 1976). This
instrument is developed to assess how people react or behave in conflict situations, and to know
which conflict style they are consciously or unconsciously inclined to use in managing conflict.
For this study, participants were asked to think of the ongoing agitation for self-determination
and independence of Biafra. The Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument survey was used to
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assess how the participants usually respond in this conflict situation and the conflict style they
are inclined to use.
To assess how these conflict styles are utilized by different individuals, the ThomasKilmann Conflict Mode Instrument makes use of a self-report survey containing 30 sets of paired
items. Each of the items describes one of the five conflict styles: competing, collaborating,
compromising, avoiding, and accommodating. The average time to complete the ThomasKilmann Conflict Mode Instrument survey online is 15 minutes.
The authors reported a higher reliability coefficient for the MODE instrument compared
with the other conflict styles instruments. As reported by the authors, the Thomas-Kilmann
Conflict Mode Instrument has an average Cronbach alpha coefficient of .60 and the internal
consistency coefficients are said to be in the moderate range. Also, the authors reported an
average test-retest coefficient of .64, which according to them, is moderately high and consistent
across the modes (Kilmann and Thomas, 1977).
The authorization to use the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument for this study
was obtained from the authorized dealer of the instrument, The Myers-Briggs Company
(www.themyersbriggs.com), from where the instrument was purchased by me.
Even though the validity of the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument has been
determined after applying it in different research settings, this research contributes to the
usefulness of this instrument in diverse settings. Measuring or analyzing the five conflict styles
that Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin born before and after the Nigeria-Biafra War use to
manage the ongoing Biafra independence conflict is a great contribution in this regard.
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Moderator Variables: Age, Gender, Education Level, and Occupation
To determine the extent to which other factors may influence the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables of this study – transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history (independent variable) and conflict styles (dependent variable) -, four categorical
variables are selected to serve as moderator variables. These moderator variables are: age,
gender, education level, and occupation.
In the words of Tuckman (1978):
A categorical or moderator variable is kind of independent variable except that it cannot
be manipulated, such as age, race, or sex, … [and] is studied to determine whether its
presence changes the cause-and-effect relationship of the independent and dependent
variables. (as cited in Thomas et al., 2015, p. 60)
These variables are used to verify whether the impact of transformative learning of the NigeriaBiafra War history on conflict styles were influenced by the age, gender, education level or
occupation of the selected sample of Biafrans born before and after the Nigeria-Biafra War.
Data Collection Methods
After receiving an approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Nova
Southeastern University to start data collection, arrangements with the administrative offices in
the research sites (institutions) previously identified for this research were completed. The
Transformative Learning Survey instrument and the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument
were used to collect data from 320 participants who agreed to participate in the research. The
two surveys were completed by the same participants with the assistance of trained volunteers at
the research sites.
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Sufficient information about the two instruments, cover letter with instructions, and
waiver of documentation of informed consent were sent to the trained volunteers at the research
sites. They were asked to also write an introductory letter to accompany the survey package that
was given to the survey participants who were selected through a simple random sampling
procedure. This helped in clarifying any doubts that the participants had regarding the study,
while showing the support of their institutions for the study.
The informed consent document given to the participants provided an overview of the
research steps, including:
•

introduction of the Principal Investigator (PI) and those assisting in the research

•

explanation of what the research is about

•

reasons for asking selected participants to participate in the research

•

explanation of what participants will do in the research study

•

explanation of possible risks and discomforts to participants

•

statement on participants’ freedom to withdraw from the study

•

information on whether or not there are benefits for taking part in this research study

•

information on whether or not participants will be paid or be given compensation for
being in the study

•

explanation on the costs for participating in the research study

•

explanation on how the information collected from participants will be kept - that is,
explanation on privacy and confidentiality

•

information about who participants can contact if they have questions, concerns,
comments, or complaints

•

information on voluntary participation in the research study; and
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•

statements on well-informed consent and agreement to participate in the research.

Before the information about the survey was sent to the selected participants, and to help
in correcting procedural errors, the data collection procedure was pilot-tested with 20 volunteers.
Upon the completion of the pilot study, and after making the needed procedural and logistical
adjustments, the selected participants were contacted by the trained research volunteers in each
site.
Participants who needed assistance in completing the survey received same from the
volunteer in charge of the survey at the research site. Training on how to assist participants
complete the survey was provided to the site volunteers. Participants who did not have internet
were invited to a research site equipped with computers and internet where they were able to
complete the surveys.
In order to make sure that the surveys were completed on time, there was a check-in with
the survey participants five days after the initial information was sent to them. This check-in was
initiated either by email or phone through the help of the research site volunteers. The check-in
was important to remind those who for one reason or another forgot to complete the surveys, and
to know whether the participants had questions or encountered a problem in the process. The
duration for completing the data collection was over a year due to the COVID-19 pandemic. At
the end of the data collection, participants were thanked for participating in the study.
Ethical Considerations
As stated before, this study was conducted using only two surveys that participants (18
years and over) consented to complete. Prior to the start of the surveys, it was determined that
the only identifying record that will link the participants and the research is the consent
document, if participants were asked to complete the consent form with their personal
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information, sign and return it to the Principal Investigator. This could lead to a breach of
confidentiality and potential harm to participants. Since this research studies a sensitive issue in
Nigeria, asking 320 participants to complete the consent form with their personal information
like names and signatures will significantly pose some confidentiality problems for both the
participants and researcher. To prevent this from happening and reduce the risk that participants
may experience, I applied for and obtained a waiver of documentation of informed consent from
the Nova Southeastern University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).
In the informed consent document, participants were told that this study involves minimal
risk to them. The risk associated with completing the surveys is not more than what they
experience in everyday life. Nevertheless, one of the surveys assessed their experiences and
knowledge of the Nigeria-Biafra War which is a traumatic experience for the Igbos. In case they
find some questions to be upsetting or if the questions evoke painful memories of war,
participants were asked to notify the research site administrators immediately so that
arrangements could be made to refer them to someone who may be able to help them with these
feelings.
Also, consenting to participate in this study does not mean that participants are obliged to
complete the surveys. Participants were told that they have the right to leave this study at any
time or refuse to be in it. Anyone who left or withdrew from the research was not penalized. The
two online surveys were set up in a way that did not allow incomplete responses to be saved.
This means that responses from participants who withdrew from the research were not received
by the researcher. Data collected from the research are stored in a confidential manner for 36
months from the end of the study and used for the purpose of the research only.
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Participants did not receive any direct benefits from participating in this study.
Information learned from this study helped to discover which conflict resolution style(s)
participants are inclined to use in managing conflict, especially the Biafra conflict. The study
was also designed to help participants find out if their knowledge and/or experience of the
Nigeria-Biafra War has any significant effect on the way(s) they handle, manage or approach the
Biafra conflict. Their participation in this research helped shed light on the relationship between
transformative learning and conflict styles. The findings will help education policy makers and
educators develop the type of history curricula and teaching methods suitable for educating
engaged and tolerant citizens.
Participants were not given any payments or compensation for participating in this study.
However, drinks and snacks were provided for participants who, not having access to a computer
and internet, decided to complete the surveys at a designated survey site. The drinks and snacks
given to participants were self-funded by the Principal Investigator. Also, the costs for
participating in this study were minimal. Participants who did not have a computer and internet
incurred minimal transportation costs completing the surveys at a designated survey site.
Information about minimal costs associated with completing the surveys were clearly stated in
the informed consent document. At the end of the survey, participants were thanked for
participating in the study.
An important aspect of the informed consent document is privacy and confidentiality
information. Given that a discussion on the Nigeria-Biafra War is very sensitive in Nigeria, the
researcher promised to keep confidential and private both the names and responses of the
research participants as well as the location and time of the survey. The researcher ensured that
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participants were completely protected from harm while participating in this research. This was
done by providing them with the needed assistance and support throughout the process.
All the data collected from participants in this study are stored in a confidential place and
handled with care by the researcher. The names and personal information of the participants will
not be revealed to the public and will not also be included in the dissertation and publications
that this research will inspire. All confidential data will be kept securely in a secure hard drive
that is accessible only to the researcher. All data will be kept for 36 months from the end of the
study and destroyed after that time by completely deleting them from the hard drive where they
are stored.
Since participation in this research is voluntary, having this level of information in the
consent form helped selected participants make a well-informed decision on whether to
participate in the research or not. Each participant was given a signed copy of the informed
consent document. They were only asked to start the survey after carefully reading the informed
consent document, agreeing to the terms, and after all their questions about participating in this
research have been satisfactorily answered.
Data Analysis
Data collected in this research were analyzed using various data analysis methods,
including descriptive analyses and inferential statistical tests.
Descriptive Analysis
For the descriptive analysis of data, both the moderator variables and the measures were
described and analyzed. The moderator variables are gender, education level, age range, and
occupation. The measures include group, transformative learning subscales, total transformative
learning scale, and conflict styles. While frequencies were calculated for the moderator variables
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in addition to the group variable, descriptive statistics analyses were done for both the
independent variable of transformative learning and dependent variable of conflict style with
particular attention to their distribution (i.e., normality or skewness).
Inferential Statistical Analysis
This research carried out inferential statistical analyses by conducting four statistical
tests: correlation, t-test, regression, and analysis of variance (ANOVA). Outlined below are five
specific null hypotheses that were tested and analyzed using inferential statistical tests:
1. Transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history is not related to conflict
styles. The statistical test conducted for this hypothesis is Pearson Product-Moment
Correlation.
2. There is no significant difference in transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history and in conflict styles between the prewar generation and postwar
generation. Independent Samples T-Test was used to test this hypothesis.
3. Transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history cannot be used to predict
the conflict styles of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin. A Simple Linear Regression
analysis was run to test this hypothesis.
4. Transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history cannot be used to predict
the conflict styles of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin while controlling for the
effect of age, gender, education level, and occupation. A Multiple Regression analysis
was run to test this hypothesis.
5. The prewar generation does not demonstrate a higher level of transformative learning
of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and use of collaborating conflict style than the
postwar generation. This hypothesis was tested by two One-Way ANOVAs.
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The above statistical tests were conducted at a p-value (significance) of 0.05.
Limitations and Conclusion
Conducting a research on the Nigeria-Biafra War is ordinarily a very challenging
endeavor. It is more challenging during the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on this reality, the
research was constrained in many ways, including limited access to research participants,
logistical and technological challenge, and financial constraints.
Participant enrollment was initiated at the research sites in December 2019 after I
received the IRB approval. In order to start data collection, I concluded all travel arrangements to
fly to Nigeria in the last week of March 2020. Unfortunately, I was advised to cancel my trip due
to the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic. I did. When it was clear that I was no longer going to
travel to Nigeria, I initiated plans to continue the research remotely from the United States
through the help of my volunteers in the southeastern part of Nigeria.
From New York, I was able to conduct a series of online training on ZOOM for my
Nigerian volunteers. They received training on how to enroll participants for the research,
conduct the surveys and deal with logistical issues. From the list of enrolled participants they
sent to me, I was able to randomly select 160 participants for each research group, a total of 320
participents for the two groups. As soon as the selected participants started to complete the
surveys, their institutions were closed indefinitely due to the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic in
Nigeria. Since many of these participants were coming to a designated research site, they were
no longer able to continue with the research. In addition to this lockdown, university professors
and staff went on a national strike in Nigeria throughout the remaining of 2020. It was only in
January/February 2021 that the universities reopened fully. Unable to be physically present in
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Nigeria due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and with the nation-wide lockdown in Nigeria and the
strike, access to research participants was completely limited.
The delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the university strike in Nigeria
prompted me to apply for IRB Expedited Continuing Review. This was approved by the IRB on
September 25, 2020. The IRB extended my data collection to September 24, 2021. With this
approval, and most importantly the reopening of schools and other institutions in Nigeria, I was
able to embark on a new round of participant recruitment and data collection through the help of
my local volunteers.
Another major challenge is logistics and technology. Since the research took place in
rural areas, for the most part, many participants were not computer literate and did not have
internet to complete the surveys online. This technology issue was made worse by the COVID19 pandemic. To remedy this unfavorable situation, I provided my volunteers with computers
and internet in two research locations. In addition, I partnered with a local cybercafé.
Participants who were computer literate but did not have a personal computer and
internet were sent to the cybercafé to complete the online surveys. Participants who were not
computer literate were brought by appointment to a designated research site managed by my
volunteers, who helped them to complete the surveys online.
The Transformative Learning Survey was set up online for my research by Dr. Edward
Taylor, Professor Emeritus of Lifelong Learning of Adult Education, Penn State University –
Harrisburg and hosted by Penn State University. The Conflict Styles Survey was created online
and hosted on SurveyMonkey. To complete these two surveys at the designated sites,
appointments were scheduled in order to prevent the sites from being crowded, and the COVID-
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19 safety measures were also observed. Both the participants and volunteers wore masks all the
time while completing the surveys at the research sites.
Mitigating the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the technological
and logistical issues cost money. Also, given that some of the participants came in from long
distances, I had to provide snacks, water and drinks. Since I could not travel to Nigeria, I used
the money I saved from my canceled trip to sponsor the research.
Although there cannot be a substitute for the benefits of being physically present in the
field to collect data for an important research of this nature, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown
that much can be accomplished virtually using advanced meeting technologies such as ZOOM,
WhatsApp and other online platforms. Nevertheless, the rural areas of Nigeria where this
research was conducted are not yet developed to tap from the benefits these modern technologies
offer. Despite these hurdles, the task before me is no longer to collect and analyze data, but to
present the research results.
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Chapter 6: Results
Descriptive Findings
Demography
The total sample size was 320 participants. The sample was 60.3% male and 39.7%
female (see Table 10). Education levels were as follows: less than senior secondary (24.4%),
senior secondary (18.4 %), some post-secondary (19.7%), bachelor degree (26.3%), and graduate
degree (11.3%) (see Table 11). Age was broken down into several categories as follows: 18 to 24
(5%), 25 to 34 (9.4%), 35 to 44 (19.7%), 45 to 54 (15.9%), 55 to 64 (20%), 65 to 74 (20.9%),
and Over 74 (9.1%) (see Table 12).
Table 10
Frequencies for Gender
Gender Frequency Percent
Male
193
60.3
Female
127
39.7
Table 11
Frequencies for Education
Education
Less than senior secondary
Senior secondary
Some post-secondary
Bachelor degree
Graduate degree

Frequency
78
59
63
84
36

Percent
24.4
18.4
19.7
26.3
11.3
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Table 12
Frequencies for Age Range
Age Range
18 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
55 to 64
65 to 74
Over 74

Frequency

Percent

16
30
63
51
64
67
29

5.0
9.4
19.7
15.9
20.0
20.9
9.1

Measures
Occupation. Participants reported seven different occupations as follows: student (5.9%),
unemployed (12.5%), trades/business (33.4%), technologies (6.6%), service (14.1%),
professional / university faculty member (7.8%), and retired (19.7%) (see Table 13).
Table 13
Frequencies for Occupation
Occupation
Student
Unemployed
Trades/business
Technologies
Service
Professional / University Faculty Member
Retired

Frequency
19
40
107
21
45
25
63

Percent
5.9
12.5
33.4
6.6
14.1
7.8
19.7

Group. One half of the sample was in the prewar generation group and the other half of
the sample was in the postwar generation group (see Table 14).
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Table 14
Frequencies for Group
Group
Frequency Percent
Prewar
160
50.0
Postwar
160
50.0
Transformative Learning Subscales. All the 18 subscales were significantly negatively
skewed. However, none of the scales were transformed prior to computing the Total
Transformative Learning Scale (see Table 15).
Table 15
Descriptive Statistics for Transformative Learning Subscales
Skewness
Statistic Std. Error
-0.641
0.136
-0.754
0.136
-0.527
0.136
-0.756
0.136
-0.628
0.136
-0.706
0.136
-0.605
0.136
-0.382
0.136
-0.628
0.136
-0.882
0.136
-0.599
0.136

Variable

Mean

SD

Acting Differently
Self Awareness
Openness
Shift Worldview
Arts Based
Dialogue Support
Emotions
Imaginal Soul Work
Spiritual
Action
Critical Reflection

79.15
77.64
74.80
77.48
73.81
73.50
75.05
73.96
76.92
79.17
73.71

18.431
19.555
20.714
19.001
20.551
23.226
21.376
19.749
19.238
19.107
20.721

Disorienting Dilemma

74.70

20.190

-0.692

0.136

Discourse
Experience
Empowerment
Social Action

79.38
77.35
73.31
76.53

18.696
18.411
20.833
18.884

-1.016
-0.616
-0.395
-0.562

0.136
0.136
0.136
0.136

Unveiling Oppression

74.48

19.870

-0.645

0.136

Ideology Critique

74.77

19.278

-0.509

0.136
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Total Transformative Learning Scale. The Total Transformative Learning Scale was
computed by taking the mean of the 18 subscales. The distribution for the Total Transformative
Learning Scale was normal (see Table 16).
Table 16
Descriptive Statistics for Total Transformative Learning Scale
Variable

Mean

SD

Transformative Learning Scale

75.872

15.03632

Skewness
Statistic Std. Error
-0.156
0.136

Conflict Style. The five conflict style variables were normally distributed except for
competing and compromising, which were moderately skewed. Since they were not extremely
skewed, they were not transformed prior to the analysis. See Table 17.
Table 17
Descriptive Statistics for Conflict Styles

Conflict Styles

Mean

SD

Competing
Collaborating
Compromising
Avoiding
Accommodating

67.13
43.57
31.21
47.29
58.32

23.517
25.887
21.269
22.717
24.629

Skewness
Std.
Statistic
Error
-0.761
0.136
0.183
0.136
0.573
0.136
0.233
0.136
-0.264
0.136

Inferential Statistical Findings
Hypothesis Test 1: Correlation
In order to test the hypothesis that Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history is not related to Conflict Styles, five correlations were run between the Total
Transformative Learning variable and the five Conflict Style variables. The results show that
there is a significant negative correlation between Transformative Learning and Competing
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Conflict Style (r = -.284, p < 0.001), and a positive correlation between Transformative Learning
and Collaborating Conflict Style (r = .277, p < 0.001). There is also a positive correlation
between Transformative Learning and Accommodating Conflict Style (r = .125, p < 0.025). The
remaining two correlations were not significant. See Table 18 and Figures 22 and 23.
Table 18
Correlations between Transformative Learning and Conflict Styles
Conflict Styles

Results

Transformative
Learning

Pearson
-.284**
Correlation
Competing
Sig. (2-tailed)
<0.001
N
320
Pearson
.277**
Correlation
Collaborating
Sig. (2-tailed)
<0.001
N
320
Pearson
0.036
Correlation
Compromising
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.524
N
320
Pearson
-0.029
Correlation
Avoiding
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.608
N
320
Pearson
.125*
Correlation
Accommodating Sig. (2-tailed)
0.025
N
320
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Figure 22
Scatterplot of the Correlation between Transformative Learning and Competing

Figure 23
Scatterplot of the Correlation between Transformative Learning and Collaborating
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Hypothesis Test 2: T-Test
To test the hypothesis that there are mean differences between the prewar and postwar
groups for the conflict styles and transformative learning scale, a series of T-Tests was run. The
results indicated that the postwar group had a higher conflict style mean for competing and
compromising variables while the prewar group had a higher conflict style mean for
collaborating, accommodating and transformative learning variables. See Table 19 for
descriptive statistics and Table 20 for T-Test results.
Table 19
Descriptive Statistics for Conflict Styles and Transformative Learning by Group
Measure
Competing
Collaborating
Compromising
Avoiding
Accommodating
Transformative
Learning

Group

Mean

SD

Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar

51.750
82.513
63.138
24.000
27.863
34.556
48.838
45.738
62.013
54.631
82.357

20.521
14.572
17.884
15.934
20.299
21.748
22.066
23.317
24.185
24.589
14.293

Postwar

69.388

12.832

Table 20
T Test Results for Conflict Styles and Transformative Learning by Group
Measure
Competing
Collaborating
Compromising
Avoiding
Accommodating
Transformative Learning
* Equal variances not assumed.

t
-15.461*
20.668*
-2.846
1.221
2.707
8.540*

df
286.850
313.853
318
318
318
314.373

p value
<0.001
<0.001
0.005
0.223
0.007
<0.001

Cohen's d
-1.729
2.311
-0.318
0.137
0.303
0.955
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Hypothesis Test 3: Regression
Simple Linear Regression. To test the hypothesis that Transformative Learning of the
Nigeria-Biafra War history could be used to predict the Conflict Styles of Nigerian citizens of
Biafran origin, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted. The results indicated that as
Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history increased, Competing Conflict Style
decreased (Beta = -0.284, t(318) = -5.284, p <0.001) (see Table 21). This model explained a low
percentage of variance in Competing Conflict Style (R Squared = 0.081, F(1,318) = 27.916, p
<0.001).
Table 21
The Summary of Simple Linear Regression predicting Competing Conflict Style
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
100.842 6.504

(Constant)
Transformative
-0.444
Learning
* Significant at 0.001.

0.084

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

15.505

<0.001*

-5.284

<0.001*

Beta

-0.284

The results also showed that as Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history increased, Collaborating Conflict Style increased (Beta = 0.277, t(318) = 5.146, p
<0.001) (see Table 22). This model explained a low percentage of variance in Collaborating
Conflict Style (R Squared = 0.077, F(1,318) = 26.482, p <0.001).
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Table 22
The Summary of Simple Linear Regression predicting Collaborating Conflict Style

(Constant)
Transformative
Learning
* Significant at 0.001.

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
7.352
7.174
0.477

0.093

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

1.025

0.306

5.146

<0.001*

Beta

0.277

In addition to Competing and Collaborating conflict styles, the results equally revealed
that Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history significantly predicted
Accommodating Conflict Style (Beta = 0.125, t(318) = 2.252, p = 0.025) (see Table 23). This
model explained a lower percentage of variance in Accommodating Conflict Style (R Squared =
0.016, F(1,318) = 5.072, p = 0.025).
Table 23
The Summary of Simple Linear Regression predicting Accommodating Conflict Style
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
42.750
7.048

(Constant)
Transformative
0.205
Learning
* Significant at 0.05.
** Significant at 0.001.

0.091

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

6.065

<0.001**

2.252

0.025*

Beta

0.125

The results of additional simple linear regression analyses revealed that Transformative
Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history was not a significant predictor of Compromising and
Avoiding conflict styles (see Tables 24, 25, and 26).
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Table 24
R Squared Test Results
Conflict Styles
Compromising
Avoiding

R Squared
0.001
0.001

P Value
0.524
0.608

Table 25
The Summary of Simple Linear Regression predicting Compromising Conflict Style

(Constant)
Transformative
Learning

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
27.376
6.131
0.051

0.079

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

4.465

0.000

0.637

0.524

Beta

0.036

Table 26
The Summary of Simple Linear Regression predicting Avoiding Conflict Style

(Constant)
Transformative
Learning

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
50.587
6.550
-0.043

0.085

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

7.723

0.000

-0.514

0.608

Beta

-0.029

Multiple Regression. In order to test the hypothesis that Transformative Learning of the
Nigeria-Biafra War history could be used to predict Conflict Styles while controlling for the
effect of age, gender, education level, and occupation, a multiple regression was run. The results
indicated that as Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history increased,
Competing Conflict Style decreased (Beta = -0.108, t(309) = -2.206, p = 0.028) while controlling
for the other variables in the model (see Table 27). It was also found that an increase in Age
Range resulted in a decrease in Competing Conflict Style (Beta = -0.557, t(309) = -9.042, p
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<0.001). This model explained a significant proportion of variance in Competing Conflict Style
(R Squared = 0.362, F(10,309) = 17.545, p <0.001).
Table 27
The Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Competing Conflict Style
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
(Constant)
117.450 7.947
Age Range
-7.893
0.873
Gender
-4.952
2.238
Education
0.067
0.908
Occupation=Student
-13.017 6.314
Occupation=Unemployed
2.942
4.458
Occupation=Trades/business 2.860
3.473
Occupation=Technologies
-7.843
5.253
Occupation=Service
-6.162
4.284
Occupation=Professional /
-6.937
5.079
University Faculty Member
Transformative Learning
-0.169
0.076
* Significant at 0.05.
** Significant at 0.001.

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

-0.557
-0.103
0.004
-0.131
0.041
0.057
-0.083
-0.091

14.779
-9.042
-2.213
0.074
-2.062
0.660
0.823
-1.493
-1.438

<0.001**
<0.001**
0.028
0.941
0.040*
0.510
0.411
0.136
0.151

-0.079

-1.366

0.173

-0.108

-2.206

0.028*

Beta

The results also indicated that Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history
could not be used to predict Collaborating Conflict Style (Beta = 0.047, t(309) = 1.061, p =
0.290) while controlling for the other variables in the model (see Table 28). However, Age
Range was a significant predictor of Collaborating Conflict Style. The results indicated that an
increase in Age Range resulted in an increase in Collaborating Conflict Style (Beta = 0.669,
t(309) = 11.987, p <0.001). These results match the T-Tests results for Collaborating Conflict
Style by group. This model explained a significant proportion of variance in Collaborating
Conflict Style (R Squared = 0 .477, F(10,309) = 28.221, p <0.001).
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Table 28
The Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Collaborating Conflict Style

(Constant)
Age Range
Gender
Education
Occupation=Student
Occupation=Unemployed
Occupation=Trades/business
Occupation=Technologies
Occupation=Service
Occupation=Professional /
University Faculty Member
Transformative Learning
* Significant at 0.001.

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
-7.355
7.919
10.426
0.870
2.485
2.230
-0.145
0.904
9.047
6.291
-6.268
4.442
-3.964
3.461
-1.973
5.235
2.369
4.269

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

0.669
0.047
-0.008
0.083
-0.080
-0.072
-0.019
0.032

-0.929
11.987
1.115
-0.160
1.438
-1.411
-1.145
-0.377
0.555

0.354
<0.001*
0.266
0.873
0.151
0.159
0.253
0.707
0.579

Beta

2.113

5.061

0.022

0.418

0.677

0.081

0.076

0.047

1.061

0.290

Additional results of multiple regression analyses revealed that neither Transformative
Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history nor the controlling variables of age, gender,
education level, and occupation significantly predicted Compromising, Avoiding, and
Accommodating conflict styles while controlling for the other variables in the model (see Tables
29, 30, 31 and 32).
Table 29
R Squared Test Results
Conflict Styles
Compromising
Avoiding
Accommodating

R Squared
0.038
0.023
0.035

P Value
0.267
0.714
0.337
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Table 30
The Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Compromising Conflict Style

(Constant)
Age Range
Gender
Education
Occupation=Student
Occupation=Unemployed
Occupation=Trades/business
Occupation=Technologies
Occupation=Service
Occupation=Professional /
University Faculty Member
Transformative Learning

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
24.529
8.825
-1.455
0.969
2.807
2.485
-0.315
1.008
4.245
7.011
1.026
4.950
5.225
3.856
10.762
5.833
2.091
4.757

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

-0.114
0.065
-0.020
0.047
0.016
0.116
0.125
0.034

2.780
-1.501
1.130
-0.313
0.606
0.207
1.355
1.845
0.440

0.006
0.134
0.260
0.755
0.545
0.836
0.176
0.066
0.661

Beta

4.723

5.640

0.060

0.838

0.403

0.123

0.085

0.087

1.444

0.150

Table 31
The Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Avoiding Conflict Style

(Constant)
Age Range
Gender
Education
Occupation=Student
Occupation=Unemployed
Occupation=Trades/business
Occupation=Technologies
Occupation=Service
Occupation=Professional /
University Faculty Member
Transformative Learning

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
51.407
9.504
1.253
1.044
1.116
2.676
-1.384
1.085
3.532
7.550
1.248
5.331
-1.102
4.153
-2.011
6.282
-0.205
5.123

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

0.092
0.024
-0.083
0.037
0.018
-0.023
-0.022
-0.003

5.409
1.201
0.417
-1.275
0.468
0.234
-0.265
-0.320
-0.040

0.000
0.231
0.677
0.203
0.640
0.815
0.791
0.749
0.968

Beta

7.338

6.074

0.087

1.208

0.228

-0.086

0.091

-0.057

-0.943

0.347
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Table 32
The Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Accommodating Conflict Style

(Constant)
Age Range
Gender
Education
Occupation=Student
Occupation=Unemployed
Occupation=Trades/business
Occupation=Technologies
Occupation=Service
Occupation=Professional /
University Faculty Member
Transformative Learning

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
39.980 10.236
0.699
1.124
0.710
2.882
0.648
1.169
-0.362
8.131
-3.588
5.741
-1.481
4.473
5.082
6.766
4.981
5.518

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

0.047
0.014
0.036
-0.003
-0.048
-0.028
0.051
0.070

3.906
0.621
0.246
0.555
-0.044
-0.625
-0.331
0.751
0.903

0.000
0.535
0.805
0.579
0.965
0.532
0.741
0.453
0.367

Beta

-4.260

6.541

-0.046

-0.651

0.515

0.177

0.098

0.108

1.802

0.073

Hypothesis Test 4: One-Way ANOVA
Two One-Way ANOVAs were used to test the hypotheses that the prewar generation
tends to demonstrate a higher level of Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history
and use of Collaborating Conflict Style than the postwar generation. The results indicated that
there was a significant difference between the group means. The prewar generation had a higher
mean than the postwar generation for Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history
(F(1, 318) = 72.936, p <0.001), as well as for Collaborating Conflict Style (F(1, 318) = 427.150,
p <0.001). However, the postwar generation had a higher mean than the prewar generation for
Competing Conflict Style (F(1, 318) = 239.031, p <0.001). See Table 33 for descriptive
statistics.
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Table 33
Descriptive Statistics for Transformative Learning, Collaborating and Competing Conflict Styles
by Group
Variable
Transformative
Learning
Collaborating
Conflict Style
Competing
Conflict Style

Group
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar

Mean
82.357
69.388
63.14
24.00
51.75
82.51

SD
14.293
12.832
17.884
15.934
20.521
14.572

What I have done in this chapter is to objectively present the descriptive and inferential
statistical results of the data analyses without any interpretations and reflections. In the next
chapter, I carefully offered my interpretations of these research findings while reflecting on their
meanings, implications, and limitations.
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion
Summary of Key Findings
This research was guided by one fundamental purpose which served as my North Star. I
wanted to find out whether a transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history will have
a significant effect on the conflict management styles (referred to in this study as conflict styles)
of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin with respect to the ongoing agitation for self-determination
and independence of Biafra.
By implication, and aided by the Transformative Learning and Conflict Styles
instruments, I examined how the previously silenced, but now revealed narratives or stories
(testimonies) about the Nigeria-Biafra War, coupled with the a priori definition of war as a fatal
incident (reason), have affected the disposition or state of mind (introspection) of the
descendants of Biafra born during or after the Nigeria-Biafra War (referred to in this research as
postwar generation), and how this state of mind has shaped the postwar generation’s conflict
styles with respect to the ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra.
In a similar way, I also studied how the Biafran elders’ (or prewar generation’s) direct
(immediate) experience of the Nigeria-Biafra War (perception), the memories of the war they
retained and now remember (memory), the available narratives about the war (testimonies), and
the a priori definition of war as a fatal incident (reason) have all affected their disposition or
state of mind (introspection), and how this state of mind has shaped the elders’ (or prewar
generation’s) conflict styles with respect to the ongoing agitation for self-determination and
independence of Biafra.
As noted in chapter 5, a sample size of 320 participants drawn from the southeastern
states of Nigeria (of which 160 represented prewar generation and 160 represented postwar
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generation) was surveyed using the Transformative Learning and Conflict Styles instruments.
The results of the data analyses provided statistical answers to the main question of this research:
Is there a relationship between transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and the
conflict styles utilized by the prewar and postwar generations of Nigerian citizens of Biafran
origin to manage the ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra? The
conflict styles are competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding, and accommodating.
The results indicated that while there was a significant negative correlation between
Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and Competing Conflict Style (r = .284, p < 0.001), Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and Collaborating
Conflict Style had a significant positive correlation (r = .277, p < 0.001). In addition, there was a
significant positive correlation between Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history and Accommodating Conflict Style (r = .125, p < 0.025). However, Compromising and
Avoiding conflict styles were not significantly related to Transformative Learning of the NigeriaBiafra War history.
Further statistical analyses revealed that as Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history increased, Competing Conflict Style decreased (Beta = -0.284, t(318) = -5.284, p
<0.001). On the other hand, as Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history
increased, Collaborating Conflict Style also increased (Beta = 0.277, t(318) = 5.146, p <0.001).
It was also found that an increase in Age Range resulted in a decrease in Competing
Conflict Style (Beta = -0.557, t(309) = -9.042, p <0.001). However, an increase in Age Range
resulted in an increase in Collaborating Conflict Style (Beta = 0.669, t(309) = 11.987, p <0.001).
Finally, the results of the study showed that the prewar generation had a higher mean than
the postwar generation for Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history (F(1, 318)
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= 72.936, p <0.001) as well as for Collaborating Conflict Style (F(1, 318) = 427.150, p <0.001).
On the other hand, the postwar generation had a higher mean than the prewar generation for
Competing Conflict Style (F(1, 318) = 239.031, p <0.001).
Interpretation of Findings
Correlation Between Transformative Learning and Conflict Styles
In chapter one of this study I hypothesized that Transformative Learning of the NigeriaBiafra War history is related to the conflict styles utilized by the prewar and postwar generations
of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin to manage the ongoing agitation for self-determination and
independence of Biafra. In line with this hypothesis, the results provided a statistical evidence
showing a significant positive correlation between Transformative Learning of the NigeriaBiafra War history and Collaborative Style of conflict management (r = .277, p < 0.001), as well
as Accommodating Style of conflict management (r = .125, p < 0.025) on the one hand, and a
significant negative correlation between Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history and Competing (or aggressive) Style of conflict management (r = -.284, p < 0.001) on the
other hand.
The directions of these linear associations are intriguing. By positive correlation (r =
.277) it means that as Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history increased, the
use of Collaborative Style of conflict management also increased (see Figure 24). In other words,
the more Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin participate in Transformative Learning of the
Nigeria-Biafra War history, the more likely they will use Collaborative Style of conflict
management to resolve the ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra.
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Figure 24
Scatterplot of the Correlation between Transformative Learning and Collaborating

Also, the positive correlation between Transformative Learning and Accommodating Conflict
Style (r = .125) could be interpreted this way: as Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history increased, the use of Accommodating Style of conflict management slightly
increased.
On the other hand, by negative correlation (r = -.284) it means that as Transformative
Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history increased, the use of Competing (or aggressive) Style
of conflict management decreased (see Figure 25). What this means is that the more Nigerian
citizens of Biafran origin participate in Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history, the less likely they will use Competing (or aggressive) Style of conflict management to
resolve the ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra.
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Figure 25
Scatterplot of the Correlation between Transformative Learning and Competing

Furthermore, it is true that the strength of the correlations between Transformative
Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and these two conflict style variables: Collaborating
(r = .277) and Competing (r = -.284) could be interpreted as weak based on Evans’ (1996)
guidelines (see Table 34). Nevertheless, following Gignac and Szodorai’s (2016) normative
guidelines for interpreting correlations (see Table 35), the strength of the correlations beween
Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and the two conflict style variables:
Collaborating (r = .277) and Competing (r = -.284) should be considered moderate rather than
weak. These two guidelines – Evans, 1996 and Gignac and Szodorai, 2016 – show that the
correlation between Transformative Learning and Accommodating Conflict Style (r = .125) is
very weak.
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Table 34
Effect Size of Pearson r Correlation according to Evans (1996)
Strength of Association
Very weak
Weak
Moderate
Strong
Very strong

Coefficient, r
.00-.19
.20-.39
.40-.59
.60-.79
.80-1.0

Table 35
Effect Size of Pearson r Correlation according to Gignac and Szodorai (2016)
Strength of Association
Small
Moderate
Large

Coefficient, r
.10
.20
.30

Also, this significant correlation does not imply the existence of a causation between the
independent variable of Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and the
dependent variables of Collaborating, Accommodating and Competing conflict styles. It simply
means that it is unlikely that the null hypothesis, Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history is not related to these conflict styles, is true. Based on the findings, this null
hypothesis is rejected and a statistically significant association is established. As discussed
below, the percentage of variance in Collaborating, Accommodating and Competing conflict
styles explained by Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history was determined
using a simple linear regression.
Mean Differences between Prewar and Postwar Generations
If Collaborating, as one of the conflict styles utilized by Nigerian citizens of Biafran
origin to manage the ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra, went
up as Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history went up, and Competing (or
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aggression), another conflict style utilized by Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin to manage the
ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra, went down as
Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history went up, then it becomes imperative
to reflect on which group of Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin scored higher or lower in
Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history, as well as in Collaborating and
Competing conflict styles.
Prior to data collection, I predicted that participants who score high in Transformative
Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history will most likely score high in Collaborative Style of
conflict management and low in Competing (or aggressive) Style of conflict management. On
the inverse, I also predicted that participants who score low in Transformative Learning of the
Nigeria-Biafra War history will most likely score low in Collaborative Style of conflict
management, but they are most likely to score high in Competing (or aggressive) style of conflict
management.
In congruence with these two hypotheses, the results of this study as presented in chapter
6 showed that the prewar generation, having a higher mean score for Transformative Learning of
the Nigeria-Biafra War history, scored higher in Collaborative Style of conflict management and
lower in Competing (or aggressive) Style of conflict management. Inversely, the postwar
generation, with a lower mean score in Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history, had a higher mean score for Competing (or aggressive) Style of conflict management
and a lower mean score for Collaborative Style of conflict management (see Figure 26).

488
Figure 26
Boxplot Comparing Mean Scores on Transformative Learning, Collaborating and Competing by
Group

There are many ways to interprete these differing results. Four indispensable and
interconnected hermeneutic elements present themselves here: age, experience, opportunity for
critical reflection, and state of mind. Participants in the prewar generation group were born
before the Nigeria-Biafra War with ages ranging from 55 to 64, 65 to 74, and over 74. By
implication, majority of the prewar generation members had direct experience of the NigeriaBiafra War or were active participants in the war. The manner in which the current agitation for
independence of Biafra is being pursued by the postwar generation reminds them of the failures
or mistakes of the prewar Eastern Nigerian Government and the Federal Government of Nigeria,
as well as the consequences of the war (Onuoha, 2013a). Their direct experience and firsthand
knowledge or memory of the Nigeria-Biafra War and the events surrounding it as well as their
ability and openness to critically reflect on available narratives about the controversial issues
embedded in the Nigeria-Biafra War history have had an impact on their disposition or state of
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mind. This is in line with Onuoha’s (2013a) assessment that the prewar generation are “not
favorably disposed to the idea of another war or a secessionist attempt” (p. 443). The change
produced within them resulted in a higher score in Transformative Learning of the NigeriaBiafra War history and Collaborative Style of conflict management. For the full percentage mean
scores of the prewar generation on both the Transformative Learning Processes and Outcomes,
see Tables 36 and 37 below.
By contrast, the postwar generation group members were born during and after the
Nigeria-Biafra War with ages ranging from 18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, and 45 to 54. What this
means is that they did not experience the Nigeria-Biafra War (Onuoha, 2013b; Omeje, 2005).
Rather, they base their knowledge of the Nigeria-Biafra War history on transmitted or available
narratives collected from various sources. Due to the fact that the teaching and learning of
history as a subject, especially the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War, was banned and removed
from the school curricula by the Federal Military Governments of Nigeria following the end of
the war, both an opportunity and spaces for critical reflection on the controversial issues and
competing narratives about the war were not available to the postwar generation. Their sudden or
unprepared discovery of what happened before, during and after the war through various sources
including social media, as well as a combination of many other variables – demographic, social,
cultural, ethnic, religious, political and economic – have had an impact on their disposition or
state of mind. The change produced within them resulted in a lower score in Transformative
Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and Collaborative Style of conflict management, and
a higher score in Competing (or aggressive) Style of conflict management with respect to their
ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra. For the full percentage
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mean scores of the postwar generation on both the Transformative Learning Processes and
Outcomes, see Tables 36 and 37 below.
Adekson (2004, as cited in Onuoha, 2013a) had stated that the militancy of the postwar
generation is “based on their expression of certain radical features, use of inflammatory rhetoric,
quest to disengage from the Nigerian state project, and inevitable clash with State Security
Services” (p. 430). These results support the proposition that although both the prewar
generation and the postwar generation seek to accomplish one goal – management of the
unresolved core issues the returned war memories evoke –, their strategies or means to attain this
goal are incompatible and “are increasingly at loggerheads” (Omeje, 2005, p. 634).
Table 36
Descriptive Statistics for Transformative Learning Processes by Group
Variable
Arts Based
Dialogue Support
Emotions
Imaginal Soul Work
Spiritual
Action
Critical Reflection
Disorienting Dilemma
Discourse
Experience

Group
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar

Mean
82.97
64.65
79.67
67.33
82.40
67.69
80.06
67.86
82.83
71.01
83.56
74.79
80.73
66.69
81.28
68.13
84.06
74.71
82.93
71.76

SD
16.537
20.125
23.075
21.754
19.417
20.758
18.561
19.056
16.822
19.728
17.067
20.062
19.465
19.581
18.717
19.505
15.830
20.165
16.802
18.304
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Empowerment
Social Action
Unveiling Oppression
Ideology Critique

Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar

81.99
64.63
81.08
71.98
81.49
67.46
81.77
67.76

18.194
19.702
18.986
17.701
18.160
19.060
17.292
18.652

Table 37
Descriptive Statistics for Transformative Learning Outcomes by Group
Variable
Acting Differently
Self Awareness
Openness
Shift Worldview

Group
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar

Mean
84.98
73.32
82.96
72.31
83.57
66.03
84.09
70.86

SD
17.518
17.499
17.966
19.681
18.237
19.326
15.898
19.583

Prediction of Conflict Styles with Transformative Learning
Notwithstanding that there was a correlation between Transformative Learning of the
Nigeria-Biafra War history and Collaborating, Accomodating, and Competing conflict styles;
and although the results indicated that the generation that scored higher in Transformative
Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history also scored higher in Collaborative Style of conflict
management, while the generation that scored lower in Transformative Learning of the NigeriaBiafra War history scored higher in Competing (or aggressive) Style of conflict management, I
could not conclude that Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history was a
significant predictor of these conflict styles. To reach such a conclusion, it was highly imperative
that additional statistical tests were conducted using a simple linear regression.
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Prior to data collection I had posited in chapter 1 that it is possible to predict the conflict
styles utilized by the prewar and postwar generations to resolve the Biafran secession conflict by
knowing their overall level (or scores) in Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history. In other words, I argued that Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history
could be used to predict the Conflict Styles utilized by Nigerian citizens of Biafran origin to
manage the ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra.
As revealed in chapter 6, the results of a simple linear regression provided statistical
evidence in support of my submission. It was found that Transformative Learning of the NigeriaBiafra War history was a significant predictor of Competing Conflict Style (Beta = -0.284, t(318)
= -5.284, p <0.001) and explained a low percentage of variance in Competing Conflict Style (R
Squared = 0.081, F(1,318) = 27.916, p <0.001). Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history was also a significant predictor of Collaborating Conflict Style (Beta = 0.277, t(318)
= 5.146, p <0.001) and explained a low percentage of variance in Collaborating Conflict Style (R
Squared = 0.077, F(1,318) = 26.482, p <0.001). In addition, Transformative Learning
significantly predicted Accommodating Conflict Style (Beta = 0.125, t(318) = 2.252, p = 0.025)
while explaining a lower percentage of variance in Accommodating Conflict Style (R Squared =
0.016, F(1,318) = 5.072, p = 0.025).
What do these predictions mean? By use of ordinary language, these predictions could be
interpreted as follows. Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history accounted for
8.1% of the variation in the use of Competing (or aggressive) Style of conflict management,
7.7% of the variation in the use of Collaborative Style of conflict management, and 1.6% of the
variation in the use of Accommodating Style of conflict management. This means that other
variables or factors were responsible for 91.9% of the variations in the use of Competing (or

493
aggressive) Style, 92.3% of the variations in the use of Collaborative Style, and 98.4% of the
variations in the use of Accommodating Style.
Nevertheless, since Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history accounted
for only 1.6% of the variation in the use of Accommodating Style of conflict management, its
prediction of Accommodating Style, although statistically significant at p = 0.025, is very weak.
Based on this fact, attention should be focused on the ability of Transformative Learning of the
Nigeria-Biafra War history to reduce the tendency of using Competing (or aggressive) Style of
conflict management as well as its ability to increase the likelihood of using Collaborative Style
of conflict management in managing if not resolving the Biafran secession conflict.
Collaborating Conflict Style as a Transformative Learning Outcome
Critics could point to the fact that Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history was not a significant predictor of Collaborating Conflict Style (p = 0.290) when the
effects of age, gender, education level, and occupation were controlled for using a multiple
regression (see Table 28 in Chapter 6). For this reason, they may question why I have concluded
that Collaborating Conflict Style is an outcome of Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra
War history. In other words, they may ask why I am implying that Transformative Learning of
the Nigeria-Biafra War history has the potential to increase the likelihood of using Collaborative
Style of conflict management to resolve the Biafran secession conflict. My response to any
critiques of this nature is discernible from the results of the analyses.
As stated before, the results of the simple linear regression showed that not only was
Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history highly significant in predicting
Collaborative Style of conflict management (p <0.001), Transformative Learning of the NigeriaBiafra War history alone also accounted for 7.7% of the variation in the use of Collaborative
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Style of conflict management (see Table 22 in Chapter 6). When combined with other variables
such as age, gender, education level, and occupation, the total percentage of the variation in the
use of Collaborative Style of conflict management explained by the regression model rose to
47.7% (R Squared = 0 .477).
This dramatic increase is due to the effect of age. As shown in Table 28 (see Chapter 6),
Age Range was the only significant predictor of Collaborating Conflict Style (p <0.001) in this
multiple regression output. It was revealed that as Age Range increased, Collaborating Conflict
Style also increased (Beta = 0.669, t(309) = 11.987, p <0.001). To be precise, from Table 28 (see
Chapter 6) we can conclude that as Age Range increased by 1 unit, the score in Collaborative
Style of conflict management increased by 10.426% with the other variables in the model being
constant. The age range used for this study are 18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, and 45 to 54
(representing postwar generation); and 55 to 64, 65 to 74, and over 74 (representing prewar
generation). Therefore, an increase from 18-24 to 25-34 is a one unit increase. This means that
an increase from 18-24 to over 74 is a six unit increase. According to the multiple regression
results, for a 2 unit increase in Age Range, the model predicts that the use of Collaborative Style
of conflict management will increase by 20.852%. When Age Range is increased by 6 units, the
use of Collaborative Style of conflict management increases by 62.556%.
These predicted increments in Collaborative Style of conflict management match the TTests results for Collaborating Conflict Style by group (see Tables 19 and 20 in Chapter 6).
Because Age Range was the only significant predictor variable of Collaborating Conflict Style in
the model, these figures are very similar to the mean scores of the postwar and prewar
generations in Collaborating Conflict Style (see Table 38 below).
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Table 38
Descriptive Statistics for Collaborating Conflict Style by Group
Variable
Collaborating Conflict Style

Group
Prewar
Postwar

Mean
63.14
24.00

SD
17.884
15.934

I therefore submit that the older people – the prewar generation – were able to score
higher in Collaborating Conflict Style than the younger people – postwar generation – because of
their higher score in Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history. On the other
side of the aisle, the postwar generation scored lower in Collaborating Conflict Style because of
their lower score in Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history (see Table 39
below).
Table 39
Descriptive Statistics for Collaborating Conflict Style and Transformative Learning by Group
Variable
Collaborating Conflict Style
Transformative Learning

Group
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar

Mean
63.14
24.00
82.357
69.388

SD
17.884
15.934
14.293
12.832

In the other multiple regression model predicting Competing (or aggressive) Conflict
Style, the results indicated that Age Range was highly significant in predicting Competing
Conflict Style (Beta = -0.557, t(309) = -9.042, p <0.001), and that the model explained 36.2% of
the variation in Competing Conflict Style (R Squared = 0.362). Compared to the other significant
variables in the model (such as Gender, Occupation=Student, and Transformative Learning), the
effect of Age Range is very high (see Table 27 in Chapter 6). Unlike in the other model which
showed an increase in Collaborating Conflict Style with an increase in Age Range, the Beta and t
values in this result are negative. This means that as Age Range increased by 1 unit, the score in
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Competing Style of conflict management decreased by 7.893% with the other variables in the
model being constant. Again, the age range used for this study are 18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44,
and 45 to 54 (representing postwar generation); and 55 to 64, 65 to 74, and over 74 (representing
prewar generation). By implication, for a 2 unit increase in Age Range, the model predicts that
the use of Competing Style of conflict management will decrease by 15.786%. When Age Range
is increased by 6 units, the use of Competing Style of conflict management decreases by
47.358%.
The reduction in the use of Competing Style of conflict management as Age Range
increases is due to the prewar generation’s higher score in Transformative Learning of the
Nigeria-Biafra War history and lower score in Competing Conflict Style (see Table 40 below).
Table 40
Descriptive Statistics for Competing Conflict Style and Transformative Learning by Group
Variable
Competing Conflict Style
Transformative Learning

Group
Prewar
Postwar
Prewar
Postwar

Mean
51.75
82.51
82.357
69.388

SD
20.521
14.572
14.293
12.832

Prior to data collection, I had hypothesized that the prewar generation will tend to
demonstrate a higher level of Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history and the
use of Collaborative Style of conflict resolution in their efforts to resolve the ongoing agitation
for self-determination and independence of Biafra than the postwar generation. Lo and behold,
these results confirmed my prediction, showing that the prewar generation had a higher mean
than the postwar generation for Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history (F(1,
318) = 72.936, p <0.001) as well as for Collaborating Conflict Style (F(1, 318) = 427.150, p
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<0.001). On the other hand, the postwar generation had a higher mean than the prewar generation
for Competing Conflict Style (F(1, 318) = 239.031, p <0.001).
With these results, and in light of the above reflections, I hereby conclude that
Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history has the potential to increase the
likelihood of using Collaborative Style of conflict management to resolve the Biafran secession
conflict. In addition, it has the ability to reduce the probability of engaging in Competing (or
aggressive) Style of conflict management within the context of Biafran secession conflict.
This conclusion is also in line with the outcome of Harris’ (2009) transformative
education project in Kaduna state, Nigeria, carried out between 2007 and 2008, in which
Christians and Muslim youth were enrolled in a transformative learning of sectarian conflicts in
Kaduna. At the end of the project, it was found that transformative learning “produced changes
in thought processes,” led to a collaborative citizen action, “while achieving the aims of reducing
rather than encouraging violence” (Harris, 2009, p. 37).
Implications
Concluding that Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history has the
potential to increase the likelihood of using Collaborative Style of conflict management to
resolve the Biafran secession conflict as well as the ability to reduce the probability of engaging
in Competing (or aggressive) Style of conflict management has many consequences or
implications for theory, research, public policy and practice. Each of these implications is briefly
examined below.
On Theory
The findings of this study have provided us with original understanding of the effects a
transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history may have on the conflict styles of both
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the prewar and postwar generations. Two effects stood out: transformative learning as a booster
of collaboration and a reducer of aggression or competition. This new understanding of
transformative learning could help in conceptualizing a theory of transformative history
education within the broader field of peace education or conflict resolution.
This is similar to what Cole (2007) did in her edited volume, Teaching the violent past:
History education and reconciliation, and what Psaltis et al. (2017) have accomplished in
History education and conflict transformation. Cole (2007), for example, argued that traumatic
historical memories of war, such as the Nigeria-Biafra War, when taught in school classrooms
following appropriate teaching methods, have the potential to further deepen if not complete
national reconciliation and peacebuilding projects in post-war, transitional countries. Similarly,
Psaltis et al. (2017) examined the relationship between history education and conflict
transformation. Although Cole (2007) and Psaltis et al. (2017), as well as many other scholars
examined in chapter 4, have answered the question as to why the history of a violent past should
be taught in school classrooms, just as this study has done. The gap in their works which the
findings of this study have filled is the specific question of how to teach the history of a
traumatic past with its controversial issues and narratives in order to foster collaboration (winwin attitude to conflict) and reduce the possibility for aggression or competition (win-lose
attitude to conflict) (Thomas,1976; Thomas & Kilmann, 1974).
From a broader perspective, some scholars have developed a variant of transformative
learning theory called transformative education (Harris, 2009). They argue that transformative
education is “an appropriate instrument for reducing tendencies to violence by increasing
people’s capacity for critical reflection and thus equipping them to analyze, and potentially
resist, future calls to violence” (Harris, 2009, p. 38). While this theory is in line with one aspect
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of the findings of this study, that is, transformative learning as a reducer of aggression or
competition; the other aspect, transformative learning as a booster of collaboration, is not clearly
explained by transformative education theory. In addition, transformative education is too broad
and does not focus specifically on the teaching and learning of the history of a violent past such
as war. This is why developing a theory of transformative history education within the broader
field of peace education or conflict resolution using the findings of this study will help close the
gap between transformative learning and the history of a violent past.
On Research
Using transformative history education theory as a research framework implies that
researchers interested in this field should study and identify various processes of transformative
learning that will not only reduce the tendency for rivalry, aggression and violence, but most
importantly will boost a collaborative engagement aimed at resolving intractable historical
conflicts. It should be noted that Stuckey, Taylor and Cranton (2013) conducted a thorough
literature review on various aspects and theoretical perspectives of transformative learning from
which they identified a set of inclusive processes and outcomes of transformative learning. As
stated in chapter 5, part of this study was conducted with the Transformative Learning Survey
developed by these authors.
According to Stuckey, Taylor and Cranton (2013), researchers have identified 14
processes of transformative learning: critical reflection, action, experience, disorienting dilemma,
discourse, arts-based learning, dialogue with others, emotional reactions, spiritual learning,
imaginal/soul work, ideology critique, unveiling oppression, empowerment, and social action.
These 14 processes of transformative learning result in 4 main outcomes: acting differently, self
awareness, openness, and shift in worldview.
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In addition to these existing outcomes of transformative learning, the findings of this
study have shown that a transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history boosts
collaboration and reduces aggression. More transformative history education studies are
therefore needed, especially in other settings and contexts, in order to confirm whether
collaboration and violence reduction could be added to the general list of transformative learning
outcomes.
Fortunately, an international group of scholars has recently started to conduct research in
Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Pakistan, Uganda and the UK to study, understand and compare
transformative history education processes and outcomes in those countries. This highly funded
transformative history education project is led by Dr. Julia Paulson, Associate Professor in
Education, Peace and Conflict at the University of Bristol’s School of Education, UK. Their
research agenda is found in their recent journal publication, Education as site of memory:
Developing a research agenda (Paulson et al., 2020). Similar transformative history education
research projects are needed in many other countries that are polarized by a traumatic violent
past.
On Public Policy
Contrary to the belief of some policymakers that the teaching and learning of the NigeriaBiafra War history in school classrooms will result in a surge of violence and reprisals, the
findings of this study revealed positive outcomes for this history education. A transformative
learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history could result in collaboration (win-win attitude to
conflict) and violence reduction (i.e., it could reduce the tendency for a win-lose attitude to
conflict). As this study has shown, these outcomes will be realized if the Nigeria-Biafra War
history is taught in schools using a transformative learning method of teaching and learning. This
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is why Mezirow (2009) defined transformative learning as a type of “learning that transforms
problematic frames of reference to make them more inclusive, discriminating, reﬂective, open,
and emotionally able to change” (p. 22). Now it has become clear that intrapersonal and
behavioral changes accompanied by action (personal, collective, group or social) as well as
consensus and relationship building are at the heart of the transformative learning outcome.
With these implications in mind, this study not only answered the lingering questions as
to why and how the Nigeria-Biafra War history should be taught in schools. Most importantly,
the findings of the study will definitely help in alleviating the long-standing fears of
policymakers on this subject matter. Instead of continuing the policy of oblivion or repression
(Ricoeur, 2004) with regard to the Nigeria-Biafra War history, policymakers should unanimously
pass sweeping legislation aimed at achieving the following: including the history of the NigeriaBiafra War in school curricula; revising the curricula to include controversial (or competing)
issues and narratives; mandating and providing resources to educators to use transformative
learning method and tools to teach the Nigeria-Biafra War history in school classrooms; and
finally making this transformative history education a mandatory subject for all students in the
tertiary and secondary education institutions. Kwon et al. (2021) support the idea that the results
of a quantitative study of this nature should “be utilized to improve the design of educational
interventions, enabling transformative learning to be more actively practiced” (p. 2).
On Practice
The findings of this study also has many practical implications for educators and relevant
pratitioners in similar sectors. In order for current history teachers or educators to use the
transformative learning method to teach the Nigeria-Biafra War history, they must first and
foremost understand its theory, practice, processes, outcomes, and how to use it to achieve the
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expected outcomes as this research has demonstrated. Similarly, transformative history education
should be included in the college or school of education history syllabi and required for all
preservice educators. In fact, both current and preservice educators should be trained in
transformative learning before they can use it to teach the Nigeria-Biafra War history. In other
words, they must be transformed in thoughts, words and actions so that they can be the change
they want their students to experience.
In addition to participating in transformative learning training, history educators must
advance and deepen their knowledge of the Nigeria-Biafra War history. This is important
because educators who are part of the postwar generation did not study the Nigeria-Biafra War
history in school. Those who had an opportunity to learn about the war may have been taught
only the official narrative sanctioned by the federal government of Nigeria. Transformative
history education implies a critical reflection on competing or controversial narratives and issues.
This means that educators should learn various perspectives on the issues and elements
embedded in the Nigeria-Biafra War history.
This is why I devoted a lot of time and many pages to the literature review chapter of this
study (see chapter 2). While reconstructing an inclusive history of the Nigeria-Biafra War, I
critically examined those competing and controversial issues and narratives from the
perspectives of the parties involved in the conflict. By carefully classifying these controversial
issues and narratives according to the precursors of the war, war processes and escalation,
foreign interventions, traumatic memories, repression and the establishment of a dominant
narrative, the return of the repressed to consciousness, obsession with the past, and teaching the
Nigeria-Biafra War history in schools, this reconstructed history, although a work in progress,
could serve as a model for future history writing and learning.
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This study therefore posits that in this era of the return of the repressed memories of the
Nigeria-Biafra War to consciousness, what is needed in Nigeria is to move beyond obsession or
repetition of the past to a transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history in and
outside the school classrooms. It behooves history educators, those in charge of curriculum
design and implementation, and policymakers to make this important and rewarding shift
happen.
Limitations
Although this study’s implications for theory, research, policy and practice as discussed
above should be taken seriously, the findings are limited in many ways. As a methodological
choice, the research was delimited to Nigerian citizens of Igbo origin within the five southeastern
states of Nigeria. Since data was not collected from the other geopolitical regions of Nigeria, it
remains unknown whether similar results - transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history as a booster of collaboration and a reducer of aggression or competition – will be
achieved in the other parts of Nigeria. In addition, given that this research did not carry out a
transformative learning intervention with students (in terms of intentional teaching) in a formal
school classroom, the outcome of such an intervention is unknown. Additional research is
needed to test this study’s hypotheses in different contexts and settings. This is important
because, although the experience of the war was not the same in all the regions, the knowledge
gap between the prewar and postwar generations are almost the same in all the regions of the
federation. I also recommend that a follow-up research should be conducted using a mixed
methods research approach specifically in a formal school classroom setting.
In addition, it is beyond the scope of this study to affirm that all transformative learning
experiences increase collaboration and reduce aggression or competition. The generalizability of
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the findings of this study is limited by the particular situation and context studied which is the
experience of the Nigeria-Biafra War among the prewar and postwar Nigerian citizens of Igbo
origin and how this experience has shaped their conflict management style with respect to the
ongoing Biafran secession conflict. The relationship between the experience of the NigeriaBiafra War and conflict management styles for the current agitation for Biafran secession could
be likened to Mezirow’s (1997) notions of “habits of mind and a point of view” (p. 5). The
former influences the latter.
As stated in the methodology chapter, both the Transformative Learning Survey and
Conflict Styles Survey included in their introductions what Mezirow (1981) called “disorienting
dilemma.” For this research, the disorienting dilemma was the specific life-changing events
associated with the Nigeria-Biafra War and the current agitation for Biafran secession from
where transformative learning experience could be drawn. According to Harris (2009), the
disorienting dilemma “unsettles them [the participants] sufficiently to knock them off balance,
preventing them from continuing in their previous routines and thus forcing them to seek new
solutions, often along paths they might otherwise have rejected” (p. 35). While this explanation
was highly true for the prewar generation due to their direct experience of the war, the study’s
disorienting dilemma had a different effect for the postwar generation. This shows that each
context, situation and setting is different. Transformative learning experiences in one context and
setting may not apply in another context and setting. Further research is therefore needed to
confirm the results of this study in other contexts and settings or locations.
As previously noted, I emphasize that the focus of the study was not to identify particular
transformative learning processes that have more impact on a person’s or group’s level of
transformation. Rather, the focus of the study was to determine: 1) whether there is a correlation
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between a transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War and conflict styles; 2) whether
transformative learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War is a significant predictor of one or more
components of conflict style; and 3) the difference in the levels of transformative learning and
use of conflict style between the prewar generation and postwar generation. I therefore invite
further research aimed at identifying those transformative learning processes that may have more
impact on these outcomes: collaboration and violence reduction.
Lastly, and based on the fact that participants’ preference for one conflict style over
another at a particular time and situation may not be the same at another time and situation, some
critics may question the reliability of the findings of this study. I hereby argue that the findings
represent the thought processes of the 320 participants at the time the research was conducted,
and should be accepted as valid answers to the research questions and hypotheses. The findings
give a clearer picture of what the prewar and postwar were thinking about at that particular time.
It should also be noted that a preference for collaborating over competing, or competing
over collaborating, is not a bad thing ordinarily. In most cases, no conflict style is better than the
other. However, in the context of this study, that is, in the management of the ongoing agitation
for the secession of Biafra from Nigeria, it is important that attention is given to what the prewar
generation is saying since they had direct experience of the Nigeria-Biafra War. The prewar
generation wants to manage the current Biafran secession conflict through a collaborative (winwin) means and not through the aggressive (win-lose) means to which the postwar generation is
inclined. Their preference for collaborative conflict management is influenced by their higher
score in Transformative Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history. As Stuckey et al. (2013)
noted, with the transformative learning survey instrument, “the extent to which a specific group
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[…] engages in transformative learning” (p. 225) is discernable. This is what this study
accomplished. For this reason, this outcome is worth appreciating.
Recommendations
I hereby put forward the below list of recommendations for implementation.
1. A theory of transformative history education within the broader field of peace
education or conflict resolution should be developed using the findings of this study.
This will help close the gap between transformative learning in general and the
teaching and learning of the history of a violent past in particular.
2. Further transformative history education research should be carried out in other
countries and contexts in order to confirm whether collaboration and violence
reduction could be added to the general list of transformative learning outcomes.
3. Additional research is also needed to test this study’s hypotheses with data collected
from other geopolitical regions of Nigeria as well as from students in a formal
classroom teaching intervention. This is important to know if Transformative
Learning of the Nigeria-Biafra War history will result in the same outcomes.
4. Instead of continuing the policy of oblivion or repression with regard to the NigeriaBiafra War history, policymakers should unanimously pass sweeping legislation
aimed at including the history of the Nigeria-Biafra War in school curricula; revising
the curricula to include controversial issues and narratives; mandating and providing
resources to educators to use transformative learning method and tools to teach the
Nigeria-Biafra War history in school classrooms; and finally making this
transformative history education a mandatory subject for all students in the tertiary
and secondary education institutions.
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5. Both current and preservice educators should be trained in transformative learning
before they can use it to teach the Nigeria-Biafra War history in schools. Also, history
educators must advance and deepen their knowledge of the Nigeria-Biafra War
history and learn various perspectives on the issues and elements embedded in the
Nigeria-Biafra War history.
The research findings presented above, their interpretations, meanings, and implications
for theory, research, public policy and practice have drawn our attention to the indispensable role
of transformative history education in deepening, if not completing, national reconciliation and
peacebuilding. My hope is that these recommendations will be implemented by those in power.
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Appendice A: Transformative Learning Survey (TLS)
Phase One: Transformative Learning Experience
Question 1: Identify a specific life changing experience(s) (or cumulative smaller experiences)
from the Nigeria-Biafra War which changed your perspective about how you make sense of the
world and your relationship with others. This should be an event(s) which altered your
perspective in a fundamental way. Describe the experience or experiences. What were the
circumstances of this life-changing experience of the Nigeria-Biafra War? What happened?
When did it happen? Where did it happen? Who was involved? How were you feeling?
Question 2: In what way did this experience(s) change your perspective, if at all, about yourself
and the way you relate to others? Describe the new perspective.
Phase Two: Measurement
Introduction
1. Something I previously believed about myself or my world no longer held true
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
2. I am more authentic than I once was
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
3. I am more open to views of others than I was before
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
4. I see different sides of a controversial issue
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
5. When I have a problem now, I see different solutions
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
6. I feel empowered to act in ways I once never would have imagined
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
Learning Outcomes
Please read the statements listed below with your specific life-changing experience in mind.
As a result of my life changing experience:
7. I feel more confident acting on my beliefs
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
8. Overtime, I have become better able to articulate my values
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
9. I have changed the way I learn something new
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
10. I am okay with uncertainty
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
11. I have experienced a deep shift in the way I see some things in the world
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
12. I have greater empathy for others' positions than I used to have
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
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13. I have made a deep shift in the way I see myself
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
14. I have stopped going along with everyone else and have my own sense of who I am
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
15. I now seek out people who are different from me
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
16. I question what experts say
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
17. I realize that I am a different person now than I used to be
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
18. I am aware that my beliefs are both the same as and different from others' beliefs
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
19. It would be impossible for me to go back to being the way I once was
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
20. My beliefs are now more flexible and open to change
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
Learning Process
Before responding to the statements below, please think again about your life changing
experiences, but this time think about the processes you go through as you change.
During the process of my life-changing experiences:
21. A traumatic event leads me to question my values
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
22. An unexpected event leads me to think about who I am and what I believe
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
23. When I have a new understanding of something, I act on it
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
24. When I hear a different point of view, I question myself
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
25. Attending church, synagogue, temple or another spiritual place is important when I am
facing a difficult dilemma in my life
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
26. Being exposed to a different culture leads me to question my own culture, and act
differently
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
27. It is liberating for me to question the views of those in authority
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
28. Challenging events lead me to question my beliefs about who I am
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
29. Creating art during a life-changing experience that helps me to understand myself
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
30. Encountering a disorienting event leads me to see myself in a different way
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
31. When I change my point of view, I act on that change
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Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
32. I become aware that some people have more advantages in life and others have few
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
33. I am led to question my own perceptions through art
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
34. I am the type of person who uses my imagination to deal with difficult circumstances
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
35. I call upon a higher power to help me get through a difficult situation
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
36. I react emotionally when my beliefs are challenged
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
37. My feelings show when I talk about my values
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
38. When I am making a change, I can see in my imagination how things should be
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
39. During a social change, I challenge what I see and hear on television, in print and on the
Internet
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
40. To address injustice, I confront those in authority
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
41. I connect to my experiences through deep emotions or feelings
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
42. I survive a traumatic event through the support of other people
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
43. I seriously question my beliefs and actions
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
44. I question my beliefs and how they are shaped by those in power
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
45. I engage in spiritual experiences to help me to see things differently
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
46. Some events shake up my beliefs and values
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
47. I feel a strong need to be active in giving back to my community
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
48. I feel freed from social expectations as a result of the changes I make
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
49. I find my life's purpose and direction in my religion or spirituality
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
50. The best conversations happen when everyone is well informed
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
51. I move away from the beliefs of my family and culture that are related to gender, race,
ethnicity, and sexual orientation
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
52. I participate in social movements
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
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53. I see the world through images
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
54. I need support from others when something has unsettled me
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
55. I need to talk to a supportive friend when I encounter something confusing or troubling
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
56. When I see unfairness in society, I realize the advantages I have
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
57. In productive discussions, I value people presenting the evidence for their point of view
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
58. I question whether equal opportunity is possible
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
59. I realize that my past experiences shape the decisions I make
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
60. I practice prayer or meditation to help connect to my inner self
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
61. I rely on discussion with others when I am going through a difficult experience
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
62. I talk to others to understand my experiences
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
63. I try to pull others together to address the needs of people from a different culture or class
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
64. I use art or music to help me understand myself and my experiences
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
65. I use metaphors and images when I am working through a dilemma
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
66. I use poetry or fiction to help me understand myself and my experiences
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
67. Dreams give me insight into my soul
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
68. I look for opportunities to act to make the world a better place
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
69. When I change the way I think, I act differently
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
70. To make sense of things, I need to question my beliefs and actions
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
71. Making art changes the way I see the world
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
72. Making changes in my life is an emotional experience
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
73. New experiences lead me to understand my past experiences in a different way
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
74. My learning is not complete without action
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
75. I understand my own point of view when I test my ideas with others
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Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
76. Reflection about others who have less privilege leads me to question my lifestyle
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
77. Self-reflection leads me to revise some of the assumptions I used to hold
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
78. Things that I read lead me to question myself
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
79. When I am confused, I talk with others to get more accurate and complete information
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
80. When I become immersed in a different experience, I start to question myself
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
81. When I see unfairness in society, I help others get access to resources
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
82. I no longer feel constrained by what is socially expected of me
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
83. When my beliefs and values are shaken up, it is an emotional experience
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
84. I find that the more knowledgeable people are about an issue, the more successful the
communication will be
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
85. New experiences lead me to think about my beliefs
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
86. When the opportunity arises, I act to protect the freedom of others
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
87. Whenever I read or see the news, I think about how groups, classes or cultures are
represented
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
88. When my beliefs change, my behaviors change
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
89. Having new experiences leads me to reflect on my past
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
90. I challenge others to become aware of unfairness among people
Mostly disagree
Slightly disagree
Slightly agree
Mostly agree
Demographic Information
• What is your gender?
Male
Female
• What is your age?
18 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
55 to 64
65 to 74
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Over 74
• What is your highest level of education?
Less than high school
High school/GED complete
Some college/university
Associate degree or diploma
Bachelor's degree
Graduate degree
• What is your employment?
Professional
Trades
Service
Student
Technologies
Retired Other
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Appendix B: The Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI)
Instructions
For this survey, think of the ongoing agitation for self-determination and independence of Biafra.
How do you usually respond in this conflict situation?
This survey contains 30 pairs of statements (1-30) describing possible behavioral responses. For
each pair, please select one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
In many cases, neither the first nor the second statement may be very typical of your behavior;
but please select only one response you would be more likely to use.
The last 4 questions (31-34) are based on demography - that is, gender, age, education status, and
employment. For each question, select an answer that applies to your current situation.
* 1. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
There are times when I let others take responsibility for solving the problem.
Rather than negotiate the things on which we disagree, I try to stress those things on which
we both agree.
* 2. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I try to find a compromise solution.
I attempt to deal with all of his/her and my concerns.
* 3. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I am usually firm in pursuing my goals.
I might try to soothe the other's feelings and preserve our relationship.
* 4. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I try to find a compromise solution.
I sometimes sacrifice my own wishes for the wishes of the other person.
* 5. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I consistently seek the other's help in working out a solution.
I try to do what is necessary to avoid useless tensions.
* 6. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I try to avoid creating unpleasantness for myself.
I try to win my position.
* 7. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I try to postpone the issue until I have had some time to think it over.
I give up some points in exchange for others.
* 8. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I am usually firm in pursuing my goals.
I attempt to get all concerns and issues immediately out in the open.
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* 9. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I feel that differences are not always worth worrying about.
I make some effort to get my way.
* 10. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I am firm in pursuing my goals.
I try to find a compromise solution.
* 11. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I attempt to get all concerns and issues immediately out in the open.
I might try to soothe the other's feelings and preserve our relationship.
* 12. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I sometimes avoid taking positions that would create controversy.
I will let the other person have some of his/her positions if he/she lets me have some of
mine.
* 13. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I propose a middle ground.
I press to get my points made.
* 14. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I tell the other person my ideas and ask for his/hers.
I try to show the other person the logic and benefits of my position.
* 15. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I might try to soothe the other's feelings and preserve our relationship.
I try to do what is necessary to avoid tensions.
* 16. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I try not to hurt the other's feelings.
I try to convince the other person of the merits of my position.
* 17. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I am usually firm in pursuing my goals.
I try to do what is necessary to avoid useless tensions.
* 18. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
If it makes other people happy, I might let them maintain their views.
I will let other people have some of their positions if they let me have some of mine.
* 19. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I attempt to get all concerns and issues immediately out in the open.
I try to postpone the issue until I have had some time to think it over.
* 20. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
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I attempt to immediately work through our differences.
I try to find a fair combination of gains and losses for both of us.
* 21. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
In approaching negotiations, I try to be considerate of the other person's wishes.
I always lean toward a direct discussion of the problem.
* 22. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I try to find a position that is intermediate between his/hers and mine.
I assert my wishes.
* 23. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I am very often concerned with satisfying all our wishes.
There are times when I let others take responsibility for solving the problem.
* 24. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
If the other's position seems very important to him/her, I would try to meet his/her wishes.
I try to get the other person to settle for a compromise.
* 25. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I try to show the other person the logic and benefits of my position.
In approaching negotiations, I try to be considerate of the other person's wishes.
* 26. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I propose a middle ground.
I am nearly always concerned with satisfying all our wishes.
* 27. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I sometimes avoid taking positions that would create controversy.
If it makes other people happy, I might let them maintain their views.
* 28. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I am usually firm in pursuing my goals.
I usually seek the other's help in working out a solution.
* 29. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I propose a middle ground.
I feel that differences are not always worth worrying about.
* 30. Choose one statement that best characterizes your behavior.
I try not to hurt the other's feelings.
I always share the problem with the other person so that we can work it out.
* 31. What is your gender?
Male
Female
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* 32. What is your age?
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
Over 74
* 33. What is your highest level of education?
Less than senior secondary education
Senior secondary education
Some post-secondary school / university undergraduate years
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate / Postgraduate degree
* 34. What is your employment?
Professional / University Faculty Member
Student
Service
Technologies
Trades/business
Retired
Unemployed

